

EDUCATING FOR PASSIVITY

- A STUDY OF PORTUGUESE EDUCATION (1926 - 1968)

Ph.D. Thesis

University of London

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study is to analyse how the portuguese regime which ruled Portugal from 1926 to 1974 (the so called "New State") formulated and implemented its educational policy in reference to its broad aims of education of portuguese people. The main hypothesis is that the main aim of the regime, in regard to education of portuguese people, was conformity and passivity.

This passivity was pursued through the setting up of mechanisms of non participation in public life and through several strategies of demobilization, both at the political level and the educational level. It will be analysed the expressive strategies of mentality inculcation through the school curriculum, the organizational strategies of compartmentalization of different social strata in different self-contained status positions through unequal access to education and access to unequal education, the administrative strategy of centralization which removes effective power from teachers and parents in school decision-making, the repressive strategies.

The role of the state in regard to civil society will be analysed, since, following the hypothesis, the "New State" wanted a demobilized and depoliticized civil society. The two official discourses formulated about this role (the corporative and the strong state discourses) will be compared. It will be studied how the strong state discourse prevailed in policy implementation.

The implementation of the strong state discourse in education will be studied in reference to the non corporative practice, to the evolution of the portuguese youth organization ("Mocidade Portuguesa"), to the state control over private education, and to the setting up of an administrative state in education through centralization.

This thesis may also contribute to a better understanding about the nature of authoritarian political regimes and about corporatist theory and practice in such regimes.

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INTRODUCTION

GOULDNER concluded that a disfunctional aspect of bureaucracy comes from the fact that a detailed definition of non acceptable organizational behaviours increases the knowledge about the minimum acceptable behaviour standards (GOULDNER 1954). Once the Ph.D. becomes a compulsory certification for the university career, the organizational behaviour congruent with the strategy to obtain it can be subject to GOULDNER's analysis.

In fact to make a Ph.D. thesis, in Portugal, implies, even if only implicitly, to hold a certain conception about what such a degree should be. If one choses a minimum behaviour one should avoid problematic areas or subjects not yet studied, controversial issues, ideological matters, areas where access to sources is difficult and the like. X

A different strategy implies risks, especially that the amount of work will not be noticed, or of the amount of time and effort involved being judged by the minimum pattern. Besides that there is less control over the amount of time and effort involved in the investigation of a real perplexing problem than in a more known research path.

But obviously there are reasons to follow the less easy track in spite of all this. Those reasons are in certain way the story of this research.

1. THE PROBLEM

This research began with the main purpose of analysing the effectiveness of the unification of Portuguese post-primary education under the hypothesis that its inadequacies arose from the fact that the change of objectives had not been followed by the congruent change

in processes (pedagogical structures and government structures).

Interviewing committed teachers - supposedly more open to innovation - to obtain information about their attitudes towards the problem and the hypothesis a vague perplexity arose in face of the attitudes exhibited.

The attitudes which struck the researcher were the following:

a) Passive acceptance of the continuation of central control over educational decision-making, even after the setting up of a teacher elected government committee in 1974, following the revolutionary situation created by the military "coup d'état" of 25th April 1974 which overthrew the regime which ruled Portugal since 1926;

b) Conformist and conservative attitudes towards school based educational innovation reflected in an inability to use the room for manoeuvre existent in the system, which was restricted but present;

c) Pedagogical individualism indicated by non willingness for group work;

d) A tendency to conceive the role of the elected teacher composed government committee as a minimum role of bureaucratic manager, accepting and encouraging a "laissezfaire" leadership;

e) A tendency to reject any formal distinction at the pedagogical authority level, between qualified and non qualified teachers (NOTE 1);

f) Explicit avoidance of any formal form of close control or accountability.

"Prima facie" some of those attitudes seemed contradictory with the educational philosophy which seemed to support the new system of school government set up in 1974 - it is the case of attitudes a), b), c) and d) (NOTE 2). Other attitudes seemed contradictory with the committed or innovatory position of the interviewed teachers - it

is the case of attitudes a), b), d) and f). All those attitudes seemed contradictory with professional values (NOTE 3).

However well founded such considerations may be, they led the researcher to think that those attitudes could not be explained solely within the study of the problems of unification of post-primary education. The possible non congruence of those teachers attitudes to the changes in processes necessary to achieve the new aims could not be explained just by studying the issues, policy formulation statements or implemented policies generated in the process through which post-primary schools became comprehensive.

It was hypothesized that the answer to such teachers attitudes could not be found by isolating the professional from the citizen, separating professional values from national cultural values, disconnecting job socialization from teacher's own formal primary, secondary and university education. This meant that those listed attitudes should be firstly analyzed as cultural ones, which implied a study of both the political and educational environment into which those teachers lived and were reared.

The main problem of the thesis became the permanence of conformist and passive attitudes in teachers even after the revolutionary change in society and specifically in the educational system. Conformism and passivity can be seen, in a cultural sense, as resistance to change, to innovation. The importance of the problem is indicated by the fact that only committed teachers were interviewed, many of whom of assumed leftist ideology and all were supposedly open to innovation. The problem seemed more interesting for the researcher because all interviewed teachers rejected being labelled as conformist and actually blamed the Ministry of Education (the central administration) for this passivity.

The study of the (new) problem implied two main dimensions - the study of the political administrative

and educational system in which the present teachers were educated (the historical dimension) and, secondly, the study of the present situation with regard to the cultural socialization of the teacher as a citizen, as a civil servant and as an educational professional.

The study of the historical dimension led us to the study of the political, administrative, cultural and educational system of the New State. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the present teachers had been educated during the New State, that is, during the regime under which Portugal was ruled from 1926 to 1974, led by Salazar (1932-1968) and Caetano (1968-1974), overthrown by the military "coup d'état" of 25th April of 1974.

That is the path which led the investigator to the study of the New State in its political and educational dimensions. Such a study had revealed itself so complex and arduous and, at the same time, so absorbing and so revealing that it became the only theme of this research.

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF THE "NEW STATE" POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL REGIME

A first reason which makes this study important had already been stated. It was during the New State that the basic socialization of the overwhelming majority of the present teachers was done as pupils, as non qualified teachers and trainee teachers and, for the majority, even as tenured teachers. The same applies to the high civil servants of the Ministry of Education who rule the educational system (NOTE 4).

One has "not a depoliticized people, but a people politicized in a certain way, educated in a certain way. We are also like that. One must know that even the resistance to this certain way will bear the mark of it, at least in the beginning" (BIVAR 1975, 27). This certain way was the "vocation to serve submissively, which was

inculcated in each of our children, in each of us" (ibidem, 26). As SALGADO ZENHA commented even those who did fight the regime suffered its influence, although reactively (in LOURENÇO 1976, 229). "What the Salazarism was, it was in great part within us and with us" (JOAQUIM 1979).

A second important reason is that the New State is the political, administrative and cultural context in which the system of centralized management of the country was rebuilt to match the needs of a twentieth century state. Such a system was the framework of educational management.

Such a system remains relatively unaltered and is still today the government mould of education. As will be shown, this administrative continuity extends to the most part of the sectors of public administration.

When one thinks that the passive and conformist attitude inculcated by the New State is the attitude necessary for the continuation of the central bureaucratic control of education (see FORMOSINHO 1986) and it is congruent with attitudes a), b) and d) observed in the interviewed teachers the importance of the study of the New State becomes clearer (NOTE 5).

Is the logic of this centralized system entirely independent from the logic of the regime which rebuilt it? That is, what is the relationship between this political regime and this administrative system? What are the relationships between the centralized control and the inculcation of passive and submissive attitudes in the controlled civil servants? The answer to such questions is obviously important in face of what can be hypothesized as an attitude continuity congruent with an administrative continuity.

A third reason for the importance of the study of the New State regime is the fact that it was this New State regime, under the rule of Caetano (1968-1974) and under the educational leadership of Veiga Simão (1970-1974), which was the promotor of the great reform of the educational system which democratized access to education and started mass schooling (see chapter one, section 3.5.).

Such reform is still the basis of the present educational system - the reform law of 1973 (Law 5/73, 25-7-1973) was only substituted in October 1986 (Law 46/86, 14-10-1986). Most of the ideas which were developed after the overthrow of New State regime, in the 25th April of 1974, were developments of previously formulated policies. In some cases they were only formulated, in many formulated and formally adopted in the Law 5/73, in many other cases the formulation and adoption was followed by the first steps of its implementation. Examples of the last include co-education in schools, the design of new curricula for secondary schools, the unification of secondary schooling, the creation of new teacher education colleges, the creation of polytechnical education, the reform of universities and the creation of new universities (NOTE 6).

3. THE MAIN CONCEPTS USED - EDUCATION, PASSIVITY, DEMOBILIZATION

It is useful at this point to define the precise meaning of the main concepts which will be used - education, passivity, demobilization.

When it is said that the New State educated for passivity we mean that it educated for an attitude and practice of no civic participation (neither in political discussion nor in political meetings, associations or campaigns). Further, education is for an attitude and practice of no participation in the life of institutions or organizations through any active involvement. Passivity means also conformism, that is, submissive acceptance of traditions and customs, of the existing social order, of all authorities.

Passivity was achieved through several means of demobilization, that is, through deliberate strategies to avoid the creation of mass dynamics (through mass meeting or mass organizations) or groups dynamics (through

membership of civil or political groups) or formal participation in public life. So passivity is the aim and demobilization refers to the means used to achieve this aim.

This thesis studies the processes by which the New State inculcated passive and conformist attitudes in Portuguese people, children and adults. Education is seen as a comprehensive process and takes a broad sense of transmission of knowledge, beliefs, values, norms, habits, attitudes, through formal instruction in schools, through family rearing practices, through mass media, through public institutions and social organizations.

Starting from this broad definition of education the thesis then studies specifically how passivity was inculcated through school education.

4. THE HYPOTHESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENT - THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

4.1. The hypothesis

The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the main objective of the New State in regard to the education of Portuguese people was to inculcate passivity in attitudes and conformism in behaviour through demobilization and depoliticization.

There is at this stage good ground to formulate such hypothesis - it will explain the teacher attitudes which bewildered the researcher (see NOTE 5), it will fit with the impressionistic evidence gathered from the researcher's formal educational experience (obtained from 1954-1970) and is confirmed by several references - see BIVAR 1975, 25-27, NUNES 1981. The hypothesis is also very plausible at another level - it fits well with the authoritarian nature of the former regime.

At the time of its formulation this hypothesis contradicted the common teacher's opinion and the opinion

of the great majority of those who wrote on the subject about the New State political and educational system. They emphasized the mobilizing period of the regime and its initial fascist resemblance. Since then the scientific studies about the New State successively emphasize its authoritarian nature - see CRUZ studies, LUCENA's papers, LOURENÇO's books.

4.2. The development of the hypothesis

The explanation of how it is intended to confirm the hypothesis is outlined in the structure of this thesis.

The first chapter deals with the problem of the non definition of the New State as a totalitarian regime and its characterization as an authoritarian state. That is, a state without political mobilization and without elaborate guiding ideology. The chapter includes a brief reference to its historical development from 1926 to 1974. It thus presents a division of New State regime evolution into periods.

The second chapter presents the theoretical basis for the New State objective - the New State elitist non participatory theory of government - and its practice at the level of the formal political mechanisms - the practice of non participation. Demobilization at this level was pursued through addressing political communications mainly to elites (rarely to masses), through autocratic practices and through the building of formal mechanisms of non participation in public life.

The third chapter presents the four types of strategies used to demobilize the people at social, organizational, cultural and psychological levels expressive, organizational, administrative and repressive strategies. This chapter deals just with the expressive strategies at the political and educational levels. At the political level the main concern is to prove that no generalized political education of the people (so characteristic of totalitarian regimes) was intended, using

the distinction between ideological indoctrination versus mentality inculcation. At the educational level it is analyzed how the passive and conformist mentality was inculcated through the school curriculum.

Chapter four develops this theme analysing the concrete content of the mentality inculcated through the curriculum in the primary school (the only compulsory schooling until 1964). This analysis is done following New State main values condensed in Salazar's motto "God, Fatherland, Family and Authority".

Chapter five analyses the organizational strategies of the New State - in the first part it studies, at the political and social level, the strategies used to demobilize the most important social organizations - the Army, the Church, the University. In the second part it analyses in detail how the organizational strategy of compartmentalization was applied in the educational system to confine different social strata in different status positions through an equal access to education and through access to unequal education.

By reproducing social stratification in a rigid way, the compartmentalization reduced mobilization for social promotion thus reinforcing conformism.

Chapter six studies the repressive strategies used to impose by force a "conformed" behaviour, paying special attention to the expressive consequences of the use (or the threat of use) of repression - creation of conformism attitudes. It describes how repression was the main answer of the regime to the university student mobilization in the 1960's. The chapter includes a final section which serve as conclusion for what had been said in chapter three, four, five and six - it emphasizes that all the different strategies try to inculcate a passive mentality and a conformist behaviour in a direct or in an indirect way. That is to say all those strategies can be seen as revolving around an expressive core of passivity and conformism.

This ends the first part of the thesis where the

relationship between the political system and the individual citizen is the main bulk of the analysis (the exception being the study of the strategies towards social organizations). The emphasis was on the pursuit of passive attitudes as a means to promote conformist behaviours. The second part is more concerned with the relationship between the State and civil society under the guidance of the same leading hypothesis. The achievement of passivity implied a demobilized and depoliticized civil society, which should be achieved by concentrating in a strong state (or under its control) all the effective decision-making mechanisms and agents.

Chapter seven studies the theory of the role of the State in New State regime. There are two official discourses about this role - the corporative discourse and the strong state one. The strong state discourse is congruent with our leading hypothesis, as will be seen comparing the two discourses. The same two discourses are present in the theory about the role of the state in education. To confirm our hypothesis the strong state principles should be the implemented ones as shown in the next chapter.

Indeed chapter eight analyses the implementation of the theory about the role of the state and shows how the practice followed the demobilizing discourse - the strong state one - which gives to the state almost a monopolist role in decision-making and minimized the part of civil society. Corporatism was only implemented in the form of state corporatism. The strong state was not implemented (nor formulated) in the mould of a totalitarian state (which would be a mobilizing state) but in the shape of an Administrative State, that is, a state where decision-making is centralized and concentrated in Public Administration departments and is done prevaiingly following bureaucratic criteria. Centralization is an administrative strategy which enhances non participation of citizens in decisions, thus effectively achieving passivity.

Chapter nine applies the same analysis to education showing that there was no corporative implementation in the educational system and that there was not an educational totalitarian state. This is shown through the study of "Mocidade Portuguesa", the supposedly mobilising Portuguese Youth organization. The implementation of an Administrative State is analyzed through the practical stand of the state towards private education.

Chapter ten studies the Administrative State in education to give evidence of the use of centralization as a demobilizing strategy to achieve passivity. This chapter proves it through a detailed analysis of the degree of control of central administration over the several areas of decision-making in preparatory and secondary schools in an historical perspective.

Chapter eleven presents the conclusions of this thesis.

The outline of the thesis shows how the hypothesis is being tested through the analysis of several different aspects of Portuguese reality. In regard to the educational system the thesis confirms the hypothesis through the analysis of the school curriculum, mainly the compulsory school one (chapters three and four), through the analysis of the structure of school which favours unequal access to education and access to unequal education (chapter five), through the study of university student mobilization (chapter six), through the study of Portuguese Youth movement - "Mocidade Portuguesa" - and the study of the position of private education (chapter nine), through the analysis of centralization in educational decision-making (chapter ten).

5. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS

The previous section outlined how the confirmation

of the hypothesis is developed through the thesis. But how will this confirmation be made? What methodological options will be taken? Which indicators will be used? This section will answer these questions.

5.1. Discipline perspectives

This thesis does not pretend to relate political or educational evolution with economic evolution, nor to analyse which type of social group prevailed in decision-making areas, or which social alliances existed, that is, it does not pretend to develop its arguments in a (strict) sociological perspective.

This study works much more with Political Science concepts, as will become clear. As it was already said, the problem which was the starting point for this study was the perplexity of the researcher in face of what he considered conformist and passive attitudes of Portuguese preparatory and secondary school teachers in the post-revolutionary and new democratic situation of Portuguese Education. This perplexity had an answer from studying the educational contexts (in a broad sense) in which the teachers were reared and instructed and work professionally. This implied the study of political regimes and its educational policies. Thus the search for Political Science concepts is natural.

But this use of a Political Science framework demands further clarification. This thesis does not pretend to explain the appearance of the "New State" or its long survival (although it provides clues to the latter question), it does not try to relate the regime development with international political evolution.

This thesis does not try either to specifically elucidate whether the New State can be labelled as a fascist regime, since this question seems to depend, in the literature, much more on what is intended by fascism than on divergence about New State features, as will be seen in chapter one. Thus the discussion of this point would divert us from the main purpose of this thesis.

The question is put in another way - whether the New State was an authoritarian or a totalitarian regime. The answer to this question is clear - it was an authoritarian regime. It is in the Political Science framework of the authoritarian regime that this study is developed, that is, in the framework of a regime without political mobilization and without elaborate guiding ideology.

This thesis tries to relate the internal political logic of the regime with its educational policy formulation, adoption and implementation. As such this study does not address questions like the role of the Opposition, the influence of the Communist Party, just as it does not analyse the role of the Armed Forces within the regime or the colonial problem. This does not mean that they are minor subjects in the study and understanding of the New State, it just serves to state the purposes and limits of the present analysis.

5.2. The educational system as dependent variable - a methodological strategy

The educational system appears, in this study, as a dependent variable and political system as independent variable. This is a methodology strategy which derives from the main purposes of the analysis. It is not, in the least, assumed as any theoretical explanatory position. If one had studied the "resistances" within the educational system - resistances from teachers, pupils, parents, associations, etc. - the methodological position would be another.

It is clear throughout the analysis that no mechanistic reproductive explanatory model is held - see, for instance, the analysis of university student mobilization, the analysis of "Portuguese Youth" or of private education.

5.3. The significant use of primary sources

The thesis uses very much the analysis of primary sources to describe and to understand New State theory. The study of most of the subjects begins by this analysis of primary sources (all translations from portuguese primary sources were done by the author unless otherwise stated).

The primary sources most used are the speeches, writings and interviews of SALAZAR and CAETANO. Salazar was prime-minister of the New State from 1932 to 1968 and was a member of government for forty consecutive years (from 1928 to 1968). But he was also the non discussed leader of the regime and its main theoretician. CAETANO was, for many years, Salazar's presumed sucessor and political heir, the second figure of the regime - he was President of the National Union (the sole party), President of the Corporative Chamber, minister of Presidency (a sort vice-prime minister) and Prime Minister (after Salazar's illness and retirement from political life) from 1968 to 1974. He was also an important corporatist theoretician and a Public Administration expert. So both Salazar and Caetano are the most important figures of the regime, both as theoreticians and as practioners. (Salazar's speeches are generally quoted as it is usual in Portugal with a roman numerical symbol indicating the number of the volume, and an arabic figure indicating the number of the page) (NOTE 7).

The prevalence of Salazar and Caetano writings as sources does not mean the ignorance of other primary sources, for instance, writings of other personalities of the regime, documents produced by the "Comissão do Livro Negro sobre o Regime Fascista" ("Comission for a Black Book about the Fascist Regime") (NOTE 8).

As regards to education the main primary sources used for the study of policy formulation are the speeches and the writings of the Ministers of Education. The main primary sources used for the study of policy implementation are legislation and other official documents.

Beyond the obvious reason that primary sources give direct access to official formulation of doctrines and policies, there are other powerful reasons for this methodological option of giving much importance to the analysis of primary sources.

Salazar said once "I know very well what I want and where I go" (SALAZAR I, 6). Indeed it seems he did. As LUCENA acknowledges "The elite of the ancient regime had a very clear notion of what the New State effectively was" (LUCENA 1984). This same lucidity appears sometimes in education. Salazar plainly stated, in 1948, that there were privileges in favour of the richer classes which come from the way education is organized (SALAZAR 1948) - it is what SAMPAIO calls "the great sense of realities" of Salazar (SAMPALIO 1976, 75). GALVAO TELLES, Minister of Education, when expanded compulsory schooling from four to six years in a social compartmentalized scheme carefully avoided the expression "democratization of education" to label this policy measure (indeed it was not that), but used just the expression "generalization of education" (GALVAO-TELLES 1966c, 16-17).

This lucidity had been being recognized by those who have studied New State regime. LUCENA says that lately the definitions of New State leaders about the regime are very much used by the researchers who search for a political definition for the New State (LUCENA 1984).

JOAQUIM said that New State leaders put adequate questions, but gave bad answers (NOTE 9).

This extensive use of primary sources in the thesis was time consuming, but it provided important information about the exact doctrinaire formulations and the hesitations and contradictions of New State leaders.

5.4. The comparison of theory and practice through the confrontation of policy formulation and policy implementation

The discrepancy between theoretical formulation

and practical realities is normal in politics, but its exaggerated proportions is something typical of Portuguese politics (see CAETANO 1950, 6-11, 1977, 226 and WIARDA 1975) and of Portuguese education (SERRAO 1981). "Admittedly a gap between rhetorical and practical exertions is not the prerogative of the Portuguese, but it is doubtful if any other nation would have much to teach them in this regard" (BURRIS 1980). In fact in Portugal even legislation can be rhetoric - it is the tendency for "decrees to prefigure the facts" (LUCENA 1976a, 22), the tendency to produce "ideological-legal treatises" (SCHMITTER 1975, 26).

So MONICA says that "although a useful indicator of official ideology, legislation must not be confused with a description of what actually happens" (MONICA 1978, 169). This means that one has to follow a methodology of analysis where a permanent confrontation between theory and practice, between policy formulation and policy implementation is built in.

The interest of the analysis of primary sources to understand New State doctrine is not harmed by this probable discrepancy between theory and practice. In fact, the acknowledgement and explanation of this discrepancy is essential for the understanding of New State purposes.

The need for an explanation is even more necessary since there are areas where this discrepancy does exist along with areas where the practice followed closely the theory. For instance, between New State theory and New State practice about the role of the State there appears a divergence which does not occur between the elitist non participatory theory of government or the theory about the expressive strategies and their practice.

5.5. The use of quantitative indicators for the confirmation of the hypothesis through content analysis

In the analysis of policy implementation quantitative indicators are often used to confirm the

hypothesis. The use of quantitative indicators has several advantages. It gives precise information about some aspects of policy implementation not in terms of yes/no, but in terms of how much was implemented. It sets up more sensible indicators of policy application variations across periods (inclusively it helps to confirm the adequacy of the division into periods).

On the other hand, the use of quantitative indicators demands a greater accuracy in the previous formulation of hypotheses, whose confirmation is more independent of subjective judgements about the content analysed.

Quantitative indicators are used generally in the research framework of content analysis. Content analysis can be seen as a kind of coding (MOSEY and KALTON 1979, 414) whose basis goal is to transform verbal, non quantitative documents into quantitative data (BAILEY 1978). For most of the policy implementation studies of primary sources documents - speeches, legislation, textbooks - it is adequate to use such method. However content analysis is very time consuming - it may need days of content categorization to build a simple table - and it is sometimes difficult to use. It demands the building of a categorization scale, the sampling of primary sources, the actual collection of data through coding and counting of content analysis units, its statistical treatment and the preparation of tables for presentation.

The first use of quantitative content analysis in the thesis is to confirm if the elitist non participatory theory of government was followed in practice. The type of receiver of Salazar's Communications - elites or masses - is used as one indicator of this practice (NOTE 10).

This same content analysis allows us, in the third chapter, to study the evolution of the percentage of communication to elites across periods which is used as an indicator of demobilization. That is, it is expected that in the normal pattern of communication it prevails communications to elites rather than to masses.

The confirmation of the inculcation of a passive and conformist mentality through the school curriculum is mainly done through content analysis of reading textbooks of compulsory schooling (NOTE 11) involving the categorization of 1632 texts of fifteen textbooks. A more detailed analysis, done in chapter four, shows us the content of the mentality thus inculcated.

In chapter nine a content analysis of "Portuguese Youth" (the nationalist youth movement) regulations allows us to draw some conclusions about its loss of mobilizing purpose.

The most time consuming and difficult content analysis is the one presented in chapter ten to confirm the use of centralization as a demobilizing strategy to achieve conformism in schools. It uses as indicators the degree of control of central administration over sampled areas of educational decision-making.

6. THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracy is presented, in this study, as the organizational link between the political structure and the daily school life, in order to inculcate passivity and conformism.

From the theory about the role of the State it follows the practice of an Administrative State which directly commands centralization of decision-making of what is done in schools. On the other hand, the omnipresence and omnipotence of the Administrative State creates in individual citizens an attitude of dependence and powerlessness, which is present also in teachers in regard to educational central administration, and is the necessary psychological legitimising support of centralization.

Thus bureaucracy is presented as the mediator of State-Citizen (teacher) relationships which directly and indirectly inculcates passive attitudes and conformist behaviours.

7. THE TIME LIMITS OF THIS STUDY - 1926-1968

The study of New State political regime, and principally the study of its educational system, ends in 1968, that is, it finishes with the termination of Salazar's rule. The main reason for this decision is the fact that the educational reform formulated, adopted and partially implemented in the early 1970's (1970-1974) have little to do with previous policies. This educational reform can only be adequately studied in conjunction with revolutionary and democratic developments after the overthrow of the regime in 1974, as STOER (1986) did. This thesis did not have adequate space to explain this rupture in educational policy within New State regime. This does not mean that some conclusions, both at the political and educational levels, can not apply to this period, as will be referred in due course of this study. This does not also mean that sometimes aspects of this period are specifically included in the analysis to prove continuity or show contrasts.

In sum, this is a study of New State political regime and educational policy with specific attention to the period 1926-1968.

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NEW STATE

1. TOWARDS A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE "NEW STATE" (1926-1974)1.1. Why it is necessary to characterize the "New State"

The mere description of the main features of the New State is not enough to clarify the influence of the political regime on the educational system, or its management and beyond that on the attitudes of teachers in portuguese cultural context (see Introduction). So one must build a framework of analysis which goes beyond description, that is, which includes some explanatory features.

Such a framework must be naturally borrowed from Political Science, since this scientific discipline has as its object characterizing, comparing and explaining political regimes.

What will be asked from such a characterization will be the theory of government of the New State, the main features of the regime, the role of State and its relationships with Civilian Society, the role of Public Administration and what is expected from citizens. This will enable us to look for continuities and discontinuities in political evolution.

1.2. Was the "New State" a fascist regime?

This is a polemic question, but also an unavoidable one, if the characterization of the New State regime is pursued.

It is not only a polemic question, but also a very difficult one to answer.

1.2.1. Difficulties of characterization

First, there is a great emotional content embedded in the word "fascism", nowadays it is almost always used as a pejorative qualification or as a political insult.

Second, because there are several definitions of what is fascism. In common political use fascism is applied to any conservative, right wing dictatorship (or even to any dictatorship as is the case of maoist groups which qualify communist regimes as "social fascism"). Naturally enough one is not going to use common and loose definitions as such. But the difficulty remains since there are different definitions of fascism among political scientists which are not entirely value free.

Thirdly, the adoption of a definition and the characterization of a regime as fascist is not necessarily seen as neutral scientific judgement, but also a value judgement about a regime (see about this the very revealing words of CABRAL 1982) (NOTE 1).

It is not by chance that portuguese authors generally prefer to label the New State as fascist (FIGUEIREDO 1976, MARTINS 1970, SANTOS 1982, SARAIVA 1974 among many others) or as a "qualified fascism" (CABRAL 1982, LUCENA 1976a, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976) or as a "little fascism" (RODRIGUES 1982, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976) (NOTE 2). Many non portuguese authors do not consider the Salazar and Caetano's regime a fascist one-see GRAHAM 1975, LINZ, MAKLER 1979, PAYNE 1979a, RIEGELHAUPT 1979a, ROBINSON 1980, SETON WATSON 1972, SCHMITTER 1975a, WIARDA 1977. There are certainly exceptions (see CRUZ 1982c, MONICA 1978, BOCA 1970, GINER 1982), but the main trend may indicate that the characterization of the New State is not independent from the intentions and cultural roots of the authors.

1.2.2. Differences and similitudes between Salazar's Portugal and Mussolini's Italy

All authors who addressed this question - how to characterize this portuguese regime - record many differences between Salazar's Portugal and Mussolini's Italy. There was not in Portugal a mobilization intention (LUCENA 1979 a, SARAIVA 1974, 60-61, SCHMITTER 1975 b) nor a mobilizing party (CABRAL 1982, LUCENA 1979a, MÓNICA 1978, 95) nor a mobilizing leader (LUCENA 1979 a); the portuguese regime did not produce

an articulate ideology (LUCENA 1979 a) and recruited its leaders in a completely different way from Mussolini's one (LUCENA 1979 a, MONICA 1978,95); foreign policies were completely different (LUCENA 1979 a, MONICA 1978,96, SCHMITTER 1975 b); the role assigned to the Church was very different (LUCENA 1979 a); the main objective was also different since the main goal of Salazar's regime was, at least in the first decades, to preserve a traditional, hierarchic, rural society (LUCENA 1979 a, MONICA 1978, 49, RODRIGUES 1982, SARAIVA 1974,59,63).

There are also similitudes - they arrived to power at the same time and in the same international context; they assigned the same role to the Head of the State, had two Parliamentary Chambers with reduced powers, an almost omnipotent Government; both had a Corporative organization based on a principle of class cooperation and had a centralized structure; both were anti-liberal, anti-comunist and nationalistic; both had youth organizations and paramilitary organizations (see about this LUCENA 1979a, MONICA 1978,95, SARAIVA 1974,58 (NOTE 3).

Are those similitudes enough to subsume both regimes under the heading of fascism? Are the differences essential or accidental in their nature? For some authors they are accidental and so the New State is a qualified fascism, a fascism with some differences (CABRAL 1982, GINER 1982, LUCENA 1976a, RODRIGUES 1982, SARAIVA 1974).

It is, of course, always possible to define fascism in a wide manner as to encompass various sorts of regimes (NOTE 4).

1.2.3. The relevance of characterization

This later consideration could lead to the conclusion that it is irrelevant to label the New State provided one presents an adequate description and explanation of its features (LOURENÇO 1976, 239).

However there are important reasons - to be added to those advocated in section 1.1 - which impose a definite

labelling in this case. To characterize is to state that the characterized regime is similar to certain other regimes and different from certain another ones. This judgement of comparison and similitude, is inherent to characterization - so an inadequate characterization can be misleading in so far as it pinpoints some features which may not be essential and overlooks others which may represent the true nature of the regime. To be concrete, if one labels the New State as fascist association with Mussolini's Italy is inevitable and this makes one think of a mobilizing leader leading a mobilizing party to mobilize society.

What is hypothesized in this thesis is that the essence of the New State was the demobilization of society, the passivity of citizens. This difference is considered essential (see in the same sense MONICA 1978,97).

From this different intention should result different educational policies. For the moment it is all that can be said. It is expected that in the end of this thesis the hypothesis will be proved and this judgement considered adequate.

The non characterization of the regime as fascism will permit us to avoid temptations found in so many works - to consider the New State as something of a foreign model imposed on Portugal which inhibits identification of its specific portuguese characteristics; and to overemphasize the initial period of the regime (1932-1945) forgetting to explain its "survival" for almost thirty years more; and to fall into the trap of being more concerned with fascism than with the New State itself (NOTE 5).

1.3 Was the New State a totalitarian regime?

1.3.1. New State leader statements that the New State was not totalitarian

This was the self-assumed stand of the portuguese regime. The leaders of the New State very explicitly put up their distances towards contemporary fascism and nazism and rejected totalitarianism, even when internal and external pressures pointed in that direction (NOTE 6)

Salazar said in 1934: "it is necessary to remove from us the impulse towards the formation of what could be called a totalitarian State. A State subduing all, without exception, to an ideal of nation or race represented by it [...] could lead to an absolutism worse than that which existed before the liberal era" (SALAZAR I, 340-341). In 1932, in his interviews to FERRO, he said "The fascist dictatorship tends to a pagan Caesarism, to a new state which does not recognize legal or moral limitations [...] On the contrary, the New State cannot run away, and does not think in running away, from certain limitations of moral nature [...]" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 113-114). "None of us would affirm in Portugal the omnipotence of the State [...]; none of us would conceive the State as the source of all morality and justice [...] without any respect for individual conscience, for the legitimate freedom of citizens, for the sacred aims of human beings" (SALAZAR I, 289). Consequently SALAZAR is against a state based in violence - he is "for a regime of strong legality against a regime of violence" (SALAZAR II, 70-71) - see also his interview to FERRO 1982 (115-117) (NOTE 7).

According to New State official statements the State should have limits to its power; this was "leitmotiv" in many of Salazar's speeches (see SALAZAR I 80, II 70-71, III 237-239, IV 366, VI 41). Those limits were explicitly asserted in the 1933 Constitution (article 4) - they were Law and Morals.

Those proclaimed limitations are very important to separate the New State from totalitarianism (CRUZ 1982 C). The moral limitation was very important since it was clear that it referred to the traditional roman catholic moral as defined by the Church (see LUCENA 1976 a, 129-133).

We will return to this point in chapter seven, section 1.5 .

1.3.2. Non totalitarian indicators

There is consensus among political scientists and historians who write about the New State (NOTE 8) to reject the totalitarian characterization applied to the regime and thus to accept its claims.

There are several features of the New State which can be used as indicators - the absence of mobilization and of a mobilizing party (*"the aim of the regime was depoliticisation rather than mass mobilisation"* ROBINSON 1979, 52), the lack of an articulate ideology to regulate all aspects of life. Indeed the last aspect is a touchstone of the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian states (see LINZ 1975 - putting some questions to the distinction see MARTINS 1969). Adriano MOREIRA makes the distinction in those terms - the State will be *"authoritarian or totalitarian as far as it only proposes or also imposes an ideology to the civil society"* (MOREIRA 1979,143).

The New State did not have such ideology (LUCENA 1979 a) or at least did not try to impose it (CRUZ 1982 c). The regime was ideologically eclectic, as will be seen below, and did not attempt to create a new revolutionary man (LUCENA 1979 a); it did not interfere with the life of civil society everywhere (GINER 1982).

This non totalitarian philosophy was not, as a rule, perverted by a totalitarian practice (CRUZ 1982c), as will be seen throughout the thesis (NOTE 9). This does not mean that there were no totalitarian elements within the regime, mainly in its early years (see NOGUEIRA 1977b, 162), nor that profascist totalitarian tendencies were not present mainly since the 1930's, until the end of the Second World War, but they were episodic or exceptional, they were never the core of the regime (NOTE 10) - see section 2.1.1 .

1.3.3. Explanation of the non totalitarian nature

There are several reasons for the non totalitarian nature of the regime - both internal and external reasons. As reasons internal to the regime one can point the catholic belief of the leaders of the regime (CRUZ 1980,376); their juridical formation which made them inclined to build an "Etat de Droit" (CRUZ 1982 c, LUCENA 1976 a); a theory of elites based

on passivity and not on mobilization as characteristic of a totalitarian regime; the leader's theory about portuguese temperament and the essence of portuguese Nation; the rural project for portuguese society; and probably the temperament and style of Salazar himself (NOTE 11).

As reasons external to the regime one can point to the strength of the Catholic Church in Portugal (see as an indicator the episode of the foundation of "Mocidade Portuguesa" - Portuguese youth - NOTE 12), the important role of the Army which was one of the pillars of the regime, the passive resistance of the middle classes or significant part of them (CABRAL 1983), the resistance of a great part of the intellectuals (ROBINSON 1979,81), the stage of development of the portuguese economy and society.

1.4. The New State as an authoritarian regime

Almost all american scholars who write about Portugal characterize the New State as an authoritarian regime - see among them BLUME, BRUNEAU, GRAHAM, MAKLER, PAYNE, RIEGELHAUPT, SCHIMITTER, WIARDA.

It has already been said that portuguese authors prefer generally the characterization of fascism. But recent studies call attention to features of the New State which are those of an authoritarian regime, mainly demobilisation - see LOURENÇO 1976, MONICA 1978. The most recent study by CRUZ (1982 c) points to an authoritarian framework. LUCENA last studies also seem to point in that direction (NOTE 13).

1.4.1. Characterization of authoritarian regimes

LINZ tried, in an article in 1964, to define a variety of regimes, which were neither democratic nor totalitarian political systems, as authoritarian regimes. Later articles elaborated on that (1970, 1973) and a general theory appeared in 1975.

According to LINZ authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, non responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities; without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises

power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones (LINZ 1970,1975) (NOTE 14).

According to LINZ limited pluralism means the legal or de facto restrictions put to the creation or activity of political groups, interest group or institutions; as long as there remains groups not created by or dependent on the state which influence the political process there is limited pluralism. This pluralism is limited, because the rulers ultimately define which groups they will allow to exist and under what conditions.

In contrast with the accountability of a democratic regime, this pluralism is not responsible (to people) since political power is not legally or de facto accountable through such groups to the citizens, even when it might be quite responsive to them. The men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and institutions derive their position not from the support of those groups alone, but from the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling groups - so there is a constant process of co-optation of members for the ruling groups which accounts for the heterogeneous and non politically professional character of the elite (LINZ 1975, 265-266).

LINZ considers both ideologies and mentalities as part of a broader phenomenon of ideas leading to action-oriented ideals, but makes a distinction. Mentalities are ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide non codified ways of reacting to different situations. On the contrary, Ideologies are belief systems based on fixed elements and characterized by strong affect and closed cognitive structure, with considerable constraining power important for mass mobilization. Ideologies are characteristic of totalitarian regimes, mentalities are typical of authoritarian regimes. Mentality is psychic predisposition, ideology is reflection, self-interpretation; mentality is previous, ideology later; mentality is formless, fluctuating, ideology is firmly formed; mentalities are closer to the present or the past, ideologies have a strong utopian element (LINZ 1975, 266-269).

Another characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the

lack of political mobilization and political participation of citizens and even of many of their supporters. Several reasons contribute to this - effective mobilization, particularly through a single party and its mass organizations, would be perceived as a threat by the other components of the limited pluralism, typically the army, the church, the bureaucracy and interest groups (to break those constraints would mean to move either in a totalitarian direction or in a democratic one); Further the absence of an ideology is a serious obstacle to mobilization and alienates the young, the students and the intellectuals from the regime; the heterogeneous character of the elite does not facilitate mobilization. Beyond those reasons, inherent to the nature of authoritarian regimes, there is generally the underdeveloped character of the population, mainly of rural population (which constitutes a large portion of the total population) which has no participatory political culture; also many authoritarian regimes came to power after periods of competitive democratic participation that created conflicts in society - so many citizens felt the depoliticization brought about by the new regime as a relief.

Demobilisation is also actively sought by the rulers since it fits with their mentalities and reflects the wishes of the institutions and groups which are part of the limited pluralism which supports them. As a consequence the regime tends to reduce politics to mere administration of public interest and to de facto expression of particular interests.

So authoritarian regimes are based on demobilisation, depoliticization and non participation. This means that no mass organizations or mass meetings are encouraged, there are no regular voluntary campaigns or face-to-face propaganda activities, no encouragement to citizens participation in the life of institutions, no encouragement or appeal to political participation through the vote, no importance given to electoral mechanisms in choosing the country's leaders or organizational leaders.

1.4.2. Demobilization and passivity as the essence of the regime - the hypothesis

It is our hypothesis that passivity was the main goal of the regime, that the New State wanted a demobilised and depoliticized civil society. This passivity and depoliticization demanded a theory and practice of government based on demobilisation, demanding conformism from individual citizens, organizations and social institutions. By passivity is meant an attitude and practice of no participation either in political discussions meetings or campaigns, no participation in the life of institutions through active involvement, no discussion of public issues, in general terms no involvement in political life at any level; it means also submissive acceptance of traditions and customs, of the existing social order, of all authorities.

As a matter of fact words like demobilization, depoliticization, non participation, obedient compliance, conformism, passivity, apathy has been used by several authors to characterize the New State intentions - see DALE and STOER, GRAHAM, LOURENÇO, LUCENA, MAKLER, MARTINS, RIEGELHAUPT, ROBINSON, SCHMITTER, WIARDA among others.

Salazar's leadership was never a dynamic one, and even lacked a strong charisma (CRUZ 1982 c). Salazar's rule can be adequately described as monotonous, grey and melancholic (LUCENA 1979 a), based on routine not on exceptional events, on daily governmental acts not on enthusiastic speeches (NOTE 15), a marked contrast with previous political behaviour in Portugal.

Salazar carried so far this wish to "deal with a sleeping country" (LUCENA 1979 a) that he was often accused of immobility(- see his acknowledgment of this accusation and his deffense as reflected in SALAZAR IV 188-189, VI 437,442-443).

This essentially passive nature of the regime fits adequately with LINZ's characterization of authoritarian regimes. One is not using the New State to exemplify LINZ's theory or to search for an adequation of portuguese regime to LINZ's subtypes (see LINZ 1975). Rather LINZ's elaboration will be used as a general framework for the analysis of the primary sources of the New State.

To aid the characterization of the New State regime in the authoritarian framework a reference to its limited pluralism is necessary.

2. LIMITED NON RESPONSIBLE PLURALISM

Evidence for the existence of a limited pluralism within the regime will come first through the analysis of its ideological sources, second through the existence of compromises in the main constitutional document of the regime (the Constitution of 1933) and third through the analysis of the different groups inside the regime.

It is also our concern here to carry evidence for the hypothesis of demobilisation and passivity as the main aim of the regime. In this way it is argued that the main ideological source of the regime was not fascism, that fascist constitutional ideas did not prevail nor any fascist group was lastingly important within the regime.

2.1. Ideological ecletism of the regime

We will begin showing how the more fascist like periods of the regime came from reasons which were external to its natural development.

2.1.1. The fascist source

a) Tactical fascistization - fascistization from within

One of the groups which initially supported the new regime was that responsible for the first appearance of fascist ideas and rituals within New State supporters - it was "integralismo lusitano" movement. This was an intelectual movement, born in Portugal after 1914, with right wing ideology, repudiating liberalism and individualism, defending organic representation and corporatism of association, decentralization and the restoration of municipalist tradition, pre-constitutional monarchy. It attracted the part of the new generation which was very nationalistic and very traditional (CRUZ 1982a, and b, MARTINS 1970, |

MARQUES 1976, 178-179, WIARDA 1977, 75-79. The New State took from it only some aspects - its traditionalism and nationalism and some aspects of its corporative ideology, but the regime never restored monarchy, never decentralized following municipalist theories, never accepted fully organic representation and substituted corporatism of association by state corporatism (NOTE 16), since this conflicted with limited pluralism, that is, would upset those compromises which make possible the adherence of several groups to the New State.

In 1932 a group emerged from this movement to form an autonomous political movement which adopted fascist ideology, symbols and rituals - they were the National-Syndicalism movement. They tried to build a kind of party state with militia type organizations (see NOTE 9). As this new movement grew and its leader (Rolão Preto) began to be charismatic, Salazar and the mainstream of New State supporters felt the need to neutralize it. This was done through co-optation of the most part of its followers despite the resistance of their leaders. This process of co-optation provoked what one can call a "tactical fascistization" of the regime. Co-optation means choice by the present members of the elites of the new members that is, recruitment for the ruling group by the ruling group and from that a slow process of assimilating the new member to the values and norms of the group.

This tactical fascistization was translated into some political activities. First, the creation in the end of 1933 of a youth movement which took a radical tone (PINTO and RIBEIRO 1982). This movement which was the predecessor of "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese youth), was called "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" (Vanguard School Action) (NOTE 17).

A second political activity which can be encompassed in this tactical expedient is the promotion of the first congress of "União Nacional" (National Union), the regime's sole party, in May 1934 (see PARREIRA et alia 1982).

This fascistization process of this New State organization had the double purpose of emptying the

threatening movement (by recruiting members in the same area and by transferring militants) and of controlling the enthusiasm of new recruits (which implied to go partially along with them, but to keep firmly the control of the situation).

One can conclude that to maintain passivity it is at times necessary to go along with enthusiasm.

b) Defensive fascistization - fascistization from without

Those internal pressures which culminated in the tactical fascistization of 1933-1934 were followed by external pressures derived from the Spanish Civil War initiated in 1936. It is what MARTINS (1970) calls a "fascistization from without", a defensive fascistization (see about this period MARTINS 1970, MARQUES 1976, 183-186, ROBINSON 1979, 58-60, SCHMITTER 1979). The civil war in Spain was considered a matter of life or death for the regime (NOTE 18) and thus the year 1936 saw the creation of many potentially mobilizing organizations - the "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese Youth), "Legião Portuguesa" (Portuguese Legion) alongside with the "Obra das Mães pela Educação Nacional" (Association of Mothers for National Education) (NOTE 19).

"Legião Portuguesa" was a paramilitary organization (a militia), headed by the Army, entrusted with the organization of civil defence and acting as a reserve force of the regime. "Mocidade Portuguesa" combined scout principles with political and religious formation. Both movements had fascist-like rituals but both declined after the Second World War (MARTINS 1970). MARQUES says that "Mocidade Portuguesa" "rapidly declined and became a subject of contempt or ironical comment for most adolescents" (MARQUES 1976, 186). Both movements lasted until 1974, what needs explanation (which will be given in regard to "Mocidade Portuguesa" in chapter nine, section 2).

One can conclude that fascist tendencies came to the regime not by natural development of inner tendencies of the mainstream of the regime supporters. They came first to meet tactical needs, then defensive needs and not independently from the prevailing international context. Over both tactical needs

and the international context had changed, it was logical that there was no longer any need for expression of those marginal tendencies. That was indeed the case in the post-war period - by the early 1950s the regime's concerns were completely different and fascist rituals useless (NOTE 20).

2.1.2. The catholic doctrinaire source

The main ideological source of New State was catholicism as translated into political philosophy (christian democracy) and as translated into social philosophy (Church's social doctrine).

"The relations of catholicism to salazarism is not a purely extrinsic relationships, but something of ideologically intrinsic to the regime. Salazar was [...] in his own way and his own time a christian democrat"; "Indeed catholic intellectuals end up being the almost exclusive doctrinaires of the New State" (CRUZ 1980,17 and 377 - see also pages 16-19).

But obviously the New State was far from a pure version of christian democracy; CRUZ calls it a *"fascistizing version of christian democracy"* (CRUZ 1980,18 and 375) (NOTE 21).

This catholic source can be seen in almost all areas of political life - it can be seen in the founding elite and in groups within the regime (see section 2.3) in the expressive strategies used by the regime (see chapters three and four) in the relationships between Church and State (see chapter five) in the ethical limits to the role of the state (see chapter seven, section 1.5), in the mentality inculcated through family and schools (see chapter four).

It was also the main ideological source of corporatism which was the basis of New State political and social structure (at least in theory), as shall be seen in chapter four.

2.1.3. Other ideological sources

There are other ideological sources in the New State. The monarchic tradition in its absolutist form and patrimonialist doctrines were also an inspiration for some sectors of the New

State, although monarchy was never restored (CRUZ 1985).

Related with that is the state patrimonialism and centralization traditions which very much influenced the doctrine and the practice about the role of the state towards civilian society and the structure of public administration - see about those traditions VALENTE 1983, WIARDA 1977.

One cannot call liberalism a source of inspiration of the regime's ideology, although CAETANO proclaims in 1941 "We will keep everything truly good and human which liberalism defended"(CAETANO 1941,124,1950,23). But liberalism was certainly a limitation to the full application both of absolutist patrimonialist ideas and of corporative solutions, as we will be seen in the next pages.

2.1.4. The most important source for mentality inculcation through education was the catholic doctrine

The catholic doctrine was by far the most important source for the educational system both in its broad meaning including all type of social mentality inculcation or in a more restrict sense of family and school education or even in the narrowest meaning -(state school education),as will be best seen in chapters three, four and nine.

2.2. Compromise in the New State Constitution - 1933

Unanimously authors consider the Constitution of the New State (1933) as a compromise constitution - see CABRAL 1976, CAMPINOS 1975, CRUZ 1982 c, LUCENA 1976 a,122-126,1978 a,89-93, MARQUES 1976,190,MARTINS 1970.

The main compromise is between demo-liberal principles of individual representation and corporatist principles of organic representation which demand that the Nation be represented in political bodies by its structural elements (the "living bodies") - families, municipalities, corporative bodies. Those were all represented in the "Camara Corporativa" (Corporative Chamber), but this body had only consultative character. In contrast, both the President of Republique and the Parliament were elected by individual citizens. This represented the primacy of individual representation over

corporative representation.

The Constitution was based on two concepts of Nation - firstly, nation as the whole of portuguese citizens, that is, nation as the portuguese people, and, secondly, nation as the network of its "structural elements" or "living bodies", the "transpersonal cultural community" (CAETANO 1972 a,509), the historical heritage to be continued today (LUCENA 1976 a,123-124, LUCENA 1978 a,89-93, CAMPINOS 1975,20-24 and CAETANO 1972 a,508-509). The first concept is used in the main elements of the political structure; the second one is the theoretical doctrinaire support of the New State, the basis of corporatism and corporative political philosophy. The second concept of Nation is also the bedrock of nationalism and of portuguese national destiny and mission and the legitimacy basis of Salazar's leadership (see CAMPINOS 1975, 25-31 and 45-47).

The compromise which characterised the Constitution is congruent with the ideological heterogeneity of the regime. SALAZAR himself praised eclecticism in political practice (NOTE 22).

2.3. Groups inside the regime - the practice of limited pluralism

The regime was never monolithic nor free of conflicts. There were different groups competing for influence - they changed at times. Conflicts were always in soft tone and behind the scenes. CAETANO even said that there had been in the Government persons that, under a party system, would have been in different parties (see SALAZAR's agreement to this in SALAZAR V,398,406-407, VI,356).

In the beginning pluralism was more intense, but with time it turned "more and more respectful" (LUCENA 1979 a) and thus more limited. This was a natural consequence of the reinforcement of Salazar's authority. (In Caetano's rule (1968-1974) pluralism became more intense again - see GRAHAM 1975,40-48).

This pluralism came from different groups inside the regime. Although the catholic source was dominant it does not make much sense to speak of a catholic group since all groups

were composed of catholics.

Indeed catholic groups which were active during the previous republican regime (1910-1926) were at the very center of the New State foundation.

In 1910 the Monarchy was abolished and a Republican Regime began. The republican ideology and practice was strongly anti-clerical, anti-catholic and anti-religious. In the words of its most prominent leader (Afonso Costa) it was the Republic's intention to extinguish religion in Portugal in two generations. Even accepting this as a boast it certainly was the intention of the leaders to put an end to the existing Catholic Church. They formulated and implemented policies towards this objective (see MARQUES 1976, and ROBINSON 1977).

It is not surprising that such policies pushed the catholic leaders to accept, or even to desire, an authoritarian regime in which the Church could be protected.

Earlier there had been a catholic revival at the turn of the 19th century (ROBINSON 1977, MARQUES 1976, 130) and some new religious organizations were introduced. One of them - the CADC (Centro Académico de Democracia Cristã) - was to provide the great part of the founding elite of the New State (ROBINSON 1977, BRUNEAU 1976, CERQUEIRA 1973, FIGUEIREDO 1976, 29-30). The CADC was a small catholic students society in Coimbra of which Salazar, Cardinal Cerejeira (patriarch of Lisbon and virtual leader of the Portuguese Church from 1929 to 1971), the President of the Parliament and many others were members. So the New State was born linked with catholic leaders and the University of Coimbra at the same time. Another catholic group became influential, beyond the one linked to the founding elite - "Acção Católica" movement ("Catholic Action") was influential at a certain time.

An important permanent group was the monarchic one (Salazar himself was believed to be monarchic in his heart by no other than CAETANO - CAETANO 1977, 368). The main aim of this group was to lead Salazar to restore monarchy. They tried it more than once, but with no success (see CAETANO 1977, CRUZ 1985).

There was also a group of corporatist theoreticians who

fought for an integral and pure version of corporatism. They were a small group of intellectuals with limited influence (WIARDA 1977). CAETANO can be considered, at times, part of this group.

At the beginning of the regime the military group was also very influential. The early thirties saw the appearance of the national-syndicalists which were briefly also an important group on the fringe of the regime (MEDINA 1977,1979).

Limited pluralism led sometimes to conflicts within the regime like the one between monarchists and republicans (see CAETANO 1977, passim.), the corporatist theoreticians intense critique of the corporative practice, (see chapter eight, section 2.2.3), the conflicts between "hawks" and "doves" in the 1950s which culminated with the dismissal of the leaders of both factions (see CAETANO 1977, 520-521, 580-583, MARQUES 1976, 221), the conflicts within CAETANO's rule between liberals and extreme conservatives ("ultras") - see GRAHAM 1975 (NOTE 23).

But pluralism could not go so far as to transform groups into crystallized tendencies within the regime or in pressure groups. Pluralism did not also go so far as to be transformed into open and acknowledged divergences of opinion (NOTE 24).

There was another source of pluralism. Beyond limited pluralism of ideological nature, there was also interest pluralism derived from the fact that different elite members represented the expectations of different potential constituencies, like economic or professional groups, or of different organizations like Army, Church, University.

2.4. Non responsible pluralism

There are two important features which distinguish pluralism in authoritarian regimes from pluralism in democratic regimes. Pluralism in authoritarian regimes is limited and non responsible (LINZ 1970,1975). That is, it is not subject to any form of electoral accountability. Different groups in the elite reflect the views of different ideological groups and of different organizations, but do not represent them officially.

In a democracy elected representatives represent their electorate and are committed, to a certain extent, to certain policies - they are accountable to the electorate. The accountability in an authoritarian regime is to the leader who co-opted the members of the elite. This is not to say that there cannot exist an informal and diffuse accountability from groups of the elite towards the groups whose views they reflect, but there are no formal mechanisms of substitution; on the other hand, lost of confidence does not imply any change if the leader's confidence remains.

2.5. Conclusion - limited pluralism and demobilization

In section 2. we have shown that as generally happen in authoritarian regimes the elite of New State was heterogeneous in its background (LINZ 1975). This is congruent with the lack of an articulate ideology, which is also characteristic of authoritarian regimes.

This heterogeneity is intimately related with the non mobilizational essence of authoritarian regimes which can retain the loyalty of disparate members, but generally alienate the support of intellectuals, students and youth (LINZ 1975).

Recruitment for the elite comes from a "syncretic ideological substratum [...] from which the dictator and the government freely chose at every political juncture" (GINER 1982). The process by which members are recruited for the elite reflects also non mobilization - co-optation by the leader or the government substitutes the active element of choice by political constituency for a passive element of fidelity to the leader. Due to the heterogeneity of recruitment areas there were few professional politicians in the elite, which also helped to avoid the creation of mobilizational political dynamics.

So it is clear that there is a link between limited pluralism and non mobilization; that is, ideological eclectism, heterogeneous basis for recruitment, the existence of different group derives and leads to lack of an articulate ideology which would be

instrumental to any mobilization.

This lack of an ideology prevented the school curriculum from being filled with strict ideological indoctrination, schooling being the vehicle for inculcating a passive mentality (that is, values, attitudes and habits rather than ideas, concepts and intellectual schemes). The New State theory about the education of children must be seen as part of its broader theory about the way portuguese should be governed - how they should be ruled.

The next chapter will deal with this theory of government. It will be presented New State elitist non participatory theory of government and its practice of non participation of citizens in public life.

3. PERIODS IN EVOLUTION OF THE NEW STATE REGIME

It is necessary for the presentation of the political and educational evolution of the regime, and for the demonstration of its relationship, to present a division of New State regime evolution into periods.

A difficulty arises from the fact that there is not yet, at this stage of thesis data and analysis which can justify all the proposed divisions. We will present now the proposed periods, with a brief political and educational description of each one.

The use of those periods to describe and explain educational policy evolution will provide this data.

The division of an historical situation into periods can be sometimes difficult when there are no decisive events or abrupt changes - but it is probably in those cases that the presentation of periods is more necessary to represent formally the continuous process of change.

The presented division uses, in the first instance, the dates of historical events which directly changed the political situation - the military "coup d'état" which set up the new regime in the 28th May of 1926, the end of the Second World War (although in this case the influence is an indirect one), the physical incapacity of Salazar and his substitution in

1968, the military "coup d'état" which put as end to the regime in the 25th April of 1974.

In the second instance this division uses political landmarks internal to the evolution of the regime - the publication of the regime Constitution in 1933, the presidential election of 1958 and the political and constitutional changes it had in the regime.

There is naturally a delay between general political change and specific policy formulation (and between policy formulation and adoption and policy implementation - see CORTESÃO 1982, 164-167). The educational policy formulation landmarks chosen to date educational periods have generally some brief delay in relation to political change - the first pair of dates shown in the titles of the following sections refer to political evolution and the second to educational evolution, thus showing this delay.

One can divide the New State regime evolution in five periods - 1926-1933/1933-1945/1945-1958/1958-1968/1968-1974. (See similar division in LEEDS 1983 - see also FRANCO 1982, NOGUEIRA, STOER 1986 (NOTE 25).)

3.1. The formative period (1926-1933/1927-1936)

In the 28th May of 1926 the republican regime was overthrown by a military "coup d'état" which gave rise to a regime which later called itself the New State. In 1928, Salazar entered into the Government as Minister of Finances and in 1932 was appointed Prime-Minister, the office he held for 36 years, until September 1968. In this period he chose Marcello Caetano to be his cooperator (CAETANO 1977, 24-25).

1926-1933 was a transitional period - a self-called "administrative dictatorship" which developed a political philosophy. The most important step of this development can be seen in Salazar speeches - "Administrative dictatorship and political revolution" (28-5-1930), "Fundamental principles of the political revolution" (30-7-1930), "The national interest in the Dictatorship policy" (17-5-1931), "Economic concepts of the new Constitution" (16-3-1933) (all in the first volume of Salazar's speeches).

The relationship of the State with the Church improved greatly, but was not definitively settled. The main financial concern was budgetary balance.

In the educational sector this period is also a transitional one, in the sense that the implemented policies were more anti-republican policies, destroying what the republicans had done, than the implementation of an articulate educational thought.

.. (MONICA divides this period into two sub-periods - 1926-1928, a purely transitional period and 1928-1936 a period where there was a gradual implementation of the new ideas under the motto "little and well" - see MONICA 1978, 281-282).

The implemented policies intended reductions in compulsory schooling, primary school curricula, primary school teachers education. It was a reaction against what was seen as the republican trial of promoting mass education and encyclopedic curricular conceptions.

The most important Ministers of Education of that period were CORDEIRO-RAMOS (1930-1933), TAMAGNINI (1934-1936).

3.2. The mobilizing period (1933-1945/1936-1947)

The landmark which sets the beginning of this period is the publication, in March 1933, of the Constitution of the New State regime, which through several revisions lasted until 1974. This marks the formal end of the military dictatorship.

For the reasons explained in this chapter, a sector of New State elite adopted a mobilizing and radical style. The influence of nazi and fascist regimes became visible. First it developed a tactical fascistization, a fascistization from within. Then, the civil war in Spain provoked the fascistization from without - reflected in creation of the "Portuguese Legion" (paramilitary organization) and the "Portuguese Youth" (Youth organization).

Repressive strategies began in 1933 with creation of the political police, special tribunals for political crimes, the introduction of censorship and political control of civil servants (including teachers).

The corporative principles of the regime in relation to the economy were set up since 1933 with publication in that year of the "National Work Statute". The relationship with the Church was definitively settled through an agreement in 1940 ("Concordata").

The most important speeches of Salazar which represent this mobilizing evolution are - "National Propaganda" (26-10-1933), "Physical Education and Sports" (3-12-1933), "The school, the life and the Nation" (28-1-1934) (which reflect the tactical fascistization) and "Political education, guarantee of revolutionnary continuity" (22-3-1938), "Aims and need of political propaganda" (26-2-1940), and some minor speeches addressed to "Portuguese Legion" and "Portuguese Youth" (which reflect the fascistization from without).

But alongside those mobilizing-like speeches there were others clearly and strictly confined to the authoritarian framework - "The portuguese New State in the european political evolution" (26-5-1934), "The great certitudes of National Revolution" (26-5-1936) (in the tenth anniversary of the "coup d'état" — it became the regime educational Gospel), "The political moment - great and small questions of portuguese Politics" (20-9-1935). So, in this period, the mobilizing discourse co-exists, even in the same persons, with the traditional demobilizing authoritarian discourse of the regime.

In education the CARNEIRO-PACHECO reforms represent the full implementation of the mobilizing spirit. CARNEIRO - PACHECO was minister of Education from 1936 to 1940 - he reformed the educational system (Law 1941, 11-4-1936), he changed the name of the Ministry of Public Instruction to

Ministry of National Education, he created the "Portuguese Youth", in 1936, "The Work of the Mothers for National Education", also in 1936. He reformed primary and grammar school education, he set up the doctrinaire sole textbook for the more normative subjects, and closed Primary School Teacher Education Colleges. All these reforms had a doctrinaire leitmotiv and a mobilizing purpose.

3.3. The stabilization period (1945-1958/1947-1964)

Due to the triumph of democratic regimes in the second World War the regime had to adjust its language and its style to the new times - the mobilizing discourse disappeared and the mobilizing symbols were substituted. Salazar even spoke of "organic democracy" trying to verbally adjust the regime to the situation which the second world war brought about. Portugal joined the NATO alliance in 1949. The Corporative structure and spirit were renewed.

The end of the War created hopes of a slight democratization of the regime, as Salazar vaguely hinted; an oppositionist movement was created (M.U.D.). Repression followed and several university professors were expelled for political reasons in 1947.

In the 1950's the regime began a slow process of industrial development of the country. It launched the "Planos de Fomento", which were five years plans - the first was a plan for the quinquennium 1953-1958.

In the educational sector the stabilization period went on implementing the primary school reform of CARNEIRO-PACHECO and regulating in detail the (centralized) management of secondary schools (Statutes of 1947 and 1948).

But the slow process of industrialization demanded a different educational policy for the mass. In 1952 the Government proposed a campaign to mobilize Adult Education to end illiteracy (NOTE 26). In 1955 LEITE-PINTO became Minister of

Education (1955-1961) - he thought that "without instruction there is no technical improvement which can be efficaciously absorbed and applied" (in SAMPAIO 1977,11); he recognized the impossibility of industrializing the country without a generalized and enlarged mass education. This position had the opposition of the traditional sector of the elite. In the ensuing confrontation the traditionalist sector won and instead of extending compulsory schooling by the the three years more wished by LEITE PINTO it was reduced to a one year extension (i.e. from three to four years). Meanwhile more technical schools were being built to serve the industrialization needs.

In 1962, GALVÃO-TELLES substituted LEITE-PINTO as minister of Education (1962-1968) reflecting the return of the control over the educational system to a more traditionalist member of the ruling elite.

In 1956 there was a serious university student unrest situation and from then on there was a permanent tension between university students and the regime.

3.4. The stagnation and decline period (1958-1968/1964-1970)

In 1958 the election of the Presidency of Republique became unusually disputed because the candidate of the opposition (Humberto Delgado) could, for the first time, really mobilize great masses against the regime. As usual the official candidate won, but through repression and fraud - the regime was very shaken and immediately substituted the system of direct election for an indirect election for the Presidency of Republique.

A group of catholics began to question the "moral union" between the Catholic Church and the New State. The bishop of Oporto wrote a letter criticizing Salazar and was consequently expelled from the country. From then on there was a clear catholic minority group, later known as "progressist catholics", actively opposed to the regime.

In February 1961 the colonial war started in Angola. In December 1961 India invaded and occupied the Portuguese territories in the indian peninsula, this was seen by the regime's elite as a national tragedy. In 1959, 1961 and 1962

there were aborted conspiracies or aborted "coup d'états". In March 1962 began the most serious movement of university student unrest until then leading to the resignation of Marcello Caetano from Rector of the University of Lisbon indicating severe splits within the elite. In 1963 the guerrilla war broke in Portuguese Guinea and, in 1964, in Mozambique.

In 1967 an armed oppositionist group appeared in a spectacular fashion assaulting the Bank of Portugal, in a small town, taking away for political purposes around one million dollars.

In sum, all of a sudden, things became very difficult, in the internal and external political front, for the regime. The strategical answer to those attacks was internal repression. The colonial war began to monopolize all the regime's attention and even provoked a remobilization of a hard core of the regime elite. It led to the need for counteracting the process of growing international isolation. Salazar's speeches of that period clearly reflect all those concerns and have a defensive tone.

In the economy industrialization goes on with foreign capital in spite of the war; tourism progresses greatly; massive emigration for France and Germany is the answer of the rural class to the crisis in agriculture.

In education this period could begin with the appointment of Galvão Telles in 1962, but the date of 1964 had been chosen because it is a landmark of educational policy formulation - the extension of compulsory schooling to six years. GALVÃO TELLES tried to make compatible the inevitable expansion of compulsory schooling with the continuation of the strong social reproduction and elite preparation as priority function of the educational system. He achieved this through the creation of a threefold track in the new compulsory fifth and sixth years of schooling. The first track is the urban track for those

who wanted to follow up studies (preparatory school), the second track was the rural track for those who also wished to follow up studying "Telescola", (that is, Television School), the third track was the rural track for those who did not go on.

3.5. The "renewal within continuity" period (1968-1974/ /1970-1974)

The event which started this period was the substitution of Salazar by Caetano in the leadership of the regime, in September 1968, due to the physical incapacity of Salazar. Caetano proclaimed that his rule would be one of "renewal within continuity". He changed the leadership style risking mass situations and creating a sort of "fireside chats" ("conversas em família"). He substituted the New State with the promise of the Social State.

There was a liberalization - repression was decreased, censorship slowed down, the bishop of Oporto could return. It

A "liberal wing" appeared in Parliament, which sometimes acted as a semi-opposition group. This liberalizations was ended in 1971. There was a revision of the Constitution in 1972 which did not change anything fundamental - continuity prevailed over renewal.

The relationship with the catholic oppositionist group worsened and the same happened with the official relations with the Holy See because of what the regime saw as the Pope support to the colonial liberation movements. University students unrest reached a new peak in 1969 and was high for all this period. The reaction to this mobilization divided the regime elite - some were for blunt repression, others for a nationalistic remobilization of the Youth, a minority for a more permissive attitude.

Foreign capital participation in portuguese economy increased and the portuguese economy went on developing in spite of the colonial war.

The colonial war issue dominated all this period and it compelled the regime to facilitate the recruitment for the Armed Forces. This provoked dissatisfaction among professional army officers thus beginning a military underground movement

which soon began discussion not only of professional issues but also of political ones - the regime was overthrown in the dawn of the 25th April of 1974.

In reference to the educational system this period begins in 1970 with the appointment of Veiga Simão as minister of education (1970-1974). He initiated an educational reform under the motto of "democratization of education". He gave to the "battle of education" (as he called it) a mobilising style which had never been seen before in the regime. In 1971 Veiga Simão proposed a complete reform of the educational system, from top to bottom, in a document which was put to public discussion. This public debate mobilised many sectors of public opinion and of political opinion, from the conservative wing of the regime (who opposed the reform) to the several oppositions (whose position goes from critical half support to a "wait and see" position to a blunt condemnation under the accusation of demagogic propaganda). The educational field was the only one where liberalization survived. For the reasons exposed in the Introduction (section 7) this period will not be analyzed (see about the meaning of Veiga Simão reform STOER 1983, 1986).

The proposed reform increased compulsory schooling for eight years, it extended preparatory education from two to four years, it created an unified comprehensive secondary school, it changed teacher education, it created the polytechnical higher education, it compelled universities to reform. It also created four new universities, ten polytechnical institutes and nine preparatory teachers education colleges (alongside the expansion of the existing primary school teacher education colleges).

The reform was approved after the public debate and the parliamentary discussion - it is contained in the Law 5/73, 25-7-1973. Many partial reforms had been made between 1970 and 1973. This reform became the basis of the development of the

educational system from then on - it is still the basis of the present system, although with many changes (the Law 5/73 was in force until October 1986).

3.6. Conclusion

This presentation of the political and educational evolution of the regime (which serves also as description of the main events during the New State regime) does not mean that the analysis of the New State will be mainly done by periods. What is generally pursued in this work is the analysis of the essential and permanent political and educational features of the New State under Salazar rule. But it is often necessary to analyse the historical evolution to demonstrate the demobilising hypothesis and to characterize more accurately those permanent features.

ARCHER in her monumental analysis of patterns of interaction and change in decentralized and centralized educational systems ("Social Origins of Educational Systems"), concludes that "Patterns of change [in centralized systems] follow a jerky sequence in which long periods of stability (i.e. changelessness) are intermittently interrupted by polity-directed measures. This had been termed the 'Stop-Go pattern' (ARCHER 1979,617). There are two clear Go educational periods in the New State - the second period with CARNEIRO-PACHECO reform and the fifth period with the VEIGA SIMÃO reform. Although representing opposed ideological options they have in common the mobilising style and the comprehensiveness of the change.

It is natural that research attention falls more on the Go periods, where change occurs (as it is indeed the case of many studies about the New State educational system), but the Stop periods last much longer and can neutralize and modify the changes of Go periods. Indeed CARNEIRO-PACHECO reform was in most of the aspects transformed by the stop period which followed - the primary school curriculum inculcated passivity not mobilization (as will be seen in chapters three and four), the grammar school reform lasted only until 1947, Portuguese Youth entered in decline (as will be analyzed in chapter nine). So Stop periods deserve as much

attention as Go periods. This thesis will try to give equivalent attention to both.



CHAPTER II

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON PARTICIPATION
IN THE NEW STATE

I-THE NEW STATE ELITIST NON PARTICIPATORY THEORY OF GOVERNMENT

1. SALAZAR'S THEORY ABOUT THE PORTUGUESE MAN AND THE WAY HE
SHOULD BE GOVERNED

Salazar and other theoreticians of the New State started from an image of the portuguese man, the portuguese essence. They held a model of how portuguese think, feed and behave and from that they worked out a theory of how he should be educated and governed.

A simple example will illustrate this relationship -
- Salazar disliked the party system, but conceded it worked well with certain peoples, the english for instance. But he considered absolutely inapplicable to Portugal any type of party system due to portuguese temperament. As he said to Ferro "I have no horror to parties on general terms; I abhor partisan system in Portugal" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,161 - see also SALAZAR V,467-8, RATO 1958,78)(NOTE 1).

As New State theories of education and government were inspired not only on general political ideologies, but started also from an image about the portuguese man we will begin by presenting this image.

1.1. Salazar's diagnosis of portuguese people defects

According to Salazar portuguese are sentimental, they suffer from a "unhealthy sentimentalism which we are used to see as kindness" (in FERRO 1982,116), from "an unhealthy fatalism" (in FERRO 1982,165), nourished by fatalistic songs like "fado", the national song (in GARNIER, no date,123), thus becoming "an eternally nostalgic and longing people, distant from reality" (in FERRO 1982,165) (NOTE 2).

Congruently portuguese are emotional (SALAZAR VI,47 and 248) which makes them abhor violence (SALAZAR II, 70, in

FERRO 1982,115-117) and prefer to be a people of "brandos costumes" (mild habits) (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,115).

Portuguese are also passive and conformist, "*suffering*" "*docile*" and "*kind*" people (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,295), with "*a natural predisposition for social discipline*" (SALAZAR II, 104).

Portuguese do not have strong wills, they are "voluble" and "unstable" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,118,191,296 and in GARNIER no date,135), they lack "*a constancy spirit and tenacity in action*" (in FERRO 1982,295) and thus they are inclined "*to build on ephemeral enthusiasms and to abandon just initiated tasks to begin other ones*" (SALAZAR V,94) (NOTE 3).

Portuguese are also highly theoretical, but at the same time superficial. "*Our bookish instruction [...] moving on abstractions, with little contact with facts, can apply its effort in empty formulas*" (SALAZAR III,393). But "*The very easiness of his apprehension decreases the need to try harder and leads him to study superficially all subjects and to trust too much on spontaneity and on the brilliancy of his intelligence...*" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,295).

So portuguese are naturally inclined to improvise instead of planning activities. There is "a true hostility in our spirit to any program of work"; "The discipline of a studied plan is painful to endure as if it was a violence done to our temperament"; so "all [...] is tendencially left to the improvisation made up in the very moment, to sudden fancies" (SALAZAR II,72).

Portuguese have "sharp critical wit" (SALAZAR VI,247), they easily engage in criticism of other's actions. Quick intelligence but no tenacity slides down easily into criticism as attractive activity of fault-finding. Salazar comments ironically - "*in our political world many of my friends prove their devotion exactly by being dissatisfied*" (SALAZAR III,32)

Portuguese are very individualist (SALAZAR II,103, IV, 454,V,467, VI 246, in GARNIER, 135), even "without noticing it" (in FERRO 1982,295). This leads to a mistrust of authority - "It is inevitable a sort of suspicion of authority not

because it lacks idoneousness, but because he wants it be less attached to what is general and more attached to what is particular" (SALAZAR VI,246). This leads also to great difficulty in adaptation to groups work (SALAZAR VI,247).

1.2. How a theory government was build upon this diagnosis

A simple explanation of Salazar's ideas will make clear the basis for his theory of government by elites. If portuguese are sentimental and emotional they are easy prey to demagogues (SALAZAR VI,47,248) - there is the need for someone who remain cold headed to decide for them. As they also are fatalistic and passive they lack initiative - there is the need for someone to take the lead. But they are also voluble and less tenacious - so this someone must be stable and constant for them, carrying through all the planned action. This is as much necessary as they like improvisation and are easily carried away by their whims. "The abyss between our intelligence which is sharp and quick, typical of southern people, and our feeble will power..." (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,188) leads to an easy finding of solutions, but not to capacity to carry them out; this naturally leads to a canalization of sharp critical wit to fault-finding activities. It is necessary someone to lead portuguese out of this impasse.

According to Salazar's image of portuguese men, they have mixed feelings about authority - they accept easily social discipline since they are passive and conformist, but they abhor intellectual discipline to which they prefer improvisation, spontaneity which goes better with their individualism and volubility. They distrust authority, but they very easily conform. It is necessary that someone uses this tendency to social discipline to persuade them to systematic action, to cooperation.

All this is the role of an elite. This elite obviously must not suffer from the same defects, it must be distant from the "low tide of the race" using FERRO's expression about Salazar (FERRO 1982,178). As FERRO says this distance gives

influence over the race, gives the necessary strength to lead people to the highest aims. "Portuguese people when properly led give everything one wants". Thus the most important and urgent condition for a successful government is "the preparation of elites which[...]lead the Nation" since "the great national problems can only be solved by those elites..." (in FERRO 1982,295-296 - see also SALAZAR 1933).

This leadership must respect the natural defects of the race and try to modify the acquired ones, must "use the formidable qualities of the race and neutralize some of its main defects" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,168 and 56) (NOTE 4).

Salazar exemplifies how natural defects should be respected. It is necessary to rule without violence because portuguese repudiate violence on account of their sentimentalism (see SALAZAR II,70-71, FERRO 1982,115-117, GARNIER no date 117-118) (NOTE 5). It is necessary to rule slowly, calmly, condescending sometimes, because of the same sentimentalism (see FERRO 1982,116-117,166, GARNIER no date, 132-133). It is necessary not to capitalize on emotionality, that is, it is necessary not to appeal to the heroic character of the race, without trying beforehand to modify the general mentality, since this slides later on into unhealthy fatalism and nostalgia (in FERRO 1982,165). It is also necessary to control public opinion since portuguese people is easy prey of demagoguery due to its emotionality and sentimentalism (see SALAZAR VI,47 and 248).

Salazar built his theory of elitist non participatory government on an image of portuguese people. His diagnosis is even today up-to-date in many points. That is, several authors say today similar things about portuguese - see for instance ARAGÃO 1985, LOURENÇO 1976,1982a, JESUINO 1982, ROBINSON 1979. All this can be included in a tradition of pessimistic images of portuguese people which was already very common in the 1870 generation (NOTE 6).

From that diagnosis Salazar drew out a theory of government he considered particularly adequate to portuguese

temperament, but the production of this theory was mediated by his political ideology and by his ideal image of the new portuguese man he wanted to build.

This means that from similar diagnosis very different therapies can be drawn out, that is, very different theories of government can be produced, according to the ideal image of portuguese man wanted. To choose a theory of government is implicitly to choose also an ideal image of man.

This points up to the need to know the ideal image of portuguese man Salazar held (since his political theory is object of this chapter).

1.3. Salazar's ideal image of portuguese - Salazar new man

Salazar acknowledged he wanted to build a new man (SALAZAR 1933,1948, in FERRO 1982, 125,156,165,277 and in GARNIER , no date,63)

The ideal man is the controlled man. In Ferro's words Salazar wants "to modify the rythm of the nation, to lead it to deny its own instincts...through a painful, but may be beneficial and redeeming suffocation" (FERRO 1982,180). That is, the new man must control his instincts even at the risk of suffocation.

The ideal man is an obedient person. "Those who prefer their freedom of action to obedience are not with us" (SALAZAR I,183-184) since "There is less damage in forbidding criticisms than in allowing disobedience" (SALAZAR II,133). "[I hope] that people obey when it comes the time to command" (SALAZAR I,6). To be obedient was not a privation, since "If you knew how difficult it is to rule you would like to obey all your life" (New State official political motto). On the other hand, "the will to obey is the only school to learn to command" (SALAZAR I,94) (NOTE 7)

The ideal man, the new man does not discuss God, Fatherland, Authority or Family (see SALAZAR II,130-134).

The ideal man, being controlled and obedient, "lives habitually" (see FERRO 1982,283, NOGUEIRA 1980, 531). This habitualness is a concept very cherished by Salazar, almost

identifying routine, habitual life with happiness (NOTE 8).

This habitual man is naturally apolitical, does not discuss public affairs, let those who know best decide for him. FERRO put it very well - *"And now that we have heard him [Salazar], let us go each one to our own lives...Please be silent...Let him work..."* (FERRO 1982,181).

As Salazar says "All this is very little after all, but I take care of pulling up from this all the rest" (SALAZAR 1933). That is, for SALAZAR the new man did not need to have any political ideology or any social doctrine, but just some basic mentality patterns and attitudes.

This "new man" seems singularly close to the old passive man we started with. There is not here any revolutionary design, any mobilizational appeal, not even any apostolic fervour. The new man obeys the leader, but this leader does not command him to act (like in totalitarian regimes), commands him not to act, to be passive, to be apolitical, to live habitually!

One must try to enlighten this apparent paradox-the new man to be built seems very close to the old man from which we started. One can hypothesize that the rural man already fits the ideal image of portuguese; the man who must become passive and apolitical through "redeeming suffocation" is the urban man (NOTE 9).

Let us find some support for this hypothesis in SALAZAR's words. *"Men who were educated and live exclusively around the school, the administrative office and the café, [coffee-shop] - and it is there that we have recruited great part of our public men - [...] have a faulty formation [...] The distance which goes from us, café customers, familiar with public departments, close to ministries, sharing the omnipotence of Power [...] and the true nation is enormous"* (SALAZAR 1933).

It is to those men, urban men, that *"the absolute sterility of politics considered as an end in itself has not yet been adequately demonstrated..."* (SALAZAR II,72). It is

those men, grouped "around mean interests", who need a therapy, an "immobilization [...] of all fragmentary political action" , (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,161).

One can even hypothesize further that it is the Lisbon urban man that Salazar had particularly in mind - as he said "the countryside [...] is more impartial, less emotional than Lisbon" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,138) or, as just seen, "the distance which goes from us [...] close to ministries [...] and the true Nation is enormous".

Summing up, both rural and urban men must be obedient, but one is already "docile" and with "natural predisposition for social discipline", the other is still longing for the old politics, is still too emotional and frenetic and should be subject to a therapy of immobilization of political action, to the "redeeming suffocation".

(This links clearly with the ruralism as characteristic of the New State (or of its first decades) - see chapter four, section 6.

The building of a new man depends heavily on the way the new generations will be educated. So SALAZAR says "The appropriation of the State [...] is not enough for the material and moral renewal nor does it guarantee by itself stability and the future of the work done. This must be grounded on the reform of education [...] [Sc] let us control the State but guide into a good path the intelligence and the will of the portuguese" (SALAZAR 1933 - see also SALAZAR I, 307, V 471).

So both *"school and family should imprint in the souls in formation, in a never-fading way, those high and noble sentiments which characterize our civilization and imprint deep love for the Fatherland"* (SALAZAR I,313). *"The best guarantee of the future of the nation is in a different formation of portuguese. From this it comes the importance of the problem [of education] even in the political domain"* (SALAZAR in GARNIER no date,63).

SALAZAR believed in *"the possibility of modification, at*

least partial modification, of national character through education" and acknowledged it was a task in which "family, school, social environment and even public affairs leadership" should cooperate (SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 63) - see also SALAZAR I, 65, 1936, in ASSAC 1952, 17.

So the building of the ideal new portuguese man through education is not the task of one institution alone, it is necessary for this task the cooperation of a group of devoted, intelligent and patriotic portuguese (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 297). That is, both educating and ruling the portuguese is the task of an elite of men. So it is logical to analyse New State theory about the role of the elite.

2. THE THEORY OF ELITES

2.1. The theory of government by elites

The New State had an elitist theory of government. Thus it had a non participatory theory of how to rule. Government should be exercised by an elite guided and commanded by a leader.

"Collective life [...] does not order itself spontaneously. It is an illusion to think that society searches or finds by itself its own guidelines [...] One or a few [persons], the collective being [...], define a direction, give impulse, create politics" (SALAZAR III, 389).

"The political function, to which it belongs spiritual guidance of the Nation towards its destiny, should belong to an elite of citizens chosen by their sacrifice, their spirit of self-denial and devotion to common good" (CAETANO 1938).

From this it follows logically that the great priority of the regime was the recruitment and education of this elite of citizens.

"Our great problem is the preparation of elites which educate and lead the Nation [...] I think it is even more urgent the preparation of large elites than to teach the people to read. In fact the great national problems cannot be solved by the people, they can only be solved by those elites acting with the masses" (SALAZAR in FERRO, 296 - see also

SALAZAR 1933 and GARNIER no date,62, (CAETANO 1941,34).

But the elites should themselves be guided by a leader *"Due to lack of equilibrium in the human spirit, order is not spontaneous; someone must command for the benefit of all "* (SALAZAR II,138); that is, what is needed is that *" many prepare, only one decides and see that it is implemented with enough means"* (SALAZAR I,375).

If the decision-making is restricted to trained elites, to govern is to consult those elites; that is, "governments should never be enslaved to the opinion of masses, because this opinion is always inferior to the public opinion of the Nation" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,272). *"We are a people's regime, but not a government of masses, a government influenced or led by masses"* (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,304) (NOTE 10).

"If democracy consists in believing that Power had its origin in masses and that Government should be led by masses and not by an elite then I consider democracy a fiction" (SALAZAR VI,41 - see also SALAZAR I,91).

(That is not the same as saying that public opinion was completely unimportant for the New State. Even before the full establishment of the New State, public opinion was considered important. *"Dictatorships are not considered governments of opinion, because they do not receive from public opinion their strenght or legitimacy, nor to they evolute in accordance with changes in public opinion. But they can and they must be governments of opinion in the sense that they can shape a public opinion, they can enlighten and lead it..."* (SALAZAR I,24 - our emphasis); public opinion is indispensable "but one never should lose the control of its formation, even out of concern for the health of it" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,272).

The theory of elites does not underestimate the importance of public opinion, but instead of making the elite to respond to public opinion, it gives to the elite the role of shaping public opinion - in fact, as SALAZAR said, "to

govern is to protect people from themselves").

2.2. Political and educational consequences

Here it is succinctly presented in the leader's own words New State theory of government by an elite. From this conception several consequences were derived. As it was just said, public opinion should be shaped by the elite - thus censorship is inevitable ("newspapers are the spiritual food of people and should be subject to quality control as any other food" said SALAZAR to FERRO 1982,95), propaganda is needed to direct public opinion and present the official truth (see FERRO 1982,270-2). Politics is mainly the action of persuading people of the goodness of Government decisions (SALAZAR V,308) - "politics[.]has as its only useful aim to give expression and political value to government actions. To govern, leading national conscience, is truly the only serious function" (SALAZAR IV,487). As it is explicitly said government and administration are the only serious business to which the elite should give time and effort - thus Government is the most important sovereignty body and Public Administration is the main instrument of action for the elite policy-making and policy implementation. All those consequences of the elitist theory of government will be analyzed in due time.

The people need not mobilize itself since its participation is not necessary in the solution of big or small national problems; politics and administration are reserved for the elite. CRUZ put this very well - Salazar "did not pretend to give to masses or public opinion the status of active political subject, but only pretended to make them object of inculcation of a passive doctrine" (CRUZ 1982c).

The educational consequences of this theory of government are very clear - the important efforts should be concentrated in educating the elites, as Salazar very explicitly said above. Thus the New State should set up a system of unequal access to education and access to different types of educational content. The educational system should prepare "those top

people which should be light and radiance" as one Minister of Education said (NOTE 11).

(One must distinguish New State political theory of elites which is a theory of government, from its social theory of elites, which is concerned with social reproduction.

As CAETANO said "what is good for society, what is good for Nation, is the existence of good elites in each [social] class, clearly differentiated, although united by the same common objective" (CAETANO 1928). SALAZAR attributes the material poverty of Portugal to lack of good social elites - good farmers, good industry men, good business men (SALAZAR 1933).

An educational consequence of this social theory of elites is the rejection of this "dangerous" idea of "compelling all persons to attend an unique school"; "To form an unique elite - that of intellectuals - would be a calamity" (CAETANO 1928). So it were set up schools for the intellectual elites (grammar schools) and schools for the elite of urban workman and low stratum of middle classes (technical schools.).

In the second part of this chapter we will analyze how that theory of government was put into practice, that is, we will analyze the practice of non participation.

This practice constitutes one main process of social and political education of portuguese - it shows how a passive mentality was inculcated through the non availability of mechanisms of participation. It shows how "public affairs leadership " contributed to the "modification of national character".

This practice created the social educational climate in which several generations grew, the generations which are now in power and govern the present educational system.

The analysis of this practice will also provide the context of government in which educational policies were then formulated, adopted, and implemented.

II - THE PRACTICE OF NON PARTICIPATION

3. ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR'S SPEECHES

A first step towards the analysis of the implementation of this theory of elites is the presentation of who were the receivers of Salazar's communications. Did Salazar speak mainly for the elite or for the masses? If our hypothesis about the demobilising nature of the regime is correct he spoke mainly for the elite.

For this analysis of the receivers of Salazar's communications one must first define what is intended for "communication" in the following presentation. The unit of analysis is any written piece included in Salazar six volume of speeches. This includes beyond the speeches, also the occasional interviews Salazar gave (mainly to foreign press), and official government notes written by Salazar. It also includes one technical report and technical notes and the diplomatic notes (which were categorized aside, as it will be explained).

The categories of analysis were naturally the type of destinataries of the communications - elites or masses. Within the elite a distinction is made between high elite and low elite, to allow analysis of what type of elite Salazar addressed. In communication to elites it were included those addressed to the National Assembly (the parliament), to the National Union (the sole party), to the Government, to the Corporative Chamber, to the Army, to the Portuguese Legion, (the regime militia) and to the Portuguese Youth (the regime youth organization) - high elite - and also those communications addressed to town mayors, corporative bodies and other group belonging to the elite (colonial authorities, high civil servants)-low elite. The category communication to masses includes those addressed to demonstration participants, those addressed to the general public in broadcasts, speeches in inaugurations, interviews, official government notes published in newspapers (and generally also broadcasted). Speeches to

various groups of civilian society like employers or sportive group leaders were also included in this category (they represent just 8% of Salazar's speeches). As there were several speeches (12) which could not be adequately allocated to the previous two categories another category of analysis was needed - Various Communications, that is, communications neither to masses nor to political, social or economic elites. This include technical reports, technical official notes, diplomatic notes, academic articles, a speech in an "honoris causa" doctorate.

For better understanding of Salazar's implementation of the theory of elites we included for comparison Caetano's speeches. The methodology used to categorize Caetano's communications followed the criteria just described.

Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 provide the result of the analysis.

TABLE 2.1

ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's and CAETANO SPEECHES

DESTINATARIES	SALAZAR's SPEECHES		CAETANO's SPEECHES	
Elites	99	55%	42	34%
Masses	70	39%	41	34%
Various	12	7%	39	32%
TOTAL	181	101%	122	100%

TABLE 2.2

ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's and CAETANO's SPEECHES
(only those addressed to elites or masses)

DESTINATARIES	SALAZAR's SPEECHES	CAETANO's SPEECHES
Elites	99 59%	42 51%
Masses	70 41%	41 49%
TOTAL	169 100%	83 100%

TABLE 2.3

ANALYSIS OF THE ELITE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's
and CAETANO's SPEECHES

DESTINATARIES	SALAZAR's SPEECHES	CAETANO's SPEECHES
High elite	73 74%	19 45%
Low elite	26 26%	23 55%
TOTAL	99 100%	42 100%

Commenting those results it is evident that Salazar spoke preferably for the elite (55% of all speeches and 59% excluding various); his speeches to masses represent 39% of the total of his speeches, being great part of those given in the fascistization period (see above pages 12-15). These results are even clearer when compared with CAETANO's performance - he addressed much more important speeches to various (32%), he spoke as much to masses as to elites (49%-51%); there is also a great difference in the type of elite Salazar and Caetano address - Salazar addresses only 26% of his elite speeches to the low/local elite against 55% of Caetano's.

Were Salazar's speeches to elites more elaborate and detailed than those to masses? Indeed they were which can be seen through the analysis of the themes of the speeches and also through a very crude indicator - length of the speech as measured by number of pages. (This indicator is only relevant because it is coincident with the qualitative content analysis).

Salazar's speeches to high elite had, on average, 14.5 pages, his speeches to low elites 11.4 pages and his speeches to masses just 10.8 pages. Thus his more longer messages were addressed to the high elite (mainly National Union, National Assembly and Army).

To sum up, it seems evident so far that Salazar indeed implemented his elitist non participatory theory of government. In the next section we will see that he even overdid it, through his autocratic practice.

4. THE PRACTICE OF AUTOCRACY

4.1. An autocratic leader

The practice of the New State did not follow to the letter the theory of government presented above. More and more an autocratic practice was perverting those ideas. This autocratic aspect is referred to by many authors - see just as examples BRADFORD 1973,88-89, CAMPINOS 1975,35-41, CRUZ 1982c, MARQUES 1976,203,215,220, WIARDA 1977,282,291,309 - and also by some actors - see CAETANO 1959,177-178 and CAETANO 1977.

CAETANO said in a famous speech in Coimbra (in 1951) "all institutions of the New State ended up gravitating around Salazar" and rhetorically asks if the New State is really a regime or just a "set of conditions which were adequate to the exercise of Power by a man of exceptional governing qualities" (NOTE 12). Caetano, in his memoir, tells several episodes which confirm this autocracy and resents, between the lines, the autocratic style (NOTE 13).

This autocracy had some ridiculous aspects, like the fact that Salazar was never told that he was no longer Prime Minister after his substitution in September 1968, due to physical and mental incapacity after an accident (see THOMAZ 1983,58-59 and 122-123 and PIRES 1973, WIARDA 1977,395-396).

This autocracy was given a religious legitimacy through the myth of the "providential man" which even Church leaders encouraged (chapter five, section 2.2.3). It was given a personal legitimacy by Salazar's ascetism, austerity and devotion to the job giving rise to the image of the mystic marriage of Salazar with the Nation; this legitimacy was carefully cultivated by Salazar with the diffusion of the idea that he did not want power(!), power was for him a total sacrifice and he only

carried his burden because it was in the interest of all (see SALAZAR to FERRO 1982,305-307).

4.2. Mechanisms of an autocratic leadership

Salazar's autocratic leadership was not only actively sought by distance, loneliness and ascetism and the image of constant self denial in the exercise of government. It was also sought by the use of several instrumental devices.

The substitution of group-decision making methods in Council of Ministers by individual meetings with the Ministers (NOTE 14), the creation of parallel decision-making bodies, like the Private Council (NOTE 15), the setting up of a system of personal accountability at top level instead of an institutional one (see GRAHAM 1975), the preference for "yes-men" for top jobs and the dismissal of some brilliant but not totally compliant men (NOTE 16), the system of recruitment for the elite through co-optation, the fragmentary pattern in public administration (NOTE 17) are all are devices to create and sustain autocratic leadership.

This autocracy was carefully preserved by the choice of submissive men for President of Republique, as will be seen in this chapter, Américo Thomaz being the most notorious example (1958-1974) (NOTE 18).

4.3. Autocratic leadership and limited pluralism

Autocratic leadership did not mean absolute power, that is, power above law and morals. It did not mean also ideological dogmatism or totalitarian indoctrination, but rather the monopoly of political initiative in the hands of Salazar, loyalty of every elite member and of the different groups towards the leader (which included personal accountability) and the cult of personality.

One must also recognize that many elite members actively pushed Salazar towards this role, above collegial bodies and elite groups.

So limited pluralism was not incompatible, to a certain degree, with Salazar's autocratic style. Probably the

heterogeneity of the elite demanded a mediator above factions and groups; this explains why part of it pushed Salazar towards autocracy.

Pluralism of opinion was admissible within the range of total loyalty and obedience to the leader (see SALAZAR I, 183-4). The counterpart of this agreement is that the leader should effectively hang over the different groups and opinions carefully avoiding total identification with any of them.

Two episodes can be presented as evidence of this implicit agreement between the leader and the elite which made compatible (relative) autocracy with (moderate) limited pluralism.

The relationships of SALAZAR with the monarchic group are a clear illustration of the ambiguity and compromise needed both for the leader and for the elite - see CAETANO's memoirs (1977) 361-393, 530-536. SALAZAR says explicitly in a letter to CAETANO *"It is clear we all agree that it had not been discussed the problem of the regime, [that is, Monarchy or Republique] [...] but not 'that it does not exist in Portugal any problem about the regime' [...] It had been possible to live [with the monarchics] because the question of the type of regime had been out of discussion. It is not convenient that it will be discussed, which mean that we must leave in suspense the monarchic solution and consider it, at least, as a future, remote and not defined possibility"* (SALAZAR in 1957 in CAETANO 1977, 533).

The other episode is the growing conflict between a conservative, "hawkish" faction led by a colonel minister of Defense (Santos Costa) and a more open one (called leftist by the other) led by CAETANO. Such a conflict could only be solved by the simultaneous dismissal of both (see CAETANO 1977, 578-583).

To conclude, the combination of autocratic leadership with limited pluralism meant, on one hand, that Salazar should carefully avoid the crystallization of the groups into political tendencies which could corner him (not allowing even a catholic tendency - see FERRO 1982, 85-86), on the other hand, it meant that Salazar should always seek a minimum

degree of equidistance and perform an arbitrational role within the elite.

4.4. Autocratic leadership and non participation within the elite

Autocratic leadership implied that participation and mobilization were limited, although not absent, within the elite (NOTE 19), since decisions came generally from the top without serious discussion of issues within the elite.

This led with time to political immobilism and demobilization within the elite. Pluralism became more respectful, the regime more grey and apathetic, rule more monotonous and habitual, loyalty more empty of real content beyond personal dedication. (This is notorious in the decline period of the regime which began after the dismissal of CAETANO and the coming of THOMAZ to Presidency of Republique (1958) - see MARQUES 1976, 220-221, WIARDA 1977, 210, 307-308).

This autocratic leadership meant that, in the educational system, even the elite was as much socialized as the masses to obey and conform - as MONICA says "In Portugal children of the ruling classes had also to learn not to question the legitimacy of the regime" (MONICA 1978, 286).

5. MECHANISMS OF NON PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE

The institutionalization of an elitist non participatory theory of government inevitably means the minimization or control of elections, since elections are the participatory mean "par excellence".

Elections can become unimportant because the elected bodies have no important roles, being the important decisions taken by non elected bodies; because they are so controlled that they cannot reflect the true opinion of the electorate; or because this is so restrictly defined that does not truly represent the citizens.

Let us analyse first the role of elected bodies and then

how elections were controlled.

5.1. The honorific role of the President of Republique

The President of Republique was directly elected by the Nation - see for this LUCENA 1976 a and CRUZ 1982 c. In theory, he had many powers including that of appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister, that is, until 1968, Salazar; he was the most important personality of the regime, he commands. In practice he was an unimportant figure, not even really the second one. This subalternity can not even be disguised under the face saving formula of CAETANO "bicephalic leadership" - see CRUZ 1982c, BLUME 1975; the fact was so evident that even the Corporative Chamber acknowledged, in 1971, that the President of Republique had "limited political powers" (NOTE 20).

The reasons for this weakness lay in the way he was proposed to be a candidate and the control of elections. The candidate was chosen by the "party", that is, by Salazar (NOTE 21) whom he, once elected, should reappoint or dismiss. Salazar never chose men of strong personality or great intelligence (NOTE 22). Secondly, since Salazar was the leader of the regime the candidate of the regime derived its strength from the fact that it was Salazar who proposed him - in a way it is true the political joke that if Salazar had chosen a traffic policeman he would be elected in the same way.

The President of Republique was, at its best, a "ceremonial leader of the Republique" (BLUME 1975), a "venerable" figure of the regime, at its worst, a puppet on a string and a source of damaging political jokes (NOTE 23).

But if the President (either "venerable" or puppet) was always inoffensive the same cannot be said of electoral campaigns. The 1949 campaign was worrying and the 1958 campaign put the elite in complete panic - see about this MARQUES 1976, ROBINSON 1979. So in 1959 the New State decided it was too risky to play the election game, even holding all the trump cards; so it transformed the system into an indirect election by an electoral college composed by the notables of the regime (NOTE 24). Before 1959 there was no

participation, after that there was not even the appearance of it.

The President of Republique was present in mass media and in school - instruments of social and political education of the portuguese - as the symbol of national unity and as such it should be above political or ideological discussions or criticisms.

This role was transmitted through school education since primary education. Reading textbooks included a text about the President of Republique and a portrait of him. The text was intended to inculcate respect and veneration for the "Chief of the great Portuguese Family" (NOTE 25).

The mass media usually qualified its reference to the Chief of State - it was called the "respectable" or the "venerable" President of Republique.

5.2. The ratifying role of "National Assembly"

5.2.1. The reasons for institutional eclecticism

It is worth beginning to call attention to the fact that the "National Assembly" (Assembleia Nacional) was not a parliament in the western european sense. The New State regime was strongly anti-parliamentarian. In the purest realization of its corporative principles there should not even exist a body based on individual votes of citizens, but just a body based on organic representation of the "structural elements" of the Nation - families, municipalities, corporations (see LUCENA 1976a,122-125). Since "the Corporative Chamber is, by its origin and composition, much more representative than the [National] Assembly" (SALAZAR IV,435) the existence of this one can be seen as a compromise and an indicator of institutional eclecticism (see chapter one, section 2.2)

There are internal and external reasons for the creation of an institution of parliamentary façade aside with a body of corporative representation (the subject of corporative representation will be developed in chapter 7).

As for internal reasons these rely heavily on mistrust of corporative representation. *"Whichever the extension of interests organized in corporations, there will be lacking always the representation of national interests, state like interests"* (SALAZAR I,388); *"it does not seem right that national interests be constituted by the mere combination of various material or moral interests..."* (SALAZAR IV,435 - see also SALAZAR V,494 and in FERRO 1982,275). As one deputy said *"The Nation is more than just the arithmetic sum of institutions. There are interests which are everybody's interests, but no group...can interpret"* (NOTE 26). The need for adequate representation of national interest justifies (either as transitional solution or definitive assumed eclecticism - see LUCENA 1976a,125-6), this solution.

But the need for international acceptability justifies also this compromise, although such reasons are not assumed (see ROBINSON 1979,68). It is good for external image to hold elections even if they are only *"para inglês ver"* (literally 'for the english to see'). International climate after the second world war was not favourable to authoritarian regimes.

5.2.2. Mechanisms of neutralizing the role and representativity of National Assembly

As it was just said, the reasons for providing parliamentary representation were exclusively strategic ; they did not come from any belief in the virtues of parliament. In fact, the regime was strongly anti-parliamentarian, so it is not surprising that several neutralizing mechanisms were built-in the National Assembly's role and representativity.

The very first was the obvious control of elections in order that only official candidates were elected.

Secondly, the choice of official candidates to deputies was controlled by Salazar himself. Thus elected deputies represented, at best, the balance of power within the regime, at worst, Salazar himself.

Thirdly, deputies were in very significative percentage terms mere representatives of the interests of Public Administration.

Salazar (IV,427-8) complains that in 1949 elections around 50% of the official candidates were civil servants (NOTE 27).

Fourthly, the work conditions of the Assembly completely perverted any serious parliamentary role - it worked only three months per year, deputies were part-time representatives, it depended financially on the budget of the Prime-Minister's office! (see about conditions BLUME 1975).

Fifthly, its powers were very limited - it could not promote the resignation of the Government; on the contrary it could in fact be dissolved by simple wish of Salazar via the President of Republic; it was not the normal legislative body (that was the Government) (NOTE 28); it could only approve the guidelines of any law and not any detailed articles (NOTE 29); its powers of supervision of Government and Public Administration actions were limited (NOTE 30); the individual initiative of deputies was limited, the main restriction being the interdiction of proposing bills which in any way increased state's expenses.

The history of National Assembly is the history of its extinguishment to use the words of one dissident deputy in 1971 (NOTE 31). It must be the only parliament which voted against a governmental proposal to increase the Assembly's power! (see CAETANO 1972a, 593).

It did not have even a participatory role for the elite, since great decisions were never made there. When in the regime's final agony period (beginnings of 1974) Caetano, then Primer-Minister, asked the Assembly to formulate an overseas policy the best the Assembly could produce was that it agreed with Government's policy, that is, it agreed with a policy for whose clarification it was asked to contribute!

5.2.3. The real role of National Assembly

What was then the real role of National Assembly? It was a forum for debate of technical problems and minor political problems. It was also in LUCENA's expression a "body of political sensibility of the regime" (LUCENA 1976a,152); that is, reflected balance of power within the ruling elite, since it worked as an instrument of the bargaining of internal

interests. It performed also a consultative role just as the Corporative Chamber. It had also an important "façade" role, a window dressing device of the regime, as said before - in this role it ratified and legitimized decisions taken elsewhere (GRAHAM 1975,32) that is, it had to rubber stamp governmental decisions in order to preserve the trappings of democratic decency.

Considering the real role it performed some authors do not consider National Assembly really a Parliament, even in a minimal sense of the word, but just the modern equivalent to medieval portuguese "cortes" (NOTE 32).

5.2.4. National Assembly - a discrete body

Contrarily to what happened with the President of Republique no reference was made in primary reading textbooks to the National Assembly. It was also not object of public attention in mass media.

This is obviously congruent with the social and political education of portuguese which did not encourage participation - consequently it did not even give relevance to formally participatory bodies.

(Only for a brief period - 1969-1972 - was the National Assembly object of attention of mass media, because of the discussions between extreme right wing and liberal members of parliament).

5.3. Control of electoral process

We have just seen that elections were unimportant because the elected bodies were unimportant. But they were unimportant because they were not truly representative due to several controls exerted in several stages of the electoral process.

This non representativeness is not surprising since the New State, congruently with its non participatory theory, did not believe in elections. *"I do not believe in universal suffrage, since individual vote does not take into account human differentiation [...] Men [...] must be equal in regard to law, but I consider dangerous to give to all the same political rights"* (SALAZAR VI,41). *"Happy are the nations which do not have, to make choices in the crucial moments of their life"* (SALAZAR III,310).

According to him portuguese people thought the same way.

"People has aversion to voting" (SALAZAR IV,190). So there were few direct elections - only President of Republic, (until 1959), National Assembly and the smallest local government body were directly elected.

5.3.1. Mechanisms of control of the electoral process

As said before, there were various controls in the process -who could be an elector, electoral registers, electoral campaigns, voting and counting of votes all was under strict control.

To be an elector was dependent, for men, on being literate or on the amount of tax payed by illiterates, and for women, on educational qualifications (generally secondary schooling) or on being heads of the family or, for those who did not qualify by previous criteria, on being married, literate and payers of house tax to the State - for all this see COMISSÃO...1979, 8-9 (for the electoral discrimination against women see Salazar's words in FERRO 1982,156-160 - NOTE 33 -; CAETANO ended up, in 1968, with this electoral discrimination - see COMISSÃO ...1979,9).

But all those who qualify could be prevented from having their names in electoral register when they "profess ideas contrary to [...] social discipline" or lack "moral idoneousness"; that is, those who openly declare to be oppositionists and to be prepared to act according may be excluded from being electors!

In this non favourable climate many of those entitled to vote did not bother to register (MARQUES 1976,191-2). Just to compare the effect of all this on actual electorate it is worth to call attention to the fact that electorate was, in 1973, around 1800000 and, in 1975, in the first election after the overthrow of the regime, the electorate was 6300000 - that is, in just two years there was an increase of 350% (see COMISSÃO ...1979,9) (NOTE 34).

But a second layer of controls was the practice of fraud on electoral register encouraged and permitted by the fact that no counterfoil or receipts of inscription was given and no access to electoral registers was allowed. Thus electoral registers were "prepared" - that is the euphemism

used in official documents to describe practices such as registering death people, not registering people allowed to vote, double registering some voters, etc. (for documental evidence of those practices see COMISSÃO...1979).

A third layer of controls was during the electoral campaign. It included governmental support to official candidates (see COMISSÃO...1979), strict control of mass media reporting of the campaign (NOTE 35), open propaganda in media of official candidates, sometimes prohibition of Opposition meetings, persecution of civil servants involved in oppositionist campaigns (see COMISSÃO...1979).

A fourth layer of controls was implemented in the electoral act itself. They included inexistence of adequate guarantees for oppositionists, supervision of voting, deliberate miscounting of votes, "carousel" and other frauds (NOTE 36).

It is very interesting to record that NOGUEIRA, ex minister of Salazar and his biographer, acknowledges those frauds - he admits that in the presidential election of 1958 the Opposition candidate (General Humberto Delgado) could have had 10% or 20% less votes due to fraud (NOGUEIRA 1980, 513 note - see page 503). CAETANO, in his memoirs admits, in relation to the same election a fraud of 15% of votes (CAETANO 1977, 577).

5.3.2. Electoral practice

What was the result of all those controls in actual electoral participation? The average participation (percentage of actual voters in reference to total population) was from 1934 to 1945 between 5.3% and 8.6% and from 1953 on it stabilized around 11-13% (Source: SCHMITTER 1979). Turn out, that is, percentage of actual voters in reference to inscribed electorate, was extraordinarily constant - from 1934 to 1942 it was located between 79% and 86.6%; the 1945 election showed the worst turn-out of all New State elections - 57.3%; from 1953 to 1965 turn out remained between 72.2% and 77.3%; the 1969 and 1973 election showed a slight decrease in turn-out - respectively 62.5 and 67.2% (Source: SCHMITTER 1979).

This constancy is due to preferential registering of people in electoral registers and to the high proportion in registers of civil servants and other employees dependent on the state or governmental appointments (for instance, employees of local bodies, Corporative bodies, mixed economy companies, etc.) since there was a strict control of actual voting of civil servants (it could be registered the name of those who did not vote - see COMISSÃO...1979, GONÇALVES 1981).

5.3.3. Why was it necessary control so heavily participation of a passive people?

This question arises naturally from confrontation of such layers of controls with Salazar's theory about the portuguese man. Such a question imposes itself even more when one takes into consideration the other controls existent in portuguese society - there was no freedom of press, speech, meetings, there was no Opposition in parliament. Why so many controls for a naturally passive and apathetic people?

In relation to elections a partial explanation can be given - the regime wanted not only to win, but also to obtain a crushing victory, which was to kill two birds with one stone, since it avoided the entrance of oppositionist deputies in National Assembly and, at the same time, it contributed to internal legitimacy and international acceptability.

But this is not the whole explanation. One can very legitimately suspect that Salazar did not believe fully in his diagnosis of portuguese man. This calls attention to how much portuguese passivity and conformism was result of deliberate non participatory policies.

5.4. The role of the "União Nacional" - the sole party

5.4.1. An official civic association

According to official statements the "União Nacional" (National Union) was not a party and so should not cultivate partisan spirit (see SALAZAR I, 94-95, 346-347, IV, 183 and in FERRO 1982, 87). Consequently, it is not a sole party (SALAZAR I, 346-347, IV, 270). "It is open to cooperation of all men of

good will provided they accept some basic principles of the New State (SALAZAR IV,183 - see also IV,469,V,398,406-407, VI,356-357). Membership of the National Union is not necessary to be appointed for political posts or public offices - see SALAZAR IV,184, VI,169-170,242 (NOTE 37).

So officially the National Union is a "civic association which linked government and people" (CAETANO 1977,289), "an association without partisan character and independent from the State which aims essentially at gathering the largest possible number of citizens, without distinction of political colour, in order to support the State and to defend public opinion..." (QUEIRÓ 1946) (NOTE 38).

5.4.2. National Union was not a mobilizing organization

The National Union was not a mobilizing party (MARTINS 1986,PAYNE 1979b, SANTOS 1982, SCHMITTER 1975,65, WIARDA 1977, 118-9). There was no mass recruitment (SCHMITTER 1975,65 note 27, LUCENA 1979a), it had no penetration on the life of the nation (LUCENA 1979a) it did not mobilize people for genuine mass demonstrations (almost all demonstrations were staged ones - see comment of THOMAZ 1983,311), it did not have any significant doctrinaire production, it was invaded by civil servants (CRUZ 1982c, PARREIRA 1982, WIARDA 1977,119) and logically never undermined or even challenged the political authority of the bureaucratic apparatus (SCHMITTER 1979).

Even in the beginning the National Union was apathetic, that is, not even initially it showed any signs of dynamism. This can be clearly seen in the account of its first Congress given in PARREIRA 1982 and also in CAETANO's memoirs (CAETANO 1977, 59-60).

Although it was intended to be passive it overdid it sometimes and even Salazar occasionally complained of its inefficiency (SALAZAR VI,376-377). CAETANO, who had very important posts in National Union, said in a letter to Salazar in 1947 "I thought [...] that Government had the intention of promoting a true civic mobilization[...] But realities became entirely against my suppositions. Government[...] goes on being the only active political reality supported by the

administrative apparatus and the polices" (CAETANO 1977,299 - see also pages 59-60,299-304).

Indeed National Union was very dependent on the Government - it was created by decree-law(!), was set up initially by the Home Office, it depended financially on the latter (see COMISSÃO...1979,71-72 and 81-83).

The non mobilizational role, acknowledged by authors and actors alike, is very congruent with our main hypothesis about the essential demobilizational nature of the New State. It is also congruent with limited pluralism and heterogeneous recruitment for the elite. As PINTO, an extreme right-wing militant, commented with disillusion the National Union was, "like bourgeois parties in pluralist systems, an organization of persons and interests, united by affinities and personal loyalty to a leader" (PINTO 1973,87).

5.4.3. The National Union was not influential within the elite

In theory the National Union could have been a non mobilizational party in regard to masses and a dynamic and influential party within the elite. It could have been an agency of political education for the elite.

This was also not the case. National Union was never a "cadres" party, a policy formulator, a doctrinaire organization, or even a think-thank group or planning office. As CAETANO acknowledges only government fulfilled those roles (see CAETANO 1977,299,293-294 - see also 332-334).

As indicator of this non influential role for the elite one can point that many deputies were not members of National Union (CAETANO 1977,304).

Another indicator of this non-influence is the concern with which even from the beginning (see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 86) no internal dynamism was allowed. As a notable of the regime said "We do not recognize parties outside National Union. Within it we do not allow groups" (NOTE 39). Since CAETANO, when president of National Union, seemed to have other opinions he came into conflict with Salazar and resigned from the post (CAETANO 1977,59-60,285-334) (NOTE 40).

This meant that no ideological groups or political tendencies were allowed (monarchists seemed to be an exception NOTE 41), only personal affinities groups or interest groups. In those conditions it is not surprising that National Union never instilled any dynamism within the elite.

5.4.4. The actual role of National Union

What was then the actual role of National Union? If it was not a mass party nor a doctrinaire or a cadres party, if it was not an agency of political education of the elite, if it did not mobilize neither people nor the elite, if it did not influence public opinion or government policies what did the National Union live for?

Its first real role was precisely to avoid political mobilization, since the official comprehensiveness of National Union (symbolized in its name) was used as legitimacy basis to prohibit any political activity or group outside it, even right wing groups (see in chapter one the case of national -syndicalists). The conclusions of its first congress already emphasized this - see PARREIRA 1982.

A second role was to control participation within the supporters of the regime. Limited pluralism and heterogeneous background of the elite and of its recruitment patterns could be dangerous, since they could degenerate into centrifugal forces. The National Union served to "hinder the crystallization of tendencies within the regime" (LUCENA 1979a). Pluralism, even limited, should be kept under control.

A third role was to deprive the Army from legitimacy to go on assuming any political role (PARREIRA 1982).

A fourth role was to act as a vast patronage machine which could explore situationism. CAETANO, in his memoirs, acknowledged this role, even calling National Union's President (himself at the time) "general agent of Countryside in Lisbon" for making personal and local demands accepted by central bureaucratic services (CAETANO 1977, 294, 300) - see WIARDA 1977, 118-119, 181, 295.

A fifth role was to act as the instrument of presenting

nationalistic candidates for elections.

A sixth role was to serve as a sort of Honors Chamber of the regime (a "collection of notables" - WIARDA 1977,118), a "regrouping of prominent people" - LUCENA 1979a).

5.4.5. Was National Union a party?

Taking all this into account one can ask if National Union was really a party.

CRUZ addresses this questions - he suggests that what was rejected was the liberal democratic conception of party. So National Union was not a state or government party, but it was a civic party, whose aim was not political participation, but civic cooperation (CRUZ 1980,378-382, CRUZ 1982c). But it is probably more useful to consider it "more as a bureaucratic appendage of the regime than a political party in the Anglo-American sense" (WIARDA 1977,294), since its degree of autonomy from the state and from government and administration was minimum.

To conclude one can say that National Union was not a mechanism of participation for the masses or for the elite.

5.5. Conclusion - there were no mechanisms of participation in public life

One can conclude that there was no participation neither through elections nor through party membership. Participation could logically come yet, in a corporative regime, through Corporations, but that was not the case since corporations were inextricably mixed up with the administrative apparatus, as shall be seen in chapter eight. Participation could still exist at local level, through local government, but that was not at all the case as will be discussed in chapter eight (Those two possible channels of participation were not analysed here just because they will be better dealt with in other chapter).

Participation through elections was also dependent, for men and even more for women, on formal school education. Since there was not any attempt of mass education there were always many illiterate persons - the rate of illiteracy was 67.8% in 1930, 55% in 1940, 45% in 1950, 38,1% in 1960, 30% in 1968, which placed Portugal below all other european countries (MARQUES 1976,203-204). This means that the legal restrictions for voting based on literacy were very important. So there was a formal link between education and political participation.

Some authors say that the regime did not need a mobilizing party as a agency for the participation of the masses, because the Catholic Church did the mobilization the regime needed (LOURENÇO 1982b). Others say that it was the Army which filled the role of the mass party (CABRAL 1976, GINER 1982, JESUÍNO 1982, MARQUES 1976).

Those explanations do not obliterate the point that the New State did not need a specific agency for ideological or political mobilization (which the Church was not) nor for participation of citizens in public life (which the Army was not).

The Catholic Church always had an important mobilizational role towards a type of mentality and patterns of life which were also the most adequate for the regime - hence the "moral union" between them. But this only proves that this mentality inculcation was enough for New State purposes.

Indeed the absence of a specific mobilising party comes from the fact that mobilisation in public areas was not the aim of the regime.

CHAPTER III

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE EXPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES - THE INCULCATION OF PASSIVITY THROUGH THE CURRICULUM

It has already been said that it is this work's contention that demobilization was the main goal of the New State. There were three tasks inherent to the achievement of this goal - to maintain demobilised the "rural man" which was considered naturally passive (a judgement which was extended to the less educated urban strata); to actively demobilise (or keep mobilisation level under strict control) urban élites, mainly in great cities; and to control organizations which were potentially mobilising - the Church, the Army, the University.

The first task was almost completely achieved through the referred mechanisms of non participation of citizens in public life and through centralization which removed decision from local bodies and local arenas.

The other tasks demanded the setting up of specific demobilising strategies. The object of the following four chapters is to proceed to the analysis of such strategies. Each chapter begins with a general analysis of the demobilising strategy and then shows how the educational system participated in it.

1. A TYPIFICATION OF NEW STATE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES

It seemed useful to present those strategies under a four category typology. This may help to clarify the regime's intentions and essence.

It is suggested that one can consider expressive, administrative, organizational and repressive strategies as four main types of political strategies.

The first type - expressive strategies - comprehends those ones where demobilisation is pursued through mentality inculcation and attitudes imprinting. The main

instrument of this type of strategy are generally the educational system, youth organizations and the mass media

The second type comprises the use of direct control by the State of access resources and decision-making to achieve conformism. This means control of access to jobs, job security, salaries, promotions, allocation of resources, etc. but also the monopoly of decision-making in the center of administrative state departments. There are two subtypes - direct control, related with the first aspects, and centralization, related with the last one. Those administrative strategies use the direct power of the State and so they are more used towards those who are more directly linked or dependent on state departments.

A third type includes strategies which are aimed towards powerful social institutions like the Army, Church, Universities, Trade Unions, etc. Those include some subtypes - compartmentalization (a strategy of isolation), co-optation (a strategy of recruitment of members for the elite from leaders of those powerful organizations) and organizational pre-emptying (occupation of an organizational space mainly to avoid the occupation of the same space by others).

A fourth type is made up by repressive strategies - they can consist in the suppression of freedoms and of information (censorship) and in the direct repression of mobilising actions.

This chapter and the next one will analyse expressive strategies, chapter five the administrative and organizational strategies and chapter six the repressive strategies and the new changing strategies in 1960s .

2. EXPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES

2.1. Ideological indoctrination versus mentality inculcation

First of all one must distinguish between ideological indoctrination and mentality inculcation. The former is a political indoctrination in an articulate ideology the latter is an inculcation of values, norms, habits and attitudes. This distinction made by LINZ follows the line which separates totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. (see above chapter one).

Ideological indoctrination is a mobilising strategy, necessary to implement new ideas, new theories or new worldviews, that is, it is a strategy to mobilise for change. On the contrary, mentality inculcation can be compatible with demobilisation when just pursuing the imprinting of traditional patterns of life thought to be always present in the national soul. In this case inculcation of traditional patterns is a strategy for non change, for preservation; thus it reinforces conformist attitudes.

So to carry evidence for the hypothesis of the demobilising essence of the regime one must prove that mentality inculcation, rather than ideological indoctrination, was the aim of the New State (see MONICA 1978, 355).

We will try to confirm our hypothesis

a) analyzing what New State leaders thought about the political education of people (that is, ideological education of masses), aided by the analysis of the speeches of Salazar;

b) analyzing what New State leaders thought about political propaganda;

Those two analysis will show that political education was neither really intended (except possibly in the period of tactical and defensive fascistization of the regime - see chapter one) nor practised, and that political propaganda was not ideological indoctrination.

The confirmation of the hypothesis will continue

c) analyzing New State theory about the portuguese "mentality minimum", that is, the basic beliefs, sentiments and attitudes portuguese should have to make feasible the ruling of New State;

d) analysing New State means (strategies of the expressive type) to achieve this;

e) describing the basic pattern of life envisaged for portuguese people in general.

The second part of the chapter will analyze how this passive pattern of life was inculcated through the school curriculum. A detailed analysis of the portuguese "mentality minimum" will be done through the messages contained in the reading textbooks of primary education in the next chapter.

2.2. Political education of people

2.2.1. Appeals for political education of people and its non implementation

The need of political education of people was occasionally emphasized (SALAZAR III, 25, 33, 37, V, 142-144) mainly of new generations (SALAZAR III, 199-203, CAETANO 1952, 11). These appeals were generally vague, since they never explained what political education has to be done, where and how (see, for instance, SALAZAR IV, 278, V, 144).

But those appeals were not implemented as can be evidenced by SALAZAR's complaints that the National Union never provided political education for masses - in 1938 (SALAZAR III, 26), in 1947 (SALAZAR IV, 76), in 1953 (SALAZAR V, 142), in 1965 (SALAZAR VI, 376) (NOTE 1).

SALAZAR's acknowledgment in 1965 that, in Portugal, only two organizations cared about the formation of their militants - the Church and the Communist Party - (SALAZAR VI, 376 - see also V, 142-143) evidence that political education was not even provided for New State's elite.

To carry further evidence one can analyze what SALAZAR and CAETANO said about corporative education. There are the same appeals to the need of corporative education of masses (SALAZAR III, 367, IV, 433), the recognition of the need of corporative education of corporative leaders (SALAZAR III, 367, CAETANO 1941, 9, 31-34) alongside with the acknowledgment that it had not been done (CAETANO 1941, 31-32, 80-81, CAETANO 1950, 12, CARDOSO 1949).

Further evidence can be found to support the argument that political education was not practiced through analysing New State leaders statements about the political education of youth. CAETANO speaking about this education, through New State youth organization ("Mocidade Portuguesa"), is very moderate. He just says "Let us make from each portuguese a conscious agent [...] of the politics which suits the Nation [...] a devoted servant, in all and above all, of national interest" (CAETANO 1952, 11). Speaking of the "integral formation of youth" he defines it just as "that which develops in youth all virtualities towards the Good" (CAETANO 1952, 35).

The appeals are directed towards obedience and christian religious and moral formation. This will be analyzed in more detail in chapter nine, when describing the project and activities of New State youth organization, and acknowledging its deliberate sharing of influence over youth with the family and Catholic Church. Indeed "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese Youth) was not a mobilising agency.

From all this one can conclude

- firstly, that political education was never practiced which is acknowledged by actors, as seen above, and authors alike, as seen in chapter one.

- secondly, that mobilizing political education of people or even of elites, was never truly intended by New State regime.

The fact that political education programs were never implemented is a strong indicator that it was never really fully intended. This indicator seen in the context of what had been said in previous chapters increases its importance. But one can carry more specific evidence if one proves that for the most part the statements appealing for the political education of the masses were produced in the tactical and defensive fascistization period of the regime (1933-1945) - see chapter one. Indeed this is the case.

All the three speeches of SALAZAR specifically devoted to political education and propaganda come from this period - "National Propaganda", in October 1933, (SALAZAR I, 261-268), "Political education - guarantee of revolutionary continuity" in 1938 (SALAZAR III, 25-38), and "Aims and needs of political propaganda" in 1940 (SALAZAR III, 193-211). The quotations of this part about the political education of people were taken mainly from these last two speeches. The same applies to the quotation of CAETANO (CAETANO 1952, 11) which is part of guidelines he produced for Portuguese Youth, when he was its leader, between 1940 and 1944.

We will now provide evidence that shows that this period (1933-1945) was an exception in the regime, thus carrying weight to the assertion that political education of masses was never implemented.

2.2.2 Analysis of the receivers of leader's speeches to provide indicators of the exceptional character of the mobilising period

We will use the division into periods presented in Chapter 1 in the analysis of evolution in the addresses of Salazar's speeches. This diachronic analysis will present an indicator of the exceptional character of the mobilising period, which is instrumental to show that the radical and dynamic appeal of that period (inherent to the tactical and defensive mobilising strategies) did not repeat itself in later periods.

(For details of the methodology used to build the Tables 3.1 and 3.2 see chapter two, section 3).

In Table 3.1 and 3.2 were recorded only those communications addressed to elites or to masses, that is, it were excluded communications categorized as "various". Caetano's rule period was included here to provide a term of comparison with the four periods of Salazar's rule, but will not be object of analysis..

TABLE 3.1

ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RECEIVERS OF NEW STATE LEADER'S SPEECHES

	1st.Period 1926-1933	2nd Period 1933-1945	3rd Period 1945-1958	4th Period 1958-1968	5th Period 1968-1974
Elite	10 91%	48 53%	27 63%	14 58%	42 51%
Masses	1 9%	43 47%	16 37%	10 42%	41 49%
TOTAL	11 100%	91 100%	43 100%	24 100%	83 100%

TABLE 3.2

ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS PER PERIODS*

	1st Period 1926-1933	2nd Period 1933-1945	3rd Period 1945-1958	4th Period 1958-1968	5th Period 1968-1974	TOTAL
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMMUNICA- TIONS - Periods 1 - 4	7%	54%	25%	14%		100%
PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO MASSES - Pe- riods 1 - 4	1%	61%	23%	14%		99%
AVERAGE COMMUNICATIONS PER YEAR	2.2**	7.3	3.4	2.3	14.9	

*NOTE: The analysis exclude Communications categorized as addressed to various, that is, neither addressed to masses or to elite. The number of years in each period was calculated in years, months and days.

**NOTE: For this calculation the first period began in 27-4-1928, the day in which Salazar entered in the Government.

It is evident that, among the four periods which are studied in this work, the one in which communication to masses was a very important strategy was the second period - in this mobilizing period 47% of the analyzed communications were addressed to masses (average is 41% as can be seen in Table 2.2 - Page 62). But the difference between this period and the others is still more clear analyzing Table 3.2 - in fact 54% of all communications and 61% of all those addressed to masses in the forty two years which the four periods encompass (1926-1968) were produced just in those twelve more mobilising years (1933-1945). Average communication per year in this period is more than double that of any other of the four periods.

So it seems demonstrated that: a) The second period was a more mobilising period than that one which preceded it and the two which followed it; b) This mobilizing pattern of communication was not repeated in the next two periods studied (the clear difference with Caetano period is not object of analysis here).

2.2.3. Conclusion - absence of political education of masses

Returning to what it have been said about political education of masses, it can be concluded from all that was said and analyzed in the two previous sections, that the period in which various appeals to political education of people were produced was an exceptional one within the regime. One can further hypothesise that this mobilizing style was part of the radical tone inherent to the tactical and defensive mobilising-like strategies of the fascistization period of the regime.

The fact that those appeals were never transformed into action is perfectly congruent with this interpretation. Thus Portugal went on in a process in which the legal revolution preceeded the mental one, to use SALAZAR's words (SALAZAR III, 366).

This absence of political education has been compensated, according to SALAZAR, by the basic mentality of the people - the "faith in those principles which consubstantiate the soul, traditions and aspirations of portuguese Nation" (SALAZAR III, 210), the intuition of portuguese people (SALAZAR III, 37) "the consistent lusitanian [portuguese] background, the lessons of history and the examples of its men of great worth, the healthy tradition of our ancestors" (SALAZAR VI, 377).

So it is necessary to analyse in greater detail this basic mentality of portuguese in which SALAZAR and the elite were so confident. But before this it is yet necessary to clarify the meaning the regime gave to political propaganda.

2.3. Political propaganda

Sometimes SALAZAR uses the concept of political propaganda in a very comprehensive meaning encompassing governmental propaganda and political education, that is, encompassing both political information and political formation (SALAZAR III, 195). At other times he uses the concept in the limited meaning of propaganda - publicity of realizations, advertisement of rulers (see SALAZAR I, 262-264). We will consider now this restricted meaning, since we have just analyzed political education.

For SALAZAR political propaganda is justified for two related reasons. Firstly, because "politically it only exists which is known to exist" (SALAZAR III, 196). If the government builds roads or schools, but only those who live nearby know it, it is, as far as politics is concerned, as if it had done nothing. So it is necessary to advertise publicly those achievements

(see SALAZAR I,263-264, III,196 - see also SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,120). In this way propaganda has the role of giving to the common citizen the national dimension about government policies and realizations, since "it is very difficult to see the world from the window of our room" (SALAZAR I,263) and it is dangerous to form opinions about national realities just by playing the philosopher in the threshold of one's door (SALAZAR I,264) (NOTE 2).

The second reason for the need of national propaganda is that "in politics, what seems to be, is". This motto was much invoked by SALAZAR (SALAZAR I,263, III,27,196,198) (NOTE 3) and opposes what seems to be (for public opinion) to what really is. Propaganda has the role of presenting things as they really are (that is, as they officially are, we add).

For those two purposes it was created in October 1933 a "Secretariate for National Propaganda".

In contrast to what happened with political education intentions, political propaganda was effectively practiced.

A secretariate was created to promote and coordinate it (later on called National Secretariate for Information), which had also, had, until 1950^S, a certain role in the promotion of culture and arts (MARQUES 1976,207-208). The mass media and the school were also very important agents of governmental propaganda. As SALAZAR predicted in 1933 it could not avoid "all personal flattering references nor all tributes paid to those who assert themselves by their work, their dedication, the unselfishness in serving public cause" (SALAZAR I,262). Indeed it was not avoided.

Propaganda was an expressive strategy used by the regime in order to create in citizens an attitude favourable to the New State and its rulers and to increase the legitimacy of their rule (NOTE 4). It was not a strategy of ideological formation, but rather of factual information (or misinformation); it was not a strategy of mobilization neither through ideological indoctrination nor through participation. It appealed rather to compliance and conformism, to obedience and quiet

acceptance of things as they were - it did not appeal to any kind of revolution, but to mere situationism (NOTE 5). So the existence of political propaganda does not prejudice our main hypothesis about the passive and demobilising nature of the regime.

Political propaganda was not even a pure expressive strategy, since it can only be efficient in a repressive context of suppression of freedom where control of mass media and censorship is indispensable.

Having evidenced that political education of people was not really intended and that political propaganda, which was implemented, was not a mobilizing strategy, we will analyze the process of mentality inculcation which was intended and implemented, as part of the expressive conformist strategies.

2.4. The inculcation of a passive mentality

2.4.1. The "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure"

In the preface SALAZAR wrote for his interviews given to A. FERRO he says that he just wants to have healthy man (neither sick nor athletic), patient, calm and tenacious

(neither abulic nor agitated) - "all this is very little but I will manage to draw the rest" (SALAZAR 1933). He goes on to say *"The formation of a solid collective conscience did not support nor demand that we would go beyond the basic aspirations and sentiments which constitute the mental and moral structure of the portuguese"*.

(SALAZAR IV,467) - see similar ideas in SALAZAR I, 94,II,27,III , 210,IV,510-511, V 515,1936 and in ASSAC 1952,17.

It is clear from those texts that SALAZAR appealed just to general values and attitudes already present in portuguese life, that is, he appealed to traditional patterns of life. This is congruent with what was said above about Salazar's new man (Chapter 2). Consequently Salazar did neither preach nor practice any frenetic style of government.

2.4.2. The "mild but constant pressure"

"A leader cannot be considered inferior or dishonest for conducting men without them noticing it" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982).

FERRO said to Salazar "[I think] your aspiration, your obstinate dream is to modify, little by little, patiently, our mentality". SALAZAR liked the idea and improved it - he preferred to use the image of *"a screw which bores slowly without hurting the wood, which does a mild but constant pressure, penetrating little by little without ever provoking a lively reaction of the matter"* (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 168-169).

So SALAZAR says that one must govern "slowly, little by little" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 166), "without trepidations nor hesitations nor backward movements" (SALAZAR VI, 443), calmly, generously, with a touch of indulgence (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982 116-117 - see also pages 190-191, 260).

The "mild but constant pressure" is the explicit mean SALAZAR uses to maintain those "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" and to build a passive man, without him noticing it.

So violence is not necessary - one must govern without violence, even for the reason that the portuguese are people of mild customs (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 115-117, SALAZAR II, 70-71).

In fact SALAZAR could not dispense with all violence, mainly because not all men accepted to be so passive and conformist as he wanted, but physical violence was never the main strategy of New State.

This invisible pressure is a means to inculcate a basic mentality in the portuguese. Which was this basic mentality?

2.4.3. The basic mentality - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority

The basic mentality the New State tried to inculcate was very clearly defined by SALAZAR in 1936, ten years after the "coup d'etat" which brought about the regime *"We take for granted God and virtue; we take for granted Fatherland and its History; we take for granted authority and its prestige; we*

take for granted family and its moral; we take for granted the glory of work and its duty" (see SALAZAR II,127-141 - see also, SALAZAR V,86)

This gave rise to a very well known slogan - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority - which is a synthesis of traditional mentality.

This mentality will be the basis for the analysis of school curricula.

2.4.4. The basic pattern of life - an apolitical life

If the collective conscience just needed to believe in God, Fatherland, Family, Authority and Work then the common citizen should just go to church, be a patriot, lead a family life, be always obedient to authorities and be embedded in his work. That is, politics should never impinge upon his habitual routine. That is, he should have only private activities and private strategies to solve his problems, never he should think of public strategies.

For politics was considered evil. The partisan politics, the politics of the others, was inherently evil (see LOURENÇO 1976, 23). Even the regime's political activity, although necessary, had just a secondary role - *"[...] for us this [political] activity has as only useful goal to give expression and political value to government acts. To govern, leading national conscience, is the only truly consistent and serious role"* (SALAZAR IV,487 - see also II,72-74) (NOTE 6).

FERRO already set up this tone of apoliticism in 1933 when he said "let us patiently wait that he [Salazar] fulfills his promises" (FERRO 1982,181). A very popular comic actor synthesised in the 1960^s this attitude in the motto "My only politics is my work and I always got on well with it" (NOTE 7).

It is as if the New State proposed an implicit pact between the regime and the Nation: ruling and government was up to the New State elite - common citizens should not care about it, in turn the State will not interfere, unlike totalitarian regimes, with private life of people. The pact was generally kept by both sides.

How far did this apolitical attitude penetrate portuguese mentality? SCHMITTER in his simulated pattern of support for the regime divides the population into five categories - active enthusiasts, passive supporters, semi-opponents, active opponents and excluded apathetics. The last group is estimated as the predominant one and the first as the least important (never exceeding 10%) - see SCHMITTER 1975 b. From the 1960^s onwards there was an increase in the mobilization of university students and trade unions. But the apolitical attitude penetrated well enough to make possible the very long survival of the regime, since "this form of political domination [...] does not depend on enthusiasm. It cultivates and survives because of passive opportunism and passivity" (SCHMITTER 1975 b).

2.5. Inculcating a passive mentality

2.5.1. Inculcating a passive mentality through mass media

The regime did not directly control newspapers, cinema or theatres', did not have the monopoly of radio; there were two private powerful radio stations and other less important besides the official one. The only means of communication which was monopolized by the State was television (television

only began to be influential in the 1960^s).

The rejection of monopoly of mass media is an indication of absence of mobilization intention (see MONICA 1978,355). Additional evidence for the non mobilisational role of mass media comes from the fact that no large scale programs of ideological indoctrination through mass media were implemented, there was no diffusion in large scale of doctrinaire books, magazines or leaflets.

The closest thing to a mobilising message was the constant manichaen presentation of facts, through the medium of fairy-tale stories, dividing the nation and the world between the good and the evil ones, the nation and the anti-nation, the deffensors of christian western civilization and its attackers, us and them. The role of the bad guy was internationally played by the communist nations, mainly the Soviet Union, and internally by the clandestine communist party (NOTE 8).

The mass media was used for permanent governmental propaganda through manipulation of information which any sample of editorials, television news or newsreel can show. As said this had no intention of mobilizing the common man, but to enhance its passive acceptance of things as were presented to him.

But political propaganda was not the only expressive use of the mass media. The less visible effects of suppression of information (through censorship) were probably much more important than the visible and explicit propaganda. In so far as it imposed the transmission to masses of a non problematic, consensual, highy moralistic and almost rosy vision of portuguese society, censorship had powerful expressive consequences. But as censorship is essentially a repressive strategy, even when it has important expressive consequences, this subject will be dealt later on in this chapter, when speaking about repressive strategies.

All this fits well with the "mild but constant pressure" used towards the inculcation of respect for God, Fatherland, Family and Authority, the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure".

In sum, the mass media was used for government's propaganda and for the inculcation of a passive mentality and not for political education of citizens or other mobilising strategy.

2.6. Inculcating a passive mentality through the educational system

Educational systems are ideal vehicles for the diffusion of social or political projects in so far as all new generations can be influenced.

2.6.1. The school as an explicit agent of mentality inculcation

Salazar acknowledged this fact *"We cannot understand, neither could we permit that the Portuguese schools should remain neutral in this struggle [against communist] [...] We are compelled to state that we do not recognize liberty as against the nation, the common good, the family and morality. On the contrary, we wish the family and the schools indelibly to imprint on the growing mind those high ideals which characterize our civilization, together with the deep love of country akin to the love of those who have created and extended our heritage in the past"* (SALAZAR I, 313-314), translation of SALAZAR 1939,209). The schools could not be divorced from the nation (SALAZAR I, 307). The school should be the "sacred workshop of souls" (SALAZAR I, 306).

CAETANO follows the same line of thought "The school is mobilized for the struggle. It has an ideal - the greatness of the Fatherland through the noble-mindedness of his children" (CAETANO 1937, in 1941,148).

This same function is assigned to the University, "the portuguese spiritual factory" (SALAZAR I, 306). *"We would not understand that the University undermined the ideals of the civilization of which it is the exponent [...] It would not be understandable that the University rebelled against God, denied Christian redemption, put in doubt the moral and social necessity of the independence of the Fatherland, or purposed to explain the World under the light of a materialist conception"* said CAETANO in 1942 (in CAETANO 1959,342).

The action of the school is essential for the building of the new man, as said above (pages 28-29). "The primary school is the nursey that society has to cultivate the ethic and professional values which it needs and experiment the man which suits it" ("Escola Portuguesa" 1934, official educational bulletin, in MONICA 1978,132).

The successive ministers of Education, in the different analyzed periods, share those ideas, although with different emphasis and styles.

CORDEIRO-RAMOS (1930-1933) defends the view that the school transmits a favourable version of portuguese Discoveries (CORDEIRO-RAMOS 1933a). TAMAGNINI (1934-1936) says that the first function of the portuguese school is to serve the national interests (TAMAGNINI 1936,59).

CARNEIRO-PACHECO (1936-1940) gives a mobilising appeal to those ideas, in the mobilising period. He criticizes the decadence of the race (1936a) and is confident that *"portuguese youth, free from the morbidity of the 'fado' [national fatalistic song] [...] will sing from side to side, in a virile chorus of pure voices [...] the imperishable faith in the destinies of Fatherland"* (1936a). He presents Salazar as the leader, that is "the spiritual guide of the People for the definitive victories of its destiny" (1935b) and as the *"great educator of our time"* (1935b) (NOTE 9). The teacher should be a *"moulder of souls and of portuguese"* (1936b). The teachers who will not accept this role should give up, *"since the hour is not for objections, but for action; and one is not portuguese only because one was born in Portugal"* (1936a, 1936b). CARNEIRO-PACHECO does not think that school is enough to guarantee the moral aims of the New State and creates the "Portuguese Youth" in military moulds (1936a, 1936c, 1938a).

The following Minister Mário FIGUEIREDO (1940-1944) speaks of impregnating "the soul of the youth of the values of the New State thought" (in SAMPAIO 1976,61).

After the second period these type of statements lost their mobilising tone. LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961) emphasises overall the nationalist role of the school in several speeches. GALVÃO-

-TELLES (1962-1968) puts side by side nationalism and catholicism as guides for school action - see GALVÃO-TELLES 1966a

Summing up, it is clear that the political and educational leaders of the New State saw the school as an explicit agent of mentality inculcation.

2.6.2. God, Fatherland, Family and Authority - the mentality inculcated by the school

As has already been said, Salazar defined, in the tenth anniversary of the setting up of the regime, the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority.

This was considered henceforth the gospel of the New State (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1938b). This motto was glossed in several occasions - see, for instance, CAETANO 1952,45, CARNEIRO PACHECO, 1938b, GALVÃO-TELLES 1964c, 1966a, 55.

The ministers of Education saw also the function of school as inculcating respect for God, love and sacrifice for the Fatherland, dedication to Family and obedience to Authority.

CORDEIRO-RAMOS (1930-1933) speaks against materialism (1932), against the presentation by the republicans of a materialist interpretation of the portuguese Discoveries. He proposes that the regime must present a glorious and religious presentation of Discoveries, he defends the important role of history in the formation of youth, since Portugal is a stronghold of christian western civilization (1933a).

TAMAGNINI (1934-1936) speaks of "reintegrating all that belongs to the national soul, all that is moral [...] all that is essentially human - the cultural aspect and the religious aspect, the thirst for knowledge and the respect for God (1936,4 - see also pages 86-87). He defends the view that all that does not possess a nationalist meaning in the structure of secondary school should be eliminated (1936,59) and assigns as the main role of grammar school education "the nationalist formation of the youth which will be the Nation leading elite" (1936,65).

In the second period mentality inculcation slid towards

ideological indoctrination. CARNEIRO-PACHECO, more than any other, asserted in his mobilizing style the dominance of education (meaning socialization) over instruction as a function of the educational system. He probably shared ALFREDO PIMENTA's thought that the portuguese people had too much instruction for the education it had (PIMENTA 1927, in CORTESÃO 1982,221). He tried to implement in an integrated whole the prevalence of education over instruction, as will be seen in a next section. He emphasized constantly the inextricable union between Fatherland and God in the education of youth, an union aimed at a mass mobilization for the "portuguese renaissance". This union is symbolized by the presence of the national flag and the crucifix, side by side, in the school and public ceremonies. The union is necessary for the identity of Portugal (Portugal will be no more Portugal if it ceased to be catholic), the union is necessary for the defense of Christian western civilization (see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1935b, 1936a, 1936b, 1936c, 1938b, 1938c).

He puts Authority as an indispensable value in education to achieve the renewal of the Nation. He tried to promote the cult of the leader (1935b), the "sole command" (1933), the image of Salazar as the great educator (1935b) - the Authority was thus personified in Salazar as the leader and the Youth and the Nation should follow the leader.

CARNEIRO-PACHECO does not value equally respect for the Family *"The State cannot ignore [...] that the family, even when morally and civically good, has no conditions to perform well its educational mission"* (1936a). He says that nowadays parents still *"half awake to the evil passions and fatal errors can only see clearly through the eyes of their children [members of Portuguese Youth]"* (1938a). He says to the very young members of Portuguese Youth (7 to 10 Years-Lusitos): *"Lusito! Next sunday awake your father and if you see him hesitating [in going to vote] take his hand bring him to vote [in parliamentary elections]...it is for your future"* (1938c). It is clear that CARNEIRO-PACHECO saw "portuguese Youth" as a vanguard "against all anti-Fatherland person [...]" at the service of portuguese Fatherland" (1936c), who would

teach to their parents the new nationalistic faith. The same aims are extended to girls- he criticizes mothers who prefer an education in the old fashion for girls (1939) (NOTE 10).

A mobilization intention, with a fascist touch, is present here (see 1938a), but it lasted only in the second period. (It is curious to notice that, according to CAETANO's memoirs, Salazar did not like the frenetic nervous style of CARNEIRO-PACHECO and ceased to receive him and to give normal support to his projects - CAETANO 1977,165).

In the third period LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961) emphasizes the role of the school in promoting a healthy nationalism, not a military like mobilizing nationalism (as CARNEIRO-PACHECO, in the second period, intended), but the patriotic wish to serve the Nation. As he puts it *"To achieve the personal development of each individual, but to try that, once he is integrated in society, each one aims naturally to make himself known at the service of the Fatherland"* (LEITE-PINTO 1966a) - see also 1960, 1963).

GALVÃO-TELLES (1962-1968), already in the fourth period, emphasizes equally nationalism and catholicism, not on the mobilizing style of the second period, but in the defensive style of one who thinks that those values are the only bastion in a changing and dangerous new world. He returns to a more orthodox view of the role of education, than his predecessor (see chapter one, section 3.3, chapter five, section 3.5). He says that education *"should emphasize each time more the spiritualist stamp which comes from the luminous Christian tradition"* (1963b) *"the young ones should be educated in the light of the principles of christian western civilization [...] we do not want more than to defend a civilization whose essence is blended with the very temperament of our people"* (1964c). We want *"the formation of Portuguese who can be good Christians and the formation of Christians who can be good Portuguese"* (1964c). GALVÃO-TELLES wants *"a renewed system of educational action faithful to the great constants of christianism and Lusitanity [portuguese essence]"* (1964a).

He clearly expresses his fidelity to the New State educational gospel *"We put God above any controversy [...] we consider the Fatherland as intangible, as a timeless and*

unitary expression of the national whole [...] We fight for the purity of Family in whose intimacy, and only there, can the human being find the true happiness and the best school of virtues. We respect legitimate Authority and want that it should be always dignified, in balanced conciliation with the necessary Freedom [...]. We long for a better and better Social Justice" (1964c). This is an adjusted version of Salazar's motto.

Congruently he conceived the role of "Portuguese Youth" not as an independent mobilising organization, but as a cooperator of school action and under its control (see GALVÃO-TELLES 1963e, 1964c).

All those transcriptions demonstrate that GALVÃO-TELLES was a much more orthodox and traditional member of the regime's elite than his predecessor, what meant that the regime remained faithful to its educational gospel - to inculcate in children God, Fatherland, Family and Authority.

The third part of this chapter will analyse the inculcation of those values through the curriculum. Before that analysis can be made, it is necessary to clarify the very notion of "curriculum".

2.6.3. Mentality inculcation through the curriculum - several concepts of curriculum

The "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" were to be inculcated in the children through the school curriculum. So the third part of this chapter and the next chapter will be dedicated to the study of school curriculum. But it is necessary that, before that analysis we define clearly what curriculum means here.

Traditional definitions curriculum centered around the academic teaching activities (around the notion of "purposive organized activity" referred by EGGLESTON 1980,16). When sociologists began to take an interest in what was happening inside the schools (see EGGLESTON 1980,4-6, MUSGRAVE 1979,193) they were concerned to make explicit the "realities of social behaviour" (EGGLESTON 1980,16) - so they centered their attention on what was really being learned in schools. They became even more interest in the "hidden curriculum" (JACKSON 1968) (that is, in "the material, academic or moral, that is taught to pupils without this being intended by those running the school concerned" - MUSGRAVE 1979,195), than in the manifest curriculum (NOTE 11).

One can have several definitions of curriculum from the most embracing to the narrowest (NOTE 12). In a first definition curriculum is all that is learned in school - it is the most comprehensive definition and includes all the hidden curricula,(all that was learned even if not explicitly taught). This definition includes all three of BERNSTEIN's message systems which realise formal educational knowledge - curriculum (that is, what counts as valid knowledge), pedagogy (what counts as valid transmission of knowledge) and evaluation (what counts as valid realization of this knowledge on the part of the taught) (BERNSTEIN 1977,85). This definition has in its comprehensiveness its greatest advantage and its biggest drawback - it demands a lot of research within the schools, including participant research, to describe a concrete curriculum, under this definition.

A second definition of curriculum excludes the hidden curriculum, but it is comprehensive in regard to the manifest one - it includes aims of education, pedagogical objectives, content of education (syllabus, textbooks, etc.), all planned activities (inside and outside the classroom) and the practised methods of teaching and of evaluation.

A third definition includes the aims, objectives and content of all planned school activities. It is a more operational definition than the previous ones, but it still demands a specific analysis of each school since, even in a

centralized educational system (as the portuguese) outside classroom activities can (limitedly) vary from school to school.

A fourth definition sees curriculum as a programme of subjects offered to a group of students (see WESTON 1980) thus concentrating the analysis on the list of subjects and ignoring outside classroom activities.

The most easy to operate definition is the last one, since it does not demand a concrete analysis of each individual school activity. We will use it as the basis of our analysis of secondary school curriculum, whose evolution will be given through the percentage of teaching time allocated to the different types of subjects. But we will include in the subjects analysed the outside classroom activities of the "Portuguese Youth" since they were compulsory for all schools. The second definition will be used in analyzing primary school curriculum. Greater attention will be given to the content of education here, investigating what mentality was being inculcated. This research will be done through the analysis of the content of primary education reading textbooks. It will be considered as planned school activities the compulsory activities of "Portuguese Youth".

2.6.4. Mentality inculcation through the curriculum - the different components of the curriculum

The distinction between the academic curriculum and the moral curriculum (MUSGRAVE 1978,1979), between cognitive learning attainments and moral learning attainments is very well known within sociology of education (SUGARMAN 1976).

Although the different types of learning outcomes are "in every concrete social situation [...] inextricably bound up together" (SUGARMAN 1976), the distinction is conceptually clear. But much more important than that clarity is the fact that this distinction is vital for the analysis of mentality inculcation.

An elaboration of the above typology will be used in our analysis - it will be considered basically an instructional

component and a moral component of the curriculum. The instructional component refers to the provision of information that is, to the transmission of knowledge and skills. The moral component refers to the influence of values orientation and norms and to the shaping of habits and attitudes.

The instructional component can be subdivided according to the type of information provided - it includes an academic component, a technical component, and an artistic and physical component (FORMOSINHO, 1985e). The academic component is characterized by the transmission of a formal, abstract and theoretical knowledge, often in a deductive and subject compartmentalized framework (FORMOSINHO, 1983a). The technical component consists in the training of specific techniques which are part of the occupational skills. The artistic and physical component refers to the transmission of knowledge and techniques related to the Arts and to Physical Education. This typology of the instructional component will be useful for the analysis of secondary school curriculum.

The distinction between the instructional curriculum and the moral curriculum holds valid for all the definitions of curriculum, but it has different importance according to whether the definition is based on the teaching perspective or on the learning perspective of the pedagogical relationship. Only the first definition of the curriculum presented in the previous section is based on learning, the others are based on the activities planned by the teachers (or the school), that is, on teaching.

Since the first definition is based on the ends, the outcomes, the learning outputs and the other definitions are based on the means, the teaching inputs, it is perfectly natural that from an activity perceived by the teachers as predominantly instructional many moral outcomes can result for the students.

The discrepancy between formal categorization of teaching activities and real learning outcomes is maximum when one compares the fourth definition of the curriculum (as programme of subjects) with the first definition.

This means that to use the distinction moral/
/instructional curriculum one must define at what curricular

conceptual level one is operating. In the most formal level (the fourth definition) History or National Language should be categorized only in the academic instructional curriculum. But an analysis at the third definition conceptual level (which includes analysis of the aims, objectives and content of the curriculum) will clearly show many moral elements in those subjects. So in our research we will clarify at what conceptual level we are operating in each analysis.

We will now analyse the curriculum of primary school, in the next section of this chapter, and the curriculum of secondary school, specially of grammar school, in the last section. In the next chapter it will be done a detailed analysis of the content of the mentality inculcated in the primary school curriculum.

3. THE INCULCATION OF A PASSIVE MENTALITY THROUGH THE PRIMARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM

3.1. The hypotheses

Based on what had been said in this work until now one can draw several hypotheses which will guide our analysis of the curriculum. They will be enunciated now putting within brackets the section of the thesis in which its justification can be found.

a) There is a high degree of mentality inculcation in the primary school curriculum (chapter two, section 2.2, chapter three, sections 2.4, 2.6.1);

b) There is not political education in the curriculum in a meaningful way, but just instillation of a conservative, conformist, passive mentality (chapter three, section 2.2);

c) The importance of mentality inculcation increases in the educational mobilizing period and decreases afterwards (chapter one, section 3, mainly 3.2, chapter three, sections 2.2.2., 2.6.1.);

d) The content of mentality inculcation is mainly based on Salazar's motto - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority (chapter three, sections 2.4, 2.6.2);

Those are the hypothesis which will guide our analysis.

3.2. Methodology of the analysis of the primary school curriculum

More importance will be attached to the analysis of primary school curriculum since it is the only compulsory schooling until the end of the period considered. The six year compulsory schooling, although decreed in 1964, was only implemented since the school year of 1968-1969.

3.2.1. The adopted concept of curriculum

The definition of curriculum which will be used in this analysis will be the second one, which is comprehensive in regard to the manifest curriculum, including aims of education, pedagogical objectives, content of education, all planned activities and the practised methods of teaching and evaluation. The main emphasis will be on the content of education.

The analysis of this content will be done using as an indicator the content of school textbooks, mainly reading textbooks (but also history textbooks). The choice of those type of textbooks is obvious since the teaching of Mother Tongue and of History is naturally the most prone to become vehicles of mentality inculcation. This was also the explicit option of the New State regime as will be seen.

3.2.2. The use of content analysis

The research method used will be content analysis. This method will be applied intensively to the analysis of reading textbooks. The methodology of this content analysis will be presented now.

Content analysis can be seen as a kind of coding (MOSER and KALTON, 1979, 414), the basic goal of which is to take a verbal, non-quantitative document and transform it into quantitative data (BAILEY 1978). This method was developed for the investigation of a broad spectrum of problems in which the content of communication serves as basis of inference (HOLSTI 1968). It is very prone to application in the analysis of educational documents (COHEN and MANION

1985,62), namely textbooks (RUMMEL 1977,152).

In content analysis one must select a unit of analysis. The normal unit of analysis is the "reading" that is, the "text", since each reading textbook is composed of a collection of texts (NOTE 13). But we also counted as readings secondary texts like popular quatrains, proverbs, riddles, jokes, sentences and slogans, since they are very often vehicles of mentality inculcation messages. For those secondary texts it is indispensable to refer the distinction between recording unit and content unit (BARDIN 1979, 104-108, BERELSON 1952,135). The recording unit is "the smallest body of content in which the appearance of a reference is counted". The context unit is "the largest body of content that may be examined in characterizing a recording unit" (BERELSON 1952, 135). In those cases the recording unit is the secondary text and the context unit is the main text with which the secondary text is most of the time related - generally the material unit which binds up together main text and secondary text is the page or set of pages (NOTE 14). For the purposes of this analysis exercise questions, exercises and all procedures related to homework or practical exercises were not considered questions. In the same way "images" or "pictures" were not considered as texts since they generally merely illustrate main texts. It was considered irrelevant for the purpose of this analysis of mentality inculcation the form of the text -
- prose, poetry, fable, theatre, slogans, proverbs, sentences, etc.

The choice of the categories of analysis should have the following qualities - objectivity, pertinence, exhaustion, mutual exclusion (BARDIN 1979,120, LEON 1980,170). The first basic categorization is "Mentality Inculcation Readings" versus "Other readings". But it is necessary to create categories within the broad category of "Mentality Inculcation". Those categories follow, in a first stage, basically Salazar's motto - "Religion" (God), "Nationalism" (Fatherland), "Family" added by "Ruralism". The remaining was categorized generally as "Morals" which functioned as a residual category. But the size of this residue (26% on average) made us create further subdivisions - thus it were created "Passive

Attitudes" (obedience, resignation, humility, mildness, etc.), "Active Attitudes" (courage, diligence, study habits, promotion, etc.) and "Non Typified Attitudes". Thus "Morals" was reduced, as residual category, just to 5% on average. The reliability of this later subdivision of the broad "Morals" category is not so high as for the other categorizations, since the categorization of attitudes into passive and active is more open to different interpretations, but it is still very good, as will be referred.

In the next chapter a detailed analysis of the content of mentality inculcation will be done and examples of texts allocated to each category will be given for better understanding of the method of analysis.

The categories are clearly pertinent to the research as required and they are also exhaustive. Some difficulties arose with the requirement of mutual exclusivity - as any reading should be categorized under only one category

when two or more themes were present in the same text, the predominant one was chosen. This hides one of the most interesting and efficacious techniques of the New State - the deliberate fusion of symbols and messages, generally nationalist and religious ones. The problem was solved not in the quantitative analysis, but by dedicating one section to the analysis of this technique (qualitative content analysis).

The validity of the content analysis instrument was done through content validation (KERLINGER 1979, 457-459, FOX 1981, 421-423, 735, TUCKMAN 1972, 141) - there was a positive judgement about the representativeness of the categories of analysis in regard to the content of the basic mentality defended by New State leaders (section 2.4.3).

The results of the analysis were treated in frequencies, that is, the tables will present the number of texts in each category generally in relation to the total, that is, in percentages.

The reliability of the categorization done (Table 3.6) was determined through inter-categorizer reliability of a 10% sample of the analyzed readings. The sample was stratified by periods of analysis, by textbooks and by categories of analysis. The general result is a very high reliability correlation coefficient (contingency coefficient C - SIEGEL 1956, 196-198) 95 %. In relation to the categorization of attitude inculcation (passive, active and non typified categories) the

reliability coefficient was 81%.

The results of the content analysis were treated in frequencies and are presented in tables, generally in percentages of the number of texts in each category.

3.2.3. The sampling of reading textbooks by period

The sampling of the reading textbooks used in the New State until 1968 was done by periods. Indeed the textbooks used were not the same in this long span of time nor did the system of textbook choice remained unchanged. In the formative period the regime demanded that all textbooks should be approved by the Minister of Education, but there was some choice of textbooks for the same year of schooling. In 1936 it was decreed the regime of the sole textbook which lasted until 1974 - only one official textbook should be used in all portuguese primary schools. In primary school this sole textbook should include all subject matters. In the second and third period (and in part of the fourth) it were used the sole textbooks planned during the late 1940^s and early 1950^s. In 1967 new sole reading textbooks began to be used. The sole textbook policy was never implemented in regard to the fourth class.

Due to the delay between policy formulation and policy implementation (see chapter one, introduction to section three) there was the need to define educational periods in terms of textbooks in force in primary schools in order to proceed to the adequate sampling procedures.

The formative period which lasts from 1927 to 1936 in terms of educational policy formulation extends to 1941/1951 in terms of primary school textbooks. The implementation of the sole textbooks planned in the educational policy formulated in the 1936 Reform (mobilizing period) began in the school year of 1941-1942 (for the first class), in 1944-1945 (for the second class), and in 1951-1952 (for the third class). Throughout the whole stabilization period (1947-1964) those same textbooks went on being used in schools. In the stagnation and decline periods (1964-1970) it were changed textbooks in

1967 and 1968. There was not time for the application of a specific policy of the fifth period in regard to primary education.

This means that textbooks which supposedly should bear the mark of the mobilizing period lasted much longer than political mobilization. This would contradict the main hypothesis of this work - the inculcation of a passive mentality as the educational aim of the New State. As it will be seen in sections 3.3. and 3.4. of this chapter and in the next chapter, this contradiction does not exist, since sole textbooks just try to use the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" (section 2.4.1.) to inculcate the basic mentality - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority (section 2.4.3.).

In the following presentation, the first pair of dates shown in the titles of the sections refer to general educational evolution and the second pair to textbooks implementation.

We sampled fifteen reading textbooks, five from the formative period, five from the second and third periods and five from the fourth period. On the whole we analysed 1632 readings, 519 for the first period, 553 for the second and third and 560 for the fourth (which also includes the fifth, as will be later explained) - see Table 3.4 .

The sampling procedure besides considering the periods of New State educational evolution as criterion, balanced the number of textbooks for the first and second year of schooling with those for the third and fourth, since the primary school curriculum emphasized the presence of History and Geography of Portugal readings in the textbooks of those latter years. The sample considers for all periods two books for the first and second year and three textbooks for the remaining years - the reason why the sample was not one textbook for each school year per period was the need to have at least two textbooks for the fourth class, since there was never a sole textbook for that year and those textbooks could have different orientations.

We will present with the list of the textbooks samples in each period a brief description of educational policies relevant for this content analysis.

3.2.3.a) The formative period (1927-1936)(1927-1941/1951)

In the formative period (1927-1936) the regime quickly discovered the importance of the school as an agency of mentality inculcation for the shaping of the conformist man. "The propaganda made in schools, [...] the notions learned there are those which always leave the most clear and lasting impression and can extend more easily to a greater number of individuals" (Decree 15088, 22-2-1928).

It was recommended, by the same decree, that there should exist colonial propaganda in schools in order to "create in our people a colonial opinion".

Congruently with the above referred purpose the Minister CORDEIRO-RAMOS determined, in 1932 (Decree 21014, 19-3-1932), that there should be inserted slogans in primary school reading textbooks. The slogans were "Your Fatherland is the prettiest of all Fatherlands; it deserves all your sacrifices ; "Do not ever put your interest above that of your family, since you pass away and your family remains"; "In the family the leader is the Father; in the school the leader is the Master; in the State the leader is the Government"; "If you know how difficult it is to command you would prefer to obey all your life" - one can easily see in those slogans, and similar ones also recommended, the Salazar's motto - Fatherland, Family and Authority (but not yet God).

In 1935 propaganda was intensified - it was decreed by the Minister TAMAGNINI (Decree 25305, 9-5-1935, Dispatch 36, June 1935) that the photograph of both the Chief of State and the Prime Minister should be hanged in all classrooms. No other photograph could be put there.

The sample for this period includes those of the approved reading textbooks more followed in primary schools before the implementation of the sole textbooks - this was indicated by the number of editions of the textbook.

The quoted dates of textbooks are naturally those of the editions analyzed and not those of the

first edition. This is the list of the sampled textbooks.


- 1 - "Leituras para a 2ª classe", Clotilde Mateus and J. Diogo Correia, Editora Livraria Enciclopédia de João Bernardo, Lisboa, 1939, 6th edition.
- 2 - "O Meu Livro de Leitura (2ª classe)", José Maria dos Santos and Carlos Alberto Pinto de Abreu, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 1941.
- 3 - "Livro de Leitura para a 3ª classe", Romeu Pimenta and Domingos Evangelista, Editora Educação Nacional, Porto, 1938.
- 4 - "Leituras para o ensino primário - 3ª classe", Augusto C. Pires de Lima and Américo Pires de Lima, Domingos Barreira Editora, Porto, 1940, 12th edition,
- 5 - "Livro de Leitura para a 4ª classe", Romeu Pimenta and Domingos Evangelista, A. Figueirinha, Porto, 1933.

3.2.3.b) The mobilizing and stabilizing periods (1936-1964) (1941/1951-1967)

In the second period (1936-1947), the mobilizing period, CARNEIRO-PACHECO, minister of Education (1936-1940) integrated all the previous period policies in an integrated policy of propaganda of the New State and of mentality inculcation (NOTE 15).

In 1938 it were distributed 84000 posters to the schools to illustrate "The Lesson of Salazar". They were to be used in reading classrooms and consisted of seven drawings which supposedly shew the Before the New State and After the New State situation. The previous situation was reproduced in dark or grey tones, the new situation in colourful and modern images. It is a clear case of propaganda of the New State in five posters, of mentality inculcation in one poster and of corporative indoctrination in another poster (see "Escola Portuguesa" nº181, 14-4-1938).

Those two last posters are reproduced in the following page.



poster 1



poster 2

It was CARNEIRO-PACHECO who introduced "God" in schools , thus completing the presence of Salazar's motto in school education, which was still incomplete in the first period as seen. He decreed, in 1936, that all state primary schools should have a crucifix behind the chair of the teacher (see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936b, and Law 1941, 11-4-1936, base XII).

The same minister of Education set up Choral Singing in the curriculum "as an element of national education and cohesion", that is, as a mean of nationalistic inculcation (see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1934b, Law 1941, base XII) (NOTE 16).

Arithmetic problems were used as instruments of propaganda of the New State - see CORTESÃO 1981, 191-194.

As a culmination to all those strategies CARNEIRO-PACHECO decided that there should be a sole textbook for each primary class which included all subject matters (LAW 1941,

Decree Law 27279, 24-11-1936, Decree Law 27882, 21-7-1937) "the spiritual weapon, indispensable to the formation of the national youth", as the bulletin "Escola Portuguesa" said (in SAMPAIO 1976, 94)", which puts as end to an anarchic situation in which an unknown author can proclaim "his truth against the interest of an elementary formative action even in the domains of that which cannot be discussed for the good of the moral unity of the Nation" (Decree Law 27882).

The implementation of the sole reading textbook policy was not so rapid as the mobilizing style of CARNEIRO-PACHECO might indicate - indeed only the implementation of one reading textbook was still (partially) completed in his rule. The reading textbook for the first class was used for the first time in 1941-1942, that of second class was published in 1944 and that of third class only in 1951, that is, fifteen years after the law which set up the sole textbook regime. There was not in that period a sole reading textbook for the fourth class.

As just seen the third class book was published already in the third period (1947-1964), the stabilization period. Indeed the sole textbooks for the three classes were used in all that long period. There was a tentative attempt set up the sole reading textbooks for the fourth class (Decree Law 40362, 20-10-1955) but again it was not implemented. Indeed there was never during the whole New State a sole reading textbook for

the fourth class.

The Minister of Education LEITE-PINTO tried to change the primary education curriculum and textbooks. He considered that their conformist message of an ascribed social status was not compatible with the attitudes needed for the industrialization of the country and the role of social promotion which the school should have (LEITE-PINTO 1966b).

He determined the revision of primary education programs (Decree Law 42994, 28-5-1960) and determined that it should be open to a competition to adapt the textbooks to the new programs (Decree Law 43618, 22-4-1961). The primary school program had lasted twenty three years (from 1937 to 1969 for the three first classes) and thirty one years for the fourth class (1929-1960) - SAMPAIO 1977, 46.

The means that during the whole two periods (1936-1947/ /1947-1964) there were in force the sole reading textbooks which implemented the policy formulated by CARNEIRO-PACHECO.

In regard to the sampling of textbooks it were chosen two of the most used textbooks for the fourth class. In the first three classes it was analyzed the whole statistical population since there was only a sole textbook per each school year at national level.

The list of the books analyzed is the following

- 1 - "O Livro da Primeira Classe", Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, Lisboa, 1958, 8th edition.
- 2 - "O Livro da Segunda Classe", Livraria Cruz, Braga, 1958, 6th edition.
- 3 - "O Livro de Leitura da Terceira Classe", Livraria Editora Figueirinhas, Porto, 1958, 4th edition.
- 4 - "Livro de Leitura para a 4ª classe", Editora Educação Nacional de Adolfo Machado, Porto, 1951 (?).
- 5 - "Leituras para o Ensino Primário - 4ª classe", Augusto C. Pires de Lima and Américo Pires de Lima, Porto Editora, Porto 1959 (edição dos autores), 27th edition.

3.2.3.c) The fourth period (1964-1970) - stagnation and decline period (1964-1970) (1967-1974)

As stated earlier the movement to change the primary school textbooks was initiated by LEITE-PINTO, but it was not brought about under his rule nor in the third period. In the fourth period the regime recognized the need to adapt the curriculum gradually at all levels (Decree Law 47587, 10-3-1967). GALVÃO-TELLES, minister of Education in the fourth period, determined another revision of primary school programs in 1968 that is, only eight years after the revision of 1960 (Portaria 23485, 16-7-1968). All those revisions maintained the same orientation towards passivity of the first and second periods programs (SAMPAIO 1977,48).

In 1964, the program for the complementary cycle of the primary school was approved (see below, chapter four, section 3.5) and the sole textbook was again used, after an initial hesitation (see SAMPAIO 1977,62).

The textbooks analyzed in this period were the new first and second class textbooks, published in 1967 and 1968, which were in force until the 1974 "coup d'état". In regard to the fourth class three textbooks were analyzed (one more conservative, following clearly the conformist passive orientation, and two other less conservative which reflect some change).

Those textbooks were still in force in the fifth period (1970-1974). The only change in this last period was the publication of a new reading textbook for the third class. But it was published so late that was only just brought into force-it appeared in the end of 1973 or beginning of 1974 (see FERNANDES 1974,178).

If we ignored the third class textbook (since the third class textbook in force during the fourth period and the major part of the fifth was one already analyzed - the 1958 one - and the new textbook was practically not in force) one can say that this analysis is valid both for the fourth and fifth periods.

This does not mean that the fifth period is a continuation of the fourth (see Introduction, Chapter I, section 3.5), but rather that, due to the priority given in the fifth period to the reform of higher education and secondary education the situation in primary schools was not basically different in this period than before.

The list of the analyzed textbooks is the following.

- 1 - "Livro de Leitura da Primeira Classe", Maria Luísa Torres Pires and Francisca Laura Batista and Glória N. Gusmão Morais, Livraria Cruz, Braga, 1967.
- 2 - "Livro de Leitura da Segunda Classe", Judite Vieira, Manuel Ferreira Patrício and Silva Graça, Livraria Cruz, Braga, 1968.
- 3 - "Livro de Leitura - 4ª classe", Joaquim Gaspar, Livraria Rodrigues, Lisboa, no date, probably 1968.
- 4 - "Novas Leituras para a 4ª classe", Editora Educação Nacional, Porto, no date, (197...)
- 5 - "O Novo Livro de Leitura da 4ª classe", António Branco, Porto Editora, Porto, 1974.

(All those textbooks were in force during the fourth and fifth periods).

3.2.4. A synthesis of the evolution of curricular implementation

The following page presents, in a table, (Table 3.3) the synthesis of all what had been said about the curriculum evolution.

TABLE 3.3- PERIODS OF CURRICULAR IMPLEMENTATION

PERIODS	POLITICAL PERIODS	E D U C A T I O N A L P E R I O D S							
		GENERAL POLICY FORMULATION	DELAY	COMPULSORY SCHOOL CURRICULAR IMPE- MENTATION-PRIMARY	DELAY	COMPULSORY SCHOOL CURRICULAR IMPE- -PREPARATORY	DELAY	SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULAR IMPE- MENTATION	DELAY
1 st PERIOD -FORMATIVE-	1926 to 1933	1927 to 1936	+1	1927-1929 Reduction in pri- mary education curricula	+1	—	-	1930 - 1932 New curricula	+4
2 nd PERIOD -MOBILIZING-	1933 to 1945	1936 to 1947	+3	1937-1951 Implementation of sole textbooks	+4	—	-	1936 New structure and new curricula	+3
3 rd PERIOD -STABILIZATION-	1945 to 1958	1947 to 1964	+2	1960 New programs	+15	—	-	1947 - 1948 New structure and new curricula	+2
4 th PERIOD -DECLINE AND STAGNATION-	1958 to 1968	1964 to 1971	+6	1967-1968 New programs Renewal of sole textbooks	+9	1966-1968 Implementation of primary complemen- tary school and preparatory school structure and curricula	+8	-	-
5 th PERIOD -RENEWAL WITHIN CONTINUITY-	1968 to 1974	1971 to 1974	+3	1973 Renewal of 3 rd class sde textbook	+5	1972 Experimental new structure and curricula for an extended prepara- tory school	+4	1970-1972 New structure and new curricula	+2

3.3. Presentation of the results of content analysis - the confirmation of the hypotheses

The tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 present the results of the content analysis. All tables give percentage numbers which are rounded for easier reading. Table 3.4 presents, in percentages, an analysis book by book. Table 3.5 is a basic synthesis of the analysis done, using only two basic categories. Table 3.6 present the detailed analysis per period using all the used categories.

3.3.1. Tables of results

Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 occupy the following three pages.

TABLE 3.4- CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM - TABLE BOOK BY BOOK IN PERCENTAGES

PERIODS			1 st PERIOD					2 nd /3 rd PERIODS					4 th /5 th PERIODS				
CATEGORIES	BOOKS	CLASS	2	2	3	3	4	1	2	3	4	4	1	2	4	4	4
		DATE	1939	1941	1938	1940	1933	1958	1958	1958	1951	1959	1967	1968	1968	1971	1974
GENERAL CATEGORIES	MENTALITY INCULCATION		49%	63%	59%	51%	66%	85%	88%	75%	82%	61%	55%	38%	68%	56%	56%
	OTHER READINGS		51%	38%	41%	49%	34%	15%	12%	25%	18%	39%	45%	62%	32%	44%	44%
	TOTAL		100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
DETAILED CATEGORIES	RELIGION		2%	4%	8%	1%	0%	45%	36%	23%	2%	2%	13%	3%	9%	0%	1%
	NATIONALISM		0%	3%	13%	10%	9%	0%	1%	22%	26%	28%	0%	1%	37%	22%	26%
	POLITICAL PROPAGANDA		1%	5%	1%	3%	0%	1%	3%	3%	2%	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
	FAMILY CULT		7%	4%	8%	3%	13%	9%	14%	6%	5%	2%	15%	6%	2%	1%	3%
	RURALISM		1%	3%	6%	1%	3%	1%	14%	9%	5%	6%	9%	12%	9%	5%	3%
	PASSIVE ATTITUDES		13%	16%	11%	9%	14%	16%	4%	4%	24%	7%	6%	3%	3%	3%	7%
	ACTIVE ATTITUDES		7%	10%	3%	11%	18%	5%	11%	3%	9%	6%	13%	3%	2%	8%	4%
	NON TYPIFIED ATTITUDES		8%	10%	6%	6%	8%	1%	4%	2%	5%	6%	0%	3%	0%	6%	9%
	MORALS (residual)		12%	9%	3%	6%	1%	5%	1%	2%	3%	3%	0%	6%	6%	11%	4%
	OTHER READINGS		51%	38%	41%	49%	34%	15%	12%	25%	18%	39%	45%	62%	32%	44%	44%
	N =		136	80	71	140	92	74	74	157	121	127	47	93	115	108	197

TABLE 3.5 - BASIC CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY
SCHOOL CURRICULUM

CATEGORIES	1 st Period	2 nd /3 rd Periods	4 th /5 th Periods	AVERAGE
	1927-1936	1936-1964	1964-1974	
MENTALITY INCULCA- TION READINGS	56%	76%	55%	63%
OTHER READINGS	44%	24%	45%	37%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
n = 1632	519	553	560	

TABLE 3.6 - CATEGORIES OF MENTALITY INDOCTRINATION
IN PRIMARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM

CATEGORIES	1 st PERIOD 1927-1936	2 nd and 3 rd PERIODS 1936-1964	4 th and 5 th PERIODS 1964-1974	AVERAGE
RELIGION	3%	18%	4%	8%
NATIONALISM	6%	19%	21%	16%
POLITICAL PROPAGANDA	2%	2%	0.4%	1%
FAMILY	7%	6%	4%	6%
RURALISM	2%	7%	6%	5%
PASSIVE ATTITUDES	12%	11%	5%	9%
ACTIVE ATTITUDES	10%	6%	5%	7%
NON TYPIFIED ATTITUDES	8%	4%	5%	5%
MORALS (residual)	7%	3%	6%	5%
n = 1022	291	421	310	

3.3.2. General analysis of the results

Those results are already conclusive in order to confirm or not confirm the hypothesis stated in section 3.1 .

The hypothesis a) - "There is a high degree of mentality inculcation in the primary school curriculum" during the New State regime - is clearly confirmed. 63% of all reading units conveyed the inculcation of mentality.

The hypothesis c) - "The importance of mentality inculcation increases in the educational mobilizing period and decreases afterwards" - is also confirmed. The textbooks for the first and second classes aim practically only to inculcate mentality - the percentages of mentality instilling are respectively 85% and 88%. A general appreciation of the results show that from 56% in the first period, mentality inculcation increases to 76% in the second period and decreases to about the previous quantity in the fourth/fifth periods. The third period went on implementing the policies of the second during

PIRES-DE-LIMA's rule (1947-1955). Only in the second part of the third period (under the rule of LEITE-PINTO, 1955-1961) the need to change those textbooks was manifested. All the textbooks analysed had their first editions either in the second period (the textbooks for the first and second class) or in the first part of the third period (the remaining textbooks - in 1951 that of the third class, in 1951/1953 the 1951 and 1959 edition textbooks of the fourth class). This means that the hypothesis c) is also confirmed.

But a more detailed analysis of those results is needed.

The confirmation of hypothesis c) is based on the results for the two main categories - Religion and Nationalism. Religious inculcation increases six times from the first to the second period and nationalistic inculcation increases more than three times. Rural mentality inculcation also increases more than three times. The decrease is sharp for religious inculcation in the fourth period, but the same does not happen in other categories - nationalism increases slightly and ruralism decreases very slightly. So the only category which follows exactly the expected "down - up -down" pattern is religious inculcation.

As seen nationalism does not fit into the general down-up-down pattern of mentality inculcation - it is the only category which shows a constant tendency to increase. This is explained by the beginning of the colonial war in 1961 and the compact mentalized mobilization it provoked in the young males in order to mobilize them for the fight Africa (see chapter one, sections 3.4, 3.5, chapter six, section 2.3).

The hypothesis d) - "The content of mentality inculcation is mainly based on Salazar's motto - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority" - is also confirmed. If one considers that respect for Authority subsumes all passive attitudes the motto mentality occupies 40% of all readings, that is, 64% of all mentality inculcation ones (considering Authority just translated in the direct inculcation of obedience the percentages are respectively 32% and 52%). Thus this hypothesis is also confirmed.

The hypothesis b) - "There is not political education in the curriculum in a meaningful way [...]" - deserves a careful analysis.

For political education it is meant ideological education of masses (see above section 2.1). Political propaganda in a broad sense includes political education plus publicity of realizations and advertisement of rulers (section 2.3). Political propaganda is used in the analyzed table in this broad sense. So the confirmation of hypothesis b) needs a more detailed analysis than Table 3.6 presents.

Texts under this category were divided into three sub-categories - political education (corporative indoctrination, explicit defense of overseas policy), mobilizing political propaganda, (which encompasses propaganda to "Portuguese Youth" and personal reference to leaders) and non mobilizing political propaganda (which includes regimes structure description and presentation of New State achievements, mostly in public works). Let us analyze the presence of each of those sub-categories in relation to the total sample (NOTE 17).

TABLE 3.7 - TYPES OF POLITICAL
PROPAGANDA

CATEGORIES	1 st Period 1927 - 1936	2 nd / 3 rd Periods 1936-1964	4 th / 5 th Periods 1964-1974	AVERAGE TOTAL
IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION	0.2%	0.5%	-	0.3%
MOBILIZING POLITICAL PROPAGANDA	1.2%	0.5%	-	0.6%
NON MOBILIZING POLITICAL PROPAGANDA	0.6%	0.9%	-	0.6%
TOTAL	2.0%	1.9%	0.4%	1.5%
n category Analysed	10	11	2	23
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

(Differences in total percentage of the political propaganda category between Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are due to rounding procedures)

One can see that political propaganda was not meaningful neither in general (1.5% on average) nor in any period (it never exceeded 2%). Ideological education was completely irrelevant, being even in the mobilizing period just 0.5% . In this period ideological education plus mobilizing political propaganda represented just 1% of the total texts. So the hypothesis b) is confirmed (NOTE 18).

3.4. Conclusion

As it was just seen, the analysis of the tables confirms the hypotheses put forward in section 3.1. The mere analysis of policy formulation documents (speeches, legislation) would point in the sense that direct political indoctrination was more organized and more obvious after the implementation of the sole textbook (MONICA 1978, 298). But the implementation of the policy formulated by CARNEIRO-PACHECO, in 1936, was done slowly (see section 3.2.3. b), was done after the extinction of the mobilizing fire. What the analysis done in this study shows is just the implementation of an organized approach to the inculcation of passive, conformist mentality.

This can be seen as an example of the need referred in the Introduction (section 5.4) to permanently confront New State policy formulation with policy implementation.

4. THE INCULCATION OF A PASSIVE MENTALITY THROUGH THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM

4.1. The adopted concept of curriculum

An examination of all the syllabus and textbooks of all the different subjects in secondary school curriculum would clearly be out of proportion in the plan of this thesis.⁵⁰ So a concept of curriculum different from that just used for the analysis of primary education was adopted for the analysis of secondary education.

As it was already said (section 2.6.3.), we will use the fourth definition of curriculum - programme of subjects. But we will include the outside classroom activities of the "Portuguese Youth" when they are compulsory - it is the case of 1936 and 1947 reforms, but not the case of the fourth or fifth period reforms.

4.2. The content analysis

Content analysis of the curriculum was done based on the analysis of the decree-laws which approved the different curricula - see in NOTE 19 a list of all this legislation.

The analysis was done through the categorization of each subject in one of the four components of the curriculum presented above (section 2.6.4.). (The unit of analysis is thus the subject). The need of mutual exclusion of categories in content analysis would impose that subjects should be allocated only to one category. But this would ignore the fact that moral outcomes come often from academic subjects. So when this consequence was explicitly intended the subjects were categorized partially in the academic component and partially in the moral component.

The academic component generally includes Portuguese, Latin, French, English, Geography, Natural Sciences and Mathematics.

The technical component in Grammar Schools includes generally "Manual Works" (Crafts) (for the exception to this categorization see NOTE 20). In technical schools the

technical component encompasses a variety of technical subjects.

The artistic and physical component includes Drawing, Choral Singing (except in the second period) and Physical Education. In 1968 and 1972 Choral Singing was substituted by Musical Education. In 1972 Drawing was substituted by Visual Education.

The moral component includes Moral and Civic Education (1932,1936), Religious and Moral Education (1947 onwards), the compulsory activities of "Portuguese Youth" (in 1936 and in 1947), the compulsory cultural sessions in 1936 Reform, and partially Portuguese and History of Portugal.

Although Religious and Moral Education was not compulsory (see chapter five, section 2.2.7), social practice made it practically mandatory through the social (and occasionally political) consequences which could come from opting out.

The activities of "Portuguese Youth" (which was created in 1936) were considered only when they were compulsory (which did not happen in 1968 and 1972). The work load of those activities was made operational considering equivalent to three hours one afternoon of activities - thus it were counted three hours in 1936 and six in 1947 for Portuguese Youth activities in grammar schools.

In 1936 it were included in the moral component the fortnightly "cultural sessions", since they were compulsory - they aimed at promoting the knowledge of the Colonial Empire, of portuguese art and of civic education.

Since Portuguese and History of Portugal were explicitly used for mentality inculcation they were included partially in the moral component. For instance, the instruction of the syllabus for "Lingua e História Pátria" (National Language and History) of the 1947 reform (syllabus of 1954 - Decree 39807, 7-9-1954) for the fifth year of schooling said "The dominant concern of the teaching of this subject [...] is to irradiate in the spirit and the heart of the pupil noble sentiments of civism and love for the Fatherland"; so "the teacher should restrain entering in details or making

judgements creator of a defeated pessimism". This intention was more enhanced in 1936 than in other periods. To make operational this partial categorization in the moral component (within the fourth concept of curriculum) one has to attribute some hours of the subject work load to the moral component and some to the academic component. One had considered generally that those subjects contributed with one quarter (of the subject work load) to the moral component and three quarters to the academic component. In the second period, the distribution was in equal parts to represent the greater emphasis in moral inculcation. Although those partitions of subject time have something of an arbitrary nature, they nevertheless represent more adequately the reality than just to ignore the moral dimension of the referred subjects by including them just in the academic component. (This partition was applied only to History of Portugal not to World History).

In 1936 grammar school reform, Physical Education (partially) and Choral Singing (totally) were included in the moral component, according to the objectives allocated to each of those subjects in the legislation.

The content analysis was done by cycles of studies - in grammar schools the first cycle includes the fifth and the sixth year of schooling, the second cycle includes the seventh, the eight and the ninth years of schooling and the third cycle includes the tenth and the eleventh years of schooling. Due to its very diversified structure the third cycle was not included in the analysis. (In 1936 Reform the structure was changed from 2+3+2 to 3+3+1, but it returned to the previous framework in 1947).

The class work load included, as it was said, Moral and Religious Education and the activities of Portuguese Youth (NOTE 21). In 1936 it included also the fortnightly cultural sessions. The class work load was taken from a whole cycle, but reduced to average hours per week.

4.3. The hypotheses

The proposition of hypotheses for the analysis of secondary education curriculum has to consider three aspects.

Firstly, the role of secondary school requires a greater importance of the instructional components of the curriculum. In grammar school, whose role is mainly the preparation for the university, prevails the academic component, in technical school prevails the technical components.

Secondly, the age of the student makes him/her more prone to the understanding of those instructional components and so it is natural that they are more present in secondary school.

Thirdly, the fact that those students who attend secondary school (and mainly secondary grammar school) are highly selected (a selected minority) - see chapter five, sections 3.3, 3.8 - makes socialization as social control more dispensable. The high middle class and the high class will provide this socialization within the home.

Taken this into consideration one can put forward the following hypotheses:

a) There is less mentality inculcation in secondary school curricula than in primary school curriculum;

b) The academic and the technical components of the curriculum will prevail respectively in grammar and in technical schools;

c) The importance of the moral component of the curriculum increases in the educational mobilizing period (see justification in section 3.1);

d) The importance of the moral component is lesser in the second cycle of study than in the first, due to greater instructional concerns of a cycle of studies which is more close to the university and greater selection of its students;

e) The importance of the moral component is greater in grammar school than in the technical school, due to the fact that grammar school was the via to access to the elite through university degrees (see chapter five, section 3.4.2) and moral component was obviously important in the preparation of the elite.

4.4. Presentation of the results

Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 present the results of the content analysis of secondary education. This analysis excludes the third cycle, as it was already said. In regard to technical education the analysis compares the Reform of Grammar School of 1947 with the Reform of Technical Education of 1948 (which lasted until 1970).

All tables give percentages numbers (in relation to the week class work load) which are rounded for easier reading.

TABLE 3.8 - 5th and 6th YEAR CURRICULUM - EVOLUTION
BY PERIODS

CURRICULAR COMPONENTS	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd Period 1936-1947	3 rd Period 1947-1964	4 th Period 1964-1970	5 th Period 1970-1974	AVERAGE
	1932 Reform	1936 Reform	1947 Reform	1968 "Ciclo Preparat!"		
CLASS WORK LOAD (Per week on average)	26.5 hours	27 hours	33 hours	27 hours	-	28.4 hours
ACADEMIC COMPONENT	56%	50%	48%	51%	-	51%
TECHNICAL COMPONENT	2%	0%	3%	0%	-	1%
PHYSICAL AND AR- TISTIC COMPONENT	30%	15%	21%	35%	-	25%
MORAL COMPONENT	12%	35%	28%	13%	-	23%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	99%	-	100%

TABLE 3.9 - 7th, 8th, 9th YEAR GRAMMAR SCHOOL
CURRICULUM - EVOLUTION BY PERIODS

CURRICULAR COMPONENTS	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd Period 1936-1947	3 rd Period 1947-1964	4 th Period 1964-1971	5 th Period 1971-1974	AVERAGE
	1932 Reform	1936 Reform	1947 Reform		1972-74 experi- mental 7 th 8 th years	
CLASS WORK LOAD (Per week on average)	28.5 hours	27 hours	34 hours	-	31 hours	30.1 hours
ACADEMIC COMPONENT	74%	62%	64%	-	55%	64%
TECHNICAL COMPONENT	5%	0%	0%	-	13%	5%
PHYSICAL AND ARTISTIC COMPONENT	18%	4%	12%	-	29%	16%
MORAL COMPONENT	3%	34%	24%	-	3%	16%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%	-	100%	101%

TABLE 3.10 - TECHNICAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM - 1948 REFORM

	A	B	C	D	E	F	AVERAGE	1947 GRAMMAR SCHOOL REFORM
CLASS WORK LOAD - in hours	43	43.7	43	30.7	31	44	39.2	34
ACADEMIC COMPONENT	18%	29%	28%	32%	46%	17%	28%	64%
TECHNICAL AND CRAFTS COMPONENT	71%	60%	63%	52%	37%	70%	59%	0%
PHYSICAL AND ARTISTIC COMPONENT	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	12%
MORAL COMPONENT	9%	8%	8%	12%	14%	10%	10%	24%
TOTAL	100%	99%	101%	99%	100%	99%	99%	101%

COURSES

A - Locksmith

B - Electrician

C - Electrical
mechanician

D - Chemical assistant

E - Business

F - Girl's formation

(Those were the technical courses where enrollment was greater)

4.5. Comment of the Tables - confirmation of the hypotheses

The hypothesis a) - "There is less mentality inculcation in secondary school curriculum than in primary school curriculum" - is clearly confirmed, although one cannot compare directly the percentages of the moral component of secondary education curriculum with the percentages of mentality inculcated readings in primary education curriculum, due to the different concepts of curriculum in which each analysis is based.

The hypothesis b) - "The academic and the technical components will prevail respectively in grammar and in technical schools" - is also clearly confirmed. The academic component occupies 51% of the first cycle and 64% of the second cycle of grammar school curricula. The technical component occupies 59% on average of the technical courses analyzed. In the first two cases they represent more class hours than all the other components put together (NOTE 22).

The hypothesis c) - "The importance of the moral component of the curriculum increases in the educational mobilizing period and decreases afterwards" - is also confirmed. This confirmation is important. If the previous confirmation could almost be taken for granted, this last one was more problematic - did the mobilizing purpose extend to secondary education or has it remained only on compulsory schooling? The answer is given by Tables 3.8 and 3.9. They both show that the moral component of grammar school education follows also that curvilinear down - up - down pattern. For the first cycle the pattern is 12%, 35%, 28%, 13%. For the second cycle it is 3%, 34%, 24%, 3%. In both cases the peak is exactly in the mobilizing period (a little more than one third of the curricular hours). In both cases the third period follows closely the second one, as it is the case with the primary school education where the third period went on implementing the policies of the second. In the second period the curriculum was practically reduced to two components - the academic and the moral components.

This confirms both the existence of a mobilizing period and, at the same time, its exceptional character (NOTE 23).

The hypothesis d) - "The importance of moral component is greater in the first cycle than in the second cycle" - is also confirmed. The moral component represents on average 23% of the total in the first cycle and 16% in the second. This same trend is also indicated by the fact that there are greater variations in the moral component across periods in the second cycle than in the first (standard deviation is 13.5 for the former and 9.8 for the latter) (NOTE 24).

The hypothesis e) - "The importance of the moral component is greater in grammar schools than in technical schools" - is also confirmed, as can be deduced from Table 3.10. One can see that the technical course which is more close to the grammar school model - the business course - (this closeness is reflected in the greater weight of the academic curriculum) gives more importance to the moral component.

One can end this section concluding that all hypotheses were confirmed.

4.6. The content of the moral component in secondary education

The content of the moral component is mainly nationalistic inculcation - Portuguese and History of Portugal, the activities of "Portuguese Youth", the compulsory cultural sessions in 1936 Choral Singing, in 1936, all envisaged nationalistic instilling (NOTE 25).

The inculcation of a religious mentality was less important, as can be deduced from the analysis of the curricular status of "Religious and Moral Education". Using indicators of curricular hierarchy (FERNANDES 1983, FORMOSINHO 1983 a) one can see that this subject was not compulsory, it was allocated only one hour per week, it was not subject to examination, it had not any influence on student promotion or in the entrance to the university. The feeling of the pupils and the climate of classrooms was generally in accordance with this low status - NUNES 1981, 149-150 (see chapter five, section 2.2.7).

4.7. Conclusion

One can conclude this chapter saying that secondary education

analysis follows generally the trends also present in primary education. Both analysis confirm that the school was viewed by New State regime as an explicit agent of mentality inculcation to shape the "new" passive and conformist man, which should support the New State elitist non participatory theory of government.

4.8 The use of conformist methods of teaching

Since the methods of teaching used can promote passivity or, on the contrary, promote mobilization, creativity, spirit of initiative their analysis is useful.

According to SALAZAR portuguese education had traditionally being minimizing the physical dimension and the education of the will, while it used memory intensively.

Such processes developed culture at the expense of research, developed "passivity of spirit" at the expense of initiative (SALAZAR 1933). CAETANO agrees with this diagnosis and says that the teaching merely concerned with reproduction of knowledge created by others (as it was the case in portuguese education) led to a "passivity of spirit" (CAETANO 1951 in ZORRO 1969, 58-59 - see also 158). This bookish and abstract education did not give to the student capacity to solve the problems of life (SALAZAR III,393).

The diagnosis seems to be adequate, but one must acknowledge that the therapeutic (if therapeutic was really intended) provoked exactly the same illness. (See in chapter two, section 1.3 a similar situation with the building of the new man of the New State which was very close to the old man). Portuguese education remained bookish, abstract, favouring memorization and reproduction of textbook knowledge. Thus the "passivity of spirit" went on, as it was the congruent design of the New State. The discipline methods used also inculcated passivity - see about methods of teaching and discipline in New State secondary school - BETTENCOURT 1983, 89-96, NUNES 1981, SANTOS 1985, 117-119.

In the next chapter it will be analyzed in detail the content of the mentality inculcated by the school, circumscribing our analysis to primary education.

CHAPTER IV

PRACTICE OF NEW STATE
EXPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES
- THE CONTENT OF THE PASSIVE MENTALITY
INCULCATED THROUGH THE CURRICULUM

In this chapter it will be analyzed the concrete content of the passive mentality inculcated through the curriculum.

This analysis will be restricted to primary school curriculum for various reasons. Firstly, only the concept of curriculum which underlines the analysis of primary school education allows a detailed analysis of the content of the mentality inculcated, since it is comprehensive in relation to the manifest curriculum, including the content of education (syllabus, textbooks) - see chapter 3, sections 2.6.3 and 3.2.1. Secondly, primary school was the only compulsory schooling until 1964, which means that all new Portuguese were subject to the inculcation of the mentality which will be analysed (thus making it very influential in the society at large). Thirdly, due to this characteristic, this analysis will be much more revealing of New State project to build the new man than the analysis of secondary school curriculum.

The study of New State primary school curriculum was done following New State main principles very well described by Salazar, in 1936 (SALAZAR II, 127-141) - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority. It will be added also Hierarchy which means respects for the existing social order and the existing social stratification, which is implicit and explicit in various New State sources.

1. FATHERLAND - ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION

Salazar said, in 1936, *"We have put without fear portuguese nationalism as the indestructible bedrock of the New State"* (SALAZAR II,132). *"All for the Nation, nothing against the Nation"* was one Salazar's motto included in reading textbooks. The study of this inculcation of a nationalistic mentality implies a clarification of the concept of nationalism. For this it will be used the usual method of analysing the primary sources.

1.2. The analysis of the primary sources - nationalism as a diffuse and pervasive concept

Analysing Salazar speeches one can conclude that nationalism is a diffuse and pervasive concept. It has many meanings (NOTE 1).

a) It can mean the creation of an independent and original political model - see SALAZAR I, preface, 338, 373-374, 379-380, II, preface, 26-28, 113, III, 130-131, IV, 191, V, 59, 320, 401, 407, and in FERRO 1982, 127 (see also CAETANO 1956 in ZORRO 1969, 64).

This aspect will be referred in chapter seven, section 1.3.2. **It** provokes a tendency for political and cultural isolationism - see chapter seven, section 1.3.3.

b) It can mean the assertion of the interest of the Nation, represented by the State, above the interests of economic groups, social classes or parties - SALAZAR I, 134. (see also CAETANO 1952, 14). This aspect will be analyzed in chapter seven, sections 1.1, 2.2.3.

c) It can mean that all portuguese have to accept the national interest (as defined by the regime), since the leaders always acted in the name of the Nation (NOTE 2). Those who do not submit to this definition are not truly portuguese, are not the Nation, they are the "Anti-Nation" - see SALAZAR I, 267-268, III, 337, IV, 355-356. Indeed the partisans of the New State called themselves "the nationalists", the patriots. *"Who is not patriot cannot be considered portuguese"*. (SALAZAR

IV,356) - see also CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,94). As one minister of Deffence said, in 1958, *"We are the Nation, not them [...] we are the freedom, not them. They are the deserters, not us, they are the traitors, not us [...] we are Portugal!"* (NOTE 3). So nationalism can have a repressive meaning - *"We do not recognize liberty as against the nation"* (SALAZAR 1939,209).

d) Nationalism can mean the assertion of Nation's historical rights over colonies and thus it is built on a definition of Nation based on history (portuguese Discoveries and conquests) and on the notion of empire.

This nationalism was translated in the first two periods in an explicit inculcation of a colonial spirit (SALAZAR II, 131). Already in 1928 it was decreed that it was necessary in all schools to intensify the study of portuguese colonies *"to create in our people a colonial opinion"* (Decree 15.088, 23-2-1928) (NOTE 4). As CAETANO said in the thirties; *"Africa is for us a moral justification and a "raison d'être" as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it we are a great power"* (in BLACKBURN 1974) (NOTE 5).

After the beginning of the colonial war (in the fourth and fifth period) there was a great insistence in the formal proclamation of Portugal as a *"pluricontinental and multi-racial nation"* (see chapter five, section 2.3). Hence the motto *"the whole Portugal from Minho [the northern region] to Timor [the farrest colony] or the sentence "There are no portuguese possessions, but parts of Portugal scattered in the world"* (SALAZAR VI, 10 - see also 12 and 15). It is the space dimension of nationalism (NOTE 6).

e) Nationalism can mean *"the undefinable essence of the historical continuity of Portuguese throughout the centuries" a "moral entity formed throughout the centuries"* (SALAZAR IV, 354). This portuguese essence *"is the tradition which individualizes us among the peoples, that which constitutes our collective character in all epochs and in all places"* (CAETANO 1952,48). That is, nationalism is portuguese uniqueness.

f) Following logically this meaning nationalism means also the national project, portuguese destiny, portuguese civilizing mission. That mission was to propagate christian western civilization and christian faith to other lands and peoples. As Salazar said the Nation has a *"sense of a national destiny which has nothing to do with the modesty of its resources and its low level of instruction. The Nation had definitely the vocation of [...] civilizing action, of imperial grandeur"* (SALAZAR III, 37 - see also I, 265, II, 132, III 43, IV 354-356). See about this chapter seven, section 2.2.1.

The New State used the images of the past and the myth of the civilizing mission to embody the self appointed task of rebuilding the Nation (see chapter seven, section 1.3.2) (NOTE 7).

For the sucess of this task was necessary *"to imprint on the growing mind those high ideals which characterize our civilization, together with the deep love of country akin to the love of those who have created and extended our heritage in the past"* (SALAZAR 1939, 209).

g) Nationalism means also, naturally, love for the Motherland (SALAZAR II, 131), *"the prettiest of all Motherlands"* as a textbook said. It means also pride of the Fatherland.

For all those reasons it was necessary to inculcate nationalism in the new generations (see SALAZAR III, 201).

1.2. Categories of content analysis of nationalism

In this chapter it will be only object of analysis those aspects of nationalism which were seen by the regime as necessary to instill in children through compulsory primary education. The other aspects are treated elsewhere in the thesis, as has been being referred.

Nationalism had a time dimension which supported meanings d) e) and f). This dimension is naturally given by the study of the history of Portugal - thus the category of content

analysis History of Portugal.

Nationalism has also a space perspective through its imperial dimension. This appears in texts by reference to portuguese colonies (either merely descriptive references or praising references) - see NOTE 4. This aspect of nationalism appears under the category Overseas Texts. The specific proclamation of Portugal as a "pluricontinental and multiracial nation" or the defense of colonial war is included in Political Propaganda.

Nationalism includes also Patriotic Inculcation which means direct appeal for love or pride of the Nation. This category was divided into two main sub-categories - mobilizing appeals and non mobilizing appeals (it would probably be more correct to speak of more and less mobilizing appeals). Mobilizing patriotic appeals include epic texts (like epic poems, texts appealing for the service of the Nation or the defense of the Nation - except specific references to colonial war - definitions of Portugal as nation), reference to national symbols (national anthem, national flag) and slogans (like "All for the Nation, nothing against the Nation", "Portugal, land of heroes and saints, navigators and martyrs, you are the prettiest land in all the world", "Your Fatherland is the prettiest of all Fatherlands - it deserves all sacrifices"). Non mobilizing appeals include lyric references to love for the Nation (mainly lyric poems) and other non typified non mobilizing references (which represent 26% of patriotic inculcation category and include praise of concrete portuguese natural beauties or patriotic references to portuguese language).

1.3. The hypotheses

Applying to nationalistic inculcation our demobilizing hypothesis one can draw the following sub-hypotheses:

a) "History of Portugal" should be the prevailing category, since it is the less directly mobilizing one;

b) In "Patriotic Inculcation", a more mobilizing category by nature, non mobilizing appeals should have a relevant expression.

1.4. Presentation of the results

Let us present Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which can confirm or not these hypotheses.

(Percentages given in these tables, as in the following of this chapter, are referred to the total number of texts in the sample. For further information it is added the absolute numbers of the analyzed category and total absolute numbers of the sample. A very slight variation of total percentage when categories are divided into sub-categories may result from accumulation of rounding procedures).

TABLE 4.1 -TYPES OF NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION
IN PRIMARY SCHOOL READING TEXTBOOKS

Types of Nationalistic Inculcation	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd /3 rd Per. 1936 - 1964	4 th /5 th Per. 1964-1974	AVERAGE TOTAL
History of Portugal	2.5%	11.4%	12.9%	9.1%
Patriotic inculcation	2.3%	4.9%	4.1%	3.8%
Overseas texts	1.5%	2.5%	4.3%	2.8%
TOTAL	6.3%	18.8%	21.3%	15.7%
n Nationalistic Inculcation	33	104	119	256
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

TABLE 4.2 - TYPES OF PATRIOTIC INCULCATION STRATEGIES
IN PRIMARY SCHOOL READING TEXTBOOKS

TYPES OF STRATEGIES	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd /3 rd Per. 1936-1964	4 th /5 th Per. 1964-1974	AVERAGE / TOTAL
Mobilizing strategies	1.3%	3.4%	2.5%	2.5%
Non mobilizing strategies	1.0%	1.4%	1.6%	1.3%
TOTAL	2.3%	4.8%	4.1%	3.8%
n PATRIOT.INC	12	27	23	62
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

1.5. Confirmation of the hypotheses - nationalism was not a mobilizing strategy

1.5.1. General confirmation of the hypotheses

Analyzing Table 4.1 one can confirm the hypothesis a) - indeed the "History of Portugal" category prevails in relative terms (it is more than double and treble respectively of the other two categories) and in absolute terms (it represents 58% of all nationalistic texts).

Analyzing Table 4.2. one can see that, on average, non mobilizing strategies represent 35% of the total, which represents a fair proportion, thus confirming hypothesis b). While the mobilizing strategies category show the characteristic down-up-down pattern (1,3%-3,4%-2,5%) the non mobilizing strategies show a constant tendency to increase (1,0%-1,4%-1,6%). The relative proportion of the two sub-categories is 42%, 30% and 39%.

1.5.2. The compartmentalized mobilization of the fourth and fifth periods

On a detailed analysis of Table 4.1 one can find a constant increasing trend in History of Portugal (2,5%, 11,4%, 12,9%) and in Overseas Texts (1,5%, 2,5%, 4,3%) - (only Patriotic Inculcation follows the characteristic down-up-down pattern with the peak in the mobilizing period (2,3%, 4,9%, 4,1%)). This is reflected in the global constant increasing of Nationalistic Inculcation - 6,3%, 18,8%, 21,3%.

This constant tendency needs some explanation since it contradicts the rule that almost all mentality inculcation categories decrease in the 4th and 5th periods after the peak in the mobilizing period - see Table 3.6

As it was said in chapter one (section 3.4), in the fourth period it began the colonial war (soon fought in three fronts) which provoked a remobilization of a hard core of the regime elite. As will be seen below (chapter six, section 2.3) this compelled the regime to implement strategies of (compartmentalized) mobilization, (that is, a mobilization specifically addressed to young makes in order to inculcate in them the need to defend the Fatherland). It is this compartmentalized remobilization strategy which is reflected in the general increase of nationalist inculcation in the fourth and fifth periods, more specifically in the 113% increase of History of Portugal and in the 172% increase of Overseas Texts.

1.5.3. Conclusions

This internal evidence points to a general non mobilizing aspect of nationalism in education, with specific but limited mobilizing areas. This internal evidence must be supplemented by the acknowledgement that nationalism did not serve any aggressiveness against other nations (SALAZAR I, 337, V, 320), any aggressive campaign of chauvinism or xenophobia or sentiments of racial superiority among european nations (indeed portuguese suffer chronically from a national inferiority complex - ARAGÃO 1985, 147-160). Salazar did not believe in appealing to the heroism of the race without previous modification of the general mentality of portuguese (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 165).

This modification was conceived by Salazar in the direction of passivity, the "new" man he would like to build was the passive man (see chapter two, section 1.3). This passivity was a means towards a conformed behaviour, it did not mean a vacuum of ideas. This passivity was best supported by a cult of the past which could substitute the dull aspect of the present. Indeed the main objective of nationalistic

inculcation was to control the self-image of Portugal which portuguese held, in order to legitimize the present leadership as the most adequate to bring Portugal to the glory of the past and to give to portuguese a sense of a spiritual mission to fulfill (see NOTE 7). Thus the manipulation of this image of the past was very important in the day to day government. As an american diplomat said, after visiting Portugal - Portugal is ruled by a triumvirate composed by Salazar, Henry, the Navigator and Vasco da Gama (ANTUNES 1985, 31).

The non mobilizing characteristic of nationalism comes from its obsessive reference to the past - 58% of all nationalistic texts refer to the past.

This obsession with portuguese past led to a self-centrization which had a logical culmination in cultural isolationism, as it was hinted in section 1.1a). This isolationism had many implication for the educational and cultural systems - it meant control of foreign books and magazines, control of foreign educational credentials, control of foreign intellectuals who wished to visit Portugal, etc. This cultural isolationism was also consequence (and probably also cause) of political isolationism - Portugal liked to stand "Proudly above!", to use a Salazar's motto in refernce to the portuguese position in regard to the colonial problem (see chapter seven, section 1.3.3) (NOTE 8).

All this does not mean that nationalism did not have mobilizing aspects, like the support for a manichaeian vision of reality divided between the good ones ("ours", the nationalist) and the bad ones ("them", the communists and crypto-communists), but this aspect was not the predominant one in school nationalistic inculcation. On the other hand, nationalism did serve to promote a compartmentalized mobilization in the fourth and fifth periods (The contribution of Portuguese Youth to nationalistic inculcation will be studied in chapter nine).

Taking into account all that was said about the role of nationalistic inculcation in general, and the internal evidence of its role in primary school, one can conclude that nationalism in education had a general non mobilizing appeal, with specific but limited areas of mobilization.

2. FATHERLAND - ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION

2.1. The concept of History

In order to inculcate efficiently a nationalist mentality through the manipulation of the image of portuguese past, History could not be conceived as an impartial and objective Social Science. History was not conceived as the rigorous study of the past, but as a strategy to *"feed in the collective soul the great certitudes"* (SALAZAR), as strategy *"to imprint on the growing mind those high ideals which characterize our civilization, together with the deep love of country akin to the love of those who have created and extended our heritage in the past"* (SALAZAR 1939, 209), *"to feed the national spirit through the cult of traditions and glories of the past"* (Martinho Nobre de Melo, a member of the regime's elite, in FIGUEIREDO 1976, 67-68).

History of Portugal was used to support all of the above referred meanings of nationalism. It was used to support the creation of an original political model (see chapter seven, section 1.3.2); to promote a strong state presenting as anarchy historical periods where the state was not strong; to promote the imperial definition of the Nation emphasizing naturally the Discoveries and portuguese colonial rights ; to stress the "uniqueness" of portuguese essence, the singularity of a Nation which is the "prettiest of all Nations" and has the "most beautiful History", as textbooks proclaimed; to inculcate love for Fatherland; all this served also to prepare children to accept the national project, as defined by the New State. As CAETANO said *"The Revolution was done [...] for the portuguese to meet again the heroic spirit with which they faced tenebrous seas [...] and built an Empire"* (CAETANO 1952, 14).

History of Portugal was divided into good, white, nationalistic periods where great heroes, based on a strong state, and appointed by providential designs performed great deeds, and bad, black periods of state feebleness, disarray, confusion, chaos or conflict. To teach History was to chose the best periods and promote their heroes and deeds. Since History was based on providential men, History should be the narration of deeds of those providential men - the heroes. In this conception "it is true all that glorifies the Portuguese Nation, it is false all that depresses it, diminishes it, debilitates or stains its reputation" said Alfredo Pimenta a nationalist historian (in CARDOSO 1982).

CORDEIRO-RAMOS, the first important Minister of Education of the New State, already deffended those conceptions of history (CORDEIRO-RAMOS 1933a), and published a decree which establishes guidelines for this approach to the teaching of history. *"History of Portugal envisages [...] to form portuguese; as such its action should be highly nationalizing. [...] All deed which means an effort of the Nation [...] should be exalted [...]. It should be object of justification and glorification all that has been done, in the eight centuries of History of Portugal to strenghten the following fundamental factors of social life: Family [...], Faith [...], Authority [...], Firmness in Government [...], Respect of Hierarchy [...], Literany and scientific culture"* (Decree 21103 15-4-1932). The decree adds that it is the State which should define the national truth, that is the truth which best fits the Nation.

CARNEIRO-PACHECO, the minister of Education of the mobilization period, in order to reinforce integration of nationalistic messages with other mentality inculcation messages even determined that all historical texts were to be included in reading textbooks. This was implemented for the first, second and third classes, but it was never implemented for the fourth class (as it was referred in chapter three, section 3.2.3.b). As it was said, in this mobilizing period, the best teacher of History of Portugal was that who could be the best interpreter of the national soul (in MONICA 1978, 301). (There are several sources for this conception of History of the New State - NOTE 9).

The logic culmination of this historical perspective, in regard to presentation of contemporary events, was to present the New State as continuation of past glorious periods, regime achievements as new deeds and Salazar as the hero of the present historical period (as the providential man given by God to Portugal in the hour of need). Salazar was compared to Henry the Navigator by his biographer António Ferro (FERRO 1982, 178-179, 226-227) and was presented in posters as the "Saviour of the Fatherland" (see reproduction of poster in CORTESÃO 1982, 90).

This conception of History achieved the status of official historiography, or even of official New State doctrine. It was so much defended by the New State that it transformed certain historical heroes in nationalist figures of the regime. This meant that to discuss History of Portugal was necessarily to attack or to defend the regime. Already in 1932 Salazar was saying that the Opposition was attacking Henry the Navigator as if he was enrolled in the "National Union", (the sole party) (in FERRO 1982, 192). Due to the highly political character of the teaching of History of Portugal many university history syllabus stopped at the napoleonic invasions to spare any embarrassment (ROBINSON 1979, 58).

2.2. Evidence of the implementation of this conception of History

It is now due time to find some evidence of the implementation of this conception of History. It will be used two indicators - one related with the content and the other with the methodology of the teaching of History. The content indicator will be the period(s) most referred in reading textbooks. The methodological indicator will be the use of heroes and deeds as predominant methodology.

According to what had been said, Discoveries should be the most referred period - indeed it would promote a glorious vision of Portugal, it would legitimize the imperial dimension of Portugal and it would justify present cooperation between Church and State, as a tradition which was intrinsic part of Discoveries, which were done "the sword in one hand [...] the rosary on the other" (GALVÃO-TELLES 1966a, 75).

There are other obvious periods which are all those where the independence of Portugal was involved - the Foundation of portuguese nation in the 12th century, the crisis of 1383-1385 where Portugal was about to be dominated by the spanish kingdom of Castile, the Restoration of Independence in 1640 after sixty years of domination by Spain - see about those historical events MARQUES 1976.

In regard to methodological strategies in the teaching of History one has categorized texts as using heroes or deeds in the teaching History, and texts which used other strategies. It is expected that, in accordance with the conception of History asserted by the New State, the former strategies prevailed.

TABLE 4.3 - IMPORTANCE GIVEN TO THE DIFFERENT
PERIODS IN THE TEACHING OF
HISTORY OF PORTUGAL

Historical Periods	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd /3 rd Per. 1936-1964	4 th /5 th Per. 1964-1974	AVERAGE / /TOTAL
Discoveries	1.3%	4.7%	5.4%	3.8%
Foundation of Portugal	0.6%	1.3%	1.6%	1.2%
1383-85 Crisis	0.3%	1.4%	1.4%	1.1%
RESTORATION	0%	0.5%	0.9%	0.5%
OTHER PERIODS	0.4%	3.4%	3.6%	2.5%
TOTAL	2.6%	11.3%	12.9%	9.1%
n HIST.PORTUGAL	13	63	72	148
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

TABLE 4.4 - TYPES OF STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING HISTORY
OF PORTUGAL IN PRIMARY SCHOOL READINGS
TEXTBOOKS

Types of Strategies	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd /3 rd Per. 1936-1964	4 th /5 th Per. 1964-1974	AVERAGE TOTAL
Heroes	1.7%	6.0%	5.7%	4.5%
Deeds	0.2%	1,8%	3.9%	2.0%
Monuments	0.4%	1.8%	0.7%	1.0%
Other strategies	0.2%	1.8%	2.5%	1.5%
TOTAL	2.5%	11.4%	12.8%	9.0%
n HIST.PORTUGAL	13	63	72	148
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

2.3. Analysis of the results - confirmation of the implementation of this conception of History

It is clearly confirmed the prevalence of the Discoveries over any other historical period - indeed it represents 42% of all historical references and it is three times more referred than any other period.

All the periods which concern the independence of Portugal represent (on the total) an average of 31% of the total historical texts (NOTE 10).

So it is confirmed at the content level the effective implementation in reading textbooks of this conception of history. Identical conclusions would come from an analysis of the content of History of Portugal textbooks - see RADICH 1979 (as it was already said, in the second and third periods it only existed History of Portugal textbook in the fourth class).

In regard to methodological level it is also overwhelmingly clear the prevalence of the "heroes" strategy - it represents 50% of the total (NOTE 11). Putting together the "heroes" and "deeds" strategy one can see that they occupy 72% of the total. So it is also clearly confirmed, at the methodological level, the application of the analyzed conception of History (NOTE 12).

The implementation of this methodology by primary school teachers, whose preparation was not very good, transformed, most of the time, History of Portugal in a sequence of names, dates and events to learn by heart in sequence, as could be experienced by any primary school pupil (see MONICA 1978, 302). This obviously decreased the effect of the methodology planned by New State leaders for the teaching of History of Portugal.

3. GOD - THE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS INCULCATION

3.1. Methodology of the analysis

In the sole reading textbooks for the first, second and third classes (in the second and third periods), it was included an appendix of religious doctrine called "Christian Doctrine". This is the implementation of a strategy decided by CARNEIRO-PACHECO which commanded that there should be a sole textbook for each class which included all subjects (see chapter three, section 3.2.3b). As it was already said, this norm was never applied to the fourth class.

The inclusion of the component of religious education within the same textbook with other readings had the effect, and most probably the purpose, of integrating religious message with the other mentality inculcation messages. This is the reason why this religious doctrine appendix was considered integrated in the sample. (In the first and second class textbooks it was also included a mathematical appendix which obviously was not considered part of the analyzed sample, since it had neither the referred purpose nor the referred effect).

3.2. The role of religious inculcation in the passive conformist strategy

Consulting Table 3.6 one can see that religious inculcation increased six times from the first to the second period and decreased drastically in the fourth and fifth periods. This down-up-down pattern is still present even not taking into account the readings from the religious appendix (percentages would then be 3%, 7%, 4%).

The massive presence of religious texts in the second and third periods show that religious inculcation had a decisive role in the implementation of the conformist strategy then designed.

In first place, the simultaneous (and integrated) presence of religious and nationalistic inculcations represent a statement of similitude between Church and State projects, and of cooperation between New State and Catholic Church. This

cooperation was often proclaimed by both partners. CARNEIRO-PACHECO, minister of Education of the mobilizing period, said that "To exclude God from school is an abominable deed" (in SAMPAIO 1976,51). A pre-war Director of Secondary education added "The school mission now can only be the creation of a single, holy, Catholic, universal and personal method of comprehending and developing this temporal life as a function of and preparation for eternal life" (in ROBINSON 1979, 58).

In 1966 the then minister of Education was saying *"I think that education must never lose and should rather put growing stress on the spiritualist nature which derives from the shining christian tradition"* (GALVÃO-TELLES 1966a,42). The Church also proclaimed this cooperation and tried to integrate all education in a religious spirit *"The true and solid moral and religious formation of the students should be done in relation to all disciplines not only in the hours allocated to the classes of Religion. [Consequently, the teacher should] try to impregnate all school subjects with religious spirit, in such a way that religion be the foundation and coronation of all educational effort"* (Portaria 22966, 17-10-1967, giving instructions for the syllabus of Religious Education - whose responsibility was committed to Catholic Church - for the complementary cycle of primary education). See about the relationships between Catholic Church and New State chapter five, section 2.2 .

In second place, massive religious inculcation contribute to give social legitimacy to Catholic Church and thus to actively encourage a powerful mechanism of social control - obedience to Church authorities as consequence of religious belief. As there was a "moral union" (see chapter five, section 2.2) between Church and State this was another way for the New State to achieve conformism. Civic preaching of obedience was complemented by religious preaching of resignation, the inculcation of acceptance of social position was complemented by christian acceptance of fate or destiny, public strategies avoidance was complemented by passive acceptance of daily events as God special design which is useless to fight. The religious phenomenon was used, as Salazar acknowledges (SALAZAR IV,373),

as a stabilizing element in society and a contribution to the project of moral renewal of the Nation.

In third place, this inculcation of a religious sense in portuguese history contributed to the acceptance of the providential character of Salazar's leadership. This character was explicitly asserted by Church leaders - "the bold and tenacious man at the helm" (Archbishop of Braga, in 1959), "the instrument of Providence" (Cardinal Cerejeira, leader of Portuguese Church from 1929 to 1971, in 1940) - see about this chapter five, section 2.2.3 . Salazar could then be presented in a religious language like the "Saviour of the Fatherland", the "Redeemer of Portugal" (NOTE 13). So it was possible to write *"Let them [the pupils] exalt with Salazar's ideas about God, about Fatherland, about Family"* (our emphasis, in "Escola Primária", 25-4-1940). Salazar encouraged this when saying, in 1937, after an aborted attempt on his life "we are indestructible, because Providence has willed it so" (in ROBINSON 1979, 66) (NOTE 14).

Finally, this massive religious inculcation minimized the possible ill effects of literacy policy (through the access to reading "subversive" books or newspapers, for instance), as MONICA explains - "To the question - 'Should we teach people to read?' - the orthodox answer was yes, provided the book be the Cathecism" (MONICA 1978, 120).

To conclude this analysis of the role of religious inculcation in the global passivity and conformism mentality inculcation of New State strategy one must call attention to the fact there were other means (at least as powerful as school curriculum), to transmit this message of cooperation between New State and Catholic Church - for instance, the presence of religious authorities in state ceremonies and the presence of regime leaders in liturgic ceremonies.

3.3. The strategy of integration of messages

3.3.1. The integration of religious and nationalistic inculcations

An integrated message combining religious and nationalistic elements should probably be more powerful than two separate, unrelated messages. Indeed this is one of the most used mentality inculcation strategies of the New State - integration of messages.

The integration between portuguese nationalism and portuguese catholicism had certainly historical roots. These roots were greatly emphasized by both sides - State and Church. "To aspire to study the historical evolution of the Portuguese people by first removing its religious life and the mission of the regular and secular clergy, would be tantamount to trying to understand the circulatory system without the blood vessels" said an historian of the Church - Fortunato de Almeida (in ROBINSON 1977). The same integrated effort was present in Discoveries and was contemporarily present in the New State defense of christian western civilization (which was God's appointed mission to Portugal).

So it is natural that the integration of Church and State projects (this "moral union"), had expression in education. As the leader of portuguese Catholic Church said "Portuguese education cannot cease to be Catholic without Portugal giving up being Portugal" (in ROBINSON 1979,63).

How was this integration transmitted through school curriculum? How can we analyse this integration? Due to the necessary characteristic of mutual exclusion of categories in quantitative content analysis (see chapter three, section 3.2.2), the methodology of content analysis used until now cannot reflect integration, since this by nature implies mixing of categories. So we will use qualitative content analysis to study the strategy of integration.

In first place, integration between nationalism and catholicism was done through a kind of teaching of portuguese history which emphasized the Discoveries period in the crusade for faith and empire perspective. The regime reserved a glorious role for the Church in the narration of the past (BRUNEAU 1976).

The second integration strategy was the mixing of nationalistic and religious symbols like in the following texts (reading textbooks are quoted by the school year, the date of the analysed edition and the number of the page) - "We are the chosen host | For the final victory | Portugal of our life | | Be confident in us, Portugal" (3rd, 1958, 142); or "Who wants to see the beautiful barge | That is going to sea? | Our Lady is in it | Angels are rowing it | St.Vicent is the pilot | | Jesus Christ is the general | What a beautiful flag they carry | It is the flag of Portugal" (3rd, 1958, 156).

The third integration strategy was to hint a special relationship of God with Portugal which was counterpart of portuguese mission in the world, which was the defense of Christian western civilization against the "Winds of History" - Fatima cult was one of the main pillars of this special relationship, the providential appearance of Salazar another. There are texts where this strategy can be seen (and evidenced) - "Our Lady of Fatima | Dove of the Highest Dove - Cot | | One day she flew from Heaven | And landed up in Portugal" (3rd, 1958, 164). "Land of the Motherland - monastery | War trumpet, mass book! | knight and nobleman | God save you Portugal" (3rd, 1958, 74). The second and third strategies were mainly present in the second and third periods.

The fourth integration strategy was the presentation of an ideal image of man where both nationalistic and religious qualities were present - "Good Man, good Portuguese | Good Christian this is the rule | To work in the world | All the good there is to be done" (4th, 1968, 140).

This integration of nationalism and catholicism in education went beyond the curriculum. The nationalist youth movement ("Portuguese Youth") had a strong religious component - the Church had representation in the high command posts of the organization; still, in 1972, a dispatch allowed "Portuguese Youth" to coordinate the activities of the "Moral Formation Offices" (Gabinetes de Formação Moral) - see chapter five, section 2.2.7 and notes 22, 23, chapter nine, section 2.2.2 .

To understand all the integration role of religious inculcation a more detailed analysis of the content thus categorized is needed.

3.3.2 Methodology of the detailed analysis of the content of religious inculcation

All the religious inculcation texts were divided into three more detailed categories:

a) Religious doctrine texts - texts of direct exposition of christian doctrine like texts about the creation, narration of gospel events and Jesus life episodes, Commandments, Misteries, Sacraments, etc.

b) Religious attitudes texts - texts instilling religious dispositions and habits, like christian charity, confidence in God, thanksgiving at meals, feeling of God's presence in Nature, respect for Sunday, etc.

c) Popular Religiosity texts - texts referent to rural or popular aspects of religion like popular religious legends, popular religious quatrains, religious processions, religious fairs and popular festivities, aspects of religion in the countryside like importance of church bells or Angelus Tolling.

3.3.3. Presentation of the results

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.5

TABLE 4.5 - TYPES OF RELIGIOUS INCULCATION IN READING
TEXTBOOKS IN PRIMARY EDUCATION

CATEGORIES	1 st Period	2 nd / 3 rd Periods	4 th / 5 th Periods	AVERAGE / /TOTAL
Religious doctrine	1.5%	13.4%	0.4%	5.1%
Religious attitudes	0.4%	1.6%	0.4%	0.8%
Popular religiosity	0.8%	3.4%	2.9%	2.4%
TOTAL	2.7%	18.4%	3.7%	8.3%
n Religious Inc.	14	102	20	136
n TOTAL	519	553	560	1632

3.3.4. The integration of religious and rural inculcation

As it is clear the largely predominant category is "Religious Doctrine" (without the Appendix, "Religious Doctrine" would be the second category representing 1,2% of the total). It is also worth-while to call attention to the fact that non popular religious indoctrination was prevailingly done by direct indoctrination and not by diffuse religious attitude inculcation. All this is explained by what have been said until now about religious inculcation.

What is now interesting for the study of the integration role of religious instilling is the analysis of "Popular Religiosity" category. This category represent 29% of all religious texts. It is part of the strategy of integration between religious and rural inculcation, which have translation in many texts - "Blessed tree, blessed shadows, blessed fruits! Blessed be the hands who planted you |the tree|" (1st, 1958,89) ."The bells toll the Angelus /Cease the harvest-women in the fields/The oxen return to the farms / It dies the rustle in the threshing-floor / Night comes, day is going / Hail Mary! (3rd, 1958,8) - see also 1st, 1958, 83; 2nd, 1958, 36-37; 3rd, 1958, 97-98. This integration reinforces the "ideal new man" of Salazar, which was built at the image of the rural man (chapter two, section 1.3)

The whole role of religious inculcation in the integration of New State messages can only be completely understood in the end of this chapter, since it will be still studied the integrating role of religious messages with respect to Family, Authority and Hierarchy inculcations.

4. GOD, FAMILY AND AUTHORITY - ANALYSIS OF FAMILY AND AUTHORITY INCULCATION

We are going to consider all those aspects in one section since they are often integratedly presented in textbooks. It is thus an illustration more of the strategy of integration of messages. As SALAZAR said *we do not discuss God [...], we do not discuss the Authority [...], we do not*

discuss the Family" (SALAZAR II, 131 -134).

As the family is the most fundamental cell of the Nation it should be protected by the State (see chapter seven, sections 2.3.1, 4.1.2) "*we do not recognize liberty as against [...] the family*" said Salazar (1939,209).

4.1. The ideal family

The inculcation of respect for family as institution and for family values was done in great part through the presentation of an ideal image of family.

The ideal family was an hierarchic structure where authority and obedience were the prevailing values. It resembled nothing the achievement oriented bourgeois family (MONICA 1978,272).

In this hierarchy the head was the father. "In the family the chief is the Father" (1932 slogan), "The Father is the most learned person of the family", "It is the father who lays down the laws in the family" (from instructions to teachers in 1937 - in MONICA 1978,274), "The father is the authority in the family" (1st,1958,75).

The woman is seen predominantly as mother and housewife, working exclusively at home - "My mother cares for the home" (2nd,1958,11), "My dear mother! [...] how she seems to be everywhere in the house! [...] How she manages to have everything in order (2nd,1853,6-7), "My mother spent the day in the kitchen" (1st,1967,99) (NOTE 15).

4.2. Family and God

The integration of family inculcation with religious inculcation was perfect. "In the cradle I learned to say Mother. In my Mother's arms I learned to say Father. Then, my Father and my Mother taught me to say God" (2nd,1958,5).

The family was protected by God - the boy prays to Child Jesus for Him to protect his father who is a fisherman and is at the sea (1st,1958,72). Parents and grandparents pray to God for their children - the grandmother says "Lord Jesus! Do protect and bless my child. Do make him, like his father, obedient to Your Law, do make him good and useful for the

Fatherland" (1st,1958,59).

The integration of Family and God was logically culminated in references to the Holy Family.

4.3. Family and Authority

It is within the family that the cult of Authority should begin, since the New State saw a direct relationship between attitudes towards the parents and future attitudes towards public leaders. So authority enforced in the family should be the model of the authority wished by the regime. "Just as you will be towards the Family you will be towards the Nation" (4th class,1968,140). "In the family the chief is the Father, in the school the chief is the Teacher, in the Nation the chief is the Government" (1932 slogan included in several textbooks)

So obedience to parents was the most congruent way to inculcate respect to authority. "The father is the authority in the family. Children are compelled to love, respect and obey him" (1st class,1958,75). "Sole textbooks showed monotonously how children should obey to their elders - parents, grandparents and other relatives" (MONICA 1978,295). Emphasis was put on obedience to the father since he is the head of the family (NOTE 16).

Those who obey are happier than those who command - "If you knew how difficult it is to command, you would prefer to obey all your life", "Obey and you will learn how to command", "The easier the obedience, the milder the command" (1932 slogans compulsorily included in textbooks). "Never envy those who are above you, since they have responsibilities and duties that you ignore" (4th,1951,119).

Obedience is thus a social phenomenon - in a factory the worker obeys ~~to~~ the foreman, the foreman obeys ~~to~~ the engineer the engineer obeys ~~to~~ the owner, the owner obeys ~~to~~ the laws prescribed by the Government of the Nation and Government leaders obey ~~to~~ their conscience formed in the love of God, Fatherland and Family, says a non sampled textbooks (in MONICA 1978,288).

The logic culmination of this principle is obedience to the Government ("All portuguese should respect and obey the

Government of the Nation" - 3rd,1958,178) and respect towards the President of Republique ("To venerate our Chief of the State [...] and carry out what he commands is a duty of loyalty towards Fatherland" - 3rd,1958,174).

4.4. The religious legitimization of obedience to public authorities

This obedience to parents and to public authorities was given religious legitimacy. Both God and Authority should not be discussed, as Salazar explained in 1936.

"The father is the authority in the family [...] The teacher is the authority in the school [...] It is God who commands us to respect our superiors and to obey to authorities" was inculcated since the very beginning (1st,1958,75). This is just an application of Church leaders thought expressed in the following words of Cardinal Cerejeira (the long lasting leader of the Church during the New State) addressed to the President of Republique "[I am] the highest representative in Portugal of a religion which commands to accept, to respect and to obey to the power of which you [...] are the highest representative" (NOTE 17).

5. FAMILY AND HIERARCHY - ANALYSIS OF THE INCULCATION OF THE SENSE OF HIERARCHY

All the mentality inculcation of the New State is based on a hierarchic perspective of society. "I believe in hierarchy, not in equality" said SALAZAR (VI,41).

This hierarchy should be preserved. The common portuguese wanted to preserve the existing hierarchy. This judgement was based in a diagnosis of portuguese society as a conservative society, which was true in many respects - see WIARDA 1977, passim (NOTE 18).

Hierarchy, in an comprehensive definition, encompasses both respect to authorities and obedience to superiors and also the attitude of preservation of the existing social stratification. As the first aspect was dealt under the "Authority" motto of

Salazar, Hierarchy here is analyzed just in the second meaning.

5.1. Family and Hierarchy - family as agent of preservation of existing social hierarchy

The ideal family was also the conformist family, which accepted its social position and did not aspire to social promotion. In portuguese society status was ascribed, rarely achieved. This ideal was much more fulfilled by the rural family than by the urban one. "Whatever pedagogues may say, it is unquestionable that in what refers both to sentiment and to culture the village family is superior to the town one" said a member of parliament, in 1938 (in MONICA .1978,270).

Thus one can expect that most of the references to family in reading textbooks respect to rural families. Table 4.6 will confirm or not this hypothesis.

TABLE 4.6 - TYPE OF REFERENCES TO FAMILY

TYPES OF FAMILY	1 st Period 1927-1936	2 nd / 3 rd Periods 1936-1964	4 th / 5 th Periods 1964-1974	AVERAGE
RURAL FAMILY	29%	100%	80%	71%
URBAN FAMILY	71%	0%	20%	29%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
n FAMILY	7	9	5	21

(The sample for this table includes only the family categorized texts which characterize the social type of the family referred. This excludes the majority of family texts (77%). It were also not considered references to rural family which were put in the category "Ruralism" and not in the category "Family".

Percentages in this table, contrarily to those of the other tables, are referred just to the small sample and not to the total sample).

The demonstration is clear - rural family is the predominant one, even not counting references to rural family in "Ruralism" texts.

A very brief study of Ramiro MARQUES which refers eight reading textbooks of the first six years of schooling confirms this - from the 53 references to family in those textbooks 34 are without reference to social origin of the family (64%), 16 respect rural families (30%) and 3 to bourgeois families (6%) (MARQUES 1981). This means that rural family references represent 84% of all socially situated families.

5.2. Family and Hierarchy based on sex - the initiation in family of differentiated sex roles

Society was based not only on a hierarchy based on social origin and social position, but also on a hierarchy based on sex. Each social cell should have head and man was "naturally" the head of the family cell, woman should be the mother and the housewife (it was never presented a text referring a woman professional worker) - see SALAZAR I, 203-204, in FERRO 1982, 156-158 .

Great part of the sex differentiation was initiated through the differentiated social roles of husband and wife, father and mother, son and daughter.

This differentiation was supported on a biological basis, since only women can be mothers, and on a psychological basis - "Man is audacious, violent and independent; woman is timid, affable and docile", so "one must not give to the feminine sex the same intellectual preparation [...], the same ideal given to boys" said a Philosophy textbook for secondary education (NOTE 19).

The differentiation implied separation of sexes during the whole educational career (segregation). But it assumed also an hierarchic differentiation which was translated in different compulsory education norms and differences in curriculum - see chapter five, section 3.6.

5.3. The cult of the family institution and the promotion of only private strategies

Family should be valued per se, as the most basic and fundamental social cell. So all the good persons should live for their families. "Do never put your interest above that of your family, since you pass away and your family-remains" said one of those 1932 slogans compulsorily included in reading textbooks. This living for the family was part of the habitual life Salazar encouraged (NOTE 20).

This total cult of the family institution contributed to the conformist strategy, since once one is totally engaged only in family affairs one limits his activity to private strategies. So no time will be available for public strategies. BRADFORD attributes the low public spirit of portuguese citizens to their excessive involvement with family affairs (BRADFORD 1973, 142). JESUÍNO (1982) says that the mythicizing of family represents a pshycological obstacle to the politicization of behaviour.

One can confirm this strategy through the analysis of a table where all references categorized as "Family" were attributed threesub-categories - inculcation of attitudes and sentiments which contribute to a conformist oriented strategy (Gratitude + Respect + Obedience + Valuation of family institution); inculcation of love sentiments (love + union); and inculcation of other various sentiments.

(Similarly to the previous table, percentages in the following table are referred just to the small sample and not to the total sample).

TABLE 4.7 - TYPE OF ORIENTATION IN FAMILY REFERENCES

	1 st Period 1927 - 1936	2 nd / 3 rd Periods 1936 - 1964	4 th / 5 th Periods 1964 - 1974	AVERAGE
CONFORMIST ORIENTED REFERENCES	39%	41%	30%	38%
LOVE ORIENTED REFERENCES	53%	47%	55%	51%
OTHER SENTIMENTS REFERENCES	8%	12%	15%	11%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
n FAMILY	36	34	20	90

(In this analysis each text could be categorized under one or more of those heading - gratitude, respect, obedience, valuation of family, love, union, other sentiments. Some texts did not allow any of those categorized references and other texts had more than one categorization. So n, in this analysis, does not mean, as usually means, the number of texts, but the total categorized references - 90 references for 91 texts).

This table does not fully confirm the demobilizing hypothesis since conformist oriented strategies do not prevail over love oriented ones, but it shows clearly that a very significant percentage of texts (38% on average) were dedicated to inculcate conformism through family values orientation. Those 38% represent an average of 2.1%, in terms of the total sample - see JESUÍNO 1982,90.

The analysis confirms the expected down-up-down pattern (39%-41%-30%) which shows that it was during the second period that conformist oriented references occupied more space in the family references (NOTE 21).

6. FAMILY, HIERARCHY AND RURALISM - ANALYSIS OF RURAL INCULCATION

It was already said that the predominance of references to rural families can be seen as part of a strategy to inculcate satisfaction with present social position in rural children.

6.1. The rural society as the ideal society

Salazar considered rural society as the ideal society. Being himself of rural origin and adopting for his life the traditional rural values, he disliked the city. . . *"What a pity I feel! I, son of the countryside, grown up under the murmur of irrigation waters and under the shadow of trees, I pity those Lisbon people who spends their leisure hours and days pushing each other sadly in narrow streets"* (SALAZAR I, 274). CAETANO also wrote, in 1927, against cities - in MONICA 1978, 142.

He feared that industrialization destroyed the rural world and rural values. His ideal was *"to flee from the materialism of today: to make the fields more fertile, without silencing therein the merry songs of the girls; to weave cotton or wool in the most modern looms, without interlacing with the thread class hate and without banishing from the factory or the workshop our old patriarchal spirit"* (SALAZAR II, 276, translation of ROBINSON 1979,165). He seemed sometimes to regret the beginning of the industrialization of the country in the 1950's - see chapter one, section 3.3.

Was school curriculum going to promote the necessary mentality change to support industrial development or, on the contrary, would try to counteract its effects in rural population?

6.2. The passive rural man as the ideal man

The ideal man Salazar wanted to build was the passive man moulded at the image of the rural man (chapter two, section 1.3), the true Nation was the rural nation, urban people was

just masses (chapter two, note 10), the very definition of Nation appealed only to its rural dimension (chapter seven, section 2.2.1).

So it was indispensable that compulsory education of rural people did not provoke any aspiration of social promotion which could result in internal emigration to towns, it was essential that the school should not "bleed" the land (NOTE 22); on the contrary, education should tie the man to the land, as the First Congress of National Union decided in 1934.

To tie rural children to the land (thus avoiding internal emigration and preserving existing social division of labor and social stratification) two solutions in regard to curriculum could be conceived - to create different primary school curricula for rural children and for urban children, or to include in the general curriculum massive doses of rural inculcation. Although there was the intention of using the first solution (see chapter five, section 3.4.1), the second alternative was the chosen one. An average of 5% of all the 1632 texts analyzed were dedicated to this task - to inculcate ruralism in children (NOTE 23).

6.3. Analysis of rural texts

Many texts sing the virtues and joys of the life in the countryside , actively encouraging children to enjoy being farmers. Anthony begin to enjoy life in the country since birth [...] When it came to age he went to the military service. He came back to his village longing for the father, for the oxes and for the land. He married. Today he is father of many children. He works and is happy. He is respected by all in the village" (3rd, 1958,12). "Myland, how I wished to be an humble peasant" (3rd, 1958,31), "Do you like your [shepherd] life? Yes, I do" (1st, 1958,89 - see also 2nd, 1958, 64-65, 3rd, 1958, 39-40).

There are many texts praising concrete form activities - "All work is like this - it gives health and joy" it is said about weeding (3rd, 1958,15), "It is charming to water the fields" (ibidem, 56), "There is no hard labour, when it does

not lack the will to work" it is said about harvesting (ibidem 58) or "All harvesting works are done with joy" (2nd, 1958, 44), "Grapes gathering is the most joyful work of farm activities", (3rd, 1958, 73) (NOTE 24).

Several references are done to the utility and dignity of farmer's activities - "All occupations are honourable [...] but none is so productive and useful as agriculture" (4th, 1951, 71), "Farmers are the most useful men" (non sampled textbook, in MONICA 1978, 293). Popular knowledge was also valued (2nd, 1958, 40, 62-63).

To complete this rural inculcation it were included several texts confronting directly city life and country life and concluding invariably for the advantages of the latter. There are interactions between town and village boys where these ones (or countryside life) are praised (2nd, 1958, 29-30, 33; 3rd, 1958, 7-8). There is even a direct dialogue between City and Village, where this one says that it has "within its breast the soul of Portugal" (4th, 1951, 161-162). Life in countryside is more healthy "Air and sun, which are so necessary to health, are very abundant in villages and lack in towns [...]. There is no greatest good than health; while countryside preserves it, many things damage it in towns" (4th, 1959, 149 - see also 2nd, 1958, 55).

So one can conclude that "Happy are those who can like peacefully in the mountains and in the countryside" (2nd, 1958, 55).

6.3. Ruralism and Hierarchy - the preservation of existing social stratification

Ruralism meant also, until the 1950's, the political and social option for a rural society as the model for portuguese society, a society where the inevitable progress coexisted with the preservation of rural values (see SALAZAR II, 276). In the 1950's it began a slow process of industrialization following a strategy of "conservative modernization" (MONICA 1978, 105).

So it is not surprising that the policy formulated in the second period increased greatly the inculcation of rural values - from 2% to 7%.

The fact that this policy was partially implemented in the industrialization period does not contradict the previous assertion, since it was the very inevitable need of industrialization which provoked the context of a necessary rural mentality inculcation to tie the major part of the farmers to the land and thus to avoid internal migration to towns.

It is surprising the littleness of the decrease in the fourth period - just from 7% to 6%. This cannot be totally explained by the normal delay between political change and educational formulation (of change) and between educational policy formulation and educational implementation. The need to tie the man to the land resulted thus probably from the great attraction emigration to France and Germany exerted over most farmers of more neglected areas.

6.4. Ruralism and integration of messages

As it has been just seen, rural inculcation is inextricably integrated with the inculcation of Hierarchy. But ruralism was also integrated with nationalism - the very concept of Nation is based on its rural dimension; it was promoted a competition to decide which was the most portuguese village (see BRITO 1982). There are several examples in textbooks of this integration - in the already referred dialogue between City and Village the latter says it has "within its breast the soul of Portugal" (4th, 1951, 161-162). "Do you know what is Fatherland? [...] In Fatherland there are the rich cornfields, the green meadows, the shadowy woods, the vineyards with their black or golden grapes, the hills with their white votive chapels" (3rd, 1958, 5-6); "My land how I wish to be / an humble farmer [...] My land now I wish / to be a known poet [...] To show to the other nations / an uprisen Portugal" said a poem called "Portugal" (3rd, 1958, 31). All this inculcated the message that the true essence of Fatherland was in rural Portugal.

The integration of rural inculcation with religious one has already been seen in the emphasis given to popular religiosity. It was shown the relationship of the liturgic calendar

with agricultural activities (2nd,1958,62-63). Furthermore success in agricultural activities is sometimes presented as being conditioned by respect for religious ceremonies "All [agricultural] works will certainly go well during the week, since everyone respected the day of the Lord" (1st,1958,88).

There was also integration of rural inculcation and family respect inculcation - the joys of rural life were integrated with the joys of family life in countryside (2nd,1958,44-46; 3rd,1958,113-114,); natural wish of imitating the father was used to tie the child to the land (3rd,1958,12).

Rural inculcation was also occasionally integrated with political propaganda, as in the text where a farmer argues with his crony in favour of paying taxes to the Government since they had been being applied in several benefits in rural countryside like roads, fountains, schools (3rd,1958,123-124) (NOTE 25).

Thus rural inculcation is also a good example of integration of messages.

7. CONCLUSION - AN INTEGRATED PRESENTATION OF AN AUTHORITARIAN CONFORMIST MESSAGE

Having adopted a definition of curriculum where methods of teaching were included a brief reference should be done to them.

7.1. The use of conformist methods

The predominance of memorization as a method of learning is typical of New State methods in primary school (MONICA 1978 323-329, 346, NUNES 1981, 28-30). This identification of learning with memorizing is an instrument of passivity inculcation. This had already been superbly commented by a portuguese renowned writer of the nineteenth century - "If the student gets used [...] to memorize each night, word by word, paragraphs which had remained unchanged for forty years, without criticizing them, without commenting them, it gets the healthy habit of accepting without discussion and with obedience preconceived ideas, adopted principles, proved dogmas, known institutions. He loses the funest tendency - - which produces so many evils - of wanting to study the *raison d'être* of things, of examining the truth of the facts; he loses the deplorable habit of free inquiry [...] Free inquiry is the beginning revolution "(EÇA DE QUEIROZ, in 'O Conde de Abranhos'", page 59).

7.2. The integration of messages

It is worth while to reflect about the content and method of mentality inculcation to which all portuguese now (1986) aged between 26 and 50 years of age were subject in primary school (NOTE 26).

The theme of integration of messages is a good way to deal with this question since it reflects both the content and the method of mentality inculcation.

The efficacy of New State inculcation message resulted not only of mere juxtaposition of several conformist strategies about God, about Fatherland, about Authority, about

Hierarchy, about Rural life, but it resulted also of its integrated presentation.

Such integration is not a strategy extrinsic to the message, it resulted naturally in an integrated conservative vision of a static world for which the new generations should be prepared by inculcation of a passive mentality.

As MARTINS (1985) comments Salazar discourse rather than to establish control over national activities relates them to a value system producing a belief relationship. This value system is subordinate to the norms of catholic morals and, in this sense, Salazar's order is total since it proposes a comprehension of life and death.

The several dimensions converge for the inculcation of passivity. Civic preaching of obedience is integrated with religious preaching of resignation and passive acceptance of God wishes. It is also integrated with rural fatalistic acceptance of weather influence in agricultural works. Civic preaching of obedience is also integrated with exclusive dedication to family affairs and with quiet acceptance of social stratification reproduction in a static hierarchic world. Such integrations were based on the diagnosis of portuguese people "natural predisposition for social discipline (chapter two, section 1.1).

Religious Education was a very powerful integrating mechanism in all that conformist strategy, since it implied naturally a belief relationship. Indeed, as it had been seen, religious inculcation was integrated with the various other messages. Through the integration with nationalism (represented in the leitmotiv of the defense of christian western civilization), it was achieved a control of historical consciousness and an intensive ceremonialization of the past which was one of the most effective inculcation methods (MARTINS, 1969).

7.3. Does this integration of messages represent a totalitarian intention?

If this integration of messages comprehends, as it had been said, a complete message about life and death, does it represent a totalitarian project?

According to the research principle stated in the Introduction the answer will be first searched in the primary sources. In 1936, MÁRIO DE FIGUEIREDO (later Minister of Education (1940-1944), several times speaker in the Parliament, and Salazar's crony since student days) said about this "*The New State has a totalitarian doctrine, which even encompasses morals and the concept of life [...] but this doctrine, at least in what regards morals and concept of life which are domains of individual conscience, is not imposed, but just proposed, through orientation of education in order to awake them in souls*" (FIGUEIREDO 1936). Following this reasoning the integration of messages is not totalitarian because it is just proposed (see chapter one, section 1.3.2).

But there is another important reason for the non existence of totalitarianism - since the doctrine about life and death was based on catholic doctrine (chapter one, section 2.1.2, 2.1.4) only an assumedly religious state could be called totalitarian. As this is not the case, as will be seen in next chapter (section 2.2.4), the integration of messages remains within the authoritarian framework.

CHAPTER V

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES
- THE ANALYSIS OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION
IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

In this chapter we will analyse how the New State used administrative and organizational strategies to pursue demobilization. In spite of their more discrete action they had an important role in the education for passivity.

We will analyze more the organizational strategies than the administrative ones, since chapter ten is all dedicated to the administrative strategies used in the educational system. The analysis of the strategies used towards the most important social organizations - the Army, the Church, the University - will occupy the major part of the first division of this chapter.

The second part of this chapter will analyze in detail how the organizational strategy of compartmentalization on was applied in the educational system. We will distinguish two main strategies - unequal access to (post-compulsory) education and access to unequal education. The formulation and implementation of educational policies pursuing those strategies will be examined in relation to the different levels of schooling. Finally we will research how efficacious were those strategies in achieving social compartmentalization and social stratification, that is, we will examine how social passivity and conformity was achieved through school structure.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES

1.1. Administrative strategies

1.1.1. Direct control of access and resources

Administrative strategies have been defined (chapter three, section 1.) using direct control by the State through administrative mechanisms of access, resources and decision-making.

Direct control of access is reflected in control of access to jobs, to job security, to promotions, to salaries, etc. Direct control over resources implies the possibility of using the allocation of resources to achieve conformity from persons groups, departments, organizations.

There are several organizations which lived in the New State completely under this system - the civil service (that is, public administration services), local government, corporative bodies, publicly owned companies, universities, the army.

The New State used this direct control to promote situationism among civil servants and employees of those organizations. Direct control was used to impede access to jobs by oppositionists, to promote preferentially "nationalist" or merely situationist persons, to avoid promotions of the less conformist, etc. Civil servants had to swear fidelity to the established order.

There was control of voting behavior of civil servants, which is a partial explanation for the constancy of the turnout in elections (see above chapter two).

LUCENA points out "Portuguese underdevelopment favours [...] administrative forms of pressure (LUCENA 1976a, 146). MARTINS calls attention to the fact that control measures over the public sector automatically controlled half of the working population" (MARTINS 1970).

So direct control was used as a strategy of promotion of situationism in large part of the portuguese working force. As such it was a powerful conformist and demobilising strategy. It is certainly not by chance that good part of the active opponents to the regime were independent professionals, mainly lawyers and doctors.

1.1.2. Centralization

The other very important administrative strategy is centralization. The demobilising influence of centralization works through two different mechanisms.

Firstly, by removing from local agents all meaningful decision-making power or innovation which reduces local servant's role to implementation of policies formulated and adopted elsewhere. This effectively demobilizes local agents for any participation in decision-making.

But centralization works towards demobilization in a less visible way. If decisions in the educational system, or in the health or social security systems, were to be partially made at local level it would increase the probability of local citizens mobilizing themselves to achieve concrete objectives from public administration. This could happen also to local organizations - local industry, local commerce, local church, local trade unions, etc. So centralization also contributes to the active avoidance of mobilization within local communities (NOTE 1).

RIEGELHAUPT concludes that in Portugal, at local level, no public strategies could be articulated, there was only room for private strategies (RIEGELHAUPT 1979a).

1.2. Organizational strategies

1.2.1. Compartmentalization

Compartmentalization is the confinement of sectors of society or organizations as within self contained compartments through difficultating diffusion of information, communication and interaction. The main goal of this strategy

was to prevent broad alliances which could introduce resistance factors to government action.

Through compartmentalization the power of the State over civil society is increased and mobilization within civil society is prevented or minimized. This strategy of isolation of sectors whose interaction could be mobilising can be considered an organizational application of the old Roman political adage "To divide in order to rule".

MAKLER studied compartmentalization in the portuguese economy in the New State and SCHMITTER applies the concept to portuguese corporatism (SCHMITTER 1975a,58). For MAKLER "it appears that the regime attempted, through compartmentalization to both maintain and contain the traditional class structure" (MAKLER 1979). This compartmentalization of intraelite mobility found its echo in the compartmentalization of interest representation.

1.2.2. Co-optation of organizational leaders

Co-optation to the elite of leaders of potentially mobilizing organizations, by the elite, was an organizational strategy commonly practiced by the New State. "A constant process of co-optation of leaders is the mechanism by which different sectors or institutions become participants in the system" (LINZ 1975,266).

As a result of this constant co-optation there were in the elite few professional politicians and the elite had an heterogeneous background (LINZ 1975,266). It contained co-opted members of the most important - and potentially mobilizing - organizations: Army, Church, University.

As seen in chapter 1(sec.2:5) co-optation is part of the non responsible pluralism feature of the regime - the co-opted member is not institutionally accountable to its organization or to its diffuse constituency, but it is personally accountable to the members of the elite and mainly to the leader. So co-opted members are involved in a conflict of loyalties, their future in the elite being dependent on accepting the prevalence of accountability to the leader.

In this way the most influential local leaders are not only removed from daily contact with their organizations, but, through loyalty to the elite and the leader, neutralized in their mobilizing capacity within their organizations.

But there is another feature of co-optation which favours demobilization. Co-optation provides organizations also with an informal channel for representation of their interests, but requires them to be satisfied with informal and behind the scenes demands and negotiations. This constitutes a non mobilizing alternative of interest representation (based mainly on patronage).

There are several episodes in the history of the New State where co-optation to demobilize active groups was very important - most of the members of the national-syndicalism movement were co-opted into the "União Nacional" (National Union) whose congress had as one of its main objectives to prepare this co-optation (see chapter one, section 2.1.1, PARREIRA et alia 1982). Creation of the radical youth movement "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" served also the purpose of co-opting young national-syndicalist militants (see chapter one, section 2.1.1, PINTO and RIBEIRO 1982). It was then the turn of the members of "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" to be co-opted by the new youth organization "Mocidade Portuguesa" (NOTE 2).

1.2.3. Organizational pre-emptying

Organizational pre-emptying is a strategy of occupation of a certain space which could be mobilized by spontaneous efforts of citizens, organizations of civil society or oppositionists. This occupation of space with a New State organization was not in order to mobilize this space but to prevent its mobilization.

"The regime's fear of mobilization matched its fear of disorganization. Organization without mobilization - this was the regime's formula. And this formula required the

deactivation of all organizations potentially capable of articulating and mobilizing sectors of the population for political intervention [...] And yet this same formula required the filling of all organizational vacuums [...] And it was via the corporative system that the State's organizational schemes were to be realized" (MAKLER 1979).

SCHMITTER also concludes that the corporative system has mainly a preemptive dimension, since it "seeks to set out from above structures of associability and channels of interest representation in anticipation of spontaneous efforts by affected classes, sectors or groups" and a preventive dimension ensuring that passive participation within its structures will occupy a certain space foreclosing alternative uses of the same space (SCHMITTER 1975a,58).

But it was not only the corporative system which was an instrument of this organizational occupation strategy, product of what SCHMITTER calls the regime's horror of the vacuum (SCHMITTER 1975a,23) - the creation of National Union (chapter two section 5.4.4), the creation of a youth organization in the educational system (chapter ten, sect.2.5) are part of this strategy.

One can sum up this strategy in MAKLER's (1979) words - organization without mobilization.

2. INCULCATING CONFORMITY IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS - THE ARMY, THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY

It is useful and enlightening for our hypothesis to analyse how the different administrative and organizational strategies were applied to the most powerful social organizations - the Army, the Church, the University. We will give more emphasis to the strategies aimed towards the two last ones, since they are much more influential in the educational system.

2.1. Compartmentalization and co-optation of the Army

As Salazar was well aware , armies are the most common agents for a regime's overthrow, due to their control over the heavier means of legitimate violence. (SALAZAR II,78).

Armies are generally natural corporations, self-contained and self compartmentalized . But one cannot regard Armies as organizations unable, due to their self compartmentalization, to mobilize masses or be mobilized by them - just as example see the case of liberation movements armies and the case of Portugal 1974-1975.

The New State elite knew fully well that the Portuguese Army could mobilize itself to act in the name of the Nation (see CARRILHO 1985, SARAIVA and SILVA, 1976,19 and SERRA and MATOS 1982). So it was necessary to make self-containment give a fair return in term of benefits, since it meant no interference in political life.

The first reinforcement for compartmentalization was the special treatment and privileges given to military men - reasonable pay, better social benefits, cheaper petrol, special supermarkets, etc. (NOTE 3).

The second reinforcement was a certain degree of self-government not allowed to any other organization (WIARDA 1977, 122-123,297-298,305). Due to this autonomy mere direct control of the Army was not feasible (NOTE 4).

Besides reinforced compartmentalization the New State also used co-optation. The most important person co-opted from the Army was the President of Republique, which was always a military man. But the Army had also the command of all police and paramilitary bodies (like "Legião Portuguesa" - Portuguese Legion) and the administration of some ministries (Army, Navy).

The Army was co-opted to perform a kind of moderating role (WIARDA 1977,305) - the Army "does not govern, but should guarantee the conditions of government, through the upkeeping of order" (CRUZ 1982c).

The colonial war (1962-1974) gradually decreased compartmentalization of the Army (chapter six,section 2.4.1.).

2.2. Co-optation and compartmentalization of the Church

The analysis of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the New State is of the utmost importance since the Church was the organization with greater potential for mobilization of people (it is just enough to recall that the biggest mobilization of people in Portugal was - and is - done in the occasion of Fatima pilgrimages). Furthermore the Catholic Church is the agency, outside the State, more influential in the educational systems. Most part of the private education system was run by catholic organizations.

It is necessary to do a brief analysis of this relationship to understand it clearly (NOTE 5).

2.2.1 A brief historical glance

In 1910 the Monarchy was abolished and a Republican Regime began. As it was said above (chapter one, section 2.3), the republican ideology and practice was strongly anticlerical, anti-catholic and anti-religious (NOTE 6). It is not surprising that the republican policies pushed the catholic leaders to accept an authoritarian regime in which the Church could be protected.

In fact the founding elite of the New State was based predominantly in catholic leaders (chapter one, section 2.3). The leader of the regime from 1928 to 1968 (Salazar) and the leader of the Portuguese Church from 1929 to 1971 (CEREJEIRA) had been students together, university professors in the same university, catholic leaders of the same organization at the same time, they entered in leadership positions in the same period - that is, the institutional cooperation was supported by very strong personal links among leaders.

From such beginnings one could expect close cooperation between State and Church. Indeed the relationship of State and Church in the New State can be described, using the words of a portuguese contemporary jesuit in 1936, as one of "moral union with economic and administrative separation" (CERQUEIRA 1973, ROBINSON 1979, 61) (NOTE 7).

2.2.2. "Moral union" - co-optation of the Church

This moral union came from communion of ideology and interests "For the first time since the 18th century an ideological agreement between Church and State [was established]" (FERNANDES 1982).

The Hierarchy of the Church was conservative and remained so (BRADFORD 1973,95). The New State claimed to follow the social doctrine of the Church when created a corporative state (NOTE 8). It also considered itself the champion of the western Christian civilization in the world.

This "moral union" led to a close cooperation between Church and State, which has its traditions in Portugal (see ROBINSON 1977). "The regime did not allow emergence of threats to the church's influence" (BRUNEAU 1976) and in return the Church proclaimed "Honor and glory to the New State in which the peace and the harmony between Church and State are based" (Cardinal Cerejeira in 1940).

Such cooperation led some to speak of Portugal as a clerical conservative state (see BRUNEAU 1976) which is an exaggeration (NOTE 9).

This cooperation was carried to the extent of open support of the Church for the New State as when Cardinal Cerejeira defined himself to the President of Republic as "The highest representative in Portugal of a religion which commands to accept, to respect and to obey the power of which you [...] are the highest representative" (in MONICA 1978,102) (NOTE 10).

This support meant even that "parish priests, particularly in the rural area, [acted] as the agent of the government policies" (BLUME 1977). This had some traditional precedents in the submission of the Church in the liberal monarchy in the 19th century - it was created a clerical state bureaucracy being the priests and bishop effectivelly ecclesiastical civil servants" (ROBINSON 1977).

2.2.3. Role of the Church in relation to the political regime

The Church had a very important legitimation function of the regime as MONICA (1978) and CERQUEIRA (1973) (GEORGE 1985) point out. The Church considered Salazar a gift from God to Portugal, "the instrument of Providence" (Cardinal Cerejeira in 1940), "the bold and tenacious man at the helm who restored the nation's unity around the sacred symbol of the redeeming Cross" (Archbishop of Braga in 1959) (NOTE 11). As LUCENA 1979 puts it "[...] charisma, given as it was by God himself, always depended upon confirmation by the Church. In Salazar's case such a confirmation always arrived punctually".

As it was said before (chapter four, section 3.2), the simultaneous and integrated presence of religious and nationalistic inculcations represent a statement of similitude between Church and State projects, and of cooperation between the regime and the Catholic Church. Thus the fact that, since the second period, Church and State were glorified together in textbooks, the deliberate mixture of national and religious symbols, the integration of the religious message with all the other mentality inculcation messages. Both Church and State were involved in the defense of christian western civilization (NOTE 12).

All this transformed the Church into a powerful agency of social control. Due to the social legitimacy this "moral union" gave to the Catholic Church obedience to Church authorities was another way of inculcating a passive mentality (NOTE 13).

2.2.4. Economic and administrative separation - - compartmentalization

But side by side with this "moral union" existed the

"economic and administrative separation". That is, the relation between Church and State is a twofold question - it concerns ideology and power (see FERNANDES 1982, FORMOSINHO et al.1982). If the State shared the ideology with the Church it was not prepared to share the power. So there was no intention to reunite Church and State and Portugal did not transform itself into a confessional state (ROBINSON 1979,61). Salazar was very explicit in 1940 *"I think it dangerous for the state to acquire the idea that it has the power to do violence to Heaven, but I think it equally unreasonable that the Church, basing itself upon the superiority of its spiritual interests, should seek to broaden its activity to influence what the Gospel itself sought to entrust to Caesar"* (SALAZAR III,239). (NOTE 14 - see also SALAZAR I,173-174, IV 373, CAETANO 1977,411-415.

Therefore "The catholic feature of the New State must be emphasized but not exaggerated for Salazar's regime (unlike Franco's) never posed as an 'apostolic' system engaged in some kind of crusade against anti-Catholic elements" (MARQUES 1976, 193) (NOTE 15).

This separation between Church and State can be seen clearly in the Concordat between the Portuguese state and the Holy See signed in 1940. "[...] the concordat is one of separation and not of union but does protect the church as a privileged institution with a very large role in society" (BRUNEAU 1976).

2.2.5. Submission of the Church to the State - co-optation and compartmentalization as instruments of control

In this partnership the Church was the subordinate part. As BRUNEAU sums up the Church was "an important, but subservient part of the system", "merely one more pillar of the conservative authoritarian regime[...] directed by Salazar".

This subordination was achieved in several ways the least of which was not certainly the faculty the State obtained through the Concordat to de facto veto new appointments of the

Church high Hierarchy (NOTE 16). So a "conservative catholic leader accomplished a far reaching submission of the Portuguese Church which was never completely fulfilled by his liberal, positivist or anti-clerical predecessors" (FERNANDES 1982).

That is, the moral union was seen as an instrument of control since it was implicit that the partnerships only existed with a certain kind of catholic church, that is, with the traditional, clerical, conservative "catholic, apostolic, roman" Church.

This implicit condition had to be made explicit when some catholics in late 1950s and from 1960, onwards began to criticize the regime. In 1958 the bishop of Oporto wrote a letter to Salazar which was publicized. He was expelled from the country because in his letter he said things like corporatism had been a device to deprive portuguese workers of their natural rights of association. Those catholic voices who refused to claim "Honor and glory to the New State" - then called "progressist catholics" - sometimes made coalitions with other oppositionist groups (NOTE 17).

As this minority was undermining the moral union the New State used repression to make clear the limits of the partnership.

If moral union was an instrument of control of which conservative and merely apolitical catholics were partners, economic and administrative separation was also an instrument of control and submission.

There was control over the appointment of bishops, administrative control of some church activities, strict control of catholic schools, as will be seen.

All those controls are part of a strategy of submission of the Church to State interests through compartmentalizing its activity into the religious, spiritual and private moral area. The experience of the "progressist catholics" is clear evidence that when catholic organizations or groups entered public moral areas or social or educational matters its freedom of movements was much more restricted or even subject to repression.

2.2.6. Conclusion

To conclude, the enormous mobilizing power of the Church was confined to private areas and expressed in religious ceremonies (masses, processions, pilgrimages, religious festivities). From all these one must call attention to Fatima pilgrimage which was (and is) the greatest rally of persons in Portugal (NOTE 18).

This mobilizing power was directed towards inculcation of the same mentality of respect by God, Fatherland, Family and Authority which SALAZAR proclaimed as the aim of the New State. This is not a coincidence since the New State found its inspiration in Catholic doctrine and its leaders were convinced Catholics. This was the strong point of the partnership, this was the justification of the "moral union".

This moral union is a great part of the explanation of the acceptance of the New State by the majority of portuguese population, which was strongly Catholic.

But this moral union had a weak point, which only revealed itself in the 1960^s. The New State not only gave up an autonomous ideological production (except in the corporative dimension), but, in the same way, did not control the main source of its doctrinaire source. That is, changes could happen in the Catholic Church, at international level, which were completely outside the regime's control - these changes could greatly affect the moral union. That what indeed what happened after the Vatican Council II in the 1960^s, which provoked an enormous change in the Catholic Church.

This provoked the first serious fissures in the moral union and was the basis which legitimized the action of a minority of catholics - progressist catholics - in the 1960^s and 1970^s of opposition to the regime (NOTE 19).

Summing up, the strategies of co-optation and compartmentalization were interdependent. Once co-optation, through moral union, began to fissure, compartmentalization became less feasible and repression of non conservative catholics appeared as an alternative strategy.

2.2.7. "Moral union" and "economic and administrative separation" in the educational system

Analysis of the strategies used by the New State towards the Church was not complete if it ignored the effects of those strategies on the educational system.

This analysis will enlighten more the State-Church relationship, will allow us to understand the role of the Church in the educational system and to have a more complete picture of schooling in Portugal.

The role of the Church in the educational system can only be understood in the twofold framework of the "moral union with economic and administrative separation".

The "moral union" is absent from the original text of the Constitution of 1933 - "the education supplied by the state is independent of any religious cult". But a law in 1935 (Law nº 1910, 13.5.1935) already states "The education supplied by the state aims [...] the formation [...] of all civic and moral virtues, these being guided by the principles of Christian doctrine and morality traditional in the country" (NOTE 20).

Cardinal Cerejeira put it like this *"The Portuguese state which allows freedom of religion and sustains no official church, is not neutral in moral and doctrinal matters [...] Portuguese education cannot cease to be Catholic without Portugal giving up being Portugal"* (in ROBINSON 1979,63).

The Concordat between Portugal and the Holy See (1940) stated that religious education was to be given in state schools to anyone who did not ask to be excluded from it. The syllabus and the appointment of teachers was the Church's responsibility. It also stated that education in state schools was to be oriented by principles and doctrine of a Christian character, traditional of the country.

The "moral union" was seen very clearly in the Curriculum of the primary and secondary schools (in chapters three and four) (NOTE 21).

In relationship with the youth organizations namely the "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese Youth) which existed in every school, the same union prevailed. The Church had a representative in the directive body of "Mocidade Portuguesa" to care for the "aspects relative to the moral formation of youth" (NOTE 22). Another example which shows that the moral union was still at work in 1972 - a dispatch of that year allowed the "Mocidade Portuguesa" to coordinate the activities of the Moral Formation Offices (Gabinetes de Formação Moral) then created in preparatory and secondary schools (NOTE 23).

But the "economic and administrative separation" was as much present as the moral union.

First of all, the portuguese educational system was not a confessional one and Religious and Moral Education was not compulsory as it is, for instance, in England (NOTE 24). On the other hand, Religious and Moral Education was a low status subject in the curriculum (NUNES 1981, 149-150)- it was allocated only one hour per week, it was not subject to examination nor had any influence on student promotion (NOTE 25). There were no morning assemblies or compulsory prayers.

Secondly, the absence of protection to private schools, for the most part under catholic control, illustrates clearly the subordination of the Church to the State - the establishment of a school depended upon governmental authorization; those schools were not subsidized by the State and they were compelled to follow the curriculum of state schools; furthermore their students were examined only in State schools. In short, church schools were tightly controlled by the State.

Thirdly, the control over the educational degrees awarded by private schools was striking - the degrees awarded by Catholic private schools were not officially recognized, the degrees awarded by religious seminaries were also not recognized.

Fourthly, there were never great facilities for the establishment of Catholic higher education institutions (apart the seminaries for the preparation of clergy) - the Faculty of Theology which was extinguished in 1911 was never restored, a Catholic University was only founded in 1972.

2.3. Managing for conformity of the University - direct control, centralization and co-optation

Almost all administrative and organizational strategies were used to achieve conformity and cooperation from this important organization - the University.

While the State directly controlled and centralized university management, at the same time it co-opted its leaders to occupy important positions in the regime and in Public Administration and thus provided the university with powerful informal channels of interest representation.

2.3.1. Direct control of the University

The most important strategies used were direct control and centralization (for the subject see FORMOSINHO et al 1982). The universities were dependent on an administrative department - the Higher Education Department ("Direcção Geral do Ensino Superior"). This department controlled the allocation of resources to universities, which was a very effective mean of achieving conformity - since 1930 all University income came from the State. Admission of staff was also controlled by the central department and even curricular reforms had to be approved by the government.

As all university teachers were civil servants, as such dependent on the central administration, they could be politically controlled. Their admission was subject, as that of all civil servants, to information from the secret police, which could have de facto veto power. As all civil servants, university professors could be dismissed if they involved themselves in politics (that is, in oppositionist politics) (NOTE 26).

In spite of being a natural corporation the university was never subject to the corporative system (WIARDA 1977,124,196,229): it was instead subject to the tight control of the administrative system.

2.3.2. Centralization of university management

Centralization is a strategy of control and

demobilization very much interdependent with direct control.

The story of the University in the New State (until 1971) is the narration of its gradual loss of pedagogic, scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. Since 1930 to 1971 "all new government policy was designed to enhance centralization and state control" (FORMOSINHO et alia, 1982 - see also BRAGA 1980).

In 1930 the regime published a new statute for the Universities (Decreto nº 18717, 27/2/1930) whereby Universities ceased to have self-government, the appointment of professors (not that of assistant teachers) depended on the Minister. The rector (principal) of the university ceased to be elected, being instead freely appointed by the Minister. In addition to all those centralizing measures it imposed uniformity to all Faculties of the same subject - they had to have the same curriculum and the same statute, which was approved by the Government.

In 1942 even the appointment of assistant teachers was transferred to the Minister of Education; in 1949 the Minister called to himself the power to open up competitions for professorship, which was a very heavy blow for the little autonomy Universities had (NOTE 27); in 1952 Faculties lost their administrative autonomy.

Direct control facilitated this general trend towards centralization, which was of course contrary not only to University role and tradition, but against corporative principles (as shall be seen).

2.3.3. Co-optation of the University

The New State co-opted most effectively the elite of the University. The University elite is composed by the full professors (called "catedráticos", that is chair holders, in the portuguese educational system). The New State co-opted those "catedráticos" for important posts in Government, Public Administration and mixed economy companies (NOTE 28).

This predominance of tenured university professors in the elite structure of the New State is a very original

characteristic of this regime. It is referred to by many authors as a "catedratocracia" (that is, the rule of "catedráticos") - see LUCENA 1976a,165, 1979a, MAKLER 1979, MARTINS 1971, ROBINSON 1979,161, SCHMITTER 1979, WIARDA 1977,13,283.

This "doctorate's dictatorship" (LUCENA 1976a,165) transformed the professoriate into the main rulers and policy - makers of the regime. They constituted the most important recruitment source for the "ruling caste" (LUCENA 1976a, 165).

SALAZAR was proud of this system - he said in 1934 "At a time when it was thought that the Dictatorship would crush everything in an attempt to create a military despotism, we see the Government composed almost exclusively of members of the higher teaching professions" (SALAZAR I,306, translation in SALAZAR 1939,203) (NOTE 29).

This "catedratocracia" can be evidenced by some indicators:

- Firstly, over half of all civilian ministers were academics (MARTINS 1971) and around 15% of the members of the Corporative Chamber (SCHMITTER 1975a,35);

- Secondly, according to SCHMITTER's study, professors and educators constituted 27.1% of the hard core of the formative political elite in Portugal (1934-1942), being the largest group in this hard core elite (SCHMITTER 1979) (NOTE 30). As he concludes "the Estado Novo was founded and staffed in large measure by a new generation composed mainly of civil servants, technicians and professors of fairly provincial origins" (SCHMITTER 1979);

- Thirdly, the two leaders of the New State were both "catedráticos" - SALAZAR was law professor in the University of Coimbra and CAETANO was law professor in the University of Lisbon; both retained their full professorship during their political careers;

- Fourthly, all Ministers of Education but one were university professors (NOTE 31).

This co-optation counterbalanced centralization and direct control over universities, since it represented a very

effective channel of informal representation of some interests of the University (as seen by its elite). On the other hand, it avoided the possibility of great dissatisfaction of this powerful organization - the University.

One can conclude calling attention to the fact that "catedratocracia" can be considered an elaborate application of the theory of the government by elites. Salazar spoke of the use of University human resources to solve the problems of the country (SALAZAR I,306-307), which was partially due to the lack of prepared elites in the country (CAETANO 1959, 338 - see also 82-84).

In the remaining^{des} of this chapter it will be analyzed in detail how the organizational strategy of compartmentalization applied to the Army and the Church, to maintain demobilization, was applied with the same purpose in the educational system.

3. THE COMPARTMENTALIZATION STRATEGY IN EDUCATION - EDUCATION FOR MASSES AND EDUCATION FOR THE ELITES

The strategy of compartmentalization was intensively and extensively used in the educational system. Indeed the confinement of different social classes within self-contained compartments was instrumental to guarantee the reproduction of social stratification thus contributing to avoid mobilization for social promotion, so ensuring social conformism. The educational system should fulfil an important function in this reproduction.

3.1. The school as agent of reproduction of "natural" social stratification - analysis of New State leaders statements

That the function of school was to reproduce social stratification was self-evident for New State leaders. Since inequality is natural ("I do not believe in equality", SALAZAR VI,41), it would be unnatural if school interfered in the process. That meant that social differences should be reflected in levels of schooling differences.

This social inequality was given scientific explanation *"Men are neither born nor go on in life in full freedom and equality. The heredity binds them, since birth, to the qualities and defects of their progenitors [...] there is an abyss between an imbecile and a genius"* says a popular and long-standing sole textbook for secondary education (AFONSO, no date,22). As CAETANO said "the gestation of a superior intelligence is the work of many years, even centuries" (CAETANO 1928).

The Minister of Education (1934-1936) TAMAGNINI invoked, in a public interview, an american pedagogue to give scientific basic to compartmentalization in education - this pedagogue divided school population in 8% of non educable, 15% of normally stupid, 60% of averagely intelligent, 15% of superiorly intelligent and 2% of notably intelligent (TAMAGNINI 1934) - see MONICA 1978,309.

Thus each child should have just the education allowed by the possibilities of hisinherited ability, otherwise - ?

As Caetano comments - the intelligent son of a skilful and honest worker who was *"selected by the primary school teacher to study sciences for which his spirit had not the same hereditary preparation as for the craft, will not be other than a mediocre intellectual"* (CAETANO 1928).

SALAZAR acknowledges that since there is a social hierarchy there exists privileges in favour of the richer classes which come from the way education is organized (SALAZAR 1948) (NOTE 32). CAETANO said, in 1928, that the teacher's selection would very probably interfere with the natural process of ascension of practical intelligence in families (CAETANO 1928).

"The idea that the school should be charged with the selection of the best ones is really an idea adequate to a party of pedagogues with political ambitions" (that is, it is a republican idea) (CAETANO 1928). Furthermore, the school is not able to do this selection, adds Caetano. *"What is important is the existence of an elite in each social class; to form a single elite, that of intellectuals, would be a calamity, a cataclysm"* (CAETANO 1928).

Thus the school should not interfere in the process of "natural" social stratification - it should reproduce it. This meant obviously that to different social strata should correspond different levels of schooling - we should be "All together but each one in its place" as one reading primer said (NOTE 33) or "A place for everyone, everyone in his place" as a Minister of Education said (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1935a). This implied unequal access to education.

Thus the educational system should be predominantly designed to prepare the elites in order to maintain social stratification.

But there was another powerful reason to put the educational system at the service of the elites - as the great national problems could only be solved by the elites acting upon the masses, it was more urgent the preparation of elites was more urgent than to teach the people to read (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 296, in GARNIER no date, 62) (NOTE 34).

As a result of the aim of reproducing social stratification and from the theory of government by elites (see chapter two) for the New State, the main function of school, besides mentality inculcation, was the preparation of elites.

If the school has as its main function to prepare the elite, then the members of the elite which stayed within the school system to become teachers are very important, since they are going to be the educators of the future elites. Consequently the top positions should be given to the professors of those teachers, that is, to the educators of the teachers of the future elite - the university professors. Hence the "catedratocracia" of the New State which was analyzed in a previous section of this chapter - this "catedratocracia" is a logical application of the intersection of the function of the educational system in regard to the elite and the theory of government by elites.

3.2. Compartmentalization as the main organizational strategy to serve the "natural" reproduction of social stratification

The non interference of school in the process of social reproduction implied that it cooperated with it - that is, to different social strata should correspond different levels of schooling. Thereby was social conformism to be achieved.

In order to confine the different social strata in different self-contained status positions and different occupational activities the school system should recreate within itself the different social paths. The compartmentalization strategy was thus naturally used.

Three main paths were created - the only compulsory schooling path, for the rural stratum and for most part of the children of the workers; the compulsory schooling plus technical course path for an elite of workers and low middle class; and the path towards the social and political elite, through grammar school and university education, mostly for high middle class and upper class children.

These three vias were created through the use of two basic mechanisms - unequal access to education and access to unequal education.

Unequal access to education was achieved through entrance examinations to secondary education, through less accessibility of secondary schools for rural population (due to its concentration in district capitals and no construction of school residences) and through allowance of economic selection to work.

Access to unequal education was achieved mainly through the creation of a dual school track in secondary education, one leading to higher education and the other to technical courses. This was based on the idea that early selection was essential for the good preparation of the elite (TAMAGNINI 1936,9).

The fight against the "escola única" (unified school, comprehensive school) had been a constant in the educational thought of the New State during the formative period, when there was still the need to fight hard educational republican ideas - see, for instance, CAETANO 1928, TAMAGNINI 1936 (for this debate see MONICA 1978, 132-144). What unifies the persons is not an unified school, but the common mentality, the duty to be at the service of the nation, in the expression of the Minister of Education TAMAGNINI (1936,10), the common objective (CAETANO 1928), that is, the inculcation of an "unified" mentality.

The dual school track implied different entrance examinations, different schools network, different buildings, different curricula, different possibilities of access to higher education, and consequently, in the end, different school status and different social status.

The same compartmentalization by dual school track was applied to post-compulsory education, which was divided into "ensino médio" (high technical education which is not included in higher education and primary school teachers education - see SAMPAIO 1973,132) and higher education.

But there were other types of compartmentalization - rural schools and urban school differed very much in accessibility to populations, quality of teaching staff, type of facilities, etc. There was also separate schools for boys and girls.

3.3. The compartmentalization through non access to post - - compulsory education - unequal access to education

3.3.1. Formulation of the strategy

The basic strategy of compartmentalization is the division of children into two great groups - those who have just the few years of compulsory schooling and those who follow up studies. For this strategy to be efficacious there needed to be created an enormous and unsurpassable gap between the non educated mass and the highly educated elite.

The size of this gap was the object of debate within New State political circles - some wanted a completely radical approach which implied not to teach the people neither to read nor to count. That meant a clear distinction between a completely uninstructed social group and a highly educated social group. A less radical approach defended the view that compulsory schooling should only teach the people to read to write and to count. This became the official position. There was still a minority group, the mobilizing group, who wanted to use schooling to indoctrinate and mobilize the people and thus was favourable to teaching the people to read well (this account of these three positions was based on MONICA 1978, 115-121). Between total compartmentalization and doctrinaire mobilization prevailed the alternative of high compartmentalization (with mentality inculcation).

The gap was thus fixed between eleven and thirteen years of study - three or four years compulsory schooling for the mass, fifteen or sixteen, on average, for the elite.

This meant that no attention was paid to mass education, which was already a contemporary accusation about Salazar's policy - see FERRO 1982, 134, GARNIER, no date, 62 (NOTE 35).

3.3.2 Implementation of the strategy

The republican government (1910-1926) had created the infant education (4 to 7 years), the general primary education (7-12 years), which constituted the five years of compulsory schooling, and the high primary education (12-15 years), which was not compulsory.

Already in 1926 the new regime abolished the high primary education, in 1927 divided the general primary education in elementary (7-11 years) and complementary (11-13 years), being only the first one compulsory. Thus compulsory schooling was reduced from five to four years.

In 1930 a new bill divided the elementary primary education in two levels, being the first of three years compulsory. Thus compulsory schooling was again reduced - from four to three years. In 1932 the New State abolished the complementary primary education, that had never really been implemented, thus making impossible for the rural population to have any accessible post-compulsory education. There was then a one year gap between the end of compulsory schooling and the beginning of secondary education, which was very important for the efficacy of the compartmentalization strategy.

All those reductions in compulsory schooling were done in conjunction with reductions in primary school curricula (in 1927, 1928, 1929 and then again in 1936 - see SAMPAIO 1976) - the motto was that for the people it was enough the learning of reading, writing and counting.

The education of primary school teachers was also object of successive reductions. In 1928, three Primary Teacher Training Colleges ("Escolas Normais") were closed only to be reopened in the same year. In 1928, the entrance requirements for those colleges were diminished and fees were set up.

In 1930, entrance requirements were lowered again (now to four years of study) and the teacher education curricula was reduced from twelve to six subject groups. In 1931, a new reduction of the curricula was made and pre-school teacher education courses were suspended. In 1935, the curricula of teacher training were oncemore simplified.

To symbolize the new approach to primary school teacher education the name of training Colleges was changed, in 1930, from "Escolas Normais" to "Escolas do Magistério Primário".

The policy of reducing the quality of primary school teacher education was brought to absurd limits when CARNEIRO PACHECO, the minister of Education in the mobilizing period

(minister from 1936 to 1940), cancelled, in 1936, enrollments in the primary schools teacher training colleges. This situation persisted until 1942, which meant that teacher training colleges were closed for six years and no new teachers was certified until 1945. This led, in 1940, to the closure of 134 schools and the non appointment of teachers for 380 primary schools. This situation created the need of emergency procedures in primary school teachers recruitment. In 1942, the teacher education colleges were reopened with new teaching staff all partisan to Salazar's leadership. The curricula were once more reduced.

All these integrated policies of reducing compulsory schooling, primary school curricula, teacher education curricula and teacher education colleges entrance requirements were not designed for the elite, but obviously for the mass. This makes clear the compartmentalization strategy used to separate the mass from the elite (and also the aim of preparing passive and conformist teachers).

3.4. Compartmentalization through the creation of a dual track

3.4.1. Compartmentalization by dual track in primary education

Compulsory schooling in primary schools was subject to dual track compartmentalization. In 1931, the regime created the "postos de ensino" (teaching posts), transformed in 1936 in "postos escolares" (schooling posts). This "cosy school of the small village" was located in rural areas and only supplied the compulsory schooling, that is, the first, the second and the third classes. This made very difficult for rural children to enter follow up studies since before entering secondary education they had to attend the fourth class in primary schools of villages or towns (NOTE 36).

The teaching staff was not the same in normal primary schools and in "postos escolares". Normal primary schools were staffed with certified teachers and the schooling posts with "regentes escolares" (which can be translated as "primary

school monitors'), who were persons who had just the fourth class and were good Christians and morally good.

Salazar justified in 1933 the system of the schooling posts staffed with primary school "regentes" as one adequate to a poor country (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 135-137) (NOTE 37).

But the members of parliament did press for a further compartmentalization - rural school should have a different curriculum from urban schools. They did approve a law, in 1935, creating the primary rural school, but it was never implemented (the Corporative Chamber and probably the Government were against - see MONICA 1978, 139).

3.4.2. Compartmentalization in secondary education

Compartmentalization in secondary education was done through the dual track - grammar school/technical school (NOTE 38).

Therefore grammar schools were reserved for those born within the elite who will be the future elites themselves. By its nature they must be cared for: *"Grammar school education [...], located as it is in the way that leads to higher education, and consequently to the professions of the highest social status, is, in our country, as in all countries, the touchstone of our degree of civilization"* (Statute of Grammar School Education of 1932, Decree.nº 20.741, 11-1-1932, in the preamble).

Thus one of its very important, if not the most important role, was to provide students for higher education. As the 1947 Statute says *"The grammar schools teaching will be distributed by three cycles. The first [...] and the second [...] has the objective of preparing for the sequence of studies and give the more convenient culture for the satisfaction of the common needs of the social life [...]. The 3rd cycle [...] maintaining the same objectives is specially designed to prepare the students for the entrance in higher education"* (Statute of Grammar School Education of 1947, Decree nº 36.508, 17-9-1947, articles 1,2 and 3)(our emphasis)

A humanist curriculum seemed appropriate to convey the objectives of grammar school education. The "goal of the general course is [...] the acquisition not of certain

knowledges but of a certain degree of culture" (Decree Law 36.507, 17-9-1947, preamble). As BOURDIEU says about the culture being the "key instrument in the integration of the elite" - "The sharing of a common culture [...] is probably one of the surest foundations of the deep underlying fellow-feeling that unites the members of the governing classes, despite differences of occupation and economic circumstances" (BORDIEU, 1981).

The 1936 reform goes even further than the others and purposes a core curriculum for the third cycle regardless of which university course the students were intending to follow - what was necessary in the last year was a "philosophical synthesis of the acquired knowledges" (Reform of Grammar School in 1936, Decree Law 27084, 14-10-1936, in the preamble).

As for the technical schools they were clearly vocational - as the Minister of Education Pires de Lima said *"I do not think that it is possible to encompass in one type of culture all that is necessary and convenient on the struggle for life [...]. It is preferable to maintain the technical education with a tendentious technical character in the technical school and education with a tendentious cultural character in grammar schools"* (PIRES DE LIMA, 1951, in REIS 1971).

Within technical education there were still courses aimed at white collar jobs (commerce and "feminine formation", for instance, which were two of the most followed of the four courses) and courses aimed at blue collar jobs, which were the great majority (NOTE 39).

Technical education accomplished the goal of creating an elite in each class, creating an elite within workers (see CAETANO 1928).

The means used to make efficacious this dual track were various. First of all, there was a public campaign against the tendency of many families (in spite of difficulties) to prefer grammar school education. *"A legislative reform [...] opened the access of secondary education to the children of the inferior classes [...]. It is important, first of all, to put an end to this legal overproduction of intellectual forces, because it is a factor of social déclassement [...]. It is indispensable to moderate the unreasonable aspirations that impregnate the spirit of the poor and the humble, it is necessary to destroy that great illusion that culture brings infallibly wealth and power"* said the Minister of Education TAMAGNINI (in MONTEIRO 1975,147).

"Normality will be reestablished when families understand that the grammar school courses, difficult by their very nature, must be reserved for the strongest and for the ablest and when selection of students will be done as it must be, in order to reconstitute to [grammar] secondary education, and consequently to higher education, that degree of dignity that each of them (each one in its own sphere) should have" (Statute of Grammar School of 1932, in the preamble).

A second means used was, naturally, to supply more technical education than grammar school education - see the Statute of 1932 in the preamble. Technical education supply had a great increase when the industrialisation of the country began in the 1950^S - see CAETANO 1959, 223, 1977, 406-407, 511 CORTESÃO 1982, 104-106, MIRANDA 1978, 1981, S. GRÁCIO 1986 (NOTE 40).

A third means was the implementation of academic selection in grammar schools ⁽¹⁾the establishment of entrance examinations (NOTE 41) ⁽²⁾ an examination in the end of the first cycle of secondary education ("it is during and in the end of this cycle that the main selection of students should occur" - Statute of 1932, preamble), ⁽³⁾ elimination of those who fail three consecutive years or five non consecutive years (Decree Law 21.681, 15-9-1932) ⁽⁴⁾ increase of fees for those who fail (Statute of 1932, article 100).

A fourth mean was the implementation of a "numerus clausus" system in grammar schools - in 1932 the total number

of classes in all the state grammar schools should not exceed 461 classes (article 17 of the Statute of 1932), in 1936 it should not exceed 600 (article 17 of the Reform of Grammar School Education in 1936; no references to "numerus clausus", appear in the 1947 Grammar School Statute).

A fifth means was through the diversion of non able grammar school students to technical education - *"In the reform of the educational system it is necessary to prevent the overpopulation of grammar schools and Universities through the distribution, in due time, of the students, according to their abilities, between grammar school and technical education"* (article VIII of the Law 1941, 11-4-1936) - see also articles 32 and 36 of the Reform of Grammar School Education in 1936. But the psychometric means to pursue this policy were never implemented (NOTE 42).

A sixth mean - last but not the least - was economic selection - grammar school fees were increased in 1928 (Decree 15.941), fees of grammar schools were greater than fees in technical schools (from 2 to 4.8 times greater), exemption from fees was easier in technical schools than in grammar schools (NOTE 43).

So compartmentalization was a very clear strategy in secondary education, until the fifth period (NOTE 44).

3.4.3. Compartmentalization in post-secondary school

Compartmentalization at the level of post-secondary education was accomplished mainly through the creation of a non higher education track and a higher education track.

The non higher education track was called "ensino médio" (which can be translated as "intermediate education" or "median education", meaning a kind of teaching which is no longer secondary education, but it is not yet higher education - see GALVÃO-TELLES 1969, 48, SAMPAIO 1973, 132). "Ensino médio" schools were mainly high technical schools of industrial or commercial nature and primary teacher education colleges.

In the fourth period the expansion of "ensino médio" became an important strategy to avoid the mass population process in universities (see a good exposition of this problem in CRUZ 1973). The Minister of Education GALVÃO TELLES was highly in

favour of this expansion (GALVÃO-TELLES 1969, 48,61); the last Minister of Education of the fourth period (J.HERMANO SARAIVA) had proposed a bill in this direction - see CRUZ 1973 (NOTE 45).

The certification given by "ensino médio" schools had neither the school nor the social prestige of higher education mainly of university education (NOTE 46). Only university education gave (and still gives) access to the educational certificate of "licenciatura" (license), which is socially accepted as giving the social expectation of being addressed as "Senhor Doutor" (literally Mister Doctor) - this custom is only practised now by Portugal and Germany (SERRÃO 1967). This addressing right symbolizes the belonging to a specific status group. This social consequence became one of the main motivations to follow university courses - both Salazar and Caetano complained that Portugal was a "country of 'doutores'"; meaning a country where all wished to become "doutores".

This social phenomenon is very well reflected in the complexity of personal address forms in the portuguese language, which reflect a strong socially hierarchic society (CINTRA 1972). This is a cause of strangeness for foreigners (see FRYER and PINHEIRO, 1961,230).

Thus the University educational credentials had an intrinsic relationship with the social hierarchy and social pattern of personal relationships in portuguese society. This explains the importance of compartmentalization at the post-secondary level (NOTE 47).

The main means of promoting this compartmentalization was the very compartmentalization in secondary education. But there were also tight entrance examinations to the universities.

3.5. Expansion of schooling in the fourth period in a compartmentalized framework

During the third period of the New State the Minister of Education of the middle part of this period - LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961) - began to consider the need for expanding schooling as a means to promote the industrial and cultural development of the nation and to reform mentalities (see

GRACIO 1985, SAMPAIO 1977,5-28).He accepted the need for quantitative educational planning (see MIRANDA 1978,1981,REIS 1971,STOER 1982,1986),but he clearly maintained the conviction of the role of the school in the promotion of a nationalist mentality (LEITE-PINTO 1960, 1963, 1966a). He considered that for too long the regime had accepted that great masses of illiterates could be maintained and that the elite could be selected just among a restricted. number of man chosen by the chance of their birth (LEITE-PINTO 1966c). He thought that the school should prepare the elites, but should also be an instrument of social promotion (LEITE-PINTO 1960,7, 1966b,7-8); thus the reading textbooks should not transmit the message that poverty is a natural fate (LEITE-PINTO 1966c).

He favoured the expansion of compulsory schooling for six years in a unified format - he proposed,in 1960, the expansion of compulsory schooling for six years in a sole school (he criticized strongly the later compartmentalized expansion of schooling (LEITE-PINTO 1966b, 32-37). He considered that it was not fair that the choice of the type of schooling be dependent only upon geographical or economic reasons (LEITE-PINTO 1966b, 34). But his plan was not adopted because it involved too much spending-so LEITE-PINTO left the government (see CARVALHO 1986, 797) (NOTE 48). All he could do, in this respect, was to increase compulsory schooling from three to four years for boys in 1956 (Decree-Law 40.964, 31-12-1956) and also for girls,in 1960 (Decree-Law 42.994, 28-5-1960).

This Minister of "hybrid ideology" and "frustrated practice" in the words of REIS (1971), was substituted by GALVÃO-TELLES (1962-1968), a more orthodox member of the ruling elite, professor of Law in the University of Lisbon(NOTE 49).

He mistrusted quantitative educational planning (GALVÃO-TELLES 1963b, 1963c, 1964a, 1965a), he clearly favoured the role of the school in the preparation of the elites. *We should be forewarned against the danger [of deterioration of quality] and do all we can to avoid the lowering of standards produced by the mass schooling phenomenon"* (GALVÃO-TELLES 1963c). *"The cultural ascension of masses, which is in itself a phenomenon and a highly commendable intention, may make us*

run the serious risk of strangling or hushing up the intellectual elite", which should be clearly avoided since society "needs also the top persons, who can be light, radiance and a lead for the others, which can only by themselves give new horizons, open up new ways, influence mentalities, make great works, operate deep transformation, create"

(GALVÃO-TELLES 1964b). (As it can be clearly noticed, in this period, the process of school reproduction of social stratification was not seen as natural as it was seen in the first two periods - the tone of the discourse became defensive).

According to those views he formulated a policy of expanding compulsory schooling in a threefold track framework. For rural children who wanted to follow up studies he created "Telescola" (compulsory school through the public television network - GALVÃO-TELLES 1963d, 1964d, 1965b); for rural children who did not want to follow up studies he created the "complementary course of primary education", in primary schools; for urban children he created "preparatory schools" (NOTE 50).

With the lucidity which characterized many leaders of the New State -see Introduction, section 5.3- GALVÃO-TELLES affirms that he does not label this expansion of schooling as "democratization of education", but just as "generalization of education" (GALVÃO-TELLES 1966c, 16-17) (NOTE 51).

He justifies this compartmentalization with several arguments - first of all, there should exist a different curriculum for those who follow up studies and for those who do not; secondly, the extinction, at this level, of the traditional secondary education is not justified since it had been the traditional solution; thirdly, the generalization of grammar school education at the fifth and sixth year level is [economically] utterly impossible due to the fact that it demands several subject specialized teachers; lastly, the generalization of the fifth and sixth year only in the primary schools would not be desirable [for middle and high class children] because it is the most elementary of all the three vias (see GALVÃO-TELLES 1964b, 1969, 51-54). He

acknowledges that this situation could lead to the accentuation of social divisions, but the same happened in the other levels of the educational system namely with the option between grammar and technical school, between "intermediate" and higher education (GALVÃO-TELLES 1969, 52-53).

The implementation of this compartmentalized policy of generalization of education was as follows -

- in 1964 the compulsory schooling was extended from four to six years (Decree-Law 45.810, 9-7-1964);

- in 1965 the "Curso Unificado da Telescola" (Unified Course by TV) was created (Portaria 21.113, 17-2-1965), which set up a Television course similar to the first cycle of grammar school and technical school (more close to the latter);

- in 1966-1967, the "Complementary Course of Primary School" began to function, with an optional character;

- in 1967 the "preparatory education" (Decree-Law 47.480, 2-1-1967) was created which substituted the first cycle of grammar and technical schools;

- in 1968 the "Curso Unificado da Telescola" was transformed in "Ciclo Preparatório TV" ("Preparatory Cycle through Television") (Portaria 23.259, 9-8-1968), which was declared equivalent to the direct preparatory education;

- in 1968-1969 both systems of preparatory education began to work and the new compulsority was effective for the first time for the children who entered primary school in 1964-1965;

- in 1971 the first public posts of TV reception were set up (until then there was public broadcast and only private reception).

By that time the threefold track of expanded compulsory schooling was fully implemented, according to the compartmentalizing aims of the Minister of Education GALVÃO-TELLES.

One can conclude that the New State regime remained faithful to its compartmentalization strategy in the compulsory schooling increase policy.(until the fifth period).

3.6. The compartmentalized education of boys and girls

As it had already been seen, the curriculum clearly transmitted different social expectations and social roles for boys and for girls(chapter four,section 5.2). This expressive strategy was congruently supplemented by an organizational strategy of sex compartmentalization.

This compartmentalization was mainly implemented through the creation of separate schools for boys and for girls and through the creation of two separate branches of "Mocidade Portuguesa" (the portuguese youth organization). In girls schools only lady teachers could teach; teachers of both sexes could teach in boys schools.

As it was seen above, in chapter three, there were no separate curricula for boys and for girls, but there were specific feminine subjects in the curricula of girls schools and some specific girls. courses (see ARAÚJO 1985). "Feminine Portuguese Youth" had a very different character from the masculine one (see ARRIAGA 1976, 113-128, DUPONT 1982, 74 - see also "Escola Portuguesa", the official bulletin for primary education, 9-12-1937).

How was this compartmentalization policy implemented? In less than a fortnight of the setting up of the New State regime (28-5-1926) co-education was abolished in the great population centers (Law 1880, 8-6-1926). Less than a year after that,co-education was officially substituted by the system of separation of sexes (Decree 13.619, 17-5-1927). In 1928 and 1931 new decrees were published to hasten the implementation of the new policy (see SAMPAIO 1976, 95-96).

Co-education was condemned by the *"double error of putting on the same situation of knowledge acquisition pupils with*

dissimilar growing rates and different psychological characteristics and of perturbing the sex differentiation of personality, through the reciprocal influence, in school hours" (Decree-Law 28.081, 9-10-1937). Co-education may be adequate for nordic countries, but not for Portugal, said, in 1938, the Corporative Chamber (in SAMPAIO 1976,98-99). There is the duty to differentiate the education of women and men as early as possible. *"Girls should be taught by women teachers and with adequate curricula. Boys should be taught by men teachers who can make them men"* said a member of parliament in 1938 (in SAMPAIO 1976,99).

The implementation of this policy in primary education, in those villages where there was only one school, led to the creation of two shifts - a boys shift and a girls shift in the same buildings (Portaria 9389, 30-11-1939).

Beyond this sex compartmentalization policy was the intention of providing less education for girls. This is clear in the 1936 reform of grammar school education - in the curriculum of the third cycle the reform proposes a "philosophical synthesis of the acquired knowledges", but it was also created, for girls, a more prosaic "Family Education Course". The intention is obvious - to divert girls from entering the University. But the course was never implemented by lack of demand - indeed for those who reached the end of secondary education the natural sequence was the grammar school via, which gave access to the university, not an upgraded housewife course.

3.7. Evolution of the compartmentalization strategy - a synthesis

In the first period, the formative period, the regime efforts in education were more directed towards organizational and administrative strategies than to expressive or repressive ones. First, it was the implementation of unequal access to education, through reducing compulsory schooling and primary school curricula, thus increasing the gap between the mass and the elite. The foundations of the access to unequal

education strategy were also solidly launched in this period. One can say that the compartmentalization policy of the New State in regard to education was basically defined in this formative period.

The second period, the mobilizing period, was more dedicated to the formulation and implementation of expressive strategies, as it was seen in the previous chapter, but it confirmed and developed the dual track strategy.

The third period, the stabilization period, returned to the emphasis on administrative and organizational strategies. It confirmed the dual track strategy in secondary education, maintaining a tendentious technical school and a tendentious cultural school in separate tracks (as the Minister Pires de Lima said, in 1951). Technical schools were developed to suit the needs for industrial development. In the second part of this period, there began a conflict between the most traditional sector of the elite (favouring strongly compartmentalization strategies) and the more development oriented sector (favouring expansion of schooling in an unified framework) - see MIRANDA 1982. The first sector asserted its positions; the latter sector could only influence the expansion of one year in compulsory schooling.

The fourth period, the decline and stagnation period, implemented the expansion of schooling in a compartmentalization framework, which represented the traditional sector position.

All these compartmentalization policies were overcome in the fifth period, the renewal within continuity period, which is not the object of study in this work. The Veiga Simão Reform (Law 5/73,25-7-1973) proposed the expansion of compulsory schooling for eight years in an unified framework, created an unified secondary school and abolished the "ensino médio" (intermediate education). Some step were taken towards this aim before the end of the regime in April 1974 (NOTE 52).

Table 5.1 synthesize all this evolution. It includes the delay between general political policy formulation and educational policy formulation^(A) and between educational policy formulation and educational policy implementation^(B and C).

TABLE 5.1 - STRATEGIES OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION IN EDUCATION - EVOLUTION BY PERIODS

PERIODS	POLITICAL PERIODS	EDUCATIONAL PERIODS	DELAY (A)	STRATEGIES OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION			
				UNEQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION - compulsory schod. policy	DELAY (B)	ACCESS TO UNEQUAL EDUCATION dual track strategy	DELAY (C)
1 st Period -FORMATIVE-	1926 to 1933	1927 to 1936	+1	1927 - from 5 years to 4 years 1930 - from 4 to 3 years	+1	- 1931- Two tracks in primary education (postos de ensino) - 1932 - compartim. in secondary education	+5
2 nd Period -MOBILIZING-	1933 to 1945	1936 to 1947	+3	-	-	- 1936-Confirmation of the two tracks system in primary education - 1936 - idem in secondary education	+3
3 rd Period -STABILIZATION	1945 to 1958	1947 to 1964	+2	1956 - from 3 years to 4 years for boys 1960 - 4 years for boys and girls	+11	-1947-1948 - Confirmation of the two tracks system in secondary education (grammar schools and technical schools)	+2
4 th Period -DECLINE AND STAGNATION-	1958 to 1968	1964 to 1970	+6	1964 - from 4 years to 6 years	+6	-1964-1968 - Three th in the 5 th and 6 th year	+6
5 th Period -RENEWAL WITHIN CONTINUITY-	1968 to 1974	1970 to 1974	+2	1973 - Proposed 8 years of compulsory schooling	+5	-1973 - Proposed the unification of preparatory and secondary schooling	+5

3.8. The efficacy of the compartmentalization strategy

How efficacious was the implementation of those compartmentalization strategies? This question will be answered using statistical indicators of unequal access to education and of access to unequal education.

The success of the first strategy will be indicated by the follow up rate of the compulsory schooled pupils.

The success of the dual track compartmentalization strategies will be indicated by the number of enrolled students in each track and the number of secondary schools, (taking into account the state and private ones) in each track.

The success of the threefold track compartmentalization in the expansion of compulsory schooling, in the fourth period, will naturally be indicated by the number of enrolled students in each track.

The efficacy of sex compartmentalization will be indicated by the number of girl students which have access to the elite, that is, which are enrolled in the university and by the percentage of non mixed and mixed schools.

All the following tables were drawn with data obtained from the official national statistics of education ("Estatísticas da Educação", Instituto Nacional de Estatística Lisboa) either directly (Tables 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6) or through SAMPAIO (1973) analysis (Table 5.3).

The numbers are presented in thousands and are rounded off to one decimal for easier reading. Percentage numbers are always marked %. When no information could be get the symbol? appears.

We will first analyse the follow up rate in Table 5.2.

TABLE 5.2 - FOLLOW UP RATE OF COMPULSORY
SCHOOLING STUDENTS
(state and private schools)

PERIODS Follow up Rate	2 nd PERIOD	3 rd PERIOD		4 th PERIOD	5 th PERIOD
	(A)1943-44 (C)1945-46	(A)1948-49 (B)1949-50 (C)1950-51	(A)1958-59 (C)1960-61	(A)1966-67 (C)1968-69	(A)1971-72 (B)1972-73 (c)1973-74
PASSED 3 rd class (A)	87,5	101,1	158,3	164,8	166,9
ENROLLED 4 th class. (B/C)	67,3 (C)	83,9 (B)	183,0 (C)	203,2 (C)	203,5 (B)
FAILED 4 th class (A)	20,1	23,3	39,0	47,9	53,5
FOLLOW UP RATE	53,9%	59,9%	91%	94,2%	89,9%
PASSED 4 th class (A)	42,0	55,8	114,0	138,6	151,9
ENROLLED SEC. SCHOOL (B/C)	9,2 (C)	12,1 (B)	39,5 (C)	73,3 (C)	108,4 (B)
FAILED 1 st year Sec.S (A)	1,7	1,1	2,3	13,1	19,9
FOLLOW UP RATE	17.9%	19.7%	32.6%	43.4%	58.3%
PASSED 3 rd class (A)	87,5	101,1	158,3	164,8	166,9
ENROLLED SEC. SCHOOL (C)	9,2	13,4	39,5	73,3	129,1
FAILED 1 st year SEC.S (A)	1.7	1.1	2.3	13.1	19.9
FOLLOW UP RATE	8.6%	12.2%	23.5%	36.5%	65.4%

(The figures represent the number - in thousands -
of the enrolled students)

The logic of this follow up rate was to compare the number of enrolled students in the next year (Year B or C) in the fourth class and in the first year of secondary school with the number of passed students in the previous year (Year A) in the previous level (third class and fourth class respectively). This was done firstly in reference to the stay on rate in primary school after the compulsory schooling of three years (first line); then it was done in reference to the follow up rate between fourth level and the first of secondary school (second line); finally, the follow up rate says how many of those who finished the third level went on to secondary school which is important mainly for the second and third periods since the third class was the only compulsory schooling until 1956-1960. The first year of secondary school represents, in the first three columns, the first year of grammar school plus that of technical school; in the last two columns it represents the first year of preparatory school.

To obtain an accurate information one has to deduce from the number of enrolled students in the next year (B or C) in the 4th level or in the first year of secondary school, the number of those who had failed in the previous year in those same levels.

Thus the follow up rate assumes that all those students who failed in the previous year in the same level are enrolled in school in the next year, which may not be true - some most probably dropped out. On the other hand, the follow up rate treats all those who fail in the previous level (3th or 4th level in reference to the 4th level or 1st year of secondary education) as they had given up studying, since they do not enter in the presented statistics of year B - this is also not true, since the majority of those will stay on. Those effects act in opposite directions and so they counterbalance each other to some extent.

Due to the fact that statistics of education were not published every year, one has not always the logic sequence of year A, year B, year C. So one has to assume in three of the five columns that there are no meaningful variations in enrollment from one year to the next, and so one used year C

instead of year B when data for year B was not available.

In spite of all those (unsurmountable) limitations the follow up rate shows very clearly the success of New State strategy of unequal access to education. Let us analyse firstly the two first columns, since they correspond to the compulsory schooling of three years.

The last line follow up rate shows clearly this efficacy - from those who passed the third level only 9% or 12% followed up at the time that this level was the only compulsory schooling. That means that the mass was around 90% and the candidates to the elite were among those other 10% (from those only a minor part entered the university). The stay on rate from third to fourth class was naturally much higher than the follow up rate from the fourth class to the first year of secondary education, since in most schools the fourth class was in the same building and locality.

The increase in compulsority in 1956 and 1960 increased greatly the stay on rate within primary education, as it was intended, but it did not reach 100% (NOTE 53). The follow up rate from primary to secondary education also increased - it increased 13%, 11% and 15% in the last part of the third period, in the fourth and fifth periods.

In the fourth and fifth period the compulsory schooling of six years was already in force - so one can conclude that there was a great degree of drop out during compulsory schooling mainly in the promotion from primary to preparatory school (57% in the fourth period, 40% in the fifth period). The compulsory schooling of six years was only gradually implemented.

In sum, the strategy of unequal access to education was very efficacious until the increase of compulsory schooling for six years, and its effects were still present after that.

TABLE 5.3. THE EFFICACY OF DUAL TRACK
COMPARTMENTALIZATION STRATEGY IN EDUCATION
- NUMBER OF ENROLLED STUDENTS (State
and Private Schools)

LEVELS OF SCHOOLING	PERIODS TYPES OF SCHOOLS	2 nd	3 rd		4 th	5 th
		PERIOD	PERIOD		PERIOD	PERIOD
		1940-41	1950-51	1960-61	1966-67	1972-73
PRIMARY (only State)	1-NORMAL S.	469,0	548,1	733,4	703,5	?
	2-POSTS	67,5	61,8	122,6	60,4	?
	% 1/ TOTAL	87,4%	89.9%	85.7%	92.8%	?
SECONDARY	1-GRAMMAR S	36.5	48.5	111.8	155.4	178,5
	2-TECHNICAL	37.7	34.3	94.7	152.0	139,2
	% 1/TOTAL	49.2%	58.6%	52.4%	50.6%	56.2%
POST - - SECONDARY	1-UNIVERSI.	9,0	12,9	19,5	30,1	47,7
	2-INTERME- DIATE	3,0	5,1	7,5	8,7	14,8
	% 1/TOTAL	75%	71.7%	72.2%	77.6%	76.3%

(The figures represent the number - in thousands -
of the enrolled students)

TABLE 5.4. THE EFFICACY OF DUAL TRACK
 COMPARTMENTALIZATION IN SECONDARY EDUCATION
 - NUMBER OF STATE AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

LEVELS OF SCHOOLING	PERIODS TYPE OF SCHOOLS	2 nd PERIOD	3 rd PERIOD		4 th PERIOD	5 th PERIOD
		1940-41	1950-51	1960-61	1966-67	1972-73
SECONDARY (State)	1-GRAMMAR	43	43	43	47	119
	2-TECHNICAL	51	63	92	101	134
	% 1/TOTAL	45.7%	40.6%	31.9%	31.8%	47%
SECONDARY (Private)	1-GRAMMAR	261	297	342	406	342
	2-TECHNICAL	80	109	47	74	20
	% 1/TOTAL	76.5%	73.2%	87.9%	84.6%	94.5%
SECONDARY (Total)	Total Grammar/ Total Schools	69.9%	66.4%	73.5%	72.1%	75%

(The figures represent the number of schools).

In these tables only the two main tracks in secondary education were considered (grammar education versus commercial and industrial education), ignoring special courses like nursery, agriculture or religious seminaries courses - the two main tracks represent around 93% of all secondary education, in terms of enrolled students.

The same criterion was used in higher education - only university education was considered in higher education since only this track led to the status group of "doutores" - university education represents, in the period of time considered, around 80% of all higher education. In "Intermediate Education" were considered the high technical schools ("Institutos Industriais" and "Institutos Comerciais") and primary school teachers education colleges.

In those Tables (5.3 and 5.4) it is ignored, in the 5th period, preparatory education since its introduction would make impossible comparisons across periods and there is a Table specially dedicated to compartmentalization at this level (Table 5.5).

The Table 5.3 shows that the most successful strategy was that applied to secondary education. This can be logically explained by the fact that the great strategy towards the mass was that of unequal access to education. In fact, during several years the proportion between the students enrolled in the secondary and post-secondary education and the students enrolled in the four years of primary education was respectively 16%, 17%, 27%, 41%, 70% (NOTE 54). The logic sequence, in the strategical level, for this minority who followed up, during the second and third period was to compartmentalize those who followed up studying in order to select access to the elite (the same logic applies in the fourth period for those who followed up after the six years compulsory schooling). This was done indeed and with relative success. At the post-secondary level compartmentalization was not so necessary, since the main selection was made in secondary education. So it is understandable that dual track compartmentalization should be pursued in the secondary education level.

As was said above, one of the main means to promote compartmentalization is to supply more technical education than grammar school education. According to Table 5.3 it seems that there was an almost perfect balance between technical and grammar education supply, which would contradict the proclaimed intentions of the New State to offer more technical education to maximize compartmentalization. Table 5.4 allows us to make further inquiries into this strategy, through the distinction between state and private supply of secondary schools (the importance of private supply of education is only meaningful at the secondary level - see chapter nine, section 3.6; so this type of analysis is not useful in the other levels of schooling). It is clear, from the analysis of Table 5.4, that state supply of technical schools was growing steadily in relation to that of grammar schools, until the fifth period - indeed the percentage of state grammar schools in relation to the total secondary state schools is always decreasing until then. This had no effects on student enrolment due to the opposite policy in the private sector - in this sector the percentage of grammar schools in relation to the total private secondary schools is much greater than that of the state sector and increases from the second to the fifth period. While the state only built four grammar schools in twenty seven years (1940-1967), the private sector created one hundred and forty five. So it was the private supply of secondary education which diminished greatly the effect of the compartmentalization strategy of the New State regime. Thus, from the part of the state, the compartmentalization policy at the secondary level was indeed pursued according to plan - from a ratio of 1.2 it developed into a ratio technical/grammar schools of 2.1. In a global evaluation, the strategy was moderately efficacious in relation to the regime's aims.

All those strategies ended in the fifth period.

In 1973-74 there were already comprehensive secondary schools - there were 85 grammar schools (35%), 93 technical schools (38%) and 65 comprehensive schools (27%) (EMÍDIO 1981). The relationship between state and private schools changed dramatically, because the state bought many private schools to implement the mass schooling policy rapidly.

TABLE 5.5 - THE EFFICACY OF COMPARTIMENTALIZATION
IN THE EXPANSION OF COMPULSORY
SCHOOLING FOR SIX YEARS

	4 th PERIOD 1969 - 70	5 th PERIOD 1973 - 74	NOW 1982 - 1983
DIRECT PREPARATORY SCHOOL	110,5 60.1%	211,7 78.8%	308,9 83.4%
TELEVISION PREPARATORY SCHOOL	191 10.4%	29,3 10.9%	61,3 16.6%
COMPLEMENTARY PRIMARY SCHOOL	542 29.5%	27,8 10.3%	0,049 0.01%
TOTAL	183,8	268,8	370,2

(The figures represent the number - in thousands - of the enrolled students)

Only the first column, referring to the fourth period, shows data about a period where compartmentalization was an adopted strategy - 1968-1969 was the first year when the threefold system of compulsority was in full operation; in 1970 it began the fifth period. So there was little time to test the efficacy of the model. Even so it is clear that compartmentalization was at work - 60% of the students frequented the noblest mean and 30% the mean designed for those who did not follow up studies.

The two following columns (referent to the 5th period and nowadays) show that the de-compartmentalization intention operated through gradual extinction of the complementary primary school via (see FERNANDES 1973,47). The last column proves the almost complete success of this intention, but it shows also that the system designed in 1964-1968 still influences the present situation, since the extinction of the third via was obtained mainly through the increase of the Television via (the demonstration of this influence was the reason to include the analysis of nowadays situation in Table 5.5.).

TABLE 5.6 - THE EFFICACY OF SEX COMPARTMENTALIZATION
- NUMBER OF GIRL STUDENTS ENROLLED IN
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

PERIODS ENROLLED STUDENTS	2 nd PERIOD 1940-1941	3 rd PERIOD 1950-1951 1960-1961		4 th PERIOD 1966-1967	5 th PERIOD 1973-1974
TOTAL NUMEER	4303	12903	20139	32059	54975
GIRLS	738	3354	6535	13345	26977
GIRLS ENROLLMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENROLLMENT	17.2%	26%	32.4%	41.6%	49.1%

As it was said above, the intention of sexual differential role inculcation and of sex compartmentalization was the transmission of a message of 'less status for girls in society, that is, of sex social compartmentalization. This message was based on the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" of the society of the first periods of the New State. The intentions became more clear in the already referred 1936 Reform of grammar school education.

This school and social message was effective in the second and third period, as can be seen in Table 5.6 . But it is also clear that it became gradually less effective - in the fifth period there was practically the same number of boys and girls in universities.

Another important strategy of sex compartmentalization was the differentiation of school attendance - there should be girls schools and boys schools. How was this strategy implemented?

In this respect the deeds were less than the intentions mainly because its full implementation at all levels would be very expensive.

In relation to primary schools, in 1942, around one

third of the primary schools were still mixed (NOTE 55). Only slowly separation of sexes was implemented in primary education.

In reference to secondary education the separation was never fully implemented, except in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra. In 1932, there were 34 grammar schools - 23 mixed (68%) and 11 separated (32%) - those eleven were in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, being seven for boys and four for girls. In 1947, there were 43 grammar schools, 29 mixed (67%) and 14 separated (33%) - those fourteen were in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, eight for boys and six for girls. The situation remained stable until the fifth period. In five mixed grammar schools a separate girls section was created in 1947.

The same norm applies for technical education - 21 of the 65 technical schools listed in the Statute of 1948 were separate (32%) and 44 were mixed (68%). From those 21 separate schools 12 were boys schools and 9 girls schools.

At the post secondary level there was no sex compartmentalization.

Congruently with the Veiga Simão Reform the fifth period ended the sex compartmentalization strategy - the Decree-Law 482/72 (28-11-1972) set up co-education in compulsory schooling, that is, in primary and preparatory schools (see "Co-educação no ensino básico", M.E.N., 1972). Co-education was experimentally generalized to all secondary education in 1971 (see DUPONT 1980,93).

3.9. Conclusion

One can conclude that the main strategy of compartmentalization of the New State was unequal access to post-compulsory education. The policy was formulated and implemented, in great part, in the formative period. It was efficacious, as seen in Table 4.2.

The compartmentalization by dual track in secondary education, which diverted many students from grammar schools was complementary of this unequal access strategy. The dual

track was successful, although not as efficacious as the policy formulations aimed, by the reasons already analyzed. But it was efficacious enough to maintain the basic social stratification.

Through those devices, carefully set up, the reproduction of "natural" social stratification was achieved.

(There was not only a social basis, but also a territorial based stratification system which was related to regional educational opportunity (see MARTINS 1971, PIRES 1984). For instance, the two districts of Lisbon and Oporto alone accounted for 46% of university students in 1963-1964. This means that the system also reproduced regional social stratification).

This compartmentalization strategy was successful also in its other aim - the preparation of elites. The percentages of university students in relation to the total is very low, as can be deduced from Table 5.3 . In 1960, only 1.2% of the active population was university educated (3.9% had secondary education, 37% primary education and 58% no school diploma) (MARTINS 1971). "The basic orientation of the secondary and university systems is of course towards the conferment of diffuse elite status". As such universities acted as agencies of cultural immobility rather than of social mobility (MARTINS 1971).

To end our analysis one must call attention to two important agencies of social mobility through education, which constituted the source of exceptions to the described pattern - the Army schools and religious seminaries. In 1963-64, 64% of the university students came from families whose educational background was university or secondary education, 33% came from families whose fathers had primary education and 3% from families whose fathers had no school diploma (MARTINS 1971). This shows that there was some degree of social mobility. Many of those who were promoted through education came from those agencies, mainly through religious seminaries. This strategy was practiced more by rural families who had able students and was often combined with patronage. A clear indicator of this family strategy

of social promotion is the fact that only 20% of those enrolled in religious seminaries opted for priesthood (COSTA 1974) - see above pages 196-197. Salazar is the most noteworthy example of this rural family strategy, which was practiced even before the arrival of the New State.

This social mobility allowed a slight degree of openness in elite recruitment, but did not put at risk the values of the regime - indeed the co-opted members had been adequately socialized in the traditional values by those co-opted agencies of social education - the Church and the Army.

One can conclude this chapter stating that the organizational strategy of compartmentalization was implemented in the educational system to reproduce "natural" social stratification in order to pursue social conformism and to avoid mobilization through massive social mobility.

CHAPTER VI
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE
REPRESSIVE STRATEGIES

The sixth chapter of this work will have two distinct parts. In the first part we will analyse the theory of New State repressive demobilising strategy - the theory of suppression of freedom (freedom of press, freedom of political association) and the theory of repression of freedom.

The second part of this chapter will analyze the effect which the social change and the political evolution in the 1960s had on those repressive strategies (and on the other type of strategies). Particular attention will be paid to the repressive strategical answer of the regime to the mobilization in the Universities of the 1960s.

One concludes analyzing the expressive dimension of repressive strategies.

1. THEORY OF NEW STATE REPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES

As it can be deduced from what was said in Chapter I authoritarian states do not differ from totalitarian states because of the quantity of repression, but because of other features - passivity rather than mobilization, mentality inculcation rather than articulate ideology, preservation of areas of private life free from state invasion, limited pluralism (LINZ 1970, 266-267).

From those differences one can deduce that repression is qualitatively different in the two regimes. In totalitarian regimes repression is carried out by appealing to the masses, to the people for cooperation or surveillance; it can even be done by the masses themselves in revolutionary moments through terror, purges and the kind. As it is always done in the name of ideology it can be practiced more on the basis of intentions and ideas rather than acts.

In authoritarian regimes repression is not carried out by appealing to the masses, it has a support in legal ground (although this can take just a formal aspect) and it is based on (oppositionist) acts rather than intentions or mere ideas.

Repression in both cases take the preventive form of the suppression of freedoms or the active form of restraint of oppositionist activities.

1.1. The New State theory of suppression of freedom

To suppress the free exercise of natural freedoms is the first action in a repressive strategy. The freedoms at stake are - freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of meeting, freedom of religion.

The Portuguese Constitution guarantees all of them, but the New State published a "festival of diplomas emptying up the rights and freedoms" (LUCENA 1976a, 134).

It guaranteed freedom of thought, meaning that no one was arrested by the mere fact of thinking differently; but there were times where those who thought differently, even not having any political or civic militancy, could be harmed in their careers by the mere fact of their ideas.

In relation to freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of meeting one can say that they were subject to several regulations promoting exactly the opposite - see about this LUCENA 1976a (NOTE 1).

The control over freedom of press and freedom of political association will be analysed apart.

There was religious freedom but the Catholic Church was very much privileged and protestant believers were many times mistrusted socially.

CAETANO, in 1934, was already legitimizing all those restrictions to individual rights distinguishing between civic freedoms and political freedoms. The latter were just instrumental to preserve and achieve the former; consequently one cannot renounce civic freedoms, but it is legitimate to restrict political freedoms. CAETANO considers civic freedoms to be - freedom to circulate, freedom to choose occupation, freedom to raise a family, freedom of religion and freedom of property (CAETANO 1950,22-23).

In fact the regulation of the use of freedoms was so complex that even Salazar acknowledged in 1949 that *"the system is not perfect and can give the impression, even to persons in good faith, that the freedom which they use is not a right, but just a facultative concession of public authorities"* (SALAZAR IV,365).

1.2. The New State theory of suppression of freedom - suppressing freedom of press and freedom of political association

1.2.1. Suppressing freedom of press - the censorship

The Portuguese people is emotive and thus is an easy prey to demagoguery (SALAZAR VI, 47,248). Free use of the press could allow the creation of campaigns to influence dangerously

public opinion. As "to govern is to protect people from themselves" the regime felt it necessary to create a system for the implementation of such "protection" - it was censorship. On the other hand, the opinion of the masses is very inferior to the true public opinion of the Nation (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,272) (NOTE 2). As "one cannot avoid [...] that it is the State which represents effectively the Nation" (SALAZAR 1933) it is up to the State to make sure that the public opinion of the Nation prevails. Besides there is an analogy which can be used - "the newspaper is the spiritual food of the people and so should be inspected as other foods are" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,95).

In sum *"the State had the incumbence of defending public opinion of all factors which disorientate it against truth and justice"* (SALAZAR VI,45).

Censorship is an evil, but a necessary evil, since *"there is less damage in not letting criticism come out than in not being obeyed"* (SALAZAR II,133), it is the *"legitimate defence of the free states"* (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,267, - see also SALAZAR V, 506).

There was not only censorship of press, but also censorship of cinema, theatre and private radio. In the case of Television and of state radio censorship was embedded in ownership. Although censorship was never officially extended to books they were frequently withdrawn on police orders (MARQUES 1976,187)

Ironically censorship was somewhat decentralised in a centralised country since each district or town had its own body of censors which could imply geographical variations in strictness. (MARQUES 1976,187).

What effects did censorship have? The most important consequence was passivity as a result of self - censorship. As MARQUES points out "This self censorship has often led to extremes of caution with little real justification" (MARQUES 1976,187 - see also MARTINS 1970).

Another consequence was an hypercriticism from part of the "intelligentsia" of all that was said in newspapers, radio of television (NOTE 3).

The role of censorship in Portugal went far beyond its usual political uses in dictatorship. Censorship had also the role of buffering socially and morally public opinion. Events which were considered asocial or immoral were suppressed. We will give just some examples of this role of censorship taken from the verbal instructions given by telephone to an Oporto newspaper ("Jornal de Notícias") between 1967 and 1974, published by Cesar PRINCIPE - one can find as suppressed items murders, assaults, cruelty to animals, corruption, social charitable activities of (leftist) students, etc. (see GEORGEL 1985, 379-382).

What was at stake was not only political propaganda, but to create an image of Portugal as it should have been - passive, quiet, good, Christian and obedient. That is, the Government transmitted through the media the image of the demobilized and morally unpolluted Portugal it wanted to achieve. The regime created not only "an imaginary political world which was dominated by the guidelines of the official government position" (BLUME 1977), but also a imaginary social world. Demobilised and quiet Portugal began as an image transmitted through the mass media. This is probably the reason why was not enough for social control to have an a posteriori press control - "A good press law can repress the abuses, but it does not prevent them..." (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 96).

To conclude, one must emphasize again the expressive consequences of this repressive strategy (see chapter three, sections 2.3, 2.5.1). It was one of the most powerful sources of demobilisation since it controlled the indispensable prerequisite of all mobilization - circulation of information - and because it provoked that self imposed passivity which came from the sensation that "Salazar put a policeman in the heart of each portuguese", to quote a current saying at the time.

1.2.2. Suppressing freedom of political association

SALAZAR was against the parties - he disliked party system in general, but considered it even more detrimental in the particular case of Portugal due to latin temperament (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 161) (NOTE 4).

Partisan spirit distorts the analysis of problems since the ground for reaching solutions is party interest and not national interest (SALAZAR IV, 361, CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,136). Parties produce also superficial analysis (SALAZAR III,387) and suffer from personalism, factionalism, clientelism and favouritism (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,67,161).

The suppression of parties even provided more freedom - people will be freer to vote without parties, since then they will "not be involved in dirty political fights" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,278); members of parliament will be freer since "Is there worse dictatorship than that of the party?" (NOTE 5).

In Portugal parties had been the cause of disorganization of Public Administration and of the State in general (SALAZAR I,125,340, CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,137-139) and would be again if allowed, since there would be then, due to latin individualist temperament, a proliferation of parties - there would be at least six or seven main parties (SALAZAR V,467,403 - see also RATO 1958,78).

This is so evident that other nations would soon follow the portuguese example. As RATO said in 1958, glossing the master, "the Portuguese Nation [...] goes on under Salazar pointing up to the Western world good constitutional paths" (RATO 1958,88).

This distrust of parties is linked with New State regime distrust of urban men (see chapter two,section 1.3) and with his conception of the Nation and the role of the State towards the Nation (see chapter seven, section 2.2.3)

1.3. The New State theory of repression of freedom

Repression means here direct action against "subversive" political, social, cultural activities which becomes materialized into arrests, judgements, detentions or dismissal of person and destruction or seizure of material.

SALAZAR diagnosed that due to traditional "mild customs" Portuguese did not like violence (see chapter two,sections 1.1, 1.2) and thus "the State should be so strong that it does not

need to be violent" (SALAZAR I,81). This points up to a legal framing of repression (see SALAZAR II, 70).

New State repression had several characteristics which is useful to summarize .

Repression was legally framed - there was no lack of decreelaws and regulations to legalize arrests, detentions dismissions and the like (see about this legislation COMISSÃO ...1985). A consequence of this legal framing is emphasis on acts rather than intentions as a basis for repression (see SALAZAR II,71).

Repression was moderate and rational (LUCENA 1976a,146); the regime strived "for an optimum of terror, rather than a crude maximum" (MARTINS 1969).

Repression was discrete (SARAIVA 1974,60-61), not to mobilize attention, and patient (MONICA 1978,97).

Repression was systematic and constant, as a kind of routine - there were "no wide swings between 'excesses' and 'liberalizations'" (MARTINS 1970).

This system of legal, moderate and rational, discrete and patient, systematic and constant, habitual repression can be seen as an application of the "mild but constant pressure" strategy (see chapter three, section 2.4.2). One can say that the New State created a system of "mild but constant repression".

SARAIVA comments that, compared with Paris, Lisbon was a city without police in which nobody, not even in his house speaking with friends, speaks loudly about politics (SARAIVA 1974,61).

To achieve effectiveness without terror the regime made the repression machinery omnipresent. In this sense the myth of the efficiency of secret police was as important as its real efficacy (ROBINSON 1979,55). As it was sometimes said "in Portugal nothing works except PIDE (secret police)".

This omnipresence implied visibility, since visibility increases power (NOTE 6). Thus the repressive machinery should be at the same time very visible and very discrete. This was achieved through the creation of certain codes only known to the secret police and the active opponents of the regime, thus

creating a kind of compulsority reverse complicity among them.

In this way repression was very present for an activist minority and relatively invisible for the great majority (NOTE 7).

This activist minority was composed mainly of communist militants (MARQUES 1976,189 - see SALAZAR's reference to communists in VI,252). This is the equivalent in the repressive strategy to the manichaen presentation of facts in mass media (see chapter three, section 2.5.1). The regime tried to isolate (compartmentalize) communists within Portuguese society and even among oppositionists.

This explains the two very different versions of the New State regime circulating - the oppositionist one where repression is seen as the main strategy of the regime (see LUCENA 1984) and the common man one where the routine, habitual and "mild but constant pressure" appear as important.

The first version invaded mass media after the 25th April Revolution and was proclaimed as the official version of the new regime about the old one, which is naturally enough since the politicians of the new regime were then communist, ex-communists, active opponents, ex-exiles, political refugees and persons transferred from the old regime who found this explanation the most rehabilitating one for themselves. The generalization of this version as the official one led LOURENÇO to write that fascism has never existed, since it did not exist for the majority of the Portuguese (LOURENÇO 1976,229-239).

Both versions are factually accurate, but their explanatory power is greatly different as it is implicit in all this work - neither repression was the main strategy of the regime nor it was the main cause of its survival. One can even say that repression was not so important for the majority of citizens by its active character, but by the generalized fear and apoliticism it provoked. Again and again one finds important expressive dimension in all New State strategies - it was the case with censorship (chapter three, section 2.3, 2.5.1, this chapter section 1.2.1), it is the case with direct repression.

One can sum up by calling attention to the integrated characteristic of New State strategies where mild but constant pressure and repression are partners of the same game. Repression had also as its aim to demobilize the common man through fear and intimidation. The myth of efficiency and omnipresence of the secret police made fear justified. Self control and self-censorship are also self-demobilizing attitudes.

The fact that apparently everyone could be an informer introduced an element of mistrust in private relationship (people was only open with very intimate friends - see RIEGELHAUPT 1979) which provoked a kind of compartmentalization of social relationships in regard to social, cultural and political discussions.

In sum, there was a common aim of expressive and repressive strategies to produce mass demobilization. This may explain why without using much physical violence New State rule was one of the most suffocating (NOTE 8).

2. CHANGES IN NEW STATE STRATEGIES IN THE 1960^S

2.1. Social change and political evolution

2.1.1. Social change in the 1960s

All the strategies analyzed until now suffered qualitative changes in the 1960^S and early 1970^S. So a second part of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of those changes. As explained in the Introduction this work will cover only the period which ends with the substitution of Salazar in 1968 - so we will not analyse the changes brought about by the rule of Caetano (1968-1974).

The cause of those changes of strategy comes, in first place, from several social and economic changes. There were economic changes due to a slow industrialization process and decline in agriculture (NOTE 9), social changes due to a slow process of urbanization, growing emigration for France and Germany, increasing diffusion of television and other mass media and general changes in habits and attitudes (NOTE 10), religious changes due to reform in Catholic Church started with the Second Vatican Council which provoked the appearance of the progressist catholics (see chapter five, section 2.2.6), cultural changes which increased what ROBINSON calls the "symbolic divorce between the intellectual world and the regime" (ROBINSON 1979, 165).

2.1.2. Political evolution in late 1950^S and 1960

There were also specifically political causes which provoked the evolution in New State's strategies. The years 1958-1962 were full of political events all of an adverse nature to the regime, as can be seen in chapter one (section 3.4).

All those events obviously shook the regime and, at the same time, mobilized various sectors of the population - intellectuals, students, progressist catholics and even elements within the Armed Forces - against the regime.

2.2. Repression - the main strategical answer of the regime to the new situation

The predominant answer of the New State to those changes and to those political events was repression which gradually developed into the building of a police state. As MARQUES said "control had almost completely passed on to the censorship service and the Secret Police [...] Repression haunted the late 1960^s as in the days of triumphant Fascism" (MARQUES 1976,224) - (NOTE 11). Beyond the traditional sufferers of repression (firstly, communists and secondly, other opponents) there began to be involved in repression intellectuals, students, progressist catholics (NOTE 12).

The building of the police state came about through coordination of the various suppressive and repressive means and its articulation with the state machinery - the secret police, other police forces, the censorship service and public administration could interchange information. The vetoing of people for public jobs is a good example of this articulation.

There were other measures which helped this building - the militarization of all police forces (see MARTINS 1970), the establishment of special tribunals for the judgement of political crimes (see BARREIROS 1982).

This building of a police state began after 1945 (MARTINS 1970) - which is an irony since then democratic trends were triumphant all over western Europe and the fascist like period of the regime was over - and was used to increase repression in the 1960^s and early 1970^s.

So there was not a change in the regime itself to answer to the new situation - there was no attempt to refresh the elite, renew the polices, revive public administration. "The New State, then, was [...] institutionally petrified and

powered only by inertia" (ROBINSON 1979,81), it "went to sleep, it became petrified and dinosauric" (WIARDA 1977,308). Even Franco NOGUEIRA, who can be considered as the almost official biographer of Salazar, acknowledges this decline (see NOGUEIRA 1985).

This decline may explain the increase in repression. It is probably not coincidence that the gradual building of the police state began after the end of the less demobilizing period of the regime - the role of a more mobilizing elite was taken by the agents of the repressive machinery in the sense of provoking passivity and demobilization through intimidation and later through increase in direct repression.

Once one puts at work a repressive machinery there can exist an organizational pursuiness of efficiency which is instrumental to gain power over the opponents and within the regime. In fact the police state machinery became with time a state within a state (MARQUES 1976,188) (NOTE 13), but it never created a climate of terror which could compel us to change the previous judgement about the role of repressive strategies in the New State.

2.3. The new expressive strategy - the proclamation of the "pluricontinental and multi-racial nation"

The regime was "ideologically bankrupt" (ROBINSON 1979, 81), corporatism was in decline (WIARDA 1977), the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" were in conflict with the social evolution. But this would not be terribly important since authoritarian regimes are based on passivity. As LINZ said - for large parts of the population in authoritarian regimes habit and self-interest may be more important, and belief unnecessary for effective control (LINZ 1970,269).

But there was an external event which provoked the need

of some kind of mobilization - the guerilla war imposed on the regime in the colonies. The regime tried, at first, to compartmentalize this mobilization in order to minimize the impact of the war on civil society. But prolongation of war, growing international isolation, a certain deterioration of the image of Portugal in Europe and in the world, began to be resented by the social elite which travelled abroad, and the rising of political and social unrest in Portugal led the regime to assert the need to give an answer to this situation also at the ideological level. This need became more commanding when some portuguese youth, mainly university students (which was the recruitment basis for the Army which fought the war) began to show signs of non conformism with regard to the war situation.

The ideological answer was the proclamation as political dogma of the doctrine of the "multiracial and pluricontinental nation". The overseas provinces were as much Portugal as the metropolis; all their inhabitants became full Portuguese; "we are only one people, forming only one Nation under a sole government" (NOTE 14); as the Portuguese Foreign Minister said in 1967 "We (the Portuguese) consider ourselves to be an African nation as well, through integration and multiracialism" (in MARQUES 1976, 229). This doctrine was propagated mainly through the mass media.

Thus in this period the regime clearly opted for some ideological indoctrination, but confined to the colonial policy and again provoked by defensive needs. Of course this doctrine had been explicit within many documents and policies of the New State, but it was an external need which made necessary to assert it so loudly and to make it object of ideological indoctrination.

This can be evidenced by the analysis of Table 3.1 of Chapter Three (Page 87). The slight increase in communications addressed to the masses (from 37% to 42%) in a decline period is mainly due to this ideological indoctrination - 80% of all communications addressed to the masses in this period (8 out of 10) were dedicated to colonial issues (five were exclusively dedicated to colonial policy and three were partially dedicated to it).

Thus this need provoked what MARTINS called the "refascistization of the regime" (MARTINS 1970). We will call it more adequately a "remobilization" of the regime.

New mobilizing organizations were created like the "National Womans Movement" (Movimento Nacional Feminino) to give moral support to the army soldiers in the war, or revived organizations like the "Liga dos Combatentes" (Veterans Association).

It is certainly not by chance that LOURENÇO (1982) in his article about fascist culture in Portugal only found clearly fascist cultural productions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The "remobilization" was favourable to the reappearance of the pro-fascist intellectual minority group.

The efficacy of such "remobilization" was very limited in regard both to its external aims of preparing a generation for war (the rate of desertions and flight from the country to avoid entering the war increased) and to its effects in the renewal of the regime.

The New State was already in decline and only defensive reasons imposed the remobilisation. The only fact which could reverse this decline was the change in leadership in 1968 - Salazar's substitution by Caetano. But this is another story to be told in other work.

2.4. Organizational strategies

2.4.1. Decompartamentalization of the Army

By stress of circumstances compartmentalization was no longer feasible in regard to the Army. Several reasons compelled the Army to decompartmentalize.

First, it was necessary to recruit militiamen to fight in the guerilla war on three fronts. More and more militiamen were incorporated with the professional soldiers in the same military units. As their permanence in the ranks was extended to four years there was time for abundant interactions. On the other hand, as part of those exchanges took place in the front where comradeship is naturally greater, their influence was more lasting.

Second, it happened that many of those militiamen who finished their military service enlisted again in the Army with a special status, thus bringing to the very Army corp new ideas and influences (NOTE 15).

Thirdly, the militiamen were recruited from young men of whom some had university courses. Those had generally more important roles to perform in the army machinery. Thus a good part of the important posts filled by new recruits was given to students coming from universities where political mobilization, ideological debate, mass meetings and general political activity were constant. More than that, it happened that the punishment to "subversive" university students was to send them earlier (that is, before finishing their degrees) to the Army. It seems that they were more influencers than influenced agents.

The Minister of Defence was already saying in 1970 that "Subversion tries to reach the Armed Forces through the sources of recruitment of 'cadres' - the schools [...]. If such perversion goes on and develops we have to alter the system of preparation of complementary officers and sergeants [...]" (in THOMAZ 1983, 142-143) (NOTE 16).

Fourthly, the Armed Forces elements entered into contact during the war with the guerilla movements. This contact had great influence on some officers as it was later acknowledged by some of them (see JESUÍNO 1982) and is clearly visible in the liberation movement spirit of the Armed Forces Movement in the revolutionary period of 1974-1975.

The young generation of professional army officers was more prone to accept all those new ideas brought in by those agents than the old guard. So it gradually developed an abyss between the old guard and the captains (such an abyss is already referred in BRADFORD 1973 and MARTINS 1969) - it were captains who overthrew the regime in April 1974 and took the power in their hands.

In sum, the colonial war "decompartmentalised" the Army - this "decompartmentalisation" proved to be fatal to the New State.

2.4.2. The fissure in the moral union between Church and State

As it was already said (chapter three, sections 2.2.5, 2.2.6) the moral union between Church and State had a fissure since the late 1950^s, which became more important in the 1960^s and

early 1970^S.

This compelled the New State to set up clearly the limits for the moral union, which was made repressing those "dissident" catholics (NOTE 17).

So repression became also part of the strategies the New State used towards members of Catholic Church.

2.5. Mobilisation in the Universities

No reference to the changing strategies of the regime in the 1960^S was complete without calling attention to student mobilizational movements in the Universities (NOTE 18).

2.5.1. Mobilisational events in Universities

One must begin by the resistance that Universities always offered to the penetration of "Mocidade Portuguesa", the nationalist youth organization created in 1936 to act in all levels of the educational system. Policies to enhance the role of "Mocidade Portuguesa" in Universities failed utterly (MARQUES 1976, 205, GEORGEL 1985, 397-398) (NOTE 19).

So the university space was more free than other spaces for other movements to act - social and cultural groups, Coimbra traditional praxis movements (NOTE 20), Coimbra traditional residences called "republicas", catholic movements (mainly JUC), etc. All this activity reflected also in the degree of mobilization which student's official associations managed to achieve.

After some moments of student mobilization in the 1940s (GRÁCIO 1987) the first great mobilization of students was in 1956 to demand the revocation of a decree-law (Decreto-Lei nº40900) which restricted very much the activities of student's associations (see RICARDO 1982) (NOTE 21). The students even protested in the National Assembly where the decree-law was sent to be discussed in a governmental delay strategy.

This protest proved that an alliance of liberal, socialist, communist and progressist catholic students to demand concrete government actions could be effective. It began here also a movement to create a national association of university students.

Since 1956 the self governed student houses ("republicas") transformed gradually from bohemian centers into political ones and gradually overcame the traditional hostility between students and non students ("futrucas") (see RODRIGUES 1982). The Delgado campaign reinforced this trend.

In 1960-1961 it was elected for the first time, in the University of Coimbra, a leftist governing body for the university student's union (NOTE 22). This led to the academic crisis of 1961-62 - see about this RICARDO 1982 and RODRIGUES 1982).

In April 1961 ~~It~~ was published a "Letter to a Portuguese [Female] Student" which appealed for the social and sexual liberation of women. It was written to the girl for whom "love" is passivity, duty and obligation" (NOTE 23).

In February 1962 ~~it~~ was created a provisional national association of students and promoted the first national meeting of students in Coimbra. In March 1962 it was promoted the Student's Day in Lisbon which provoked the arrest of many students and physical confrontation between students and police. It was the beginning of the crisis. In the sequence of events many students were arrested, demonstrations were violently broken by the police, students were suspended from university and others expelled, others called to the military service before finishing their courses as punishment. The students association saw their headquarters sealed off by state police, subventions were suspended.

2.5.2. Mobilizing for change

Thus repression of all sorts was the regime's answer to students mobilization. This repression was instrumental in the radicalisation of student's positions which in turn provoked more mobilization to which more repression was the answer - a vicious circle. This means that repression was at the same time consequence and cause of mobilization.

As those events shaped a whole generation - henceforth called the 1962 generation - and since this generation became, after April 1974, part of the political and cultural

establishment it is worth while to analyze in more detail this mobilisation for change.

Firstly, the students demonstrated during the crisis that they have capacity to mobilize themselves against the regime and were willing to press for changes (NOTE 24).

Secondly, it was used in Portugal, for the first time, new methods of mass mobilisation like mass rallies, student assemblies ("Assembleias Magnas"), permanent meetings; conflicts with the police and occupation of buildings; class - strikes, boycotts, transformation of classes into debates, etc. All those actions were mobilisation for change.

Thirdly, those movements tried not only internal coordination (for instance, through the creation of a national association of students) but also promoted alliances with other sections of society - opposition groups, mainly communist party and socialist groups, progressist catholics, faculty members. This alliance with some liberal or leftist faculty members was very important to question "catedraticia" and university support to the regime through co-optation.

This alliance with faculty members revived university autonomy. Though this the crisis provoked some dissensions within the elite - Marcello CAETANO, then Rector of the University of Lisbon, resigned because of police intervention in the University (ROBINSON 1979, RICARDO 1982).

Fourthly, the student's movements questioned the basic conservative mentality of the New State. This is clear in the "Letter to a Portuguese Student", but also in the practice of new kinds of relationship between sexes, new attitudes towards authority, towards politic and religion, etc. The conservative right saw in the letter referred to above just an appeal to free love and dissolution of customs, but the letter represented really the questioning of the kind of submissive attitudes which were the basic support of passivity and demobilization.

2.5.3. Consequences of student mobilization for New State strategies towards them

Which consequences had this student mobilization in New State strategies towards them?

Firstly, the University became an "autonomous arena of political debate" (FORMOSINHO et alia, 1982). It became the only arena where conservatives, socialists, communists, maoists, trotskyists openly competed for power in elections for student associations. So the University became the only sector of society really mobilized and, furthermore, mobilized on a mass basis.

Secondly, the students invoked the autonomy of the University to avoid police intervention and political interference. Thus they tried self-compartmentalization as a strategy to enlarge their freedom of movements. Many members of the Faculty also claimed the need to maintain police and political personalities outside the University.

Later on, in the 1970^s, after the great crisis in the University of Coimbra in 1969, which was not analysed here, the need of coalitions with other sectors of society openly assumed by many radical students, made this strategy less important.

Thirdly, the coalitions of some Faculty members with students affected somewhat the natural character of the previous co-optation of "catedráticos". The political division of Faculty staff became each time neater and thus co-optation began to mean clear and assumed cooperation with the regime. This transformed co-optation into a polemic personal attitude and an academic political issue.

That is, student's mobilization affected seriously traditional strategies of the University both towards students and Faculty members. As said below, repression was the main answer of the regime to this new situation. The repression towards the students was officially legitimised in mass media interpreting all mobilisations as result of subversive activities of the communist party. It is obvious that this failed to explain why the student mass was now more prone to

be influenced by student activists than before, but the regime was not interested in understanding that mobilisation, but just in repressing it and legitimising publicly that repression.

A great part of what happened in CAETANO's rule within Universities, the Army (see this Chapter, section 2.4.1), the Church, the opposition cannot be understood without reference to the student mobilisation.

Further, the popular and political mobilisation after the 25th April "coup d'état" and the pattern of behaviour of good part of the present cultural and political establishment cannot be understood without reference to this mobilisation (NOTE 25).

3. CONCLUSION - THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSION OF REPRESSIVE STRATEGIES

Contrary to a vision which was very popular immediately after the 25th April 1974 "coup d'état", repression was not the main strategy of New State regime - in this sense, "fascism never existed", as LOURENÇO said (LOURENÇO 1976,229-239 (NOTE 26).

The importance of repressive strategies can only be clearly understood when taken in conjunction with the expressive ones, that is, integrated in a global strategy. As said above (section 1.3), the possibility of repression was as important as the actual repression. This means that repression was a strategy not only aimed at an active minority of opponents, but part of an integrated expressive strategy to inculcate conformism and apoliticism in common man through fear.

This conclusion is reinforced by the dual character of repression - it was, at the same time, visible in its potential aspect and invisible in its active aspect. That can only mean that repression was, in its intimidating side, a generalized strategy. If the New State was for the majority of Portuguese people what it was for some its unusually long survival could be labelled in the category of historical miracles (LOURENÇO 1976,233) (NOTE 27). One can see here an adaptation of the regime to portuguese characteristics which abhor violence.

Censorship must be emphasized as a vital repressive component of the integrated expressive strategy. The censorship role in this strategy is to inculcate in every man an attitude of self-restraint and even active self-control.

To sum up the role of repressive strategies one can conclude with Salazar's sentence that "Institutions and laws should work in such away that one must be a patriot by need, when it is not by discipline or by virtue" (SALAZAR in ASSAC 1952,40).

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE NEW STATE REGIME

- THEORY -

The relevance of this chapter for this work is centered around the need to carry evidence for the demobilising hypothesis showing that the role of the State in general, and within the educational system in particular, was such as to prevent and effectively avoid mobilization within civil society (see Introduction, section 4.2).

In fact the achievement of conformism and passivity through demobilisation implies a partition of tasks between the State and civil society where the former has the lion's share. If many social and educational tasks are given freely to private individuals and organization this demands, implies and allows a mobilisation of various sectors of civil society. Thus the achievement of demobilisation implies a strong control of the State over all aspects of national life.

Was this strong control of the State over social life envisaged by New State elite? How was this control compatible with the assumed non totalitarian nature of the regime?

To answer those questions this chapter will analyze the theory of the New State about the role of the State in the portuguese regime. The next chapter will analyse how much of this theory was practiced; it will study the kind of state which the regime shaped - an Administrative State, where the Public Administration had the monopoly of policy formulation. In chapter nine we will study the practice of the role of the State in the school educational system to conclude (in chapter ten) that, within a centralized framework, the portuguese state had an overwhelming power in all aspects of educational decision - making, thus preventing any mobilisation of the educational agents.

1. THE THEORY OF THE STRONG STATE

Analyzing primary sources about the role of the State one can find two divergent discourses about the concept and role of the State and its relationships with civil society. There is one discourse based on interventionism - the strong state discourse - and another based on self-government - the corporative discourse. The first one is much more consonant with demobilisation intention and the last one demands mobilization of social, economic and cultural agents. If our hypothesis is correct the strong state discourse should have prevailed over the corporative state.

To make easier the proof of our hypothesis in regard to this aspect the two discourses will be exposed separately, showing the internal congruence of each.

One important caveat should be made at this stage - the explanation of the theory of the New State about the role of the State as two separate discourses is an analytical method to enhance two different logics present in New State theory. It is a decision of the researcher. The New State actors intermingled both discourses (presenting each one as limitation to the full application of the other) into a single doctrine. Such a doctrine is extremely ambiguous since it shifts its emphasis with different actors and different moments (see LUCENA 1976a). The ambiguities and contradictions are hopefully better understood through the analytical device used. On the other hand, this device allows us to make clear which emphasis prevailed in the practice, which is instrumental to prove our hypothesis, as it was said.

We will analyze first the interventionist discourse and then the corporative one.

1.1. The theory of the strong state

The motto of the strong state is one of the very first

of the authoritarian regime. As early as 1930 SALAZAR was saying that " *The State should be so strong that it does not need to be violent*" (SALAZAR I,81) in 1934 he said " *we have to achieve the strong State in name of the most sacred interests of the Nation*" (SALAZAR I,289 - see also SALAZAR II,71,IV,66) (NOTE 1).

The very existence of the dictatorship (1926-1933) is justified by the crisis of the state (see SALAZAR 1933). The state had not being been up to the value of the Nation - " *if the Nation was not up to its individual values, the State was still inferior to the Nation*" (SALAZAR 1933). Thus the expression "New State" symbolized this doctrine of the strong state and the political will to build a renewed state - see SALAZAR I,288,301, CAETANO 1968.

In this doctrine of a strong state it is implicit the notion of an autonomous state, " *a strong State [...] independent and supercilious towards private, group, class or faction interests*" (SALAZAR IV,268 - translation of ROBINSON 1979 - see also SALAZAR I, 134 - NOTE 2), " *hanging over the power fractions - services, municipalities, private and public activities, local life, colonial domains, the thousand manifestations of life in society - [...] the State will extend the shroud of its unity [...] and its strenght*" (SALAZAR I,81). " *We want a State dignified enough and strong enough not to be corrupted by them [the organized interests]*" (SALAZAR I,302) (NOTE 3).

All this emphasis on a strong state is obviously congruent with the authoritarian character of the regime.

1.2. The theory of the doctrinaire state

The New State rejects very strongly the liberal State, passive spectator of economic and social manifestations, which is considered responsible for the social and political crisis of the western world (see SALAZAR IV,183, CAETANO 1941,21-22,129-132).

Salazar reasons that - any state is inherently a political structure based on some conceptual system; as by

essence any power instance tends to achieve survival and continuity it cannot allow discussion about those concepts. On the other hand, if the State believes in the superiority of its conceptual scheme it cannot be conceived neutrality since it could be equivalent to denegation of this conceptual construct. Thus any state is a "doctrine in action" and thus cannot be indifferent to the propagation of its doctrine (SALAZAR 1936).

So the State must be able to define a general policy (SALAZAR V,57), must have an economic thought (SALAZAR I,208), an educational policy, a scientific policy, etc. (see SALAZAR I, 291,III,235-236).

The state must have a moral role in society (CARDOSO,1949 11), it must be a moral leader (LEITE,1936). The interventionist state is an "ethical state" since it seeks to impose more justice in social relationships (AFONSO, no date, 25). *"The ethical state has not only a political objective, but also spiritual and moral concerns and aims: to accomplish a high function of moral justice, to implement a moral and economic doctrine within the unified Nation"* (AFONSO, no date, 26).

As CAETANO says *"The State ceases to be considered as frame which can be adorned indifferently with any image: it professes a doctrine, expresses an ideal, it assumes a position in morals, economy and sociology [...] the State believes in some principles and intends to implement and defend them [...], it is the pedagogue which teaches the whole Nation"* (CAETANO,1941,133 - see ibidem 145-147).

The "doctrine in action" State is defined clearly in opposition to the liberal state since this was the conception of the overthrown republican regime, but it took since the very beginning an explicit position against a totalitarian state conception. Analyzing the initial statements of the leaders of the regime (1928-1934) one can obtain enough indicators of this theoretical distance - the State will respect, although with limitations, basic individual freedoms (SALAZAR I,80,134, 341,382, CAETANO 1934 in CAETANO 1941,107-126), will let free for private action several fields like family life, professional activities, cultural arenas, etc. (SALAZAR I,383),

it will respect private initiative in economy (SALAZAR I,202-211), it will respect christian principles and the Catholic Church (SALAZAR I,341). Besides those indicators there were, as said in chapter one (section 1.3.1), explicit statements rejecting totalitarian conceptions and identification with Mussolini's fascism (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 113-115, I 79-80, 289,340-342).

In sum, a strong state is an interventionist state, it is a state with a doctrine, but it is not a totalitarian state.

1.3. The theory of the State as rebuilder of the Nation

1.3.1. The rebuilding role

As said above, it is the crisis in the State which justified the dictatorship. This crisis is not new. In New State presentation of portuguese history the liberal period (1820-1910) and the republican period (1910-1926) were dark periods (see MONICA 1978, 299-305 and RADICH 1979, 103-115). The New State regime initiated a period of national grandeur, which could continue the glorious periods of the "Reconquista" and the Discoveries (NOTE 4).

In fact, the State assumed the task of rebuilding the nation through awakening energies which had been numbed by previous regimes. *"What we are doing is [...] to save what there is of most vitally deep in the genius of portuguese Nation [...] with new energies which allow us to maintain the identity of Portugal through the centuries [...] in order for us to be old without being antiquated, to be experient without being closed to experiences"* (CAETANO 1951 in ZORRO 1969, 64 - SALAZAR's interviews to FERRO often reflect the same ideas).

It was necessary a return to the (rural) people values and traditions. For this it was necessary to fill the State with persons with the new mentality, that is, it was necessary a new elite. JOAQUIM, which is an excellent analyst of this role of the New State, puts it like this - *"The elite [...] is people which is not just people [...] The elite which defines itself in regard to the people is the only people there is"* (JOAQUIM 1979). The role of the elite is to make all

portuguese become lastingly people (NOTE 5).

But it was not enough to possess the State in order to rebuild the Nation - *"the possession of the State, which is a necessary condition to save the Nation from total ruin and disorder, is not enough for material and moral renewal [...] Such has to be rooted in the reform of education [...] let us held the State in our hands, but let us [also] orientate in a good direction the intelligence and the will of the portuguese"* (SALAZAR 1933).

So the educational system was seen as the main instrument for this rebuilding of the Nation. It will be seen later on how this idea was implemented through the school curriculum.

1.3.2. The construction of an original political structure to rebuild the Nation

The political structure which the regime set up to rebuild the Nation had to be logically based in the very values and historical heritage of this same Nation. As there is said to be a specific "Portuguese soul" (see Caetano in ZORRO 1969, 116-124) there should also exist a specifically portuguese political structure. Hence the motto of the originality of the *"portuguese political experience"*, as it was called (see SALAZAR II, preface)

"We tried to make a political creation structurally portuguese [...] the main source of inspiration of the guidelines of our political structure has been our history, our tradition, our temperament, in sum, portuguese reality" (SALAZAR III, 30-31). *"It was repudiated [...] the mere importation of political formulae designed for humanity in abstract"* (CAETANO 1956 in ZORRO 1969, 64). *"One day it will be recognized that Portugal is lead by an original system, specific of her history and geography"* (SALAZAR I, 338 - see also about the originality of the regime I, 373-374, 379-380, II 26-28, III 130-131, V 59, 320, 401, 407 and in FERRO 1982, 127) (NOTE 6).

1.3.3. Consequences of this role of the State - nationalism and isolationism

The fact that the State took to itself the role of rebuilder of the Nation based on the idiosyncratic characteristics of this same Nation led naturally to nationalism.

The educational system is pervaded by inculcation of a patriotic mentality of cult of the glories of Fatherland, of love for the sweet Motherland. It also led to giving to the curriculum subject History a very important formative role. All this had been analyzed in chapter four.

It led also to cult of portuguese traditions and uses - just as examples one can point the rebuilding of national monuments, the competition to chose the "most portuguese village of Portugal" (see about this BRITO 1982), the importance given to "fado" as the national song (see MATOS 1982), etc.

It led also to political and cultural isolationism which, coupled with Portugal peripheral situation in Europe, made Portugal a country bypassed by the great european political and cultural movements - "*proudly alone*" as SALAZAR commented about portuguese political isolationism in the 1960^s due to overseas policy (NOTE 7).

1.4. The theory of the leading role of the State in society

1.4.1. The leading role of the State in society

Modern societies demand more of the state, they created "the elephantoid character of this monstrous modern State" (SALAZAR IV,245 - see also III,235-6). This solution is inevitable - "*the monstrous modern State [...] even when gives up of possessing the souls, cannot refrain from imposing, through a thousand interventionist acts and competences, guidelines and limits to free expansion of social life*" (SALAZAR IV,245 - see also III 235, V,109-110 and CAETANO 1970a 183).

So the State has nowadays a leading role in society. In fact "*Collective life [...] does not order itself spontaneously. It is an illusion to think that society searches*

on finds by itself its own guidelines" (SALAZAR III, 389). Thus one has to accept a "beneficial state interventionism" (SALAZAR V, 93 - see also III, 369). "The State will be an effective instrument of prosecution of the national interest, not only in relation to the higher objectives of our internal and external policies, but also in fulfilling the most trivial tasks of daily administration, which are not less essential" (CAETANO 1959, 171). As a positive result the New State became "a great national firm which needs daily to solve the most varied, complex and urgent problems of vital interest for collectivity" (CAETANO ibidem).

In consonance with all this the Constitution of 1933 gives the State as tasks "to coordinate, to stimulate and to lead all social activities" (article 6, 2).

This is also applied to the division of competencies between central government (carried out by the state) and local government (carried out by municipalities). BAPTISTA, an important member of the elite, home minister under CAETANO, says "The State should interfere [...] in municipal life and [...] from that intromission it can result after all benefits" (BAPTISTA 1957, 38 - see also 38-42).

1.4.2. The fragility of portuguese society demands from the Portuguese State an even more leading role than in other nations

"The fragility of portuguese life in all aspects" (SALAZAR IV, 245) will compel the state to go too far (SALAZAR III, 68). "The tendency for this regime [state socialism] among us must be found more in the essence of our race which is deprived of initiative, than in other social concerns" said SALAZAR to FERRO (in FERRO 1982, 106) (NOTE 8).

In Portugal all "in fact depends from the beneficial or detrimental breath of the Power" (SALAZAR IV, 246). "The social formation of portuguese people leads to the fact that the State is everything or almost everything" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 188).

This underdevelopment compels at the same time the state to intervene. "Those [countries] which by some motive let themselves lag behind have to submit themselves to such an

impulse which can come only from a centralized action [...] from a concentration of means" (SALAZAR IV,245). BAPTISTA also justifies state control over local government because Portugal is a country *"which let herself lag behind in the conquest of many factors of material progress"* (BAPTISTA 1957,38).

1.5. Limits to the role of the State

All the strong state discourse is punctuated with the firm assertion of several limits to the role of the state in society. There are ideological limits, ethical limits and merely pragmatic limits.

The ideological limits come from the rejection of the liberal state and from rejection of the totalitarian state either in Nazi, fascist or socialist form (see chapter one, section 1.3., this chapter, section 1.2).

The New State proclaimed solemnly two ethical limits - Moral and Law. To assert publicly this self-limitation the article four of the 1933 Constitution affirms: *"The Portuguese Nation constitutes an independent State whose sovereignty only acknowledges as limits, in the internal order, moral and law"* - see for the same acknowledgment SALAZAR I,80,341,II,71,III,237,239,IV,366,VI,41,1936.

Those limits are not perfunctory ones, since they have a concrete content (see LUCENA 1976a,129-133, WIARDA 1977,84).

One first limit is what CAETANO calls the civic freedoms (see chapter six, section 1.1), not subject to renunciation by any state.

To consider law as a limit means that the New State accepts theoretically the principles of an "Etat de Droit" (see CRUZ 1982a). It means also the respect by the state of the very own laws it creates (see SALAZAR II,71). In fact, the New State only exceptionally violated its own laws (LUCENA 1976 a,130). This implied that even repression was legally framed and generally all repressive activities were legally covered - see chapter six, section 1.3.

To consider Moral as a limit means that Roman Catholic traditional moral law is going to be respected. This implies three kinds of limits - those derived from it being the moral traditionally adopted in the country; those derived from the

authority of Portuguese Catholic Church; those which come from the fact that the source of this moral is an external one (NOTE 9).

There are also merely pragmatic limits to the role of state in society. In order to obtain efficiency state interventionism should have limits. The State should not substitute agents of national activities (SALAZAR I,81), it should not inhibit private initiative nor become a businessman or an industrialist (ibidem 127), it should not extend its functions (ibidem 211), it must not control all economy or absorb all the life of the Nation (SALAZAR III,67, 349).

As SALAZAR said *"This state socialism [...] would be an ideal system to gratify the in born self-indulgence and bureaucratic delirium of common portuguese [...] State socialism is the bourgeois regime 'par excellence' [...]. Initiatives do not appear, do not flourish, because the boss is immaterial, almost an image. Things go slowly, with indolence, with sleep"* (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,106-107). CAETANO reinforces this idea saying that it would be a very dangerous illusion to see in the State the dispenser of all wealth (CAETANO 1959,237).

2. THE THEORY OF THE CORPORATIVE STATE

2.1. Definition of corporatism

The Portuguese regime adopted officially a theoretical system of social and political organization based on corporative principles - see article 5 of the 1933 Constitution (NOTE 10).

Corporatism can be defined in general terms by three important features.

First of all, corporatism is a "system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly[...]" (SCHMITTER 1975, 8-9).

It is an alternative to other models of interest representation of which pluralism (unlimited pluralism) is the best known and the prevailing one in western democracies (see SCHMITTER 1974).

To put it in another perspective - it is a "particular model or ideal-type institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decision structures of the state" (SCHMITTER 1974, our emphasis).

As it is implied in the definition corporatism is most at ease in an authoritarian regime where the state has an important role of control of civil society and there is a limited pluralism of association - the corporative state is a limited pluralist state.

A second feature of corporatism is its emphasis on the cooperation of classes stressing social solidarity and class harmony rather than class conflict. Society is composed not of antagonistic classes but of harmonious groups divided according to their social function. The cooperation among classes is mediated and controlled by the State in the name of the national interest.

A third feature of corporatism is that it generally presents itself as a third alternative between capitalism and socialism (or liberalism and socialism).

The Portuguese authoritarian regime adopted corporatism as its official doctrine and proclaimed itself a Corporative State in the 1933 Constitution (article 5).

Corporatism was very much in line with the Catholic social doctrine which was a source of inspiration for the New State, as said above (chapter one, section 2.1.2)

Corporatism was very popular between the two World Wars. Several factors like the decline of political liberalism, the Russian socialist revolution and the great economic depression of the 1930s all pushed some leaders to find a third way between capitalism and socialism, in the economic level, and between liberalism and totalitarianism, in the political level. Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal and also, in a minor scale France, Poland, Rumania and Brasil all experienced some kind of corporative system.

The main references about portuguese corporatism are LUCENA's, SCHMITTER's and WIARDA's works.

We will begin our analysis of Portuguese corporatist theory by the discourse about the incorporation of the Nation into the State. The first step towards implementation of corporatism was to incorporate the Nation, with all the different manifestations of collective life, into the State, so that the State becomes the Nation corporatively organized.

Then we will present the basic principles of corporatism.

Finally we will present the main features of the Corporative State and introduce a theoretical categorization of corporatism which will be very useful in the analysis of corporatist implementation.

2.2. The theory of the incorporation of the Nation into the State

The building of a corporative state may imply the incorporation of the Nation, organized in corporative organizations, in the structure of the State. This was the route chosen by the New State.

2.2.1. Definition of Nation

As it was already said (chapter one, section 2.2) the New State adopted more than one definition of Nation. But it is the definition of Nation as the historical heritage continued which best fits its principles. In Salazar's words it is "*the undefinable essence of the historical continuity of Portuguese throughout the centuries*" (NOTE 11), it is a reality in which it is comprehended independence, organic unit and a civilizing mission" (SALAZAR IV, 356). For Salazar the Nation is not adequately represented by the body of electors (see SALAZAR V, 39). Thus the historical and organic Nation prevails over the democratic and liberal definition of nation.

As such the nation is an abstract notion whose historical essence must be interpreted (and can be reinterpreted). That is, nation is what the New State wants it to be since it implies an emphasis on some elements of the past and oblivion of others. The New State defined that Portugal was a nation with a civilizing mission (NOTE 12) and a nation which was teaching the western world new ways of organizing the political structure (see NOTE 6).

By the same process of (re)definition Nation is the rural people, but not the urban masses - "*the distance which goes from us [city men] [...] and the true Nation is enormous*" (SALAZAR 1933). As Salazar said "*Governments should not be enslaved by the opinion of the masses, always inferior [...] to the public opinion of the Nation*" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 272 - our emphasis). It is not only by pure conservatism, but in consonance with this rural definition of Nation, that it was said, in 1927, that the healthier part of the Nation were the illiterates (in MONICA 1978, 119) (NOTE 13).

Neither the historical heritage Nation nor the rural Nation were in crisis. The crisis was caused by a divorce between a liberal and urban state and an organic and rural Nation. The solution was to build an organic state and fill its agents with rural values. In other words, the solution was to incorporate the Nation into the State, to rebuild the state according to the image of the Nation.

2.2.2. The incorporation of the Nation into the State

"The greatest political problem of our era must be the need to organize the Nation [...] in order to fit it into the State [...]" (SALAZAR I,386), "to organize the Nation, from top to bottom, with the different manifestations of collective life, since family to administrative bodies and economic and moral corporations, and integrate the whole into the State" (SALAZAR I,91) - see also SALAZAR I,84-87, I,208, I,288, IV, 259. Thus "the State is the Nation socially organized" (SALAZAR IV,181).

"The State not only knows the economic life [...] and leads it [...] but the economic elements - productive forces - enter into the structure of the State, they are part of its constitution" (SALAZAR I,288). CAETANO says, in the same direction, that "the State should identify itself with the Nation as much as possible" (CAETANO 1956, in ZORRO 1969,65).

2.2.3. Consequences of this incorporation - the State is the only representative of the Nation

As a consequence of this incorporation of the Nation into the State this is the only representative of the Nation. *"One cannot avoid, mainly in a country which was formed as ours was formed, that the State be the effective representative of the Nation" (SALAZAR 1933 - see also SALAZAR 1939,84,251). He adds that the expression of the Nation is more or less dignified in accordance with the very dignity of the State.*

As this relationship should be an umbilical one, it cannot have intermediaries. One can hypothesise that this is one more reason why the party systems had to be rejected, since parties embody the existence of different interpretations

of the national interest. *"Above [...] national parties or international ideologies, above all there is the Fatherland, the portuguese interest"* (CAETANO 1944, in ZORRO 1969,94). *"Questions of the highest national interest were [in portuguese previous party systems] subordinate to the more trivial party conveniences"* (CAETANO 1948, ibidem 136 - see also SALAZAR IV,361). As long as there is only one State and one Nation there is only one national interest (the national interest). The State through this new corporative relationship with the nation is able to formulate and implement, without party intermediaries, this national interest. In fact, the State is a better representative of the nation than the parties since it incorporates the nation corporatively organized - SALAZAR I,87,288. It is what Salazar sometimes called *"organic democracy"* (NOTE 14).

2.3. The basic principles of corporatism

2.3.1. Man is seen incorporated in primary groups

Society is an abstraction. What really exists is various societies (CAETANO 1941,45-49). All men live in those societies which are natural groups like family, neighbourhood community and voluntary groups like profession, associations, etc. (see SALAZAR I,85-87, CAETANO 1941,46-49,60-61). Thus society is not an association of individuals, but a community of primary societies (CAETANO 1967 in ZORRO, 1969,49). Individuals should not be seen in isolation, but only as being incorporated in those societies.

Those primary groups can be natural or voluntary. The most important natural group is family, *"irreducible social cell"* (SALAZAR I,85) on "whose moral solidity the structure of the Nation is built" (SALAZAR 1936 - see also SALAZAR I,203, III 357, CAETANO 1941,46). The second is neighbourhood community (the "commune" in CAETANO's words) - vicinage is source of much community of interests (see SALAZAR I,86, CAETANO 1941, 47-48).

From the voluntary groups the most important is the "profession" in which *"similarity in livelihood, communion in pattern of work, contribution for the same objective [...]"* (CAETANO 1941 48) creates naturally communion of interests.

There are several associations to which men belongs - cultural, educational, scientific, literary, technical, welfare, religious, entertaining associations where communion of interests is the main reason of their creation and existence (see SALAZAR I,86, CAETANO 1941,60).

Then it comes, on the top of all, a natural group to which everybody belongs - the national community.

2.3.2. Organic representation of interests

All those social group are the "*structural elements*" or "*component organisms*" or "*living forces*" of the Nation (NOTE 15). Those structural elements are incorporated into the State, as said above. This incorporation provides a system of interest representation which is more effective than that based on trade unions and employer's association and on democratic liberal principles. As SALAZAR says - "*here it is a manifestation of the representation system which is more faithful than any other*". SALAZAR I,87).

Organic representation of interests is the essence of corporatism. Corporations are the institutional instrument which embody organic representation. They are "*great national associations which integrate the organizations which represent the various activities and professions contributing to a specific social function, making effective the peaceful cooperation of all those interests involved in the performance of that function, under the concern for national interest*" (CAETANO 1950,11). "*They are never organisms merely directed to economic guidance; they are social bodies*" (CAETANO 1941,24).

Corporations are artificial persons, autonomous from the state, which can issue norms and regulations for their members (CAETANO 1941,24-25). They "coordinate, represent and deffend its interests in prosecution of common good" (Law nº2086, 22-8-1956). It is an important role of Corporations to adjust individual or group interests to the national interest.

2.3.3. Cooperation of classes

A third basic principle of corporatism is class cooperation as opposed to class struggle. *"We do not accept the idea of incompatibility of interests between employers and workers"* (SALAZAR V, 463-464 - see also I, 193, 207, V, 495-496; CAETANO 1941, 61, 65). *"Corporations are instruments of conciliation of tensions generated within great national activities"* (CAETANO 1969, 24 - see also pages 42 and 192) (NOTE 16).

As a logical consequence employers, technicians and workers should participate in the government of corporative bodies (CAETANO 1941, 71) (NOTE 17).

2.3.4. Hierarchy

Organic representation gives the representational monopoly of interests to corporations - as such it presupposes a regime of limited pluralism and thus implies an authoritarian regime. Such a regime favours a hierarchy which is also implied in organic representation.

As PINTO says corporatism is based on the principle of "vertical structure of society" - that is, society instead of being divided into strata it is divided in vertical slices, each slice encompassing all the activities of a nation in a certain domain (see PINTO 1960). Within each slice there should be a hierarchy.

As each hierarchichal level has its own powers and corporations are not dissolved into the State, corporatism does not give all authority to the state, but, using CARDOSO expression, divides and pulverizes authority (CARDOSO 1949, 11).

2.4. The Corporative State

2.4.1. Types of corporatism

Corporatism can be integral when all activities of society are corporatised' or partial when only some activities, generally the economic ones, are subject to corporative organization.

Corporatism can be pure when corporative organizations are the only basis of political structure or subordinate when

the corporative structure is dependent from a political structure not based on corporatist principles.

Corporatism can also be a corporatism of association when corporations are created by spontaneous initiative of agents of social life and can develop outside the state. State Corporatism happens when it is the state which creates corporations and incorporates them into the state or controls them.

(See about those distinctions MARTINEZ 1967, SCHMITTER 1974,1975, WIARDA 1973,1974,1977,7).

Those distinctions will help to characterize the type of corporatism that it was formulated and that which was implemented and thus to enlighten the role of the state in regard to civil society (NOTE 18).

2.4.2. Features of the Corporative State

a) The Corporative State as global model of society

As global model of society, encompassing economic, political, social, cultural, educational activities, a corporative state must follow an integral and pure corporatism of association. As such it is an alternative both to communism and capitalism, to socialism and liberalism (NOTE 19).

b) The Corporative State creates a new way to structure economic life

The economy should be self-governed by great corporations representing the main economic activities, which is better than an economy led by the government - see SALAZAR I,239, SALAZAR 1936 (NOTE 20).

c) The Corporative State represents a new organization and structure of political power

The basis for the participation of any individual in the government tasks of the state is his social utility; as this social utility is generated in the primary group in which he is incorporated he should only exercise his political rights in those primary societies (CAETANO 1967 in ZORRO 1969,49-51 - see also CAETANO 1941,61).

In a pure corporatism those primary societies will be the main contributors for the election of sovereignty bodies and for the elaboration of laws. They will constitute a "corporative parliament" (CAETANO 1972 a,330) (NOTE 21).

d) The Corporative State proposes a new structure for public administration

The new structure of public administration is brought about by the setting up of corporative administration as important part of public administration. As CAETANO says *"The corporative regime is that one in which the problems of each one of the great economic, spiritual and moral functions of the Nation are handed over to those who participate in their execution organized in global associations called Corporations [...] It is the Corporation which will legitimately obtain a share of public power to organize, regulate and discipline those activities [...]"* (CAETANO 1941,89). - see also CAETANO 1970 a,370).

There will be three main types of public administration - state, local and corporative administration. As the state will have to share important administrative tasks with local authorities and corporations one will have a decentralized administration. *"The corporative regime is one of self-government, a system highly decentralizing in economy and administration, whose centrifugal tendency will be balanced by a strong Government"* (CAETANO 1941,90 - see also ibidem 56, 88, CAETANO 1970 a,248,370, SALAZAR I,86-87, III 361).

The transformation of the "social pluralism" into "juridic pluralism" "constitutes a reaction against centralist tendencies" (MARTINEZ 1967).

But corporative principles should penetrate also state administration - CAETANO said that in a corporative regime all ministries must be corporations, meaning that they should proceed according to corporative spirit and in perfect cooperation with corporative organizations (CAETANO 1950,13).

2.4.3. The relationship between the Corporative State, individuals and civil society

"Corporative organization aims in fact to solve the problem of relationship between the individual and the State in a way which seems to me adequate: to restrict and transform the exercise of political and economic freedom to preserve individual freedom" (CAETANO 1941,118). It is *"the only formula which manages to harmonize the need of organization with the principle of freedom"* (CAETANO 1950,24).

Corporatism is clearly put by CAETANO, in 1934, as a system which guaranteed to persons as much individual freedom (civic freedom) as liberalism, but in a new framework of relationship state - individual (see CAETANO 1934 speech "The individual and the State in corporative doctrine" in CAETANO 1941,107-126) (NOTE 22).

As can be deduced also from all that was said until now corporatism proposes a new scheme for the relationship between state and civil society, by incorporating interest representation of the latter into the former.

This representation is done by intermediary social bodies called Corporations which mediate between the individual and the state. In representing civil society interests upon the state they will subordinate individual and corporative interests to national interest.

In order to accomplish this mediating role the State conferred upon corporations certain powers - they are artificial persons in regard to the law, they can produce common law, they perform public administration tasks and are the basis of political representation.

There is a transformation of the "social pluralism" into "juridical pluralism" thus reinforcing the autonomy of the corporative organizations in regard to the state (see CAETANO 1970a, 369).

2.4.4. The role of the State in the Corporative State

It is clear that Corporations and intermediary Corporative organizations are autonomous from the state (see CAETANO 1941,56,88-89, CAETANO 1950,22); they even should be

free not to obey unjust or abusive commands of the political power (CAETANO 1950,22).

The state is at the same time a corporation and a supercorporation. As corporation it had tasks of public order, national defense and external representation. All other activities which had been being absorbed by the State (as education, health, communications, etc.) could be handed over to corporations. So the corporative state would be, in the purest version of the theory, a minimum state; but not in the liberal way, that is, by leaving to private initiative all those activities, but by transferring them to intermediate bodies (see CARDOSO 1949,29, MARTINEZ 1967).

But the state is also supercorporation whose task, in that quality, is to coordinate and supervise corporations (MARTINEZ 1967 - see also SALAZAR I,89, CAETANO 1941,26).

3. CONTRADICTIONS AND PARADOXES WITHIN NEW STATE THEORY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE

3.1. Contradictions within New State theory about the role of the state

3.1.1. Contradictions and paradoxes

As it is clear, there is contradiction between a strong state discourse and a pure corporative discourse.

The state must be strong and have a doctrine in order to rebuild the nation and lead society, being its moral leader; but, at the same time, the state will set up Corporations representing the various interests which will be autonomous from the state and will propitiate a system of economic self-government.

Those Corporations should be autonomous from the state, but, at the same time, incorporated into it, as all the nation corporatively organized, must be incorporated into the state.

The very state has a dual nature - it is at the same time a corporation and a supercorporation.

The ambiguities, contradictions and even paradoxes go up to the political structure, based, on one side, on concentration of powers and a strong and dominant Government, according to the strong state discourse, and based, on the other side, in pulverization of authority and sharing of power through the bestowal of juridic status to Corporations.

The contradictions go on to public administration which should be, at the same time, centralized and decentralized.

The relationships between the state and civil society appear sometimes as that of a state-father or the national "patrão" (boss) (softened by the image of the state-pedagogue of the nation) which effectively eliminates intermediaries between the nation and the state; on other times, one is presented with a more liberating vision of a society in dialogue with the state through those intermediary social bodies - the Corporations (NOTE 23).

Corporations will be the main basis of political power and, at same time, CAETANO proposed a "national corporation of politics" which is the sole party (CAETANO 1938), which would take away from real corporations this power.

3.1.2. The exemplification with New State discourse about the role of the State in economy

All those inconsistencies are present as contradictions or hesitations in the regime discourse about the role of the state in economy, which will be used as exemplification of what was said.

SALAZAR asserts that "The proposition that the nation's economic interests should be directed by the state is almost self-evident" (SALAZAR I,291, translation of ROBINSON 1979, 129) and CAETANO sees in it a natural consequence of the primacy of Spirit over Matter (CAETANO 1934, in CAETANO 1950, 23). On the other hand, SALAZAR thinks that a self-governed economy is better than an economy led by the government (SALAZAR I,293) and CAETANO criticizes, in 1950, the apparent abandon of this self-government (CAETANO 1950).

In 1953, SALAZAR says that the five years plan was formulated taking into account "the whole set of [financial] possibilities that State and individuals can use for certain objectives" (SALAZAR V,124, our emphasis). At the same time, all New State discourse is punctuated with several bows to private initiative, statements about State intentions to give up mixed ownership of mixed capital companies once they were properly launched (SALAZAR I, preface,V,109-110), solemn denegations of any intention to put the control of the whole economy in the hands of the state (see, for instance, SALAZAR III,67), abjuration of any state socialism (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,106-107).

Just to impress more the extent of those contradictions a brief reference to New State practice is needed (a more detailed reference to the statist practice will be done later on in this chapter).

In order to implement the "*moderate interventionism*" (SALAZAR I,211) effectively practiced, several mechanisms were proposed and set up - the "Organizations of economic coordination" (see CAETANO 1970a, 361-363), the five years plans ("Planos de Fomento") launched in the 1950^S(NOTE 24), many administrative departments, the setting up of mixed capital companies (privately and publicly financed) (see

SALAZAR I, preface, V,109-110), the existence of public companies, credit facilities for economic agents (CAETANO 1959,224-225), public investments in basic industries (ibidem) the "condicionamento industrial" (industrial conditioning) (see BRITO 1985).

But, in 1957, were finally created the economic Corporations, that is, not just lower and intermediary level corporative bodies, but the full ones the corporative bodies "par excellence" the ones which would assure economic self-government.

3.2. The awareness of New State leaders of those contradictions and their danger - the fear of the "socialism without doctrine"

The leaders of the New State were aware of some of those contradictions.

The need to produce apologizing statements or to blame some factors for the excesses of state interventionism are indicators of this awareness. For instance, CAETANO, in 1957, says - "it were infrequent the cases in which the intervention [in industrial companies] was a result of deliberate purpose in order to implement any policy in consonance with any doctrinaire interventionist principles" (CAETANO 1959,222). Several factors had been blamed for those excesses - the fragility of portuguese society (this chapter, section 1.4.2) the characteristics of portuguese people (chapter two, section 1.1) the Second World War (chapter eight, section 2.2.2), etc.

This awareness can also be read in the between the lines doubts and in the lines hesitations. For instance, SALAZAR seems to mistrust state willingness to give up partial ownership of mixed capital companies once they were properly launched (SALAZAR I, preface, SALAZAR V,110); he fears state corruption through intervention in the economy (SALAZAR I, preface); CAETANO, in 1951, doubts that had been reached an equilibrium between government's authority and professional and economic freedom (in CAETANO 1959,173-174).

But the main indicator of the awareness of New State leaders of those contradictions is the fear of their onesided statist solution. Indeed they feared the implementation in Portugal, through gradual unnoticed state interventionism, of a "*socialism without doctrine*" (CAETANO), a "*state socialism*" (SALAZAR), a "*white bolshevism*" (TEOTÓNIO PEREIRA).

As early as 1932 SALAZAR confesses to FERRO his fears about the adequation^{cy} of a state socialism to the characteristics of portuguese people, to their inborn self - indulgence and bureaucratic delirium (see this chapter, sections 1.4.2.,1.5) This portuguese tendency to live at the expenses of the state could induce unwillingly a state socialism.

The SALAZAR's socialist fear syndrom is revealed in several statements - for instance, he speaks of "the elephantoid character of the mounstruous modern State" (SALAZAR IV,245 - our emphasis) and he does not see "in the growing socialization neither economic interest [...] nor social interest [...] nor political interest" (SALAZAR I, 210).

CAETANO seems even more obsessed than SALAZAR by the possible invasion of the society by the State. He particularly fears the coming of a "socialism without doctrine". He fears that "unwillingly, and even without one noticing it, we go little by little sliding towards pure socialism", towards the "worst of all socialisms" the "*socialism without doctrine*". This kind of socialism can be introduced under non socialist principles, or even under anti-socialist ones; thus it does not provoke any reaction of the victim, whose awareness of its coming will be too late (CAETANO 1950,19-20).

He was already protesting in 1941, against "this idea that nothing is possible without the favour of the state and its permanent protection" (CAETANO 1941,27). Still in 1957 he considers a very dangerous illusion to see in the State the dispenser of all wealth (in CAETANO 1959,237) (NOTE 25).

Even corporatist implementation was seen, in the beginning, by some, as a sort of "*white bolshevism*" (see PEREIRA 1937).

All those fears of SALAZAR and CAETANO are clear indicators that they too were aware of the contradiction.

3.3. An hypothesis - two separate discourses about the role of the state

All those contradictions and paradoxes cannot be seen as mere product of natural oscillations of emphasis in order to make clear either the differences in regard to the liberal state or the frontier in regard to the socialist state (NOTE 26). They also cannot be explained just in terms of natural gaps within the same ideological context between theory and practice, theoreticians and practitioners, intellectuals and politicians (NOTE 27).

In the beginning of this chapter the presentation of New State theory as two separate discourses was justified as an analytical method. Now one can go one step further and hypothesize that the "strong state" discourse leading to "moderate interventionism" (SALAZAR I,211) and the corporative discourse leading to a predominantly self-governed economy and society are really two separate discourses.

To carry evidence for the legitimacy of this hypothesis a table of comparison was drawn which shows the complete internal logic of each discourse.

TABLE 7.1 - COMPARISON OF NEW STATE DISCOURSES
ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE

CORPORATIVE DISCOURSE	STRONG STATE DISCOURSE
1 - Emphasis on Nation	1 - Emphasis on State
2 - A minimum state	2 - A "strong state"
3 - The historical Nation as mould for the State	3 - The State as rebuilder of the Nation
4 - "Incorporation of the Nation into the State"	4 - The State as leader of society
5 - Social and juridic pluralism as guarantee of respect for individual rights	5 - Ethical and pragmatic limits to State action
6 - Self-government of economy	6 - The State leads economic life-"moderate interventionism"
7 - Political power is based on the organic nation, that is, in corporations	7 - A "strong government"
8 - A decentralized administration	8 - A centralized administration ("concentration of all kinds of resources")
9 - Mediaeval municipalism as administrative model	9 - Enlightened despotism and 1930 ^s authoritarianism as sources of inspiration for an administrative model.

3.4. An initial explanation for the contradictions and paradoxes of New State discourse about the role of the State

There are not only internal contradictions within the theory, but contradictions between theory and practice, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

But one can already call attention to some aspects which contribute for an initial explanation of the contradictions.

3.4.1. The corporatist theoreticians explanation

One must acknowledge that Portuguese corporatist theoreticians were aware of (some of) those contradictions, which is evidenced by the theoretical cover they tried to give to such discrepancies (NOTE 28).

Their usual explanation is that there was a pre-corporative stage before full corporatism could be set up to its full application. In this pre-corporative stage the state had to be a strong state, a moral leader preparing the future corporative stage. This is the only one which could be properly so called corporative (see about this LUCENA 1976a, WIARDA 1977).

In this an enlightening explanation or just a mere theoretical face saving formula? Had the regime lived always in a pre-corporative stage?

3.4.2. Contradictory historical sources for New State theory

One must call special attention for the contradictions in the different historical sources of inspiration of New State, since they can enlighten the referred internal theoretical contradictions (NOTE 29).

The New State doctrine is explicitly inspired in portuguese history and traditions (this chapter, section 1.3.2) This inspiration is affiliated in different historical traditions, periods and ideas. It reflects respect and nostalgia for mediaeval and modern age municipalism and corporatism (as a system of self-government of local and professional

communities) and, at the same time, fascination for Enlightened Despotism (Enlightenment); that is, New State leaders missed local selfgovernment and corporative traditions and, at the same time, they admired absolute power from divine origin.

This same ambiguity was already present in one of the ideological sources of the regime - "integralismo lusitano" (chapter one, section 2.1.1) - NOTE 30) and, in a certain way, in portuguese corporatist theory. In this respect one can call attention to the role of moral leader given to the state which contains the seeds of interventionism (see FERREIRA 1951, for instance), the incorporation of the nation into the state which makes this one only representative of the Nation, the dual nature of the state as corporation and supercorporation and the very tradition of natural corporatism which is one of patrimonialist state corporatism (see NOTE 29).

That is, the New State used to build its political theory sources which appealed both to self-Government and to central government, to decentralisation and to centralisation , to a lively civil society and to a controlled one. The traces of those different traditions are imprinted in New State theory about the role of the State.

3.4.3. The international context in which New State theory was built

To add to those contradictions in the historical sources one must acknowledge that international context in which New State theory was built was also contradictory.

Side by side with international Catholic pressures towards the implementation of some sort of corporatism which could incorporate the Catholic Church social doctrine there were totalitarian trends and practices.

During the 1930^s several regimes adopted the label of "New State". The main principles of those "New States" were - the necessity of state intervention in economic life, the important role of the state in maintaining social unity, the existence of strong government (see CAETANO 1968). But those principles can both be realized in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.

That is, international influences were also contradictory. But one must acknowledge that the totalitarian trend was very influent at the time.

3.4.4. The heterogeneity of the elite

One had already said that neither New State ideological sources were homogeneous nor it was homogeneous his elite - see chapter one, section 2.

The differences in historical and traditional sources interact with those ideological and political differences in the elite. These differences are even translated in the existence of groups within the regime. The corporatist group was a very intellectual minority within the regime, as can be seen in WIARDA's study about Portuguese corporatism (WIARDA 1977). This group emphasized aspects which were forgotten by the other group which was more statist oriented - see WIARDA 1977, 194 (NOTE 31). From those other groups one must acknowledge that, as seen above (chapter one, section 2.1.1) there was one which was even oriented towards a totalitarian state. But this group was also a minority group.

That is, the heterogeneity of historical and traditional sources and of international context was reflected in the heterogeneity of the elite.

Those are not full explanations of the contradictions and paradoxes of New State theory about the role the State. They serve just as immediate and initial explanations useful for a better understanding of what was said and of the coming section. Indeed it is now time to enquire what was the prevailing discourse about the role of the state regarding education. Does it reproduce the same contradictions present in the general discourse about the role of the State? We will try to answer this question in the next section.

4. THE THEORY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN EDUCATION

There was, at least, initially, also contradictory discourses about the role of the state in education.

There was a non interventionist discourse favouring the control of the family over the education of their children. This was the corporative discourse in which the family was considered the first "structural element" over which the corporative nation was organized - see this chapter, sect. 2.3.1, 2.3.2.

But soon an interventionist discourse was developed, which was strongest in the period of the fascistization of the regime. The Minister of Education

CARNEIRO PACHECO (1936-1940) personified the totalitarian tone of this discourse and the Minister of Education PIRES DE LIMA (1947-1955) its authoritarian administrative version. This last version represents the true discourse of the New State about the role of the State in education, the one which prevailed and was implemented, as shall be seen.

We will present first the corporative discourse, linking it with corporative theory, and then the interventionist discourse, linking it with the "strong state" discourse.

4.1. The corporative discourse in education

As theoretical background to understand the corporative discourse in education a brief explanation of the integral concern of corporatism will be needed.

4.1.1. Portuguese corporatism should be an integral corporatism

As seen above (this chapter, section 2.4.1), corporatism can be integral when all activities of society are corporatized. Portuguese corporatism was explicitly intended to be an integral corporatism. SALAZAR said, in 1934, that the organization of corporations "comprehends from material interests to intellectual and moral ones" (SALAZAR I, 288), comprehends "moral corporations" (SALAZAR I, 345) such as education, science, arts, entertainment, sports, welfare, etc (see CARDOSO 1949, 28-29, MARTINEZ 1967). As portuguese corporatism was not

restricted to the economic sphere and thus should be an integral corporatism (NOTE 32), education should be corporatized.

4.1.2. The prevailing role of the family, primary corporative structural element, in the education of children

The main "structural element" of corporatism - the family - should be the primary responsible for the education of children (see SALAZAR I,341).

This principle was given constitutional status. In the Constitution of 1933, family is considered *"the primary basis of education"* being the role of the State and municipalities to *"facilitate to parents this duty of instructing and educating their children"* (articles 11 and 13) (NOTE 33). *"Education and instruction are compulsory and are entrusted to family and to official or private educational establishments in cooperation with the family"* (article 42).

There was a clear distinction between education and instruction, the latter being the transmission of information and education the socialization in values, norms, habits, attitudes. So what the Constitution says is that the State cannot instruct or educate against the values of the family and, at the same time, that the state has, in the educational field, a merely supplemental role (SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 63-64).

But this discourse was already marked with some mental reservation for instance, the same Constitution which commits to family the role of educating the new generation commits to the state *"the formation of character, of professional value and of all civic and moral virtues"* (article 43). Thus it is possible that state socialization contradicts family socialization.

Another example of this reservation can be seen when SALAZAR conditions the merely supplemental role of school to the recognition of *"educating competence"* in concrete families (SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 64).

4.1.3. The corporatization of educational government and management

In consonance with the predominance of the family in the education of children, and by application of the general corporative discourse, the government and management of the educational system should be corporatized and decentralized.

There should be minimal state interference and a proliferation of corporative bodies, where the major part of the decisions were bargained and taken. Some would be taken at state level, but even then in corporative spirit since, according to corporatist theory, all ministries should proceed with corporative spirit.

The Corporation of Education should be the apex of all educational government of education. The influence of families within this corporatism should be prevailing.

4.1.4. The corporatisation of Universities

The University, as the main educational organisation, should also be corporatized. Indeed the university was already a natural corporation but should now be corporatized in the national scheme of corporatisation of society activities.

The subject of corporatisation of university was not a main concern of corporatist theoreticians, but even so deserved more attention than the general corporatisation of the educational system (NOTE 34).

The first aspect of this corporatisation should be, according to CARDOSO's book "The University - corporative institution", published in 1952, the setting of a corporative hierarchy - the School or Faculty - the University - the Federation of Universities - the Corporative Council.

The second aspect of this corporatisation is the initiation of a different pattern of social relationships between students and professors. The university professor should interact with his students outside the classroom thus providing opportunity for the fulfilment of his role as educator of youth. This is a so important aspect that CAETANO made an important conference only about this theme ("New University - the problem of relationships between professors

and students" given in Coimbra, in 1942) and CARDOSO suggests the setting up of a social interaction classroom of one hour per discipline per week (CARDOSO 1952,16) (NOTE 35).

A third aspect of the corporatisation of the University is the participation of students in the management of the university (CARDOSO 1952,26-27).

All this implied a more autonomous university than we know it was the case (see chapter 5, section 2.3) - see CAETANO 1949, CARDOSO 1952,25 .

4.1.5. The inculcation of a corporative mentality - a corporative curriculum

The corporatisation of the educational system and of all national activities implied the inculcation of a corporative mentality in the new generation through the school. That is, it was necessary to socialize children and youth with new corporative ideals and institutions.

This corporative curriculum was indispensable for the preparation of corporative elites. As the main role of school was the preparation of elites (chapter two, section 2.1) and the preparation of corporative elites was instrumental in the implementation of corporatism (chapter three, section 2.2.1) the corporative curriculum was instrumental for the establishment of the Corporative State.

4.2. The strong state discourse in education

Alongside this corporative discourse applied to education there was also the strong state discourse. That is, New State ideas about education follow, at least initially, the same contradictory pattern already seen in the discourse about the general role of the state.

4.2.1. The pedagogical role of the state towards society

The strong state should have a pedagogical role towards society - SALAZAR speak of the "educative function which should be given to this moderate interventionism" (SALAZAR I, 211), CAETANO asserts that the state is the "pedagogue which teaches the whole Nation" (CAETANO 1941,133 - see above page 107) (NOTE 36).

The strong state, as an ethical state, should be the moral leader of society (CARDOSO 1949,11 FERREIRA 1951, LEITE 1936, SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 63 -see this chapter, section 1.2).

The role of the state as educator, as moral leader, directs us to the problem of the state as political educator of masses. As seen above, although there were defenders of such a role (chapter one, section 2.1.1) political education of masses was not implemented because it was incompatible with the true authoritarian nature of the regime (chapter three, section 2.2).

That is, if one considers that the educational role of the state demands mobilisation of masses to politically educate them, one must acknowledge that those statements were just part of the radical tone inherent to the tactical and defensive mobilising strategies of the fascistization period of the regime.

If one considers that the educational role of the state towards society can be performed through the shaping of structures and institutions, that is, through administrative and organizational strategies and through "a mild but constant pressure" (chapter three, section 2.4.2) then the New State performed such a role.

4.2.2. The responsibility of the state in the instruction and education and youth

We have already said that the commitment to families of the main responsibility in the education (socialisation) of children was a qualified attribution. As SALAZAR clearly said in 1934 *"It is impossible for us to conceive neither would we ever allow it, that our schools should be divorced from [...] the nation [...] neither could we permit that the Portuguese schools should remain neutral"* (SALAZAR I,307,313 - see also SALAZAR 1936).

SALAZAR recognizes the development of modern trends which give to the State *"The possession of childhood and youth, education in a nationalist direction, the formation of a general mentality, exercises, games, sports, the care for physical and moral renewal of race, concerns for scientific*

research" (SALAZAR I,291); "*the State [...] extends its demands to the formation of the family, revalidates the instruction and education of youth, control or directs intellectual activity*" (SALAZAR III,235). SALAZAR accepts as inevitable this growing role of the state, but rejects its totalitarian tone and consequences (for instance, he rejects the control of the State over art – see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 265).

All this is not new to us – we have already seen that, according to SALAZAR, it is possible the partial modification of the portuguese character through education (chapter two, section 1.3) the building of the new man depends on education (chapter two, same section), through a "mild but constant pressure" and the inculcation of a basic mentality (chapter three, section 2.4) and through non mobilizational conformist methods (chapter three, section 4.8, chapter four, section 7.1).

Thus it is evident that the state vindicates for itself both the instruction and education of the new generation. This is contradictory with the solemn constitutional commitment of giving the main educative role of children to families.

This contradiction cannot be solved by theorising that the family educates the new generation in a context where the state educates society and thus families – first, because this meant that the right of families was just a delegated attribution and not a natural one, which contradicts New State statements; second, because the State clearly vindicates the direct and immediate use of its right.

Thus one has again a contradictory discourse of the New State about the role of the State in society.

4.2.3. The theory of the New State about the role of the Catholic Church in education

As have been said above (chapter five, section 2.2) there was between State and Catholic Church a "moral union with economic and administrative separation".

This relationship was reproduced in the educational system (chapter five, section 2.2.7). There was since 1935 an implicit pact whereby the state promoted religious education in its

own official schools ("moral union"), but under its control, and, at the same time, controlled tightly all private schools, even those religiously orientated and Church owned ("economic and administrative separation").

That is, the New State principle is that the state should have the control of all education, incorporating in its own schools religious education.

This is a clear example of a non totalitarian strong state discourse.

4.3. Towards a non totalitarian strong state in education

It is evident that the New State discourse about the role of the State in education reproduces the same contradictions of the general discourse about the role of the State.

But it is also obvious that the tone of the corporatist discourse applied to education is non convincing.

The discourse either is defended just by some corporatist theoreticians (as it is the case of the corporatization of university), or its just an indication of good intentions (portuguese corporatism should be an integral corporatism, the curriculum should be the transmitter of corporative mentality) or it is just the mere application of general corporatist principles (the corporatization of educational government and management).

The statement about the role of the family is a traditional Christian principle which was given a corporative phraseology. But even this solid principle is limited and contradicted in the same Constitution which recognizes it.

The strong state applied to education is clearly much more convincing; it is much more easy to believe that is meant to be implemented. There appears to be even some totalitarian tones in part of this discourse. But this tone is part of the radical tone used in the fascistization period - as has been seen, it was not implemented any political education of masses.

There are specific indicators, beyond the general ones already analyzed in previous chapters, of rejection of a totalitarian version of the strong state in education. First, the mere existence of a non interventionist discourse, even in a feeble tone; second, the constitutional status given to the role of the family in education, even with its limitations;

third, the moral union with the Church.

Thus the strong discourse is much more convincing than the corporative discourse, but its totalitarian version is not accepted. This seems to point to the prevalence of the implementation of an administrative strong state in education. The implementation of New State theory about the role of the State in education will be analyzed in chapter nine.

One can conclude from all that was said until now that the formulation of the theory of the New State about the role of the state in education was done through two different discourses - the corporative discourse and the strong state discourse.

Before analyzing the implementation of this theory it is necessary to proceed to the analysis of the implications for our main hypothesis of the practical prevalence of one of those two discourses.

5. TWO TYPES OF STRONG STATE PRACTICE - THE MOBILIZING STRONG STATE VERSUS THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRONG STATE

It is now due time to clarify the notion of strong state and thus to link this chapter with the previous ones and to proceed to further clarification of how it contributes to the confirmation of the main hypothesis of this work.

As said in the beginning of this chapter the achievement of conformism and passivity through demobilization implies a partition of tasks between the state and civil society where the former has the lion's share. This means that the confirmation of the hypothesis demands the prevalence of the strong state discourse.

On the contrary, the implementation of a true corporative state would imply the invalidation of the hypothesis. In fact, this implementation would imply the existence of mobilization within corporative bodies at all levels, even at the primary level, it would imply the preparation of mobilizing corporative leaders. On the other hand, the rebuilding of the Nation by the State is in itself a mobilizing task. In the same way, the decentralizing consequences foreseen in the corporative discourse are much more mobilizing than centralization, since this restricts much more the number and type of citizens involved in decision-making processes.

Thus it is concluded that only a strong state is compatible with our hypothesis, since the achievement of demobilization implies a strong control of the State over all aspects of national life. But how is this control compatible with the non totalitarian nature of the regime? In other words, is a totalitarian strong state compatible with our hypothesis? The answer is clearly no, since as have been seen in chapter one, by definition the totalitarian state is mobilizing (see LINZ 1975). So the control over civil society must be made in authoritarian moulds.

That is, the strong state to be implemented must pursue passivity and demobilisation, must have a limited non responsible pluralism, mechanisms of non participation of citizens in public life, control of electoral processes (when they exist), must use organizational and administrative strategies and must not use expressive mobilizing strategies like political education. That is, it must be an authoritarian state.

The authoritarian demobilising strong state tends to be an Administrative State, that is, a state where decision - making is centralized and concentrated in Public Administration departments and is done prevailingly with bureaucratic rules and criteria. The reason is that the concentration of decision making enhances non participation both of citizens and elites in decision-making and thus effectively achieves passivity. The absence of a clear ideology inhibits ideologically based decision-making processes and facilitates the setting up of bureaucratic rules for decision-making; on the other hand, the Public Administration has not a party as competitor for formulation of policies, as it happens in totalitarian or democratic states.

Now one has some criterion to distinguish which type of strong state was implemented by the New State. This criterion is - opposed to an ideologically based decision-making, typical of totalitarian states (where the sole party is the main policy formulator and mobilizing means of policy implementation are used), there is, in an Administrative State, a pure bureaucratic process of decision-making in which Public Administration is the main policy formulator and mere administrative strategies are used for policy implementation.

In the next chapter (the analysis of the practice about the role of the State in society) these criteria would be used to confirm our main hypothesis as translated into a practice about the role of the state in society - the New State became in his practice an Administrative State.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE NEW STATE REGIME
- PRACTICE -

The practical outcome of New State theory about the role of the State will be studied first comparing corporative implementation with corporative theory. Then analysing New State practice as an Administrative State. The next chapter it will analyse the practice of the theory about the role of the State in education.

I -SUBORDINATE AND STATE CORPORATISM

The analysis of corporative implementations will try to answer three questions, which follow the above referred (chapter 7, section 2.4.1) qualifications of corporatism.

- Was corporatism the main driving force of the nation and were Corporations the main center of its political structure? In other words, was the implemented corporatism pure or subordinate?

- Were the Corporations really representative of society interests and were they independent from the state? In other words, was the implemented corporatism a corporatism of association or a mere state corporatism?

We will try to answer those questions in this part. The answer to the last question will be given in next chapter when the problem of corporatisation of education will be analyzed. This last question is

- Were the various areas of society actually corporatised? In other words, was the implemented corporatism an integral corporatism or just a partial (merely economic) one?

1. SUBORDINATE CORPORATISM

1.1. Subordination to political power

The answer to the first question - was corporatism the main driving force of the nation and Corporations the main center of its political structure? - is clearly a "no".

Portuguese corporatism was not pure corporatism, but just a subordinate one. This fact is acknowledged even by corporatist theoreticians (CAETANO 1972a, 330-331), CARDOSO 1949 25-28, MARTINEZ 1967) and also by scholars (LUCENA 1976a, 162-165, WIARDA 1977).

In fact corporative organizations did not have political power, neither through primary organization nor through the chamber of all corporations - the "Corporative Chamber" (NOTE 1). This chamber should be the apex of political power based on functional representation of interests. Although "The Corporative Chamber is, by its origin and composition, much more representative than the [National] Assembly, of the various interests existing within the Nation" (SALAZAR IV,435) it never had more than a strictly advisory role (see article 103 of 1933 Constitution). But his action was limited even within this already restricted role since its "parecer" (written advice) was only compulsorily given in case of bills presented (by government or members of parliament) to the National Assembly - this was a tiny minority of the overall legislative output of the New State which was mainly based on Government decrees .

In logical consonance with all this, the Corporative Chamber was not considered a sovereignty body, what is an indisputable anomaly in a state which claims itself corporative (LUCENA 1976a,123).

So it is obvious that no "organic democracy" (SALAZAR) (see WIARDA 1977,175,183) ever existed in Portugal.

This subordination of organic interest representation to political representation comes from the belief of most regime' leaders (Salazar included) that organized interests were egoist by nature and thus could not adequately represent national interest (see SALAZAR I,388, III,368-369, IV,435). As "the Nation is more than the arithmetic sum of institutions" (as a member of Parliament said - NOTE 2) national interest is much more than the sum of functional interests. There exist a "general political interest, specific of the Nation as entity and moral unity", "national interests, state interests properly speaking" (SALAZAR ibidem).

Since a corporative parliament could not adequately define general interest (NOTE 3) there was the need to maintain a chamber to represent such national interest (SALAZAR V,494) - NOTE 4 . Furthermore, as the state should perform the role of representative of the Nation (chapter seven, section 2.2.3) , it makes sense that not only it must intervene in the definition of the national interest (SALAZAR I,293, V 464), but also that it is up to the state the formulation of the nation interests.

From all this it follows naturally an eclectic solution in which corporative structure was subordinate to political structure (NOTE 5) - see chapter one, section 2.2.

1.2. The most important organizations were not corporatized

As said above (chapter five, section 2.3.1, notes 3 and 8) neither the Army, nor the Church nor the University, although natural corporations, were ever corporatized. Public Administration was also not subject to the corporative structure (this chapter, section 41). This means that the most important organizations were never corporatized, which reinforces clearly the incomplete character of corporative implementation.

2. STATE CORPORATISM

The answer to the second initial question - are Corporations representative of society interests and independent from the State? - is also no.

2.1. The New State implemented a regime of state corporatism

The three scholars who made the most important studies about portuguese corporatism agree to label the regime as one of state corporatism - LUCENA 1976a, 1978b, 1979b, SCHMITTER 1975a, WIARDA 1977 (see also MAKLER 1979, MONICA 1978, 93-94, ROBINSON 1979, 130-133).

There are several indicators of state control over economy which contradict the whole corporative idea of self-direction and there also indicators of government control over the corporative organizations themselves - the non

creation of Corporations until 1956, the existence during the whole span of time of the corporative regime (1933-1974) of governmental agencies for economy control ("organismos de coordenação económica"), the governmental practice of regulating economic life and other activities without consulting the corporations, the compartmentalization of corporatism into one ministry which existed alongside other ministries which controlled and regulated activities which supposedly should be corporatized, the elaboration of a five-year national development plan formulated and implemented by the government, governmental appointment of corporative representatives(!), excessive number of civil servants in the Corporative Chamber are enough indicators of state corporatism.

Besides this the fact that corporatism was incomplete - - practically speaking was limited to economic activities as shall be seen later on - left all other activities subject to control by the state and not coordinated by (non existent) corporations.

How did the regime evolve towards state corporatism? How was this evolution explained by corporatist theoreticians? How can this evolution be really explained?

The answer to the two first questions will be done in the remaining of this chapter. The answer to the last questions will compel us to transcend the corporative framework and will only be dealt in the following chapter.

2.2. The evolution towards state corporatism

The whole story of portuguese corporatism is the story of its evolution towards state corporatism (see about this evolution LUCENA 1978b, 1979b, 1979c, WIARDA 1977).

2.2.1. Implementation period (1933-1939)

The initial implementation period is coincident with a mobilising period of the regime, as has often been said. In order to facilitate the carrying into effect of corporative structure the government created governmental departments for regulation of the economy ("organismos de coordenação económica" - organizations of economic coordination). Those

were pre-corporative structures to be incorporated into the Corporations, once they were created. Several corporative organizations at primary level were set up. All those efforts would be culminated with the planned creation of the first Corporation in 1938, in which the governmental departments were not incorporated as it was previewed (for this period see TEOTÓNIO PEREIRA's memoirs - 1973).

2.2.2. The advent of war and corporatism discredit(1939-1949)

The war invalidated the creation of this Corporation and brought about the governmental use of corporative organizations to control the economy in order to impose austerity (see WIARDA 1977,163-173). All corporative leaders were appointed from above.

In the post-war period corporatism entered into discredit and it was even set up a Parliamentary Investigation Commission to corporative organizations, whose conclusions were so devastating that the government refused to give it any official attention (see about this report LUCENA 1979b).

2.2.3. Corporatist revival - 1949-1968

All this discredit made many believe, even within the regime, that the days of corporatism had gone. But in 1949 SALAZAR said "It is time to relight the fire and continue the journey", that is, it is time to complete the corporative scheme (see SALAZAR 1949 - see also SALAZAR IV, 369, V, 141-142).

This provoked a flourishing of theoretical studies criticizing the kind of corporatism implemented until then (NOTE 6) and pointing to war as the scapegoat of the situation (NOTE 7). Many theoretical studies were then published (see WIARDA 1977,184-193), being CAETANO's conference in 1950 - "Present situation of Portuguese Corporatism" one of the most important and influential; it had been very much quoted in this work (NOTE 8).

All those critiques provoked a renewal of corporatism, but in the state corporatism mould.

Following this renewal there was created in 1950 the Ministry of Corporations; in 1957 all economic Corporations

were created (NOTE 9); in 1959 and in 1966 were created the moral Corporations, and the corporative building was formally complete.

The Corporative Chamber had slightly increased powers and had, in practice, a more important advisory role than before.

But all this renewal was done in the moulds of state corporatism as indicated by

- the creation of a Ministry specific for Corporations, which is against the ideal of all ministries being filled with corporative spirit (see CAETANO 1950 - NOTE 10).

- the vertical scheme followed in the creation of Corporations which favoured control by the state (NOTE 11).

- the permanence of the organizations of economic coordination alongside the Corporations created in 1967 (NOTE 12).

- the setting up of exclusively governmental controlled economic planning through the "Planos de Fomento" (see NOTE 24 of chapter four).

- the control by the government of all elections in corporative bodies.

- strict control over all corporative organizations, both workers and employers (NOTE 13).

- the governmental appointed members were the overwhelming bulk of Corporative Chamber membership - only a third was appointed by the corporative organizations (before 1960 even these were selected by the government from a list of "acceptable" names submitted to it) (NOTE 14).

2.2.4. Corporatist decline - 1961-1968

The social changes of the 1950^s led to a shift in corporatist orientation which translated the decline of corporatism as a political and social doctrine and the basis of New State structure. The corporatist structure was put predominantly at the service of social welfare (social security and social assistance), thus building the basis of the future Caetano's "Social State" (Estado Social) - see

about this decline WIARDA 1977, 209-252.

In the new building of the Ministry of Corporations, inaugurated in 1966, corporative activity was gradually confined to one of the twenty-one floors (WIARDA 1977,232).

(The date of 1961 was put as the beginning of this period since the appointment of a new Ministry of Corporation, in May 1961, made this underlying change clearly visible).

2.3. Conclusion - Corporatism was in Portugal always state corporatism

It is not difficult to conclude from what had been said that the state controlled the whole corporative organization and used it (alongside with the so-called pre-corporative bodies) to regulate economy.

The slow process of industrialization initiated in the 1950's with the launching of the above referred (chapter seven, section 3.1.2, this chapter, section 2.2.3) "Planos de Fomento" demanded that the State used all the available means to coordinate efforts towards the achievement of the self-proposed economic targets.

The political dimension of corporatism - the Corporative Chamber - represented more the government than the organized interests. The Corporative Chamber was thus really a government advisory body.

As it is clear, portuguese corporatism was not a corporatism of association, but clearly a state corporatism.

Such tendency towards state corporatism began when the implementation of corporatism was initiated, as had been, seen (see about this LUCENA 1978b, 1979b, WIARDA 1977, 142, 155).

It is important to remark the domain of the State in economic and social life. This domain made Portugal similar in some respects to many eastern european countries and could be described by several authors as a state capitalism system.

2.4. The analogy of portuguese state with eastern socialist states

It seems that the fear of regime's leaders of the coming of a socialism without doctrine was justified, since several authors made analogies of New State economic structure with eastern european socialist states.

"Portugal came ironically, given the regime's strongly anti-Communist ideology, to resemble more the centralized, state-run economies of Eastern Europe than the planned but still in large measure laissez faire systems of the West" WIARDA 1979 - see also WIARDA 1977,85,305,342).

"The corporative state shaped a new Portugal, very much in the socialist way, which will be hard to destroy" (MARQUES 1976,183 - see also page 199). *"SALAZAR had left Portugal in excellent conditions for the establishment of a 'socialist regime' [...]. The State was so powerful, the country revolved so much around the state apparatus and its bureaucracy [...] that it would be extremely easy to transform Portugal into a 'socialist' republicue'"* (SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,41). LUCENA expresses similar opinious (see LUCENA 1978). (NOTE 15)

This similarity between the economic structures of the New State and those of eastern european countries probably occurred also sometimes to regime's leaders. This is indicated by the fear of the "socialism without doctrine" (chapter seven, section 3.2), but also by occasional specific positive comments about certain aspects of communist regimes. SALAZAR acknowledges the "superiority of its state organization, which is translated into unity of command and into its power of decision-making and implementation" (SALAZAR V,421) (see the same ideas in SALAZAR IV,252 and in SARAIVA and SILVA, 1976,

39) and see similarities between communist and state corporatism perspective about social conflicts - there is not only producers and workers interests but the natural interest, which should prevail (SALAZAR V,464) (NOTE 16).

The analysis of these similarities makes natural the next section - the study of the tendency for state capitalism in the New State.

2.5. From state corporatism to state capitalism

If one forgets New State theory and analysis only its practice one can conclude that the regime created an economic system which is close to "state capitalism" - see GRAHAM 1974, LUCENA 1976a,174, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,28,38-39, WIARDA 1977 143,302-304,309,352).

This tendency towards state capitalism although limited and controlled by the New State (LUCENA 1979b) was inexorable (LUCENA 1976a,174) - eventually the system of state capitalism which grew up alongside supplanted the corporative structure (WIARDA 1979).

This "capitalism without capitalists" (SCHMITTER 1975,8), bureaucratic and semipublic" (LUCENA 1979b), linking together government and the major interests (WIARDA 1979) was common in the Iberian latin-american world (GRAHAM 1974).

This growing control of the state overeconomy was instrumental to the industrialisation of the country without lost of traditional values, that is, industrialisation without rupture with traditional society - LUCENA 1976a,111, MONICA 1978,102-105, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,39. For Salazar there was not even true progress if the old traditional values disappeared (LUCENA 1976a,119).

For Salazar the ideal was to mechanise agriculture *"without silencing the joyful songs of the girls; to weave cotton or wool in the most modern weaver's loom, without interweaving in the thread the class hate nor forcing out from the workshop or the factory our old patriarchal spirit "* (SALAZAR II,276).

Thus there was not in the New State a global and explicit option for development, which could represent a certain degree of rupture with traditional society (FRANCO 1982). But still there was a policy of slow development (see AMARO 1982, JESUÍNO 1982). Salazar "wanted economic growth for Portugal and industrialisation, but he would permit none of the social and political concomitants (greater pluralism and participation in society and polity) that normally accompany the modernization process" (WIARDA 1977,335).

This means that state capitalism supplanted corporatism in order to assure a safe process of industrialization which could maintain the authoritarian nature of the regime and its demobilizational strategies to induce citizen's conformism.

3. CONCLUSION - THE CORPORATIVE STATE STRUCTURE AT THE SERVICE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

3.1. The authoritarian demobilising nature of the regime prevented the implementation of doctrinaire corporatism

One can conclude from what said that corporatism had by no means lived up in practice neither to its doctrinal importance as the basis of the New State, nor up to its own principles. Corporatism was merely a subordinate one, it was implemented in the state corporatism mould, and entered in decline in the 1960^s.

There are important structural reasons (social, economic and cultural ones) which can explain this development of corporatism (NOTE 17). There are also specific political reasons related with the political structure and the nature of New State regime.

What interests us now is the analysis of the compatibility of pure corporatism (integral non subordinate corporatism of association) with the authoritarian nature of the regime.

Indeed one can ask several questions on this line:

- was pure corporatism compatible with the concentration

of powers inherent to authoritarianism?

- was pure corporatism compatible with the demobilising nature of the regime?
- was pure corporatism compatible with political repression?
- was pure corporatism compatible with the non doctrinaire character of a regime mainly based on the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure"?

The Corporative state demands limited freedom of interest association and gives the state a moral role - in those aspects it fits well with authoritarianism. But there are several features of pure corporatism which do not fit with it - true representativeness of Corporative organizations members, freedom of the corporative representatives to put forward solutions opposed to those proposed by the Government, autonomy of Corporations, cooperation of classes by direct relationships without intermediaries, self-direction of economy, decentralized administration.

The strong state is inherent to authoritarianism and, consequently, concentration of powers is typical of authoritarian regimes. But this concentration is clearly not compatible with the juridic recognition of social pluralism, decentralized administration and pulverization of authority, which are referred to above as features of corporatism.

The non participatory nature of the regime prevented true representativeness of corporative organization members and freedom of corporative elections (when existing at all). As WIARDA says "Even in its least authoritarian periods [...] the regime hence never functioned in the truly representative, participatory way that was the original vision" (WIARDA 1977, 343) (NOTE 18).

It is necessary a climate of freedom to achieve true representativeness freedom and autonomy in corporative organizations. "Right from the beginning came the conflict between the desire for implementing corporative reforms and the need to control those who opposed such changes by means

of repressive instruments" (WIARDA 1977,343 - see also pages 184,206). That is, the repressive strategies of the regime were not compatible with the implementation of corporatism. The gradual building of a police state was also not compatible with a true corporative revival in the 1950^s. It even happened that the corporative organizations were increasingly seen as integrated in the repressive strategies of the regime (WIARDA 1977, 179-180).

For corporative organizations to be the basis of the whole functioning of society and political structure, as corporatist theoreticians pretended, it was necessary to have a proliferation of leaders at grassroots and intermediate level (not only at central level) and their education in corporative theories and ideals. All this obviously demanded a degree of mobilization. The non mobilizational nature of the regime prevented the recruitment, education and mobilization of corporative leaders. This explains why the frequent complaints of lack of preparation of corporative leaders (for instance, CAETANO 1941,31-32,80-81, CARDOSO 1949, CAETANO 1950,12) were not fruitful.

The same reasoning applies to the corporative education of masses and elites. In fact few Portuguese knew what corporatism was really about in its original vision (see WIARDA 1977,138).

To sum up, one can conclude that the authoritarian demobilising nature of the regime prevented (in conjunction with other factors to be analyzed later) the implementation of doctrinaire corporatism or even of a structure with reasonably recognizable corporative features. Thus the corporative structure became naturally at the service of the authoritarian regime. If what came about can still be called corporatism is clearly beyond the scope of our work (NOTE 19).

But this does not mean that one can throw away the whole corporative doctrine, ideal and practice, as utterly irrelevant for the understanding of the role of the state or for the understanding of the nature of the regime.

Indeed the fact that corporatism did not perform the functions which its doctrinaire discourse promised does not mean that it did not perform other functions which are relevant for the referred purposes (NOTE 20).

3.2. The real functions of corporatism

I have emphasized four aspects of the practice of state corporatism which seem to me crucial to understanding its relation, on the one hand, to social structure and, on the other hand, to public decision-making in an authoritarian political context.

The first is the extent to which 'sponsored' or state corporatism is preemptive, i.e. seeks to set out from above structures of associability and channels of interest representation in anticipation of spontaneous efforts by affected classes, sectors or groups. The second is the extent to which the corporatist experience is preventive, i.e. attempts not to mobilize or regiment its subjects for positive state-selected tasks but to ensure that normal or passive participation within its structures will occupy a certain physical, temporal and ideational 'space', foreclosing, if not prohibiting, alternative uses of that same space. The third is the extent to which such a mode of interest representation is defensive, i.e. encourages associations to act primarily, if not exclusively, in the protection of special corporate 'rights', privileges or exemptions granted from above, rather than in the 'agressive' promotion of new projects or interests. The fourth is the extent to which it is compartmental, i.e. manages to confine potential conflicts within specialized, non-interacting decisional 'orders', thereby preventing the creation of multiple issue and multiple sector alliances or blocking 'partisan' appeals to wider publics and clientele.

When one combines these four obviously interrelated dimensions, one is led to the conclusion that the role and consequences of state corporatism must be assessed, not primarily in terms of what it openly and positively accomplishes, but in terms of what it surreptitiously and negatively prevents from happening.

(SCHMITTER, 1975a, 58)

This long quotation of an author who studied deeply portuguese corporatism sums up clearly the real functions of corporatism (see also STOER 1982, 72, WIARDA 1977, 336-337).

The preemptive and preventive functions of corporatism correspond to the organizational pre-emptying strategy already

described in chapter five (section 1.2.3) Corporative organizations occupied a certain organizational space thus preventing the formation of strong trade unions and of strong employer's associations which could put at stake state autonomy (see SCHMITTER 1975a,59).

Corporative organizations had, in the economic system, a function similar to that which National Union performed in the political system (chapter two, section 5.4.4; chapter five, section 1.2.3).

The SCHMITTER's pre-emptive and preventive functions reflect also the regime's expressive strategies to pursue passivity.

The SCHMITTER's compartmental function of corporatism (also very well analyzed in MAKLER 1979) was also a strategy of demobilization (chapter five, section 1.2.1).

This meant that the corporative structure was at the service of the authoritarian regime. This means also that it is in the strong state discourse which one should seek the real role of the state in portuguese society and in the educational system. It is what will be done in the second part of this chapter.

II - THE NEW STATE AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The strong state discourse could be traduced either into a totalitarian or into an authoritarian state. As it was already said the New State opted since the beginning for the authoritarian mould. That is, it opted for a strong state which pursued passivity and demobilization.

As it have been said the state had a predominant role in all portuguese life. How was this role performed? If neither a mobilizing party nor the Corporations served as mediators between the state and civil society how was this predominance exerted? The answer will be given in this part.

The New State was an Administrative State, that is, a state where all decisions, even political decisions, are made by a centralized Public Administration. In an Administrative State the policies are administratively formulated and bureaucratically implemented. In this situation participation of citizens in public life is impossible and even participation of many areas of the elite is discouraged - passivity is effectively pursued.

This part will analyze the New State as an Administrative State. Indeed several authors categorize the New State as such - GRAHAM 1975, RIEGELHAUPT 1979a,b, SCHMITTER 1975a, WIARDA 1977. CAETANO acknowledges that the regime he aided to build was an Administrative State (CAETANO 1966). LINZ's subtype of the authoritarian regime "bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime" parallels the model which is more frequently called Administrative State.

As just said, an Administrative State is essentially a state where a non responsible Public Administration has a

centralized bureaucratic control over all aspects of nation's life (see GRAHAM 1975,7-11, WIARDA 1977,21,290 - for a review of literature about the Administrative State see GRAHAM 1975). But a more detailed and operational definition of Administrative State is needed to facilitate the analysis of New State practice.

Several characteristics can be deduced from the above definition. Some related to who detains the power - a) and b) - others related to how it is exerted - e) to g).

So, in an Administrative State

- a) Public Administration performs a very important role;
- b) Public Administration is the main formulator of policy;
- c) There is a fusion between administrative and political careers, being Government part of Public Administration;
- d) There is concentration of powers traduced in a strong Government;
- e) There is centralization of decision-making;
- f) There is no autonomy of local government;
- g) There is no participation of the administered ones;
- h) Problems are administratively formulated and bureaucratically implemented.

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW STATE AS ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

4.1. The importance of Public Administration

Both Salazar and Caetano gave importance to Public Administration. SALAZAR defines the State as *"The leader, the government, the bureaucracy, that is, roughly speaking a constant thought, an enlightened will, a body of study and execution"* (SALAZAR III,389-390) - see also SALAZAR I,121,III,392,V,408. CAETANO calls it the *"diligent and efficacious apparatus of Government action"* (CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,64).

So both leaders devoted time and effort to the administrative reform. Indeed administrative and financial reforms were a "leitmotiv" of many speeches of Salazar (see SALAZAR I,121,II,23,III,66,277-285,V,43,122) and were one of the regime's achievements (MARQUES 1976,202). But the

industrialization effort attracted the best "cadres" for the private sector and Public Administration became qualitatively understaffed (CAETANO 1966). This renewed the concern for the administrative reform led to the creation, in 1967, of a Secretariate for Administrative Reform. (NOTE 21).

The initial "*administrative dictatorship*" maintained, during the initial period, many high civil servants of the previous regime - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,118, CRUZ 1982c, MARTINS 1970 (chapter five, note 2; this chapter, section 4.3) NOTE 22). This is an indicator of the importance given to the stability of Public Administration (NOTE 23).

A more powerful indicator of the importance of Public Administration is the massive presence of members of Public Administration in the founding elite of New State. SCHMITTER (1979) in his analysis of New State formative elite (1934-1942) finds that around half was composed by civil servants; in the first session of the legislative assembly (1934-1938) they were 74.6% of the total. Civil servants went on being very influent in the National Assembly (chapter two, section 5.2.2) and predominant in the Corporative Chamber. (see NOTE 14) and in the National Union (chapter two, section 5.4.2).

One indicator more of the importance of Public Administration is the sheer size of bureaucracy - see SARAIVA and SILVA 142, WIARDA 1977,301 (NOTE 24). The definition of civil servant includes categories which are not considered as such in other systems - teachers, university professors, judges, policemen, military men, etc.

Due to its importance Public Administration, alongside with the Army, the Church and the University, was never corporatized (this chapter, section 1.2).

4.2. Public Administration as the main formulator of policy

One must acknowledge that in the Portuguese authoritarian regime there was not other decision-making center which effectively could formulate policies - the Presidency of the Republic and the National Assembly were very limited in their real powers, the National Union was not a mobilizing party

which could become an alternative policy formulator center (see CRUZ 1982c, SCHMITTER 1979), Corporations and Corporative Chamber were controlled by the State through the Government and Public Administration, local government had not any significant role in the regime. The Catholic Church was co-opted, the University centralized and co-opted, and the Army, soon became compartmentalized again after the military coup. Due to lack of unlimited political pluralism there was no political parties or civic associations which could be policy formulators.

So Government and Public Administration were left alone to formulate, adopt and implement policies. Due to the fusion of political and administrative careers there is an absence of a specific political level of decision-making. Thus the Government appears predominantly as the head of Public Administration. So Public Administration (headed by the Government) is by absence of competitors, the only policy formulator.

This monopoly of policy-making is acknowledged by several authors - GRAHAM 1975,14,33, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,41,80, WIARDA 1977,290-292.

CAETANO commenting on the subject of the relationship between Politics and Public Administration says that "The administration ceases to be characterized as a function to assert itself as power", being the separation between Administration and Politics a mere question of level of decision-making (CAETANO 1970a,9,15) (NOTE 25).

This administration co-opts institutions of civil society being the most notorious case the Universities (chapter five, section 2.3.3.) (NOTE 26).

4.3. Fusion of administrative and political careers

As had been said one can encompass Government and Public Administration as part of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Administrative State (WIARDA 1977,124,292). Ministers, as administrative heads of their ministries, are an important part of Public Administration.

Ministers have a political role as members of the Cabinet

and an administrative role as heads of the administrative departments of their ministry. In an Administrative State this administrative role is the most important. SALAZAR said, in 1943, that his ministers were condemned to be the "chief technicians of their respective Ministries" instead of being just "technicians of general ideas" as it should be (SALAZAR III,393). This would be due to the theoretical and bookish character of our school system.

CAETANO recommends, in 1951, "a stable government with ministers which can be really administrative heads" (in CAETANO 1959,172 - see also CAETANO 1970a,263-264).

But, in 1966, in his study about portuguese public administration, CAETANO attributes partially to the increasing administrative role of ministers the decline in public administration. (CAETANO 1966) (NOTE 27).

The real cause of the overvaluation of the administrative role of minister does not lie, as it is evident, in the bookish character of portuguese education, as Salazar pretends, but in the very administrative and authoritarian nature of the regime. The concentration of power of decision-making in Public Administration compelled ministers to be administrative heads in order to exercise effective power - otherwise power would be passed on to directors-generals (see GRAHAM 1975,55). The stability of government favoured the process (see CAETANO 1966, MARQUES 1976,203). But there was another essential reason - the practice of autocratic rule by the prime-minister which concentrated all important political decisions (chapter two, section 4) obviously devaluated the political role of ministers.

All this led to a fusion of political and administrative careers which is the organizational translation of the confusion between political and administrative levels of decision-making, indicating a subordination of politics to administration (NOTE 28).

It goes without saying that this fusion implied a great ideological and political control over Public Administration membership. Until 1935 the regime used a strategy of co-optation of the previous civil servants (chapter five, NOTE 2) and so no significant purge of senior civil servants was done. But then the fascistoid mobilizing period of the regime began and control became strict.

There was strict control on admissions which were preceded of information of the secret police (see COMISSÃO... 1982). The newly recruited should swear *"I declare upon my honour that I am within the social order established by the 1933 Political Constitution and I actively repudiate communism and all subversive ideas"*.

Civil servants showing *"a spirit of opposition to the fundamental principles of the Political Constitution, or who do not guarantee cooperation in achieving the higher aims of the state, will be suspended or retired [...] or [...] will be dismissed"*. (Decree Law nº 25317, May 13th, 1935). Several political purges of civil servants were done based on those legal dispositions. There were significant purges of university teachers in 1936, 1946-7 and 1962 (see COMISSÃO... 1982) (NOTE 29).

There was also a strict control of actual voting of civil servants (chapter two, section 5.3.2) and no trade unions or corporations of civil servants were allowed.

As "portuguese underdevelopment favours cultural and administrative forms of repression" (LUCENA 1976a, 146) and as public service employed many persons, this means that through those strategies the New State controlled almost half of the working population (MARTINS 1970).

Naturally enough Public Administration was considered a strong and safe political support of the regime (see FIGUEIREDO 1976, 63, PORTAS and GAGO 1980).

4.4. Concentration of powers - a strong Government

An Administrative State is not a state based on separation of powers as the classical liberal state formula of the "État de droit" (see CAETANO 1972a, 325). On the

contrary, it is a state based on concentration of powers on the executive body - the Government using Public Administration.

The classical distinction between a legislative body assuring the legislative function, an executive body assuring the executive function, and a moderating body assuring the true political function was not accepted (NOTE 30). All those functions were concentrated in one body - the Government. So the Government in the regime was the most powerful sovereignty body - (see about the role of the Government in the New State CAETANO 1972a,645-662 (analysis of the Government as sovereignty body) CAETANO 1970a,251-274 (analysis of the Government as administrative body), CRUZ 1982c, LUCENA 1976a, 147-160, WIARDA 1977,292-293).

Indeed the motto of the need for a strong government is linked by Salazar to the need for a strong state - "There is no strong state where the Government is not strong" he repeats often (SALAZAR I,81,385,IV 66,357). So SALAZAR defends the strenghtening of the executive power (SALAZAR I,81-84,227,385, IV 357,V,399, in FERRO 1982,274). This means that the Government does not depend on the Parliament (but depends on the President of Republique who appoints the prime-minister), it is the normal legislative body (NOTE 31).

This "dictatorship of the executive" (LUCENA 1976a,147) was made stronger through the practice of autocracy (NOTE 32).

Indeed the Government was the "only active political reality", as CAETANO already acknowledged in a letter to Salazar in 1947 (CAETANO 1977,229 - see chapter two,section 5.4.2) (NOTE 33). As a slogan compulsorily included in reading text books in 1932 said *"In the family the leader is the Father, in the school the leader is the Master; in the Church the leader is the Priest; in the Nation the leader is the Government"* (Decree n° 21014,19-3-1932).

4.5. Concentration of powers - centralization

Concentration of powers means not only a strong government, but a concentration of decision-making on the top level of the central services of Public Administration. Public

Administration in an Administrative State is centralized.

Centralization had a very long tradition in portuguese history, due to geographical, historical, political and social, economic, cultural and ideological reasons (BARRETO 1984).

The New State centralizing policies gave continuity to the liberal (1820-1910) and to republican (1910-1926) policies - see BARRETO 1974, CAETANO and others 1982.

Centralization is entirely congruent with the administrative character the regime took, but inconsistent with corporatist doctrine and municipalist tradition, both invoked by the New State (chapter seven, section 2.4.2.d), 3.3)

Anyone who studied the New State could not fail to notice that the centralization mould was very much influenced by the napoleonic mould (NOTE 34). The centralization invaded areas which have generally in western tradition a certain degree of autonomy like university government (chapter five, sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2) or local government, as will just be seen.

SALAZAR's praise of concentration and continuity in administrative life (SALAZAR I, 374) and of an unified command ("many prepare, one above decides and executes" SALAZAR I, 375) obviously led to centralization. SALAZAR's autocratic style of government (chapter two, section 4) enhanced the effects of centralization.

Centralization did not bring efficiency. Speaking about the educational system MARQUES comments "Sucessive reforms in each group of upper schools enhanced centralization but had very little impact on quality of education" (MARQUES 1976, 205) Only from the top one could see all, but this did not mean one could modify it (GRAHAM 1975, 60).

4.6. Concentration of powers - no autonomy of local government

Despite initial statements about decentralization (SALAZAR I, 86), the cult of the tradition of municipalism (see above pages 129-131) and corporative doctrine (see above page 121) tight control over local government was exerted as soon as 1926 (ROBINSON 1979, 53). This control initially intended to do away with local republican patronage (PORTAS and GAGO, 1980).

The interference of central government in local affairs was justified by New State leaders with the advantages of concentration of power in underdeveloped countries (see SALAZAR IV, 245, BAPTISTA 1957, 37-42 - chapter seven, section 1.4.1) with the lack of human and material resources in local communities (CAETANO 1970a, 245-246) (NOTE 35).

The logic of the strong state leads directly to this interference as was already hinted in initial statements (chapter seven, section 1.1). There was no lack of legal mechanisms for this interference (see CAETANO 1970a, 352-359). On the other hand, local government bodies had no general duties but specifically detailed ones, regulated by law, which was a strong limitation (see CAETANO 1970a, 318).

Naturally the mayor was appointed (CAETANO was against his election - see CAETANO 1972b, 634-635) and should represent both the municipality in regard to the State and the Government in the municipality. This made the mayor both a local and state body (see CAETANO 1970a, 288, 323). Even at the lowest level (parish) there was a "base of carefully screened safe Government people" (BLUME 1975).

Beyond all those controls, financial control was decisive and made autonomy non-existent - see MARQUES 1976, 198, REGELHAUPT 1979.

So there was no autonomy whatsoever of local government (NOTE 36). This led to concentration in Lisbon of the major part of the human resources of the State and consequently of the headquarters of the major economic groups. Portugal developed a macrocephalic aspect - a body where the head is out of all proportion (see BARRETO 1984, COSTA 1966).

4.7. No participation of the administered citizens in decision-making

Although every citizen was highly dependent from the State, it could not participate in any quality in any level of the process of policy formulation, adoption or even implementation. The authoritarian nature of the regime created mechanisms of non participation, of which centralization was not the least important (see chapter five, section 1.1.2; chapter seven, section 5; chapter eight, section 4.5).

Those mechanisms

were reinforced by repressive mechanisms and were helped by several strategies to promote demobilized attitudes; that is, participation was not legally available, was not de facto possible and hopefully would be not even desired.

This non participation extended to rural and urban areas. RIEGELHAUPT concludes that the New State "controlled peasant participation by effectively eliminating all possibilities of local-level participation in the political arena " (RIEGELHAUPT 1979) (NOTE 37).

Not even local elites could be very influential in a system where all decisions were taken at central level - ASSIS GONÇALVES, Salazar's secretary in his early years as prime minister (and later given a role as representative of the Government in a district far away from Lisbon) reports several conflicts between local nationalist leaders (unable to make promises or to appoint or promote persons which could reinforce their own political position) and central departments (NOTE 38).

Of course this non participation neither of the administered citizens nor, in a much lesser extent, of local elites in decision-making is related with the non accountability of Public Administration, natural in a non responsible limitedly pluralist regime.

4.8. Administrative formulation and bureaucratic implementation of problems - an administrative style in decision-making

4.8.1. Administered Politics

The monopoly of decision-making by Public Administration, the concentration of powers and the fusion of political and administrative careers led to a style of decision-making where all problems were administratively represented and all solutions bureaucratically framed. As MANNHEIM (1952) says *"The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration"*.

Questions were put into bureaucratic categories previewed in previous legislation (MERTON 1940) so the bureaucrat's job is to fit problems in the most adequate bureaucratic category and

to apply to it the general rule pre-decided for this categorized situation. In such situation rule making is the important formulation task and categorizing the important implementation task.

CAETANO gives a clear account of this process *"For the bureaucracy all problems, even those of the most acute social interest, and all cases, even those of the deepest human density, are reduced to the volume of a file which wanders slowly by the paths of bureaus, leaving now and then a residue - a filing card. So life is being reduced to schemes, it is being squeezed into juridic essence drops and transformed into printed forms"* (CAETANO 1950,19).

This "administered politics" (GRAHAM 1975,14) (NOTE 39) led to an "administered society" (RIEGELHAUPT 1979), invading all areas - even repression was administrative and legally framed (chapter six, section 1.3; chapter seven, section 1.5).

4.8.2. The predominance of Law men in Public Administration

Being the most important task of this "administered politics" the pre-decision of problems through categorizing situations and giving each category a solution through the making of legal norms it is natural that Law men became the predominant group in the regime. In fact, their expertise is essential in a system where innovation is rule making and reform rule remaking.

Indeed SCHMITTER tells us that for years lawyers and judges constituted almost one third of the Assembly and 15% of the Corporative Chamber (SCHMITTER 1975,34). Well over half of the civil cabinet ministers during the period 1932-1968 were graduated in Law; a similar proportion probably hold for senior civil servants (MARTINS 1971). As NUNES says "administration [was] commanded fundamentally by men with legal formation" (NUNES 1964).

Indeed Law was the avenue for power, being Law the continental equivalent to the English Public School in this sense (NOTE 40). Far more law graduates were produced than were used in judicial matters, but Law had a great potential of role substitution (MARTINS 1971). A standard joke among

portuguese Lawlicentiates is very revealing of this -"The Law course prepares for everything even to one become a lawyer" (NOTE 41).

The consequence of this predominance of Law Men in Government and Public Administration was to reinforce the legalist-bureaucratic style. Indeed this style served also as pretext to consider Law men more prepared than other licentiates ones to government and management. It became a vicious circle - legalist style of decision-making is both cause and consequence of the predominance of Lawmen. If every problem is a legal problem (or must be transformed into a legal problem) Law men should monopolize decision-making.

So even doctrinal documents became, in SCHMITTER's words, "*ideological-legal treatises*" (SCHMITTER 1975,26). Ideological principles are transformed into legal principles which facilitates the bureaucratization of doctrine.

This tendency is very much supported by the predominance of a positivist philosophy in the Faculties of Law (at Coimbra and at Lisbon). As one professor of Law said, in 1932, in a public ceremony, presenting a colleague as implicit model of Law professional - "for him, as jurist, there is no Law outside the norms which are assumed and ratified by the rulers" (in HESPANHA 1982)NOTE 42).

The predominance of Law men in Administration made very difficult the creation of a professional spirit specific of Public Administration and even the creation of a School of Administration (NOTE 43).

If one adds the legalist tendency to the "catedratocracia" of the New State one can logically conclude that university professors of Law were the most powerful group in Government and Administration. Indeed this was the case - most of the academics who where members of Government were professors of Law. Both Salazar and Caetano were professors of Law. This role was even more visible in the educational system - out of the fourteen ministers of Education between 1932 and 1968 half were professors of Law (thirteen out of fourteen were university professors) - from 1936 to 1955 there was a constant rule of professors of Law over the Ministry of Education (NOTE 44).

4.8.3. The relationship between Politics and Administration

The administrative framing of all problems presupposes a concept of Politics which identifies it, in large part, with Administration. This is indeed characteristic of authoritarian regimes (LINZ 1975,271), typical of bureaucratic thought (MANNHEIM 1952) and very current in latin-american Iberian world (WIARDA 1977,21).

SALAZAR's speeches give several indicators that his political thought supports similar views (NOTE 45). As seen above (chapter three, section 2.4.4), partisan politics, the politics of the others, was inherently evil. New State politics was obviously not evil but played just a minor role in the regime's activity when compared with administrative government activities.

"Government is the superior guidance of national collectivity through the definition of objectives to be reached and the daily decision of problems of implementation of those objectives. Politics is the set of individual or collective means through which public conscience is led to a state of adherence or mere conformity in regard to those objectives and cooperates with the authorities in their implementation"

(SALAZAR IV, 274 - see also SALAZAR V 304-311). Politics "has as only useful goal to give expression and political value to government acts. To govern [...] is the only truly consistent and serious role" (SALAZAR IV, 487 - see also SALAZAR II, 72-74).

Thus for SALAZAR administration is the only worthy and honourable activity, politics is reduced to mere propaganda and can aim, in truly demobilizing fashion, towards mere conformity of citizens (NOTE 46).

5. CONCLUSION - THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IS CONGRUENT WITH PASSIVITY AND DEMOBILISATION

As we have just seen the strong state discourse was implemented in Administrative State practice. The Administrative State is the most congruent with the passivity aim of the regime. The concentration of decision-making did not allow for any participation of civil society in decision-

-making, the administrative formulation of problems created an apolitical and apparently value free style of decision-making and the power of Public Administration did not allow guarantees for those who were subject to its administration. Indeed the Administrative State was very effective in achieving passivity and demobilisation.

CHAPTER IX

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN EDUCATION

-PRACTICE-

How were the different discourses of the regime about the role of the state in education implemented in practice? According to our hypothesis, the authoritarian strong state discourse should have prevailed in practice under the form of Administrative State .

We will analyse the role of the state educational practice in three stages.

First of all, we will gather evidence to prove that there was no corporative implementation in education. Special attention will be paid to University, since it is the most prominent and powerful educational organization in the regime as it is, at the same time, a natural corporation.

The next stage of our analysis will be decisive for the confirmation of our hypothesis. As it was referred above (chapter one, sections 2.1.1.b), 3.2), it was created, during the mobilising period, a mobilising youth organization ("Portuguese Youth"). Does this mean that, at least in education, the mobilizing strong state discourse led to a totalitarian educational practice? It is through the analysis of what become of that organization that we will seek the answer to this question.

The third and final stage of our analysis will examine if the authoritarian strong state had been implemented in education under the form of Administrative State. This will be done through the analysis of the position of the State in regard to private teaching (strong state) and through the analysis of the centralization of educational management (Administrative State) in the next chapter.

This chapter will show both the real role of the State in education and will hopefully carry further evidence for the authoritarian nature of the regime, as manifested in education.

1. CORPORATISM WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED IN EDUCATION

1.1. A partial and incomplete corporatism

Before analyzing the case of corporatist implementation in education it is necessary to analyze the implementation of moral corporations in accordance with the theoretically integral character of portuguese corporatism (chapter seven, sections 2.4.1, 4.1.1) and thus to answer to the question put in the beginning of the previous chapter (page 291) - were the various areas of society actually corporatized?

The answer is that since 1966 all areas of society were formally corporatized. So Portuguese corporatism could formally claim (only after 1966) to be formally an integral corporatism.

But the reality is very different. In fact, Portuguese corporatism was a partial corporatism, almost restricted to the economic area. Several indicators point in that direction.

First of all, the formal completion of corporatism was retarded until 1966, which is the date of the creation of the moral and cultural corporations - the Corporation for Welfare, the Corporation for Science, Letters and Arts and the Corporation for Physical Education and Sports. So, even at the formal level, Portugal lived in partial incomplete corporatism for thirty three years (1933-1966); moral corporations were created almost in the end of Salazar's rule (NOTE 1).

Secondly, the most important moral and cultural organizations were never corporatized. As said above (chapter eight, section 1.2) neither the Church (NOTE 2) nor the University were ever corporatized. Corporatization of (liberal) professions watered down many of the control devices of corporative regulations (see WIARDA 1977, 139-140, 245).

Thirdly, the primary organizations of those moral

corporations were not changed and their representatives did not really represent them (LUCENA 1976a,161,1978b) -(NOTE 3).

The Corporative Chamber did not represent adequately the moral interests.

In sum, if one goes beyond formal aspects portuguese corporatism was only an economic one - see LUCENA 1976a 161-162 , WIARDA 1977,329-330.

1.2. The non integration of the University in the corporative scheme

The most important moral corporation in the educational system would be the University. But it was not corporatized. In spite of the work done during the period of the corporatist revival about this corporatization (chapter seven,section 4.1.4) and in spite of the fact that Caetano, a theorician of University as a corporation, was Rector of the University of Lisbon (1959-1962) the university remained outside the corporative system.

There were sometimes timid defenses of university autonomy (see the episodes narrated in CAETANO's memoirs in CAETANO 1977,295-301,332-333) or attitudes which demonstrated the conscience of university privileges like the resignation of CAETANO as Rector of the University of Lisbon in 1962 due to the entrance of the police in the University (chapter six, section 2.5.2). But this could mean only that a University is a natural corporation; it did not mean that it was integrated in the implemented corporative scheme.

Occasional references to university corporative autonomy were just to pay lip service to the regime's official doctrine but had no real meaning - see, for instance, GALVÃO TELLES's reference, when he was Minister of Education, to the autonomy and self management of university students welfare service (GALVÃO-TELLES 1967) - or were qualified with restrictions and limitations (GALVÃO-TELLES 1963a).

The reality was, as it was said in chapter five (section 2.3.2), the gradual centralization of university management and the repression of university students activities (chapter six, section 2.5). Any autonomy which was obtained for the university came from the

political activity within the university of its students which, since 1962, transformed the University in an "autonomous arena of political debate". (chapter six, section 2.5.3)

WIARDA refers as reasons for this non integration of the University in the corporative scheme conjuncture reasons, the technical difficulty of corporatizing a so complex institution, the volatility of student body, the political opposition of senior faculty and students and sheer inertia (WIARDA 1977,124).

But deeper reasons can be invoked to explain this situation.

Why indeed was a natural corporation with traditions of self government and historical privileges, the "alma mater" of all corporatist ^{ef}theoricians (almost all of them were university professors) not part of the implemented corporative scheme?

First of all, the University elite did not need this integration to obtain power, since through co-optation they could guarantee a "catedratocracia". This linked the elite with the only political reality - Government/Public Administration which was much more powerful than the corporative structure. Thus the opposition of senior faculty to corporatization of the university.

On the other hand, corporatist implementation in the University could be dangerous for the authoritarian nature of the regime, since it enhanced autonomy and self-government which could be dangerous if given to younger members of staff, not yet co-opted, and to university students. Indeed portuguese intellectuals did not convert "en masse" to the new regime (ROBINSON 1979,81) and the period of corporatist formal completion (economic corporations were created between 1957 and 1959) coincided with the great social changes which had a counterpart in university unrest (chapter six, section 2) Gradual centralization was clearly preferable from the point of view of the regime's authoritarianism.

So when university student unrest began (1956,1961-62, 1969 onwards) and the public debate about the unwillingness of Universities for self-reformation took form (from 1968 onwards - NOTE 4) corporatism was no doctrinaire reference at all.

1.3. The non corporative government of the educational system

As said in chapter seven (section 4.1.2) the touchstone of educational corporative management was the attribution of primary responsibility for the education of children to families.

In reality parents had no participation at all in school government at any level, not even in the village primary school. So it is clear that this main principle was ignored.

The only corporative vestiges in educational government are the permission of individual "domestic teaching" (article 43 of the Constitution) and the setting up in 1936 of an organization called "The Work of the Mothers for National Education", a "collaborative agency" of the corporative structure (WIARDA 1977, 117).

The "domestic teaching" is the individual teaching given at home by parents or other relatives who live with the child. By its very nature it is a faculty which could be used by very few families. According to statements in the first "National Congress of Private Schools" in 1965, the major part of this teaching became almost clandestine (in GOMES 1981).

In regard to "The Work of the Mothers for National Education" its objectives were to stimulate the education role of families, to give child care guidance to mothers, to defend good customs and more specifically to promote pre-school education, to promote school social welfare, to help teachers in the moral and civic education of pupils and in their attendance and school progress, thus contributing for the nationalist education of Portuguese youth (Decree nº 26893 15-8-1936).

This organization was staffed on a voluntarily basis by mothers of the upper class generally linked with local and governmental elites. It was clearly aimed at the indoctrination of low class families in the good customs, good educative principles nationalist spirit. It did not mean to promote the participation of families in school education decisions, but rather control morally and doctrinally low class families and more "suspicious" teachers (SAMPAIO 1976, 40).

The deeds were rather less, in all dimensions, than the intentions; the organization never got any prominence (MONICA 1978, 228). It utterly failed to promote pre-school education,

it failed in the educational welfare dimension (in 1940 only 0.4% of primary school population got school meals through the organization says MONICA, ibidem).

The creation, in 1966, of the Corporation for Science, Letters and the Arts, where educational interests were represented, did not modify the government of the educational system. In fact this Corporation "never did really began to function, largely because of the opposition of the university community and of the sheer difficulty of organizing such an inherently individualistic sector" (WIARDA 1977,229) (NOTE 5).

5.4. The non meaningful indoctrination in the curriculum

As it was above analysed in chapter three (section 3.3.2) political education was not meaningful, ideological education was completely irrelevant. So it is not surprising to discover that corporative indoctrination was practically ^{non-}existent in compulsory education - we only found a text about the cooperation of classes in the sole reading book for the third class, a text about the Corporative state in a book of 1937 for the fourth class (NOTE 6). It was probably considered a too elaborate doctrine to be presented to young children.

Corporative indoctrination was also completely unimportant in secondary education, but one can find here more positive statements of intentions. The reform of grammar school education of 1936 (Decree 27084,14-10-1936) states, in its preamble, the need to form a "corporative mentality" and in the article 33 the need for all teachers to give their teaching a "colonial and corporative direction". The Law 1941 (11-4-1936) had previously declared that it would be compulsory in all schools of the post-primary level (including teacher training schools) courses of corporative organization.

But in the reform of grammar school education of 1947 all this vanished into thin air. We were in the period of corporatism discredit (chapter eight, section 2.2.2) as to corporatism revival it had no effect on the curriculum.

The only presence of corporative indoctrination in this curriculum which survived from the 1936 mobilizing reform was (since 1936 until 1974), a course of "Political and Administrative Organization of the Nation" where some corporatist indoctrination was done (NOTE 7). But the low status of this subject in the curriculum, mainly due to having only one hour per week and to the fact that no specialization was needed to teach the subject, almost cancelled any indoctrination effect (NOTE 8).

In regard to technical education, corporative indoctrination was formally assumed as necessary, the reason being the need to control the future working class. But even here it was given only one course of one hour per week in just one school grade under the name of "Corporative Formation". The same effect of low status almost cancelled any indoctrination effect (BETTENCOURT 1983, 93-94).

In regard to the University corporatism was only present in the curriculum of Law courses - there was a course of Corporative Law. The appeal of Pires Cardoso for a compulsory semester course about corporatism for all university courses (CARDOSO 1949,14) was not followed. But, as Law licentiates were considered the natural corporative elite (CARDOSO 1949,14-15), and were also the political and administrative elite, corporatist formulation was included in their training.

Research centers for corporative studies were created in the University of Lisbon (in 1949) and in the University of Coimbra (in 1951) which were henceforth responsible for the major part of the doctrinaire studies about corporatism (see about their work WIARDA 1977, 194-197).

1.5 Conclusion - corporatism was not implemented in education

One can easily conclude from what was said that Corporatism was not implemented in education and that is not relevant for the understanding either of New State theory about education or of its practice.

This irrelevancy is even emphasized by the fact that the creation of the corporation of education (Corporation for Science, Letters and the Arts) was done in 1966, in a period where the educational system was breaking away from the mould of the mobilising period in some aspects - the substitution of primary sole textbooks was in preparation (the first new sole textbook was used in the school year of 1967-1968) (chapter three, section 3.2.3.c)), compulsory schooling was expanded for six years in 1964, the preparatory school was created in 1967 (chapter five, section 3.5).

One can hypothesize that corporatization did not perform in the educational system any of the real functions of corporatism already described (chapter eight, section 3.2) - the preventive and the defensive functions of corporatism were mainly necessary in the economic system whose agents were not directly controlled by the state, but it were not necessary in a system which was completely centralized and whose agents were directly controlled.

The failure of the corporative discourse in education means most probably the practical success of the strong state discourse. Did it prevail in the mobilising mould or in the demobilising authoritarian mould? As it was said in the beginning of this chapter, the answer to this question will be done analysing the history of the apparently mobilising youth movement - the "Mocidade Portuguesa".

2. THE FAILURE OF THE STRONG MOBILIZING STATE DISCOURSE IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

- WAS "MOCIDADE PORTUGUESA" A MOBILIZING MOVEMENT?

As it was just said, we will carry evidence for this failure through the analysis of what became of the mobilizing youth organization of the regime. This does not mean that the analysis of statements about aims and of the school curriculum cannot provide also relevant evidence for this failure, but rather that the main evidence should come from the analysis of the only educational organization which assumed more clearly, at least in the beginning, this mobilizing intention.

2.1. Foundation of "Mocidade Portuguesa" (M.P.) as a mobilising movement - its main principles

As seen above, "Portuguese Youth" - "Mocidade Portuguesa" (henceforth named as M.P.) - was founded in 1936, during the "fascistization from without" period. This period included a set of changes in the regime of mobilizing tone, as has been seen (chapter one, section 2.1.1,b), chapter three, section 2.2.1).

It was unquestionably founded as a mobilising movement which fits with the fascistoid pattern of the period (see CARNEIRO - PACHECO 1936 a, 1936c, 1938a). According to the first regulation (Decree-Law nº 27301, 4-12-1936 henceforth named simply as the Regulation, it *"encompasses all youth, being it in school or not, and has as aims to stimulate the integral development of its physical capacity, the formation of character and the devotion to Fatherland, in a sentiment of order, in the liking of discipline and in the cult of military duty"*. The M.P. *"will promote the moral and civic, physical and pre-military education of its members [...] and will cultivate the christian education traditional in the country"*.

It was a movement organized around the trilogy "Fatherland, God and Authority". The nationalistic inculcation was transmitted mainly through pre-military training and physical development in order that "through a complete

hierarchy and a sound formative guidance, the youth of Portugal be a closed rank of nationalistic faith" (CARNEIRO - PACHECO 1936a). Authority and hierarchy were a good way to imprint devotion to the Fatherland. Religious indoctrination was also present and the 1936 Regulation even said that "*on no account [the M.P.] will admit in its ranks an individual without religion*"|. Authority transpires in all articles of the Regulation and is embodied in the military organization and training and in respect to hierarchy.

This trilogy is implemented through an alliance of three very important institutions in the New State - the Army, the Church and the University. The Army is given some command posts (see article 9 and 10 of the Regulation) and general influence over the organization, the Church is present at all levels through religious assistants (see ARRIAGA 1976,69-70) and the direction of M.P. was given several times to University professors ("catedráticos" and Army men divided almost all the leadership of M.P. - see ARRIAGA 1976,49-59 - from 1940 to 1944 Caetano himself was the leader of M.P.). This institutional trilogy was present in various symbols - the patrons were a warrior saint (Nuno Álvares Pereira) and the organizer of Discoveraies (Henry, the Navigator), the hierarchic units were called upon historical and nationalistic figures or themes. The trilogy was also present in parades and other public activities of M.P. (NOTE 9).

2.2. The coexistence in early times of a totalitarian discourse and an authoritarian discourse

There are various totalitarian-like statements and a few regulations which indicate clearly the existence of a totalitarian intention in the early times of M.P. But there are also, at least, as many which contradict those indicators and point towards an authoritarian (and thus less mobilising) discourse. We will study the coexistence of those two discourses through the analysis of speeches of the mobilising minister who created M.P. (Carneiro - Pacheco), the instructions given during the mobilising period

by the second National Commissary of the M.P. (1940-

-1944), who was no less than Marcello Caetano (published in a book called. "The Mission of the Leaders - Reflections and Guidelines for 'Portuguese Youth' " - CAETANO 1952), the first Regulation of M.P., the Conclusions of the First National Congress of M.P., in May 1939, (included in CAETANO 1952) and the "Precepts of the Good Affiliate Member"(also included in CAETANO 1952).

2.2.1. The totalitarian discourse

Analysing those primary sources one can find several totalitarian-like statements - the emphasis on the military training and spirit of M.P. (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, 1936c, Regulation articles 1,9,11); his extreme nationalistic fervour (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a,1936c, CAETANO 1952,48-49); the desire to build a new mobilised youngman and thus to create a "new nationalist renaissance" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936c); appeals to mobilisation of nation (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); appeal to cult of physical fitness and virility (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, Regulation article 1) and occasional references to the decadence of the race (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); the cult of obedience and of blind adhesion to the leader (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936c).

There are other indicators of a totalitarian intention in statements which exalt the value of M.P. in the education of youth in regard to institutions like the family or other organizations like the school or the Church. The insufficiency of family in the education of new generation is sometimes acknowledged (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, CAETANO 1952,36-37) and it is expected some resistance of families to the implementation of M.P. (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); it is even occasionally said that "we are in such times that often parents need to be educated by their children" (CAETANO 1952, 37 - see also SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,288,CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1938a)(NOTE 10).The insufficiency of school is also referred (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, CAETANO 1952,38-39).

Appeals to cooperation with "Portuguese Legion" (Legião Portuguesa) a mobilizing militia created in 1936 (see above page 14) (SALAZAR II,297-298,III,162 CAETANO in 1940 - in ARRIAGA 1976,54 - Regulation, article 9) and the occasional

intercharge with german nazi youth organization (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1938a).

But there organizational indicators which go beyond mere verbal statements - the military-like internal organization of M.P., its symbols (uniform, roman salute and other paraphernalia), the S in uniform's belts in a tentative cult of the leader all are indicators of a totalitarian intention.

The organizational role assigned to M.P. is also a powerful indicator - membership was compulsory, M.P. encompassed all youth being it school youth or not (Regulation article 1); in 1942 it was given M.P. the coordination and control of all youth movements (Decree-Law nº31908, 9-3-1942), of all school associations (1942), of all physical education and sport practiced by young ones until 21 years of age (August 1942 - see ARRIAGA 1976,28). The M.P. was also given the supervision of all extra classroom activities in schools in the 1947 reform of grammar school education (Decree-Law nº 36508, 17-9-1947) and in the 1948 reform of technical education (Decree-Law nº 37029, 25-8-1948) and the supervision of the teaching of Physical Education, Choral Singing and Women's Handworks (Decree-Law 36507, 17-9-1947, article 13). M.P. was also responsible for the school canteen (NOTE 11).

These early times of M.P. were met with enthusiasm by the regime's press (see ARRIAGA 1976, 79-94); the national broadcasting corporation even for some time began and ended its broadcastings with the M.P. anthem (ARRIAGA 1976,64). Those early times were propitious to interchanges with totalitarian youth organizations (see ARRIAGA 1976,37-47 and FERREIRA 1952), tentative cults of the leader (CARNEIRO-PACHECO called Salazar "the great educator of youth" - in ARRIAGA 1976,39 - see also in CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1935b Salazar "as the great educator of our times")(NOTE 12).

One can conclude that there was indeed mobilisation and a mobilising group supporting M.P. action. CARNEIRO-PACHECO is the overexcited and frenetic spokesman of this group. Undoubtely some within the regime followed this mobilising style, but the main stream remained clearly quieter. According to CAETANO (CAETANO 1977,165) Salazar so disliked CARNEIRO-

-PACHECO that he ceased to attend him. As we will now see, both the speeches of CAETANO and, in a much greater scale, those of Salazar remained in the authoritarian framework.

2.2.2. The authoritarian discourse

There are clear and explicit statements denying any totalitarian intention in M.P. - M.P. is a "movement of *integral formation, but does not pretend to be a movement of totalitarian education. Integral formation is that which develops in youth all virtualities towards the Good*" (CAETANO 1952,35 - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,156) (NOTE 13).

The basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure"(chapter three,section 2.4.1)which are the basis of the passive mentality inculcation, are present in CAETANO's instructions to M.P. (CAETANO 1952,45,146). Salazar puts it very clearly, in 1950 "*It is not understandable [...] that M.P. be not the vivarium of an anticommunist elite, anti-communist only because it is portuguese, anti-communist only because it is spiritual, anticommunist only because deffends freedom of conscience and fights for human dignity*" (SALAZAR IV,510-511) (NOTE 14).

It is very obvious from CAETANO's instructions, from the conclusions of the First National Congress of M.P. and from the "Precepts of the Good Affiliate Member," that the main aim of M.P. is moral education, rather than political ideological education - the main aim is the development of all virtualities towards the Good, the integral formation,the teaching to become a man (CAETANO 1952, 7,34-35), the moral education of youth (CONCLUSIONS, number 5).

The first National Commissary for the M.P. (1936-1940) was already saying that M.P. was not a political party nor had any immediate purposes of political fight (in ARRIAGA 1976,52) For CAETANO the political aspect of M.P. is fundamentally the preparation of elites and to make of "*each portuguese a conscient, disciplined and persistent agent of the policy which suits the Nation*" (CAETANO 1952,11 - see also page 29). Caetano reports that the so called "nationalist formation instructors", specially charged with nationalist indoctrination,

which existed in the beginning the organization, had been soon dropped because the system did not work (CAETANO 1952,145).

In the prevalence of moral education one can feel the influence of Boy Scouts organization - this is explicitly acknowledged by Caetano (CAETANO 1977,110-111) and referred by MARQUES (1976, 186) and WIARDA (1977,120,250).

The analysis of both the "Conclusions of the First National Congress" and the "Precepts" carry evidence for this. Out of the ten precepts 80% are concerned with moral education; out of the twenty-nine general conclusions 38%(11) are concerned with moral education, 14%(4) with pre-military training, 14%(4) with physical education, 14%(4) with nationalistic and political education (21%(6) were categorized as various) (NOTE 15).

In correspondance with the doctrinal trilogy (God, Fatherland, Family) there was a trilogy of educational agents which the New State considered fundamental for the education of youth - Church, Army and Family. Those three agents should be present in school and in M.P., as had already been seen in the initial section of this part. As Caetano says - M.P. formation is "*integral, but incomplete formation. In order to complete this formation it is not too much the efforts of Family, School and Church, in conjunction with ours*" (CAETANO 1952,42) "*The M.P. is above the school, in the same plane of the sound family and of the Church, as environment of character formation and preparation for life*" (CAETANO 1952,8). The role of the family as educator, in this context, is emphasized (see SALAZAR in 1938 - III,89). All those statements reject any monopoly or superiority of M.P. as educational agent of youth.

In consonance with this spirit one can quote several statements which qualify restrict or even contradict the more totalitarian-like statements quoted in the previous section. "The pre-military education is fundamentally a formative pedagogical problem, hence it should be done by processes

different from those of military instruction." (CONCLUSIONS, number 19 - see also CAETANO 1952,30). "The physical education of youth should be accommodated to the possibilities of those to be educated" (CONCLUSIONS, number 1 - see also CAETANO 1952 30). The cult of obedience should only be exercised when it is useful and always respecting the personality of young ones, and promoting their spirit of initiative and autonomous action (CONCLUSIONS, numbers 11,12,13,14). Authority should be based on prestige (CAETANO 1952,50). All those statements are much more moderate than those above quoted about the same subjects.

The most significant indicator of the non totalitarian essence of M.P. (or, at least, of its divided soul, in early times) is the role of the Catholic Church in M.P. As had been seen in chapter three "moral union" between the New State and the Church is one of the most important evidence for the authoritarian demobilising essence of the regime (chapter two, section 5.5). This "moral union" existed in M.P. since the beginning (although it became much more clear after the mobilising time - see FERREIRA 1952).

The Church had seen with suspicion the creation of M.P. (NOGUEIRA 1978,21), but several statements were clear and explicit in asserting the "moral union" at this level. The Minister of Education comments that "God and Fatherland had been together since Portugal was born" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); Caetano reaffirms that *"As we do not pretend the educational totalitarianism, we do not only respect, but also want and greet, the existence of the works of the youth from 'Catholic Action'"* (CAETANO 1952,41) (NOTE 16) and asserts that M.P. does not pretend to have a specific moral doctrine outside that of the Catholic Church (CAETANO 1952,40). Indeed M.P. wants to promote not only moral, but also religious feelings, attitudes and practices among its members (CONCLUSIONS numbers 6 and 7, CAETANO 1952,40) (NOTE 17).

"Moral union" was also present at the organizational level - there were "ecclesiastic assistants" at all levels headed by

a "National Ecclesiastic Assistant".

One can conclude that, even in early times, the authoritarian discourse co-existed, at least with equivalent status, with the mobilising totalitarian-like one - the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" were as present as the mobilised attitudes, the respect of family was as present as the idea of educating the parents through the children, moral education was as present as political education, religious education was as present as nationalist education, the Church was as present as the Army, God was as present as Fatherland.

We have not enough evidence to confirm if one of the two discourses was clearly prevailing at the time, but it seems clear that different groups inside the regime supported different discourses. The mobilizing group was naturally more ostentatious and thus attracted more attention, but it is interesting to call attention to the preference clearly given by Salazar and also by Caetano (although in this case with some concessions to the mobilizing group) to the authoritarian discourse.

2.3. The abandonment of the totalitarian-like discourse and the decline of M.P.

This title could be interpreted as implying a cause - effect relationship between those two facts. That is, once the mobilising period ended with the world war, M.P. decline naturally followed by cessation of its "raison d'être". This would mean that the true nature of M.P. was that of a totalitarian youth organization. Against this reasoning stands the fact that M.P. remained until 1974. To accept this explanation would imply to accept that M.P. only lived according to its essential purpose nine years (1936-1945) and was in decline the remaining twenty nine years (1945-1974)!

On the other hand, if the true nature of M.P. was pursuing demobilisation and passivity it could have developed naturally, once the mobilising period (which would have somewhat distorted its nature) ended. Indeed this was not apparently, at first glance, the case.

The question is complex and so the title does not pretend to contain any hidden explanatory message. It just affirms an

intention of explaining those two phenomena. In fact, we need an explanation not just for the creation of M.P., but for its decline. We also need further explanations to account for its long survival in a declined condition. All the few studies which try to explain M.P. address the first question, very few the second question (ARRIAGA 1976, BETTENCOURT 1983) and apparently none the third question (only a brief reference can be found in MARTINS 1970).

It is obvious that one cannot center the study of an organization which lasted thirty eight years (1936-1974) in the study of the first nine years. So this section will analyse the remaining years of M.P.

This discussion is central for the confirmation of the main hypothesis of this work - the creation and persistence of a totalitarian-like mobilising youth organization within the New State would be a very serious objection to our hypothesis that the regime sought passivity through non participation and demobilisation.

2.3.1. Evidence of the decline of M.P.

The M.P. was never a great success (BETTENCOURT 1983, FONSECA 1983, 70 MONICA 1978, 355, ROBINSON 1979, 58-59), never penetrated meaningfully the University (MONTEIRO 1975), it even became a subject of contempt or ironical comment (MARQUES 1976, 186) "Though the Mocidade sounded both fierce and Fascist, in fact it never became either of these" (WIARDA 1977, 120). It entered in decline after the Second World War (ARRIAGA 1976, 13, 58-59, 105, BETTENCOURT 1983, MARQUES 1976, 186) and became in time like a Boy Scout organization (WIARDA 1977, 250).

Evidence for this decline will come, first of all, from statements of the very leaders of M.P., in its Second Congress in 1956; then from content analysis of the three Regulations of M.P. (1936, 1966, 1971); the frontal attack on M.P. by FERREIRA, a member of parliament in 1952; still within the analysis of primary sources, one can find, even in the initial period, some indicators of difficulties which could help to understand the later decline.

BETTENCOURT's interviews of teachers is a useful

secondary source to confirm the primary evidence.

In 1956 M.P. promoted its second (and last) congress. In this Second National Congress of M.P., which had "the effect of a true autopsy" (ARRIAGA 1976,100) many statements of its leaders of M.P. represent clear evidence of an acknowledged decline -

"Only looked from afar does today's M.P. resemble a youth organization"; "last years have been almost completely [...] highly detrimental", "the M.P. has gone very little inside the boys" (all those statements and similar ones can be found in ARRIAGA 1976,95-101). Thus this decline was acknowledged by the organization (see SALAZAR V, 471).

The loss of doctrinal or civic content can be indicated by the analysis of M.P. Regulations. The proportion of expressive and instrumental articles of regulation should vary across time - that is, it is natural that loss of doctrinal and civic content should be translated in an increase in the proportion of instrumental regulation and in the consequent decrease in expressive statements in Regulations.

The measure of analysis will be the "article of regulation". Within the expressive category are included statements of aims and objectives, content of activities, references to symbols and rituals; instrumental articles include the organizational structure of M.P. (central and local), articles referring the coordination structure, hierarchic relationship, competences of decision-making bodies, staffing and finances.

The analysis of the last Regulation presents a difficulty - at that time there were two official youth organizations of the regime : M.P. and the "Secretariate for Youth" created in October 1971 (Decree-Law 446/71, 25-10-1971). The analysis of this situation is beyond our temporal scope of analysis (which ends in 1968). Since we are not analyzing specifically M.P. as such, but the regime's official youth organizations, the best solution seems to be to add the two Regulations of 1971 together - in a note a specific analysis of each one will be done and a brief explanation of this situation will be presented.

TABLE 9.1- EXPRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN OFFICIAL YOUTH
ORGANIZATION(S) REGULATIONS

CATEGORY OF ARTICLES	1936 STATUTE	1966 STATUTE	1971 STATUTES
EXPRESSIVE ARTICLES	16 64%	19 30%	15 27%
INSTRUMENTAL ARTICLES	9 36%	44 70%	41 73%
TOTAL	25 100%	63 100%	56 100%

As it is clearly visible there is a gap between the first Regulation (Decree-Law 27301, 4-12-1936) and the second one (Decree-Law 47311, 12-11-1966) - the number of regulations almost trebled, but the number of expressive regulations decreased enormously proportionately to the total. This can be seen as an indicator of bureaucratization and loss of doctrinal content (of course such indicator would be doubtful on its own, but here it supports other evidence). From 1966 to the two Regulations of 1971 ("Secretariate for Youth" Regulation - Decree-Law 446/71, 25-10-1971, M.P. Regulation Decree-Law 486/71, 8-11-1971) there is no significant difference (NOTE 18).

So this analysis can be seen as evidence of loss of doctrine and civic content of M.P. and thus of the decline of its mobilizing intention.

In 1952 a member of the National Assembly made as clear as a frontal attack on (boys) M.P. as the regime allowed - see FERREIRA 1952. This attack carries evidence of the decline of M.P. in two ways - through the accusations of inefficiency to M.P. and through the fact that it was possible

to attack so strongly the official youth organization (NOTE 19).

But one can already find early signs of alarm in the primary sources of the initial period, which were the object of analysis in the previous section. Caetano complained, in 1942, of the little support given to M.P. (in ARRIAGA 1976,55 - see also CAETANO 1977,8). Caetano very premonitorily warns against the temptation to promote just façade events (CAETANO 1952,75-78) and criticizes the dull sessions (in a very vivid account he tells of those M.P. sessions where "in inactive ranks the small talk alternates with the yawn" (CAETANO 1952,100).

This decline has even caricatural aspects like the emphatic denial of M.P. leaders that the S in the uniform's belt ever stood for Salazar (for the episode see ARRIAGA 1976, 74-76) (NOTE 20).

A secondary source confirms the decline evidenced by the referred facts. BETTENCOURT interviewed several teachers which were witnesses of M.P. work - they asserted that M.P. never performed the role it was assigned (BETTENCOURT 1983,94-96).

2.3.2. The tentative renewal of M.P. - the reform of 1966

The Second National Congress of 1956 did not provoke any immediate change M.P., in spite of the demands of its leaders to abolish compulsority.

Only in 1966, thirty years after the creation of M.P., did the Minister of Education, Galvão Telles, decided to reform M.P. This reform was preceded by a long speech about the problems of youth (GALVÃO-TELLES 1964c) in which he reasserted the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" and recommended that M.P. abandoned all appearance of educational statism and military aspect - see also GALVÃO-TELLES 1963e.

This reform had as its most important features to give to school a much greater control over extra-classroom activities and to give M.P. the promotion of school social services ("acção social escolar") (see ARRIAGA 1976,110-112). On the other hand, M.P. was to concern itself mainly with

school youth, almost abandoning the pretension of embracing all the youth. Compulsority of M.P. activities attendance was reduced for the first six years, being dependent for the remaining years on the decision of the Rector of a grammar school or the director of a technical school (article 26 of the 1966 Regulation). It gave to M.P. the monopoly of all school sport except on higher education (article 28).

Those reforms, on the one hand, merely adjusted principles to facts (it is the case of reduction of compulsority and restriction of M.P. mainly to school youth); on the other hand, those reforms by giving a more important role to school restricted the autonomy of M.P. activity. But there is also a third important aspect in those reforms -

- there is clearly a goal displacement from civic and moral education to sport and school welfare. This goal displacement seems similar to the goal displacement of corporatism towards welfare functions (chapter eight, section 2.2.4) and means acknowledgement of the abandonment of the early aims (NOTE 21)

The reform did not impede the decline of M.P. The reform of 1971 was just the final blow in a "delayed corpse" (NOTE 22)

2.4. Explanation of the decline of M.P.

It is evident that, in the initial period, the mobilising group behind the mobilising discourse of M.P. could produce statements, rituals and regulations which reflected the mobilisation intention - compulsority is the most prominent aspect. But there was, since the beginning, resistances to M.P., not just outside resistances but inside ones (ARRIAGA 1976, 46-47). Those resistances explain partially difficulties in the implementation of a mobilizing M.P. Those resistances were acknowledged by the leaders of M.P. (ARRIAGA 1976, 46-47, 101-104) and had their main cause in the compulsory characteristic of M.P. membership (NOTE 23). There were resistance from families, resistance from the Church (ARRIAGA 1976, 13, 101, FERREIRA 1952) (NOTE 24). As these resistances came from educational agents which generally supported the regime they reflect their vision about the regime they support.

There was other type of resistance - the resistance of secondary and higher education teachers and university

students (NOTE 25).

But the main cause of decline of M.P. was the end of the mobilising period and the consequent disappearance of the mobilising group within the regime - the same decline happened with other mobilising organizations like the "Portuguese Legion" (see GUERRA 1984,108,116). This was brought about as more easily as the mobilisation style was, from the point of view of the mainstream of the regime, a strategical move - (chapter one, section 2.1.1) (NOTE 26). Only policy change brought about by the Government can explain why M.P. had not had enough support to finance and staff a structure which could be adequate to accomplish its comprehensive task (NOTE 27).

So the authoritarian nature of the regime is undoubtedly the main explanation for the decline of mobilising M.P. (see in similar sense BETTENCOURT 1983,99-101).

So far the explanation seems reasonably linear and covers the creation and decline of M.P. - in brief, M.P. was created by pressure from the mobilising group as a (partial) mobilising organization, its decline being the direct consequence of the end of the mobilising period. Since its nature was essentially totalitarian it did not fit in the normal authoritarian characteristics of the regime. What happened to M.P. was similar to what happened to its predecessor the "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" - chapter one, section 2.1.1a); chapter five, section 1.2.2 .

But this reasoning does not explain adequately the long survival of M.P. That is, the difficulty pointed above remains. So it seems that further analysis are needed to elucidate the true nature of M.P.

2.5. Explanation of the survival of M.P. in a declining condition - the true role and nature of M.P.

In searching for reasons for the survival of M.P. the first which comes across is sheer inertia. In such a regime as the New State, inertia indeed played a part in non change. But this explanation can be abandoned immediately because the Second National Congress of M.P. proposed changes

in the characteristics and structure of M.P.

Does the tenacity with which [the regime] holds on to its key symbols and the resilience with which it revives dormant organizations after periods of international discredit" (MARTINS 1970) explain adequately the survival of M.P.? This statement is more a verification than an explanation, but linked with the "mausoleum effect" can provide an explanation.

The "mausoleum effect" in that previous organizational forms identified with earlier historical experience continue to exist side by side with those characteristics of modern industrial orders" (GRAHAM 1974) is typical of the latin-american-iberian world. As a consequence the political system of those countries resembles a "living museum" which reflects their whole history of political experience (GRAHAM 1974, WIARDA 1977,24). In this sense passive M.P. poses as a "living museum" or as a "mausoleum" remembering the mobilising days.

This characteristic is related to a process of change by superimposing social, ideological and political layers rather than by substitution of the old by the new ones. That is, change is the adaptation of the newer wines to the older bottles (SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,50, WIARDA 1977,25-26). Indeed the reform of youth movements was done by superimposition of another new organization ("Secretariate for Youth") - from 1971 onwards M.P. became exclusively a "living museum".

But has M.P. just been a "living museum" since the end of the war? Was its role just that of a mausoleum - to remember already gone times? Let us go back to the Congress of 1956 to search an answer. It was said there *"In the peak of its compulsonity three quarters of portuguese youth did not exist for M.P."* (in ARRIAGA 1976,96). This means that M.P. never worked as a mass organization. Its leaders asked, in this Congress, for the end of compulsonity. As one leader said *"Educational revolutions were never done acting upon enormous masses, since education is a personal work. What we need is an elite which works with the masses and gives them the redeeming ferment [...] Let us free the compelled attendants. Let us stay those who consciently want to stay"*. (in ARRIAGA 1976,96 - see similar demands from other leaders and groups

in ARRIAGA 1976,95-101) (NOTE 28). But this voluntariness, which "was almost enough prerequisite to transform M.P. in a true youth organization" (ibidem) was never allowed to M.P.

The appeal of M.P. leaders seems reasonable and adequate to the authoritarian nature of the regime - was it not Salazar himself who pointed to the preparation of elites as the main educational task of the regime (chapter two, section 2.2). In 1966 compulsority was restricted to the first six years, being from then on dependent on the decision of the head of schools. Indeed compulsority was restricted to the age range which was specifically asked, in 1956, to be excluded from membership of M.P. (see ARRIAGA 1976,100). Only in 1971 was this appeal satisfied - that is, voluntariness was only granted when M.P. suffered the last blow.

In sum, M.P. was compelled to continue in a impasse situation - it could not act as a mass organization by lack of means and will, and it was not allowed to act as an elite organization. Indeed it was compelled to act as a failed or decayed mass organization. A question naturally arises - why was not M.P. allowed, as its leaders demanded and seemed adequate (according to the elitist theory of government of the regime), to act as an elite organization of civic character? The answer to that question would provide us with an answer for the true nature of the regime.

A first hypothesis could be found on the educational role of M.P. which would, in some way, impose compulsory attendance. According to BETTENCOURT's interviewees, M.P. was mainly seen, in secondary schools, as a resource center for obtaining material facilities not available normally in schools. Paradoxically M.P. activities appeared as the only space in which students and teachers could discuss informally and pursue their own interests. Thus one can sometimes find teachers, politically situated in the opposition to the regime, in charge of some M.P. activities (BETTENCOURT 1983,94-95).

One can conclude from here that M.P. performed an useful educational role through promotion of (non political) extra-classroom activities. But this role does not impose any compulsory attendance, since voluntary adhesion seems

essential for the success of sportive, cultural and recreative activities. On the other hand, since resources for those activities in Portugal are always scarce compulsory attendance of those activities would be clearly not convenient.

So one must conclude that it was not the educational role of M.P. which imposed compulsory attendance.

One must search the explanation in other direction - in a political direction. If one recalls what been said about the organizational pre-emptying strategy of the New State, one can hypothesise that M.P. occupied a certain organizational space which were to let free could be occupied by other youth movements - student's associations, civic youth movements, progressist catholic movements, etc. This would be very dangerous for the demobilizing purpose of the regime. From this point of view, it is clear that compulsority was essential for the sucess of this organizational occupation strategy.

But one can go a little further in the exploration of this political (but not ideological) dimension of M.P. One can hypothesise that there was another reason for not allowing M.P. to become a voluntary organization, which has all to do with the nature of the regime. If M.P. was allowed to work on a voluntary basis its civic character could be activated again. This was very probable because some of M.P. elite were ideologically followers of the more mobilizing group of the mobilizing period of the regime. There was even a civic association of ex-members of the elite of M.P. ("Liga dos Antigos Graduados da Mocidade Portuguesa" - "League of the Ex-Officers of Portuguese Youth") (NOTE 29). The transformation of M.P. in a nationalist elite organization could provoke again the political appearance of a new dynamic ideological pressure group inside the regime, which could evolve into a political tendency.

This could be a far greater danger for the existing elite than the decay of M.P. The more immobilist the regime became, as it was the case in the 1950^S (chapter one, section 3.4; chapter two, section 4.4; chapter six, section 2) the less it was willing to accept any solution which could upset the balance of power inside it. As it was said in chapter two (section 4.3), Salazar always avoided the crystallization of the regime's internal groups in political tendencies, since they

could corner him and thus diminish his range of manoeuvre within the regime.

Those two political reasons seem to adequately explain why it was essential that M.P. remained legally compulsory.

To sum up, the true educational role of M.P. was to promote and coordinate extra-classroom activities and to promote moral education. The true political role of M.P. became, after the mobilising period, to pre-empt the organizational space of youth associations in order to avoid that it will become occupied by internal or external (to the regime) mobilizing groups.

Thus M.P.'s role is congruent with the authoritarian nature of the regime. This means that the strong state discourse did not lead in education to any totalitarian practice.

(Before concluding this section it is necessary to note that the analysis of the function of M.P. is restricted to boys M.P. Although the analysis of girls M.P. would be as interesting, on the educational point of view, it would not fit our purpose. As it was said, the analysis of M.P. in this thesis serves to confirm our demobilising hypothesis, through explaining that the initial mobilizing intention and totalitarian appearance of masculine M.P. was dropped after the mobilizing period. The analysis of feminine M.P. would be useless in this respect since, from the very beginning, it did assume clearly a demobilizing intention - see ARRIAGA 1976, 115-127, 141-151. That is, its congruence with our hypothesis could not be in doubt).

Until now we have concluded that corporatism was not implemented in education and also that there was not any

implemented strong totalitarian state discourse in education. It is due time to see which state discourse was effectively implemented. This means that we will analyse the implementation of the authoritarian strong state in educational practice. This will be done, in the last section, through the analysis of the position of the state in regard to private teaching (strong state) and then, in the next chapter, through the analysis of centralization of educational management (that is, of the implementation of the administrative state).

3. THE STRONG STATE IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE - THE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE EDUCATION

As it was said in the beginning of this chapter, the third stage of our analysis will examine if and how the authoritarian strong state had been implemented in education. This will be done in this section through the analysis of the position of the State in regard to private education.

3.1. New State theory about freedom of private education

Congruently with the theoretical position in regard to the role of family in education (chapter seven, section 4.1.2) the New State was favourable to private education. This could be seen as the substantiation of the family right to choose the education of children (NOTE 30).

The New State gave constitutional status to this principle. The 1933 Constitution says that the state should *"facilitate the performance of parent's instruction and education of their children, cooperating with them through state schools, reformatories or through favouring private institutions with those same objectives"* (article 13,4). In the article 42 the Constitution does not distinguish between official and private education - *"Education and instruction are compulsory and concern family and state and private schools in cooperation with it"*. The principle of freedom of private education is asserted in the article 44 *"It is free the establishment of private schools parallel to state ones, subject to state inspection, which the state can subsidize; the state can give official status to their certificates if their curricula and staff quality are not inferior to those of state schools"*. The Law 2033 (27-6-1949) renews the constitutional permission of private schools to have different curricula from those of official ones (NOTE 31).

As often happens with New State, the ordinary legislation was charged with the task of restricting, contradicting and distorting the constitutional general principles. It is the typical case of ordinary laws about repression (chapter six, section 1.1). It is also the present case of freedom of private

education. As RODRIGUES comments all this common legislation was embedded in a "spirit of theoretical freedom of teaching and real limitation to its exercise" (RODRIGUES 1976).

3.2. New State practice about freedom of private education - the control of the state over private education

The controls over private teaching began in the setting up of a private school - it was necessary to obtain a charter ("alvará") granted by central administration and to have a special inspection visit to the facilities ("vistoria") before the effective opening of the school.

Then the controls extended to the director (who needed a specific diploma) and to the teachers who were subject, as if they were civil servants, to the disciplinary power of the state.

The curriculum and the general pedagogical organization of private schools was compulsorily the same as that of state schools (see Decree-Law 36508, 17-9-1947, article 6; Decree-Law 37029, 25-8-1948, article 367; Decree nº 48572, 9-9-1968 article 25) - this clearly contradicts the constitutional law. In this line the teaching of religious education was imposed and M.P. membership compulsory.

Another layer of control was the one of the certification of students. Until 1957 all students of private schools were compelled to do their examinations in state schools with state teachers - only this way they could obtain official value certificates. From 1957 onwards the state would appoint in the official examination jury of private school students one private school teacher.

There was also great difficulty in the transference of a student from private to state schools.

Above all this, the state set up a central department specifically assigned to control and inspect private schools - the "Private Teaching Inspection".

The first statute of private teaching was produced in 1931 (Decree 19244, 16-1-1931). New statutes followed each more detailed than the previous one - 1932, 1933, 1934 and finally, 1949. This last statute (Decree nº 37545, 8-9-1949)

was the most important since it was only revoked in 1980. It is part of the effort made in the stabilization period to codify and rationalize central administrative control over all education - the grammar school statute was published in 1947, the technical school one in 1948 and the private education in 1949. There is a continuity between all those successive statutes in the control of the state over private education. One can even say, with some irony, that the only discontinuity is the 1933 Constitution precepts.

In sum, the administrative control of the state limited greatly the freedom of private education. But there were also financial controls - the constitutional permission of state subventions to private education was never used in the period studied in this thesis. The Minister GALVÃO TELLES (1962-1968) considered this possibility (see TELLES 1966b, 421-422, TELLES 1966c, 39-40), but never put it into clear execution. Only in 1971, in VEIGA SIMÃO's rule, was initiated a policy of subventions to private schools (NOTE 32). Beyond this non financial incentive, private schools were taxed.

One can conclude that there was strong administrative and financial control by the State over private education. Did the same controls apply to the schools owned by New State's co-opted partner in the portuguese passive mentality inculcation - the Catholic Church? The next section will answer to that.

3.3. New State practice about freedom of private education - the control of the state over Church owned private education

Chapter five (section 2.2.7) gave clear answer to the previous question - the moral union was not an obstacle to the administrative submission.

The Concordat between the Holy See and Portugal (1940) says in his article XX that *"Catholic Church associations and organizations can freely set up and support private schools parallel to those of the state, being subject to its inspection and to its subvention and officialization in the same term as other private schools"*.

In regard to religious seminaries, where catholic priests

were prepared, the Concordat decrees that its internal organization and curriculum is not subject to state inspection - even so the Church should report to the Central Administration the textbooks which were adopted for the non philosophical or theological subjects.

Control over those schools was exerted mainly through the administrative control over the value of their certificates. In a first stage, until 1956, no official acceptance whatsoever was given to seminary certificates. This provoked some situations which were both ridiculous and vexatious. For instance, if a priest wanted a driving license (for which it was necessary to have primary education) it was useless to proclaim he had twelve years of post-primary studies, since they counted for nothing in the official system - he was compelled to exhibit his primary school certificate.

In 1956 a decree was published in which some acceptance (equivalence) was given to religious seminary degrees (Decree-Law 40591, 4-5-1956). This equivalence was not given in terms of certificate, but just in terms of access to examinations in state schools. Even so there was a discrepancy between the years of study required for access to examinations for religious seminaries and the other schools. Table 9.2 shows this discrepancy.

TABLE 9.2 -COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF STUDY YEARS REQUIRED
FOR ACCESS TO OFFICIAL EXAMINATIONS BETWEEN
RELIGIOUS SEMINARIES AND REGULAR SCHOOLS

DEGREE	NORMAL SCHOOLS	RELIGIOUS SEMINARIES	DISCRE PANCY
Primary education	4 years	-	-
1 st Cycle of Secondary Education	6 years	8 years	+ 2
2 nd Cycle of Secondary Education	9 years	11 years	+ 2
3 rd Cycle of Secondary Education	11 years	16 years	+ 5
Higher degree	15-16 years	no equivalence	-

The table is clear in itself and shows that the higher the degree the tighter the control.

This control is the application of the strategy of compartmentalization of the New State in relation to Catholic Church. As it was said in Chapter five, side by side with "moral union" there was the "economic and administrative separation". Religious seminaries should be "administratively separated" in order that priests became clearly compartmentalized in the religious sphere - they should not compete with their educational qualifications in the normal market.

One can ask the question - why did the Catholic Church accept this apparently inferiority situation, if it had a privileged status as partner of the regime? "As to the degrees conferred by the seminaries, the Church supported the State policy because it allowed a narrow control of the Church's Hierarchy over its priests. They hardly could leave the Church or oppose its leader's decisions as they depended on the institution to keep their economic resources and their social status. Some evidence is available to support this explanation: a) although the priests and ex-seminarists who did not follow the priesthood made several attempts to obtain the recognition of their degrees, the Church's Hierarchy never gave official support to this demand; b) even after the first recognition of those degrees by the Ministry of Education, administrative devices were frequently used to refuse to give the school certificates required for the priests to register in State Universities or to apply for a teaching job in private or state schools " (FORMOSINHO, FERNANDES, PIRES, 1982).

On the other hand, this compartmentalization helped to increase the number of seminary graduates who opted for the priesthood. This needs some explanation - indeed seminaries were frequented, in the major part, not by clearly vocational candidates for ordination, but by able rural children in search of educational and social promotion. Seminaries were a very important instrument in the (little) social mobility of rural classes - Salazar is the most noteworthy example of this rural family strategy of social promotion (NOTE33).

According to COSTA(1974) only 20% of all enrolled in religious seminaries opted for priesthood. If religious seminary certificate had normal market value it is very probable the decrease of this proportion. Hence this is another reason for the peaceful acceptance by the Church's Hierarchy of this compartmentalization (This had also the consequence of making more difficult the social mobility of rural classes).

The state only changed this compartmentalization strategy when it needed all the qualified workmanship it could get to answer to the need for increasing the teaching staff caused by the policy of great expansion of schooling in the fifth period of our division (1968-1974). In 1972, seminary courses were given legal recognition for teaching in the preparatory school, that is, in the new 5th and 6th year of compulsory schooling (NOTE 34).

3.4. Characteristics of private education

Due to the administrative and financial control and due to the lack of official support, private education developed certain characteristics which conditioned its role and status.

The first characteristics is its non competitive character - private education was offered generally either in the level of teaching where the state did not offer education (pre-school level) or in professional areas where the state had not yet any educational supply (language, secretariate, management courses, for instance) or, within normal primary and secondary schooling, in geographical areas where no state education was available (large villages, non district capital towns). This strategy avoided either tight control of the state (in the first two cases) or direct competition with state schools (in the last case).

In fact, to set up a private school, in this last case, was considered a risky business - either the private school was financially supported by a religious organization (NOTE 35) or it

seemed necessary to play safely by choosing an area where no state competition existed. This is clearly linked with the second attributes characteristic of many private schools - their commercial character. Indeed, in non confessional schools, commercial concerns sometimes superimposed on educational quality concerns (GOMES 1981).

A third characteristic of private education is that it was, in the major part of the cases, supported by Catholic Church organizations. This religious character of many private schools is natural in a country where the Catholic Church is so influent. On the other hand, religious organization had, more than simple private individuals, the financial power needed to set up a school.

Both confessional and non confessional schools were generally frequented only by elites - thus its elitist character. In fact, those families who enrolled their children in primary or secondary private schools paid twice for the education of their children - through private school fees and through taxes. It is natural that, in a poor country, only high middle class or high class families could afford this.

All those characteristics conditioned the role private education performed in portuguese educational system.

3.5. The actual role of private education in portuguese educational system

Due to these characteristics private education could not generally provide an ideological or pedagogical alternative to state schooling or perform an innovatory role.

Indeed the role of confessional schools in providing an ideological alternative was relatively unimportant since state schools also provided an education based on catholic christian values (article 43 of the Constitution) and offered also specific teaching of catholic religion and morals. For the most part, families who chose religiously controlled schools for their children did not do it predominantly for religious reasons, but because they needed a boarding school due to lack of near by schools, or wanted a social and morally controlled education for their children, or wanted a more individualized

attention.

Very few private schools were also asked for their pedagogical alternative offer. Due to administrative and pedagogical control of the state, it was very difficult to build a global pedagogical alternative which included both academic and moral curricula. The only area where private schools could create clear pedagogical models was where the state was absent - pre-school education, new professional courses, religious seminary education, etc. But in those cases one cannot properly speak of alternative since this requires the existence of a confrontation of models - in those cases no official model was available.

It was in those areas that private education performed an innovatory role; but the importance of this role was prejudiced by the commercial character of many of these schools and lack of quality of teaching staff and some lack of concern with educational quality (GOMES 1981). The absence of competition facilitated this result.

The major part of private education performed just a supplemental role, offering education similar to that offered by state schools in communities where no state education was available.

Private schools in towns where state education was also available performed generally remedial role, receiving students who did not perform adequately (in relation to their families expectations) in state schools or needed special attention. The official regulations even permitted that a student, who expected a failure in state schools, could transfer, during the school year, to a private school and present himself to examination in the normal conditions of private school students. The inverse was obviously not possible - in fact, transfers from private to state schools were difficult.

Some private schools (generally boarding schools) specialized in a disciplinary role and provided specific attention to maladjusted, disruptive or rebel students.

From what was said one can predict the areas where private education was, in quantitative terms, more important - pre-school education, due to absence of state educational supply; grammar school education, due to the elitist and supplemental role of private schools. The next section will confirm this.

3.6. The importance of private education

TABLE 9.3-ENROLLED STUDENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
(percentage in relation to total
students enrolled in private and state schools)

LEVELS OF SCHOOLING \ PERIODS	2 nd Period	3 rd Period		4 th Period	5 th Period
	1940-41	1950-51	1960-61	1966-67	1973-74
PRE - SCHOOL EDUCATION	100%	100%	100%	100%	91.2%
PRIMARY EDUCATION	8.5%	5.0%	4.6%	5.3%	6.3%
PREPARATORY EDUCATION				37%	8.7%
GRAMMAR SECONDARY EDUCATION	50.8%	54.6%	58.8%	57.3%	20.6%
TECHNICAL SECONDARY EDUCATION	5.0%	12.4%	5.8%	6.1%	1.2%
TEACHER EDUCATION	—	—	13.5%	18.9%	11.4%
HIGHER EDUCATION	—	—	9.2%	7.3%	5.3%

(The Table was build upon statistical date from national educational statistics - it was also consulted SAMPAIO 1973).

Pre-school education was left, until 1973, only to private initiative. The New State regime did not offer educational services in that area, since it assumed that, until school age, children should be educated and reared only by their parents (mainly by their mothers). This position was reinforced by the inculcation of a traditional mentality in regard to women - to perform well the roles of mother, housewife and spouse they should stay at home. As SALAZAR says "there never was a good housewife who did not have plenty of work to do" (SALAZAR I, 204 - see also SALAZAR to FERRO 1982, 156-157).

In regard to primary education the role of private schools was in all periods, unimportant.

But the situation was completely different in grammar school education. Indeed, until the fifth period, private schools had more students than state ones. The supplemental role of private schools was clear here, generally in a non competitive framework - private grammar school education was generally offered to communities where no state grammar schools were available. As private schools were not supported by the state, they had fees; thus only high middle class and high class families could afford private education for their children. On the other hand, those families demanded generally the kind of education which could give access to the university. That is, there was, on the side of the demand, economic and social reasons which explained the success of private grammar school education (and its elitist character).

The same reasons explain why private technical education was not demanded. On the other hand, its supply was very little due to the fact that it did not attract those who could pay (high middle class and high class), and due to the fact that those who could be attracted by vocational and professional courses did not have economic capacity to pay the fees. Furthermore, the setting up of a technical school was more expensive than that of a grammar school, due to the machinery involved. All this is clearly reflected in the non importance of private technical education in all periods.

Teacher education was also a state affair, except in relation to the preparation of pre-school teachers, which

accounts for the percentages of private teacher education (NOTE 36).

In higher education the same applies. The percentages of private education are mainly due to religious seminary education (at the higher level) - 54% (84% in 1960-61, 66% in 1966-67, 20% in 1972-73).

So the analysis of table 9.3 is congruent with what had been said about the characteristics and role of private education in the New State educational system. From all what had been said, one can take some conclusions about the status of private education, which is instrumental to confirm the assertion of the "strong state" discourse in education (NOTE 37).

3.7. The status of private education

What were the consequences of all those financial, academic and administrative controls on the status of private education? And what were the effects of the above referred characteristics and role of private schools in this status?

The first consequence came mainly from the message transmitted by state controls - private education was much more a tolerated teaching than a fully accepted (and even less supported) kind of education. This is also evidenced by its non competitive character and the predominance of its merely supplemental (rather than alternative) role.

The second feature of private education status is its second class teaching status. Evidence for this status is overwhelming - the state controls, the non competitive character, the predominance of the supplemental, remedial and disciplinary roles over the alternative and innovatory roles. Beyond this one can quote some legal dispositions which reflect this - the easiness of transfer of almost failed students from state to private schools versus the great difficulty of transfer of even good students from private to state schools; the lesser requirements of private school teachers qualifications; the prohibition of the use of the name of "liceu" (grammar school), which was exclusive of state schools (Decree Law 36508, article 7). This last disposition is very enlightening about the minority status given to non state education - private education was even semantically

"compartmentalized".

The stigma of private education could not come from any intrinsic difference between the kind of education practiced in it and in state schools, since state controls existed precisely to uniformize this. The lesser qualifications of private school teachers does not also seem enough to explain the stigma, since all kinds of students (private and state ones) were compelled to make examinations in state schools, thus obtaining exactly the same kind of certificate. That is, the eventual difference in the means of teaching was covered by the equality of the ultimate control. This means that this was certainly more a consequence than a cause of the minority status. Thus the stigma seems to concentrate on the extrinsic characteristic of ownerships - state or non state ownerships.

This leads us to the question of the role of the state in Portuguese society, and in Portuguese educational system, during the New State regime, mainly to the question of the legitimacy of state control over all social activities. The legitimacy of the state in the present question was built not only on the image of the state as the moral leader or the "national patron" (WIARDA 1977,105,150), or the "Mother-Providence"(ARAGÃO 1985,355), but also on careful destruction of the legitimacy of private education. This was based, in its commercial character, in contrast with the noble character of official teaching (see FRANCO 1976); or in its elitist character, in contrast with the low cost of official schools; or in its religiously partisan character, in contrast with the non ecclesiastical ambience of state schools (the emphasis was not put on the religious character, but rather on its ecclesiastical character which awakes strong anti-clerical roots in the portuguese - NOTE 38). Thus private schools education was less noble, less social and less independent than state education - thus it was less legitimate. Hence state controls were justified.

How was this second class status congruent with the elitist character of education? The fact is that private schools performed, even for the elite, only a secondary role - a supplemental, disciplinary or remedial role. That means that, apart the disciplinary or remedial situations, they were not the normal choice of the elite, when there was the possibility of a choice. The "liceus nacionais" (national grammar schools) enjoyed generally great prestige.

More difficult to explain is the peaceful acceptance of the Church of a second class status to a kind of teaching which was, in its major part, owned by religious organizations. We have already analyzed the Church's position in regard to the status of religious seminaries education. Let us analyse, in the next section, the Catholic Church's position in regard to regular private education.

3.8. The Catholic Church's acceptance of the second class status of private education

There are several reasons which can explain Church's acceptance of this second class status of private education.

First of all, the Church accepted because this was part of a status quo which was much better than the previous situation - "moral union with economic and administrative separation" was better than official persecution.

Secondly, because state education was also guided by "the principles of christian doctrine and morals, traditional in the country" (article 43 of the Constitution). Indeed the New State introduced massive doses of religion in compulsory education and guaranteed the teaching of Religion in secondary schools (see chapters three, four and five) (NOTE 39).

Thirdly, because the social control of the Catholic Church Hierarchy over catholic laymen, and over society in general, was more than enough to guarantee that a christian catholic socialization prevailed in the educational system (NOTE 40).

Fourthly, because Church and State were partners in the more comprehensive project of inculcating a passive mentality in portuguese people.

So the Church's acceptance of an inferior status for many of its schools was seen as part of a global implicit and explicit deal in which its social and educational influence was not only respected, but also fostered.

But this deal relied on the maintenance of some implicit conditions - on the maintenance of Church's social control over society, but also on a consensual catholic world and a consensual perspective, within catholics, about the role of Church in portuguese society. Such consensus existed until the early 1950's, but became gradually to fade since late 1950's and mainly during the 1960's and 1970's (see chapter five, sections 2.2.5, 2.2.6, chapter six, sections 2.1.1, 2.4.2). The catholic "dissidences" (which were thereby political dissidences) put at stake not only the "moral union", but the Church Hierarchy strategy of educational influence through social control.

If this hypothesis is correct one can expect the appearance of Church official positions in favour of private schools in the 1960's and 1970's - indeed, once the adopted strategy was questioned, it was safe to try, at the same time, another strategy which implied a more clear and dignified role for private schools.

The evidence supports our hypothesis. In 1962, an Episcopacy Pastoral Note defends that was then due time to face the problem of private teaching with larger perspectives, as other countries did. The same message is conveyed by the 1964 Episcopacy Pastoral Note.

It is obviously not by a fortuitious coincidence that the first "National Congress of Private Teaching" was held in 1965. It asserts private teaching rights and asks from the State financial support for private schools (see ACTAS 1965). For instance, LOUREIRO's communication (NOTE 41) claims for a free teaching based on family educating rights, economic equality and pedagogical freedom; at the same time, criticizes the strict commercial approach in private education (LOUREIRO 1965).

From then on we have a more assertive position from Church Hierarchy (see, for instance, LEITE 1968 (NOTE 42)).

There was another powerful reason for this assertion - private schools suffered, in late 1960's and in the 1970's, the greatest threat not only to its status, but to its survival. Due to the predominance of the supplemental role in relation to the alternative (competitive) role, private schools were particularly vulnerable to any expansion of state's schools network. This would mean to set up state schools where previously only private education was available - private schools were not prepared for the competition. The statistics of the last fourteen years of the regime show this very clearly.

TABLE 2.4 ENROLLED STUDENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
(1960 - 1974) (in relation to total enrollments
in private and state schools)

LEVELS OF SCHOOLING \ YEARS	1960 1961	1963 1964	1966 1967	1969 1970	1972 1973	1973 1974
PRIMARY EDUCATION	4.6%	4.8%	5.3%	5.2%	5.9%	6.3%
PREPARATORY EDUCATION			100%	34.5%	19.0%	8.7%
GRAMMAR SECONDARY EDUCATION	58.8%	58.4%	57.3%	55.2%	44.3%	20.6%
TECHNICAL SECONDARY EDUCATION	5.6%	5.4%	5.9%	5.7%	5.8%	1.2%

This table was built based on the national statistics of education. Data about the school year 1973-1974 is presented with reservation since the 1975 and 1979 official compilation of statistics differ in their results about this period (!!!)

In reference to preparatory education one must comment that, from 1965 to 1971, there was an only private TV preparatory education (official TV education began in 1971-1972). From 1965 to 1968 TV private education was the only preparatory education available - in 1968-1969 the state direct preparatory education began. This explains why in 1966-1967 preparatory education was guaranteed, in 100%, by private schools (private "Telescolas").

The table provides evidence which justifies the concern of Catholic Church, and private schools in general, about the future of private education after the expansion of compulsory schooling.

3.9. Conclusion - the tight control over private teaching is evidence of the prevalence of the strong state discourse in education

The objective of this part of chapter nine was to show how the strong state discourse prevailed in education in its authoritarian mould.

The analysis done about the control, the characteristics, the role, the importance and the status of private education provided overwhelming evidence for this objective. This evidence is reinforced by the fact that no ideological issue was at stake - the tight control was similarly exerted over schools which were supported by the New State partner, the Catholic Church.

The strong state control was decisive for the unimportant role that, on the whole, private education performed in portuguese educational system - between 1960 and 1972 private education represented between 11.4% and 14.2% of all enrolled students. The situation worsened in the fifth period in the area where private education was traditionally important - grammar school education.

If private teaching was so tightly controlled how would state teaching be controlled? The answer to this question will

be the object of the next chapter which analyses the full implementation of the Administrative State in education.

CHAPTER X

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN EDUCATION

- THE ANALYSIS OF CENTRALIZATION IN SCHOOL EDUCATION

The analysis of centralization of decision-making in the educational system has as its main purpose to carry evidence for the confirmation of the use of educational centralization as a demobilizing strategy to achieve passivity.

The analysis will be done at the secondary educational level. There are two main reasons for this choice - first all, centralization in primary education has already been studied (MONICA 1978, second part, chapter three); secondly, secondary education is the ideal area to analyze centralization since in Portugal administrative control is much more present there than in primary education, as will be seen.

1. PRESENTATION OF THE METHODOLOGY USED

If the hypothesis that centralization was a strategy of demobilisation is correct, one can expect that centralization decreased during the mobilizing period. That is, during that period ideological control should have prevailed over administrative (bureaucratic) control. This demands that the analysis of centralization be done diachronically.

The research was conducted through content analysis of the Statutes of grammar school education, technical education and, since it was created, preparatory education.

The analysis falls mainly upon the education for elites - grammar school education, not only because it reflects more the careful control of the state, but also because it was published a statute for grammar school in each of the first three periods of New State regime (1932, 1936 and 1947). The fourth period is represented through the analysis of the statute for the preparatory education school (1968),

which was common both to grammar and technical school future students. The research includes the last period of New State and presents also the present situation. This last inclusion attempts to show the relevance of the analysis for the understanding of the present situation, and implies the existence of structural continuities before and after the 25th April revolution.

The comparison of regulations for grammar and technical schools will be done through the analysis of the 1947 grammar school statute and the 1948 technical school statute (both lasted until 1974).

1.1. The educational decision-making content analysis

Two methods of content analysis were used (NOTE 1). The first was the analysis of decision-making in the several areas of school management to determine the degree of centralization. Three major areas were considered - curriculum and evaluation, pedagogical management, government and administrative management. Each major area was divided into smaller areas. In each of those smaller areas several sub-areas were considered - these sub-areas were the main unit of analysis in a first stage. All those type of areas can be seen in Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 .

1.1.1. The scale used

The situation in respect to each sub-area (item of analysis) was categorized in an ordinal scale; according to the degree of control of central administration over this concrete area of decision. Those categories are:

Graphic symbol	MEANING
XXXX	Total control of Central Administration. No room for school discretionary judgement decision.
XXX●	Almost total control of Central Administration. Very little room for school discretionary decision
XX●●	Control of Central Administration Little room for school discretionary decision
X●●●	Guidelines of Central Administration. Some room for school discretionary decision
●●●●	Freedom of school in decision-making - discretion of school

1.1.2 Type of items analyzed - control items, structural items, uniformity items

The great majority of the items of analysis (sub-areas) reflect the degree of control of central administration over decision-making in schools; that is, they reflect the degree of discretionary decision-making in schools. From that one can conclude the degree of the schools autonomy. This means that the categorization is done based on who decides mainly (Central Administration - the first four categories - or the school - the last category) and, in the case of Central Administration decision, how tight are rules for implementation in school. We will call those items control items - 55 of the 70 sub-areas are of this type (79%).

There are also structural items which are 9% of the total - (6). In some areas of decision-making, although all decisions are pre-made by Central Administration, the structure they create can give more or less autonomy to the school, across the several periods of time. The categorization reflects this degree of autonomy. For instance, the situation in which students can be promoted without being subject to national examinations gives more autonomy to the school than

the inverse situation. Another example - if the decision to promote or fail a student is done by mere juxtaposition of individual decisions of the different subject teachers the school has less structural autonomy in this area than if it is given to a committee of teachers the power to override individual decisions and to produce a global judgement over students which ends by a promotion/failure decision. In both cases the Central Administration determines tightly the rules, but the choice for individual or group decision-making has influence in the autonomy of the school. The last solution gives more power to include non subject knowledge considerations (like ability, work qualities, personal situation, etc) into the decision-making process. A third example is given by the teacher grouping structure. If teachers are grouped on a monodisciplinary basis the degree of structural autonomy in class allocation to teachers is lesser than if Central Administration determines (with no equal room for school discretionary decision about teacher grouping) that teacher grouping is done bidisciplinary or on the basis of great areas of knowledge.

A third type of sub-area of analysis reflects the degree of uniformity and rigidity in educational decision-making. Uniformity is a characteristic intrinsic to centralization (CRUZIER 1964) - so in measuring how far the system is uniform for all schools, all teachers and all students, one is measuring how far the system is centralized. Only 7% (5) of all items are of this type. There are those items which reflect more uniformity - those referent to curricular routes, optional subjects, curricular uniformity in general - and two items which reflect the degree of rigidity - bureaucratisation of teachers appointment, field of recruitment of headmasters. For instance, in this case the level of the ordinal scale is attributed as a function of the comprehensiveness of the recruitment field - this field can be only teachers of the school at stake, only teachers of the same level of teaching, any teacher or teachers and pedagogues. The assumption is that the greater the field of recruitment the lesser the degree of rigidity of the system of appointment.

In sum, the seventy items can be of three types - central control items (79%), structural autonomy items (9%) and uniformity/rigidity items (7%). There are 6% items (4) of mixed type. In Appendix there is the indication of the type of each of the seventy items of analysis.

1.1.3 Type of items - general items, complex items

Some items refer a general judgement about great areas - about curricular rigidity, curricular uniformity, teacher curricular freedom, autonomy in the evaluation system, bureaucratization of teachers appointment, financial management, secretaryship management. Those are the seven items which reflect general judgements about centralization in great areas. They are presented in Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 in a different type of lettering.

For most part of the items the categorization in one level of the scale is done based on a linear judgement. But sometimes it is necessary to use more than one indicator to characterize adequately the item in analysis. Those are the complex items. For instance, the degree of autonomy of the school in the class allocation to teachers depend on various factors - the number of subjects teachers can (are legally allowed to) teach, legal teaching load, the existence of other rigid criteria for class allocation and the need of approval (or some more discrete control) of central administration.

In the case of those complex items, based on several indicators, each indicator is given a score of 0-0.5-1, according to the degree of centralization it reveals; the final categorization is given on the basis of the average of the partial scores. This average is transformed in a level of the ordinal scale in accordance with the following criterion 0.0 to 0.19 - 0000; 0.20 to 0.39 - x000; 0.40 to 0.59 - xx00; 0.60 to 0.79 - xxx0; 0.80 to 1 - xxxx. If the indicator used is a categorized item the same conversion scale applies.

1.1.4 The result of the educational decision - making context analysis - Tables 01, 02 and 03

The result of this first method of content analysis (educational decision - making analysis), which involved 483 categorizations, is represented in the following pages in three tables - Tables 01, 02 and 03.

The list of the documents used for this content analysis is:

- 1932 - Statute of Grammar School Education,
Decree nº 20741, 11-1-1932.
- 1936 - Reform of Grammar School Education
Decree-Law nº 27084, 14-10-1936
- 1947 - Reform of Grammar School Education and
Statute of Grammar School Education
Decree-Law nº 36507 and Decree nº 36508 both
of 17-9-1947.
- 1948 - Statute of Technical Education
Decree nº 37029, 25-8-1948
- 1968 - Statute of Preparatory Education
Decree nº 48572, 9-9-1968.
- 1970-1974 - Various legislation.
- 1985 - LAL 1985/1986 "Circular de apoio ao lançamento
do ano lectivo", Direcção Geral do Ensino Se-
cundário.
- Decree-Law nº 769-A/76, 23-10-1976
- Portaria nº 677/77, 4-11-1977
- Portaria nº 970/80, 12-11-1980
- other legislation.

AREAS OF SCHOOL DECISION-MAKING		PERIODS:	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	NOW
			1932	1936	1947	1948	1968	1970 1974	1985
CURRICULUM FORMULATION	GENERAL STRUCTURE		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	OBJECTIVES		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	SUBJECTS LIST		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	CURRICULAR VIAS (10 th to 12 th)		XXXO	XXXX	XYOO	OOOO	-	XOOO	OOOO
	OPTIONAL SUBJECTS (5 th to 9 th)		XXXX	XXXO	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXXO	XXXO
	SYLLABUS		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	TEACHING TIME DISTRIBUTION		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXXO	XXXX
	TEACHING TIME UNIT		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXXO	XXXO	XXXX
	CURRICULUM EXEMPTIONS		XXXX	XXXX	XYOO	XXXO	XYOO	XYOO	XXXX
	CHOICE OF OFFERED COURSES		-	-	-	XXXX	-	-	XXXX
	Curricular Rigidity		XXXO	XOOO	XYOO	XXOO	XXOO	XXXO	XXXX
	Curricular uniformity		XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXOO	XYOO	XXOO	XXXX
CURRICULUM IMPLEMENTATION	METHODS OF TEACHING		XXOO	XXOO	XXXO	XXOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO
	RATE OF IMPLEMENTATION		XXOO	XXOO	XXOO	XXOO	XXOO	XXOO	OOOO
	TEXTBOOKS		XOOO	XYOO	XXXX	XXXX	XOOO	XOOO	OOOO
	Teacher curricular freedom		XXXO	XXOO	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXOO	XXOO
STUDENT PROMOTION	PROMOTION SYSTEM		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	PROMOTION WITHOUT EXAMINATION		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO	XXXX	XOOO	OOOO
	WHO PROMOTES		XXXO	XXXO	XXXO	XXXO	XXXO	XXXO	XXOO
	EVALUATION TECHNIQUES		XXOO	XXOO	XXXO	XOOO	XXOO	OOOO	OOOO
	EVALUATION SCALE		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	FAILURE BY ABSENTEEISM		XXOO	XXXX	XXXO	XXXO	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
EXAMINATIONS	NATIONAL EXAMINATION SYSTEM		XXOO	XOOO	XXXX	XXOO	XXXX	XXXX	OOOO
	TYPE OF EXAMINATION		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	EXAMINATION CONTENT		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXOO
	PROMOTION SYSTEM IN EXAMINAT.		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	OOOO
	WHO MAKES EXAMS. TESTS		XXOO	XOOO	XXXX	XXOO	XXXX	XXXX	OOOO
	WHO MARKS EXAMS TESTS		XXOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	OOOO
	WHO APPOINTS EXAMINERS		XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XXOO	XOOO	OOOO
	DATES OF WRITTEN EXAMINAT.		XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXOO	XXXX	XXXX	XXXO
	DATES OF ORAL EXAMINAT.		XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	XOOO	-
	Autonomy in evaluation system		XXXO	XXXO	XXXX	XXXO	XXXX	XXXO	XOOO

TABLE 10.2 CENTRALIZATION OF SCHOOL DECISION - MAKING IN PREPARATORY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

-PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION

PERIODS		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	NOW
AREAS		G1932	G1936	G1947	T1948	P1968	P/G 1970/74	1985
PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION	SCHOOL CAPACITY	XXXX	XXXX	XXX0	XXX0	XXX0	XXX0	XXX0
	CATCHMENT AREA	XXXX	XXXX	XX00	XX00	XX00	XX00	XX00
	TEACHING ORGANIZATION	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX	XX00	XX00	XXXX	XXXX
	TEACHER'S GROUPING	X000	X000	XX00	X000	XXX0	XXX0	XXX0
	TEACHING LOAD	XXXX	X000	XX00	XX00	XXXX	XXX0	XXXX
	CLASS ALLOCATION TO TEACHERS	XXX0	0000	X000	0000	XX00	X000	XXX0
	STUDENT'S GROUPING	X000	0000	XXX0	X000	X000	XX00	XX00
	CLASS SIZE	XX00	XX00	XX00	XX00	XXX0	XXX0	XX00
	CLASS SPONSOR	XXXX	XX00	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	REMEDIAL TEACHING	XXXX	XXXX	XXX0	XXXX	XX00	XX00	XXX0
	SCHOOL YEAR	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	SCHOOL TIMETABLE	X000	X000	XXX0	XX00	XX00	XX00	XXX0
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT								
	MIDDLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX	XXXX
	ROLE OF SCHOOL COMMITTEES	0000	0000	XX00	XXX0	X000	X000	XXX0
	NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEETINGS	XX00	XX00	XX00	0000	X000	X000	XX00
	NUMBER OF MIDDLE MANAGERS	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XX00	X000	XXX0	XXX0
	APPOINTMENT OF MIDDLE MANAGERS	XXX0	XX00	XX00	XX00	X000	XX00	X000
TEACHERS	ROLE OF MIDDLE MANAGERS	XX00	0000	X000	XXX0	X000	X000	XXX0
	TEACHER CERTIFICATION	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	CERT. TENURED T. APPOINTMENT	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	CERT. NON TENURED T. APPOINTMENT	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	NON CERTIFIED T. APPOINTMENT	X000	X000	XXXX	XX00	X000	X000	XXXX
	BUREAUCRATIZATION OF T. APPOINT.	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX	XXX0	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX
	SUBJECTE TEACHERS CAN TEACH	0000	X000	XX00	0000	XXXX	XXX0	XXXX
STUDENTS	TEACHER EVALUATION	X000	X000	XXXX	XXXX	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX
	ENROLLMENT OF STUDENTS	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	PROCESS OF STUDENTS ABSENCES	XXXX	X000	XXXX	XXXX	0000	XX00	XXXX
	ABSENCES REMISSION	XX00	XXXX	XXX0	XXX0	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX
	STUDENTS FORMAL PUNISHMENT	X000	X000	X000	X000	X000	X000	XX00

TABLE 10.3 CENTRALIZATION OF SCHOOL DECISION - MAKING IN PREPARATORY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

-GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

[illegible]

1.2. The expressive versus instrumental rules content analysis

The second method of content analysis used in this chapter is mainly based on the type of control that rules prescribe. This control can be an ideological, expressive control or an administrative, bureaucratic, instrumental control. It is the same distinction already used to categorize demobilization strategies in chapter three and M.P. (Portuguese Youth) rules in chapter nine (see chapter three, section 1., chapter nine, section 2.3.1)(NOTE 2).

It is necessary to give to this distinction an operational character. Expressive rules are those which reflect the expressive order, which convey ideological control in educational decision-making. So expressive rules are operationally defined as those related to aims, objectives, to the basic organizational structure, to curriculum, evaluation, socialization. Instrumental rules are operationally defined as generally those related with administrative management or the non expressive aspects of pedagogical management.

Beyond this main categorization, rules are divided into pedagogical rules and administrative rules. Pedagogical rules are those related to pedagogy, that is, related to the content of what is being taught and the method of how is being taught and also related to the coordination of teaching; pedagogical rules also include rules referent to teachers and students. Thus pedagogical rules can be operationally defined as those referent to curriculum (formulation and implementation), to evaluation (student promotion and examination), pedagogical organization of the school and middle management, student's punishment, teacher education.

Administrative rules are those referring to the administrative management of school and those related to the structure of the system and to government. Thus administrative rules can be operationally defined as including the main structure of the educational system, school government, secretaryship management, financial management, school social service, non teaching staff management, non pedagogical teaching staff management (appointment, salary, absences to

work, etc.), student enrollment and fees, transitional rules (that is rules which regulate the transition from the old situation to the new situation).

The crossing of those two variables creates four groups of rules. There are in fact pedagogical expressive rules and pedagogical instrumental rules, administrative expressive rules and administrative instrumental rules. As an example of pedagogical instrumental rules one can point to the administrative regulation of examinations and evaluation (for instance, closing date for examination enrollment, appointment of examiners, setting a date for examinations and the like), administrative regulation of student teaching process. This means that within rules about evaluation and examinations or teacher education some were categorized as expressive and others as instrumental. As examples of administrative expressive rules one can point to those referring to the main structure of the educational system and to school government.

This analysis was only done in complete and global regulations (Statutes) and this excludes the present situation and the fifth period. As the analysis has as its main objective to analyse historical evolution it excludes the 1948 Statute, since the third period is already represented by the 1947 Statute.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10.4 .

TABLE 10.4—TYPE OF RULES IN MAJOR AREAS OF
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT

CATE- GORIES OF ANALYSIS \ PERIODS		1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	4 th P 1968	AVERAGE
EXPRESSIVE RULES	PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT	56 35.0%	31 56.4%	161 26.6%	120 32.7%	398 31.2%
	ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	25 10.2%	7 12.7%	36 5.9%	20 5.4%	88 6.9%
INSTRUMENTAL RULES	PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT	62 25.2%	1 1.8%	188 31%	49 13.4%	300 23.5%
	ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	73 29.7%	16 29.1%	221 36.5%	178 48.5%	488 38.3%
	TOTAL	246 100.1%	55 100%	606 100%	367 100%	1274 99.9%

2. GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS - THE EVIDENCE OF CENTRALIZATION

In order to permit easy comparisons (in the tables referring to the first content analysis) of differences of levels of centralization, among great areas and areas and among periods, the data must be presented in a way that makes clear the differences. This demands that the level of centralization should be transformed into a single score. Hence the non presentation of percentages of each type of item per periods or per areas.

There are two possible ways to do this. The first is to convert each level of the ordinal scale into a score - 1 for 0000, 2 for x000, 3 for xx00, 4 for xxx0 and 5 for xxxx. Thus 1 is the lesser level of centralization and 5 the higher. This method is very convenient and it will be used. But one important precaution must be made - in doing that one is transforming an ordinal scale into an interval scale. In this one the difference between 1 and 2 is the same that the difference between 4 and 5, since the scale has equal intervals. But the same does not apply in an ordinal scale - that is, one cannot assure that between x000 and xx00 there is the same increase of centralization that between xx00 and xxx0; this point is even more relevant due to the heterogeneity of the situations categorized. Hence the use of another way of presenting the data which does not have this objection - the percentage of central control itens (xxxx, xxx0, xx00) present in any period or area. This system is entirely legitimate, but does not take into account the differential categorization of the lesser itens (x000 and 0000). The following tables (Tables 10.5, 10.6) will use both types of single scores .

TABLE 10.5 - GENERAL EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION

PERIODS AREAS	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	3 rd T 1948	4 th P 1968	5 th P/G 1970-74	NOW P/S 1985	AREA AVERAGE
CURRICULUM AND EVALUATION	4.1	4.0	4.3	3.9	3.9	3.6	3.2	3.9
PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT	3.7	3.3	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.7
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	3.6	3.6	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.4
PERIOD AVERAGE	3.8	3.6	4.4	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
% OF CONTROL ITEMS	79.7%	69.6%	91.3%	82.9%	79.4%	78.3%	78.3%	79.9 %

G - Grammar School Legislation

T - Technical School Legislation

P - Preparatory School Legislation

S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation

TABLE 10.6- EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION
IN CURRICULUM AND EVALUATION

AREAS \ PERIODS	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	NOW	AREA AVE- RAGE
	G 1932	G 1936	G 1947	T 1948	P 1968	P/G 1970-74	P/S 1985	
CURRICULUM FORMULATION	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.1	4	4.6	44
CURRICULUM IMPLEMENTATION	3	3	4.3	4	2.8	2.5	1.8	31
STUDENT PROMOTION	4.2	4.5	4.5	4	4.5	3.7	3.3	41
EXAMINATIONS	3.7	3.4	4.1	3.4	3.9	3.8	2.1	35
PERIOD AVERAGE	3.9	3.9	4.3	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.0	38
% OF CONTROL ITEMS	90.3%	80.6%	90.3%	84.4%	86.7%	74.2%	61.3%	81.2%

G - Grammar School Legislation

T - Technical School Legislation

P - Preparatory School Legislation

S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation

TABLE 10.7- EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION IN THE
PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT.

PERIODS AREAS	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	3 rd T 1948	4 th P 1968	5 th P/G 1970-74	NOW P/S 1985	AREA AVERA- GE
PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION	3.9	3.2	3.8	3.3	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.7
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.2	2.3	3.0	3.7	3.2
TEACHERS PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT	3.4	3.6	4.7	4.0	4.3	4.1	5.0	4.2
STUDENTS MANAGEMENT	3.8	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.3	3.8	4.5	3.8
PERIOD AVERAGE	3.7	3.3	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.7
% OF CONTROL ITENS	72.4 %	58.6 %	89.7 %	79.3%	70 %	79.3 %	96.6%	78%

G - Grammar School Legislation

T - Technical School Legislation

P - Preparatory School Legislation

S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation

TABLE 10.8- EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION IN
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT

PERIODS AREAS	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	3 rd T 1948	4 th P 1968	5 th P/G 1970-74	NEW P/S 1985	AREA AVERA- GE
GOVERNMENT	3.6	3.6	4.7	4.1	4.1	4.3	3.9	4.0
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT	3.5	3.5	5	5	5	5	5	4.6
PERIOD AVERAGE	3.6	3.6	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.4
% OF CONTROL ITENS	66.7%	66.7%	100%	88.9%	88.9%	88.9%	77.8%	82.6

G - Grammar School Legislation

T - Technical School Legislation

P - Preparatory School Legislation

S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation

2.2. The centralization is confirmed

Global analysis of tables 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8 show that from 1932 until today there is a high degree of centralization in secondary education management. The average level of centralization is located around the category "Almost total control of Central Administration" (level 4 of the scale); 80% of the items reflect major control of Central administration.

This centralization remains stable, which is indicated by a low standard deviation - 0.22 for the first type of score and 5.98 for the percentage score (based on Period Average data of Table 10.5). Centralization range goes from a minimum of 3.6, in 1936, to a maximum of 4.4 in 1947.

Another indicator of the high degree of centralization is the very detailed list of sub-areas (items of analysis) which include matters like optional subjects, teaching time distribution (that is, if it is allocated four hours per week to a subject it is also determined how they are to be spent - 1+1+1+1 or 1+2+1, etc.), dates of written and oral examinations, school capacity, class allocation to teachers, class size, student's absences remission, and others - this detail reflects the degree of control of Central Administration.

One must take into account that the tables presented have a strong bias in favour of pedagogical management, because it suits better the demonstration of the demobilising character of centralization in relation to teachers, but the same, or probably more, detail is present in the rules concerning administrative management.

Another indicator of the high degree of centralization comes from the qualitative analysis of rules - they go sometimes to ridiculous details. For instance, the Statute of 1947 determines the colour of the ink which must be used to mark examination tests (article 515); it determines that the Government can decree a national uniform model for student's copy-book (article 358).

Curriculum formulation is the most centralized sub-area

in all periods, which is natural since it determines what should be taught. It is done in the tradition of centralized curricula which is so well caricatured in the famous anecdote of the 19th century french minister of education which "could pride himself on being able to announce, just by consulting his watch, which page of Virgil all school boys of the Empire were annotating at that exact moment" (CROZIER 1964, 239).

A uniform curriculum determines, to a great extent, a uniform pedagogy (FORMOSINHO 1985a) and it is congruent with a tight control of its implementation through a system of national examinations.

Centralization applies evenly to all aspects of school life. It does not fall predominantly to administrative matters - indeed, as seen in Table 10.9, an average of 55% of the rules refer to pedagogical management and an average of 45% of the rules refer to administrative management.

So one can easily conclude that centralization of educational management is confirmed.

TABLE 10.9 - PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT RULES - in percentages .

AREA OF RULES	PERIODS	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	4 th P 1948	AVERAGE
PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT RULES		60.2%	58.2%	57.6%	46%	54.8%
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT RULES		39.8%	41.8%	42.4%	54%	45.2%
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =		246	55	606	367	1274

2.3. The prevalence of instrumental control

The confirmation of the reality of centralization in educational management demands that we analyze the relative position of instrumental rules and expressive rules in the statutes analyzed. The predominance of bureaucratic control over ideological control should be indicated by the prevalence of instrumental rules over expressive ones. Table 10.10 would confirm this or not.

TABLE 10.10 - INSTRUMENTAL AND EXPRESSIVE RULES
- in percentages.

TYPE OF RULES	PERIODS	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	4 th P 1968	TYPE OF RULES AVERAGE/ /TOTAL
EXPRESSIVE RULES		45.1%	69.1%	32.5%	38.1%	38.1%
INSTRUMENTAL RULES		54.9%	30.9%	67.5%	61.9%	61.9%
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =		246	55	606	367	1274

Indeed Table 10.10 gives another important indicator of the centralization - on average, 62% of the rules are instrumental ones, against 38% of expressive rules. In all periods but one (the second period), instrumental rules prevail over expressive ones. It is in the 1947 Statute that instrumental rules are in greater percentage.

As it is natural, the percentage of expressive and instrumental rules is not the same in pedagogical management and in administrative management, as can be deduced from Table 10.4. In pedagogical management expressive rules prevail (57% on average); in administrative management instrumental rules prevail (85% on average). As can be seen, even in pedagogical matters the percentage of instrumental rules is very high (43%). Administrative Instrumental Rules is the only sub-area whose increase is steady - see Table 10.4 (30%, 29%, 37%, 48%).

The prevalence of instrumental rules in general reflects the predominance of bureaucratic control and thus confirms the setting up of a centralized system of educational management.

3. THE PREVALENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN THE MOBILISING PERIOD - ANOTHER CONFIRMATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

As it was said in the beginning of this chapter, if the hypothesis that centralization was a strategy of demobilization is correct, one can expect that it decreased in the period where the opposite aim - mobilization - was pursued. This would be firstly shown by a decrease in administrative (bureaucratic) control in that period, which would be indicated by a decrease in the percentage of instrumental rules in the Statute of 1936, and a consequent increase in the percentage of expressive rules. Indeed ideological control (indicated by expressive rules) is the congruent one with mobilizing purposes.

Ideological control is based on political control of access and promotion, doctrinaire control of teacher education, control of the curriculum and appointment of educational managers on the basis of political confidence (NOTE 3).

Bureaucratic control is based on detailed regulation of all aspects of school life (both pedagogical and administrative management) and on compliant acceptance of those regulations. This compliance is guaranteed by the obedience expected of all civil servants, by hierarchic control, by school inspection, and mainly by the inculcation of a conformist and passive mentality in teachers.

The analysis of Table 10.10 confirms our hypothesis very clearly. The second period shows a clear increase in expressive rules (from 45% to 69%) which is followed by a sharp decrease in the third period (from 69% to 33%). Naturally the opposite happens with the percentage of instrumental rules. It is noteworthy to recall that the mobilising period is the only one in which the Regulation analyzed had more expressive than instrumental rules. It is also interesting to observe, in Table 10.4 that expressive rules about pedagogical management occupy 56% of all the rules in 1936 Statute (the highest value recorded); there is only one rule of instrumental character in that area of school management.

Table 10.11 represents graphically the evolution of ideological control (indicated by percentage of expressive rules) across the four periods observed. It is evident the peak of ideological control in the mobilising period. So the hypothesis is again confirmed (NOTE 4).

TABLE 10.11 - GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE EVOLUTION
OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL



_____ Percentage of expressive rules in relation to the total.

----- Percentage of expressive rules in Pedagogical Management

But there still another way of confirming our hypothesis - if centralization was a strategy of demobilization its lowest point should have been in that period where there prevailed the opposite strategy - a strategy of mobilization. Let us look again at Table 12.5 to confirm or not this statement. Indeed the global centralization score of the second period (1936) is the lowest of all the seven periods analyzed.

4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN EDUCATION

4.1. 1947 and 1948 Statutes - The apotheosis of the Administrative State in educational management

The statutes of 1947 and 1948 represent the apotheosis of the Administrative State in educational management and the clear prevalence of bureaucratic (and conformist) control of education over ideological (mobilising) control.

(Differences of centralization level between 1947 and 1948 Statutes are due to the greater curricular complexity of technical education (due to a great variety of courses) and not to different philosophies of educational government).

There are several indicators to confirm that 1947 and 1948 statutes represent a landmark.

First of all, from 1947 onwards instrumental rules clearly prevail over expressive rules - only the 1947 and 1968 statutes are not below average percentage of instrumental rules (see Table 10.10). From 1936 to 1947 there was an increase of 218% in the percentage of instrumental rules (392 rules in absolute numbers; 274 rules in relation to 1932 statute). This increase is steady in instrumental rules about administrative management - 29% in 1936, 37% in 1947, 49% in 1968 (see Table 10.4).

A very typical example which indicates the difference between 1936 and 1947 statutes is the norms about textbooks. In the 1936 statute it is determined (article 32) that there will be a national sole textbook in History, Philosophy and Moral and Civil Education, that is, in the more ideological subjects.

In the 1947 statute (article 390) all subjects, including the least ideological ones, like Mathematics or Drawing, should have national sole textbooks - the bureaucratic principle of uniformity was imposed (NOTE 6).

Another indicator of the apotheosis of the Administrative State is provided by the analysis of the relative position of the three major areas of educational management in relation to the centralization level. Table 10.12 shows this relative position based on data from Table 10.5 .

TABLE 10.12 - RELATIVE POSITION IN RELATION TO
CENTRALIZATION LEVEL OF THE THREE
GREAT AREAS OF EDUCATIONAL
MANAGEMENT

RELATIVE ORDER	1 st G 1932	2 nd G 1936	3 rd G 1947	3 rd T 1948	4 th P 1963	5 th P/G 1970-1974	Now P/S 1985
1 st	CE	CE	GAM	GAM	GAM	GAM	GAM
2 nd	PM	GAM	CE	CE	CE	PM	PM
3 rd	GAM	PM	PM	PM	PM	CE	CE

CE - Curriculum and Evaluation Area

PM - Pedagogical Management Area

GAM - Government and Administrative Management Area

From 1947 statute onwards, Government and Administrative Management became the most centrally controlled area, instead of Curriculum and Evaluation, which was the most controlled area in 1932 and 1936 regulations.

The control of Government and Administrative Management had been hence situated between 4.5 and 4.9 point of the 1 to 5 scale.

Indeed the tighter control of curriculum is more congruent with ideological control; the tighter control of government and administrative management is more congruent with bureaucratic control (NOTE 7).

4.2. The evolution of the Administrative State in the educational management

It is somewhat striking in the analysis of Table 10.5 the constancy of centralization. Analyzing the global records of centralization (period average) one sees from 1947 onwards - - 4.0, 4.0, 4.0 and 4.0 (in percentages 83%, 79%, 78% and 78%). Standard deviation in this period is 0, in relation to the ordinal score, and 1.9 in relation to the percentage score.

The Minister of Education from 1962 to 1968 (GALVÃO TELES) even tried to elaborate one of those "ideological - - legal treatises" that SCHMITTER speaks (SCHMITTER 1975a, 26) - a "Statute of National Education" (see GALVÃO TELES 1966c, 1969) (NOTE 8).

He spent years in preparing this great diploma which would represent the translation into juridic norms of all the educational philosophy and all the pedagogy; that is, it would represent the more elaborate achievement of the Administrative State in Education. In spite of the commitment of the Minister to the project, he was dismissed before he finished the work (NOTE 9).

The prevalence of Law men in educational management, which is completely congruent with the Administrative State (chapter eight, section 4.8.2), went on - as an indicator from 1947 to 1974 three of the six ministers were licensed in Law (NOTE 10).

The Administrative State was less visible in primary education. First of all, the efficacy of strictly bureaucratic control in a situation where teachers worked separately, in scattered units of teaching (the great majority of schools had only teacher) was obviously limited. But there was probably another reason - as primary schooling was the only compulsory one, it is natural that ideological control was there more careful. One has already seen in chapter three that the reading sole textbooks determined in the mobilising period lasted until the fifth period (exclusive), which is probably consequence of the same ideological concern.

Control on primary education had to be teacher control, due to the isolated conditions of work. This control began in the control of primary teachers education (see MONICA 1978, 210-218), went on to control on access to tenure and promotion (MONICA 1978, 207) and was completed by control of teacher's practice through inspection. The creation of "regentes escolares" (chapter five, section 3.4.1) also facilitated ideological control (NOTE 11).

But there are still many mechanisms of the Administrative State in primary education. MONICA comments *"When one considers the explicit aims of formal indoctrination of primary school teachers during Salazarism, its efficacy seems very far from a success. [...] instead of creating new institutions, the regime used a different policy of teacher recruitment and forms of administrative repression aimed at compelling teachers to conformism and apathy"* (MONICA 1978, 218). Promotion after tenure was based on seniority (MONICA 1978, 207), school inspection was remote. In fact, MONICA tells us that school visits by inspectors were rare and hasty; as there was only one inspector for 356 schools the probability of an inspection visit was a remote one, ideological influence over teachers through inspectors did not exist (MONICA 1978, 163-169). So centralization was also very present (MONICA 1978, 164-165). MONICA concludes that the most efficient control over teachers was social control by the parents of their pupils and of local community (MONICA 1978, 166-169). This means that, through this other way,

ideological control was really more important in primary education than in secondary education.

4.3. The evolution of the Administrative State in educational management - analysis of the evolution of the number of rules

One of the main features of the Administrative State in education is the management by rules which are produced mainly by the Government and Central Administration. The number of rules existent in each period is an important indicator of the evolution of the Administrative State in educational management. To demonstrate the opportunity of the analysis of this thesis we extended the present analysis to the present period, even at the cost of increasing the difficulty in data gathering, due to the scattered aspect of the present educational legislation.

4.3.1. Methodology of the analysis

Indeed the attainment of this information for all areas of educational management, in relation to the present period, proved to be an impossible task. So it was confined to

selecting only some areas of secondary education educational management. The criterion for this choice was the availability of compilations of present educational rules in certain areas. In accordance with such criterion three areas were chosen - Pedagogical Organization, Teacher Management and School Government.

The sources used for each area were the following:

Pedagogical Organization Area - it was based on the official compilation made in 1985 by the Ministry of Education through the central department for secondary schools: "LAL 1985 - 1986 - Circular de apoio ao Lançamento do Ano Lectivo" with his "Anexo de Legislação", Direcção Geral do Ensino Secundário, 1985 (27-6-1985).

Teacher Management Area - the source used for the counting of rules in force in this area, in the present period was a compilation in three volumes made by the Ministry of Education in 1981: "Gestão em Educação" - Pessoal Docente", Boletim Informativo do Ministério da Educação e Ciência, Lisboa, nºs.7,8,9, Janeiro/Fevereiro 1981.

School Government Area - the source used was a private compilation of legislation about this area.

The source used for the fifth period is a compilation of laws made in 1973 by the Ministry of Education - "Ensino Secundário Técnico - Legislação Compilada e Anotada", Ministério da Educação Nacional, Secretaria de Estado da Instrução e Cultura, Direcção-Geral do Ensino Secundário, September 1973.

The compilation reproduced the 1948 rules of the Statute of Technical Education and added, when necessary, the new rules referring to each subject. As most part of the new rules were common to grammar and technical education, we used the data about technical education to estimate the number of rules in force in grammar education - the symbol \pm indicates (in Table 10.13) that the data for grammar school is a estimate.

Before the presentation of the collected data it is convenient to clarify certain points.

First of all, the data refers only to secondary schools management. This includes, in the third period, the 5th to the 11th year of schooling, in the fifth period it includes the 7th to the 11th, and now includes the 7th to 12th year schooling.

Secondly, the data from the third and fifth periods includes rules relative to grammar and to technical schools, in the present period the data is referred to the comprehensive secondary school.

The counting unit is the minimum normative unit. This criterion overcomes difficulties which arise from differences in legislative technique between periods and between Government or Parliament legislation and administrative laws. Each subdivision ("ponto" or "alínea" or "parágrafo") counts as an unit, but preambles to rules and titles do not count as units. (Since there did not exist those problems, we used, in Tables 10.4, 10.9, 10.10, 10.11, the criterion of counting as one rule only the "artigo" - article).

The subjects included in each Area are always the same across periods, independently of differences of categorization in different compilations. The criterion used was that reflected in the sub-areas which constitute each area in Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3.

In the present time the counts are not exhaustive, since the sources used are also not exhaustive of all the existing rules in each Area. This is indicated in Tables 10.13 and 10.14 by the symbol > .

In the Teacher Management Area, in the present period, we included both the rules referring to the teaching profession and the rules referring to the teacher as civil servant (but it excluded those rules present in the compilation which referred to civic laws like electoral laws). But as it was not possible to obtain comparable data for the other periods this data is not included in the general calculations.

The Area of School Government includes, in all periods, the middle management rules, that is, rules about structure of school middle management, role of school committees, number of committee meetings, appointment of middle managers (class sponsors, heads of subject groups), etc.

4.3.2. Presentation of the results of the analysis

Let us present now the results of this analysis in Tables 10.13 and 10.14.

TABLE 10.13 - NUMBER OF RULES IN SELECTED AREAS
OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT

PERIODS AREAS	3 rd PERIOD 1947 - 1948	5 th PERIOD 1973	PRESENT PERIOD 1981 - 1985
PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION	G T 108 115 223	G T 362 [±] 385	>1583
TEACHER MANAGEMENT	G T 261 356 617	G T 894 [±] 1220	>[2101] (1) >2034 [4135] (2) >2034
SCHOOL GOVERNMENT	G T 91 142 233	G T 243 [±] 379	>1162
TOTAL	1073	3483 [±]	>4779

(1) Number of rules referring to teacher as civil servant.

(2) Total number of rules referring to teacher management.
As there are no comparable numbers in the previous periods
this total is not included in the general calculations.

G - Rules referring to grammar schools.

T - Rules referring to technical schools.

TABLE 10.14 - PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE IN NUMBER OF RULES IN
EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT ACROSS PERIODS

PERIODS AREAS	1947-1948	5 th PERIOD 1973	NOW 1981-1985
PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION	100%	335% \pm	>710%
TEACHER MANAGEMENT	100%	343% \pm	>330%
SCHOOL GOVERNMENT	100%	267% \pm	>499%
TOTAL	100%	325% \pm	>445%

The Table shows the overwhelmingly clear increase in educational legislation from 1947-1948 to our days. This increase was already very visible in the Veiga Simão's period (1970-1974). But it is also very great the increase from 1973, although it is not so evident in the table as the increase from 1947-1948 to 1973.

One must consider three points in relation to the present number of rules which explain this lesser visibility. Firstly, the counting is not exhaustive because the sources used were also not exhaustive. Secondly, although the major part of the rules of 1947 and 1948 Statutes are not in force now, the statutes themselves are not revoked and some of their rules are

still in force, but they were not counted for the present period since it is difficult to know which rules are in force and which rules are implicitly revoked (NOTE 12). A third point which help to explain the lower visibility of the increase from 1973 to nowadays is the fact that present legislation about comprehensive secondary school is much more economical (in terms of number of rules) than different legislation for grammar schools and technical schools, which had to repeat in the respective statutes many rules which applied to both types of schools. All this means that the difference between the present period and the fifth period in number of rules is more meaningful than the tables suggests.

Assuming that the percentage of increase in number of rules between 1947-1948 and nowadays holds constant for each area one can calculate the number of rules in force in educational management of secondary schools around 17500. It is a very crude calculation (NOTE 13), but it serves to enhance the character of the present state of the Administrative state in educational management.

4.3.3. Interpretation of the results - the hypothesis of the influence of the advent of mass schooling on the increase of legislation

Why does the number of rules increase so greatly across periods? How can this evolution be explained? One can hypothesise that the growing complexity of educational management provoked this proliferation of rules. But what would be the cause of this growing complexity? One can hypothesise that the advent of mass schooling - with its changes in the academic and social climate of schools, the need to recruit more teachers and more managers, to build bigger schools and to crowd the existing ones - was the main factor responsible for this complexity.

In 1964 the regime decreed the extension of compulsory schooling for six years, which began to be implemented in 1968-1969. This means that the effect on secondary schools (then from 7th to 11th year of schooling) began in 1970-1971. The new preparatory schools (5th and 6th

year) became mass schools by nature, but the great increase in demand in secondary schools - due to the compulsority decreed - progressively transformed secondary schools in mass schools.

Indeed in 1973-1974 743% more students were enrolled in preparatory and secondary education than in 1940-1941, 639% more than in 1950-1951, 264% more than in 1960-1961 and 177% more than six years before (1966-1967). (The calculations were based on the official statistics). The mass school was already implemented in the fifth period (1970-1974).

A first indicator of the effect of mass schooling on legislation was the publication, in 1968, of a new Statute for the 5th and 6th year of schooling, that is, for preparatory education. But we will analyse here the effect of this policy change only on secondary education management.

If the hypothesis above formulated is wrong one could expect an even production of adequate rules for secondary education management during the years which last from the publication of the Statutes to the publication of the 1973 Compilation (1948-1973). If this production is much greater after the first impact of the added compulsority in secondary education (which coincides with the fifth period 1970-1974) the hypothesis can be considered confirmed. The criterion of adequacy of rules (to the 1973 situation) is indicated by the fact of still being in force.

In order to test our hypothesis we sampled two of the three analysed areas of Technical Schools Management (due to the fact that the most part of the new rules are common to grammar and technical schools the choice of type of school is not relevant in this case). The new rules, added to the 1947 and 1948 Statutes, were categorized in two groups - those produced between 1948 and 1969 and those produced between 1970 and October 1973 (although dated

from September 1973 the Compilation still includes legislation of October 1973).

Table 10.15 shows the results of this analysis.

TABLE 10.15-THE EFFECT OF THE ADVENT OF MASS
SCHOOLING ON THE INCREASE OF
SECONDARY EDUCATION LEGISLATION

AREAS	PERIODS	1948 1969 3 rd -4 th Period	1970 1973 5 th Period	TOTAL
PEDAGOGICAL ORGANIZATION		185 69%	85 31%	270 100%
SCHOOL GOVERNMENT		81 34%	143 60%	237 100%
TOTAL		266 52%	228 45%	507 100%
Number of years		22	3.8	

The analysis of the Table clearly confirms the hypothesis. Indeed in the 3.8 years the fifth period produced 45% of all new rules of the analysed areas in force in 1973 (against 52% in the remaining 21 years - the 3% missing represent 13 units of School Government rules which could not be dated, because they are mere elucidation of rules).

Of all the total rule units in force in secondary education in 1973 (thus including those of the 1948 Statute) 30% were produced just in the 3.8 years in which the

effect of extended compulsory schooling began to affect secondary schools. This indicates that changes had to be done in secondary schools (due to its growing mass school characteristic) which demanded the production of abundant new legislation. So the hypothesis is confirmed.

As the mass schooling process was intensified after the change of political regime in April 1974 - in 1980-1981 there were 139% more students enrolled in state preparatory and secondary schools than in 1973-1974 and 159% more just referring secondary schools - one can expect another increase in legislation in relation to the 1973 Compilation. Table 10.13 shows that this increase indeed happened, which can be seen as another way of confirming the hypothesis.

4.3.4. The hypothesis of the progressive inadequacy of the central bureaucratic paradigm of educational decision-making

The ever growing increase in legislation can be also seen as indicator of the possible progressive inadequacy of the central bureaucratic paradigm of educational decision-making.

Indeed, according to the above made estimates, there should be around 17500 rule units for the management of secondary schools. It seems not easy for an educational administrator (not specifically prepared for the job, as it is the case in Portugal) to manage adequately a so great amount of rules. But the great amount of legislation produces several other consequences which can be causes of inadequacy. Firstly, the increase in law making increases also the possibility of contradictions among laws. Secondly, it increases also the doubts about the interpretation of produced rules. Thirdly, since most part of the revocation of rules is made only implicitly (that is, by mere publication of new different rules) it is, in many cases, difficult to know if some less recent rules are still in force or not - that is, the system generates an ambiguity about the status of many rules. All those problems can only be solved, within the central bureaucratic paradigm, through the publication of new clarifying legislation, which reinforces the inadequate pattern. All those consequences are aggravated by the general

loose and unconnected character of the new legislation.

If those are considered indicators of inadequacy of the central bureaucratic paradigm one can ask - why does mass schooling provoke this progressive inadequacy?

In a grammar school the reality of a school for an elite provoked a socially and academically homogeneous climate which supported the bureaucratic assumption of rules made for the "average student" in a "average school" (see FORMOSINHO 1984b). This basic assumption of the central bureaucratic pedagogic decision-making became inadequate in the context of a mass school (FORMOSINHO 1985b). As it is known, central bureaucratic decision-making is based on pre-decision of all possible situations through pre-made rules. This assumes the possibility of easy anticipation of all questions and demands careful categorization of situations (MERTON 1940) in order to give to each one an adequate solution - that is, it demands that decrees prefigure the facts, in LUCENA's words (LUCENA 1976a, 22). Mass schooling creates a complex and very diverse situation in regard to comprehensiveness of curricula, proliferation of optional subjects, variety of buildings, different teacher certification procedures, social and academic heterogeneity of students, etc. - all this makes anticipation much more subject to error, categorization much more difficult and, naturally, central rules less adequate to solve concrete situations. That is, central decision-making becomes both more difficult and less adequate.

So the progressive inadequacy results from the contrast between social and educational evolution (change) and the constancy of centralization as system of educational management (non change).

4.4. Conclusion - the strong state took in education the form of administrative state

From all these analyses one can conclude that the Administrative State mould prevailed in educational management. Its apotheosis was represented by the 1947 and 1948 Statutes.

Due to the coming of mass schooling the Administrative State mould was reinforced which is indicated by successive increases in legislation, as had been analysed. This evolution did not bring more adequacy to educational management. On the contrary, progressive inadequacy resulted from the contrast between educational change and constancy (non change) in the system of educational management. (This analysis has put aside the question of the possible intrinsic inadequacy of the central bureaucratic paradigm for pedagogical decision-making - for this see FORMOSINHO 1984b).

One can conclude establishing positively that in education the strong state took the form of Administrative State.

But centralization is not only a question of adequacy of methods of decision-making nor only a question of the extent and the type of control over what goes on in schools. It involves also personal control over teachers. This aspect will be analyzed in the following section.

5. CENTRALIZATION AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHER'S CONTROL

There were several kinds of control over teachers--expressive controls, repressive controls, administrative controls. Although the last ones are the congruent ones with the Administrative State, a brief reference to other controls is necessary to understand the context of use of administrative controls.

5.1. Expressive control of secondary school teachers

One had already spoken of primary school teacher role in New State school mentality inculcation functions (chapter three, section 2.6.1.), of the congruent primary school teacher expressive controls (this chapter, section 4.2.) and of the evolution of its teacher education (chapter five, section 3.3.2.). So in this section it will be referred the expressive control of secondary school teachers.

It is obvious that centralized management of education could only be efficacious if it was designed a system to ensure that teachers and educational managers in secondary schools complied with central commands. Expressive controls were essential in the creation of this attitude.

A first strategy to ensure this attitude was the control of teacher education. Teacher education of secondary school teachers was done, since 1930, in three separate stages (see FORMOSINHO 1985d)- first the academic preparation in Universities (as seen above - chapter five, section 3.4.3. - this meant a social selection); then, a year of pedagogical theory; then a two years post-graduate training period (only one year, after 1969) in a secondary school ("estágio"). This "estágio" (student teaching) was never done immediately after the academic course - the licensed was appointed as provisional teacher for some years before he could be admitted to the "estágio", since

places for teaching practice were limited. Those two post-graduate training years were not paid. Thus the system ensured academic and economic selection in access to professional certification.

The training period was done mainly based on model pedagogy, in which the trainee was mainly required to reproduce the type of teaching he have seen his master teacher been doing (FREITAS 1983, 24-26, PINTO et al. 1974). This ensured pedagogic compliance; school socialization taught administrative compliance.

Empiric models of teacher education, that is, models based only on non theorized experience and on learning through socialization in what exists, are shown to be culturally conservative (FORMOSINHO 1984a, 1985c). The just described model had many feature of an empiric model (FORMOSINHO 1985d) and was thus congruent with the inculcation of the desired professional conformism in teachers (NOTE 14).

5.2. Repressive control of secondary school teachers

SALAZAR said "It would be ridiculous if the State [...] acknowledged the right of educational functionaries (which are not chosen by the families) to teach principles opposed to those of the State" (SALAZAR 1936).

Thus teachers were subject to the same political controls of the common civil servant (teachers were also civil servants) - there was potencial control of their voting patterns (chapter two, section 5.3.2., chapter five, section 1.1.1.), teachers could be dismissed if they engaged in oppositionist activities (see chapter five, section 2.3.1. and chapter six, section 1.).

The headteacher ("reitor" or "director") was appointed by the Minister of Education on the basis of political confidence. (This does not exclude that competence criteria were used, but they were not the first criterion). Thus the headteacher was a potential agent of political control in schools.

5.3. Administrative control of secondary school teachers

There was direct control of access to employment, to certification and to tenure (see chapter five, section 1.1.1.). This direct control had clear repressive components - the admissions were generally preceded by an information of the secret police - and also expressive components since the admission imposed that teachers swear fidelity to the established order ("I declare upon my honor that I accept the social order established by the Political Constitution of 1933 and that I actively repudiate communism and all subversive ideas.").

The main strategy to ensure teacher control was the implementation of teachers duty to obey. as the Statute of 1948 says (article 317, o), the teacher should "abstain from showing in front of pupils or subordinate officials any disagreement about the organization of services or about superior's orders". (The formulation is not so strict as that found in the Statute of the Weather Service (Decree n°37109, 19-10-1948) - "the civil servant attitude should be such as to give the impression that he agrees entirely with given orders, without showing or even hinting, that the points of view of the chief do not meet his approval").

This strategy is instrumental for the success of the implementation of New State aims of mentality inculcation. Without teacher obedience the strategy of implementation of those aims through national central curriculum formulation could be useless.

The central departments prepared the national syllabus which the Minister approved. The Minister chose, since 1947, sole textbooks which were valid for all schools in the country. But this was not enough - the teachers were forbidden of dictating notes or changing the order of the teaching of different subjects in the syllabus or not teaching certain subjects. It was also strictly forbidden the use of auxiliary textbooks or epitomes (see, for instance, the articles 170, 414, 415, 416 of the Statute of 1947) (NOTE 15). Curricular control was then culminated

with national examinations.

All this conformist purpose was helped by the growing teaching load given to secondary school teachers - from 18 hours per week in 1932, it was increased to 20 hours per week in 1936 and finally to 22 hours per week in 1947 (22% more than fifteen years before), which is still the normal teaching load nowadays. The more hours the teacher spent in classroom work the more it was probable he restricted his work to preparing classes and giving classes - it is the bureaucratic disfunction analyzed by GOULDNER 1954 - the exact knowledge of the minimum patterns of work which are still acceptable tends to level the work, within the organization, at this minimum point.

The success of centralization in achieving passivity of teachers was probably helped by the feminization of teaching occupation at secondary school level. The several roles of the professional women in a traditional society (mother, spouse, housewife, professional) often inhibits a great degree of commitment by lack of available time. Besides that the traditional education of women in submission to men (see chapter five, section 3.6.) also worked in that direction.

In 1940-41 there were only 34% female teachers in grammar school education; in 1966-67 its percentage was 61%. In reference to technical education the percentage of women teachers was 21% in 1940-41 and 48% in 1966-67.

The same effect of feminization is described by STOER (1985) in regard to primary school teachers. STOER explains the sudden change of the role of primary school teacher from ideologue of Republican ideas to the "souls moulder" of the New State to the feminization of the occupation (STOER 1985, 63-64). In 1940-41 there were already 76% of women in primary school teaching in 1967-68 there were 88%. The New State actively favoured this trend in regard to primary school teachers, reserving, since 1942, two thirds of the places in the reopened Teacher Education Colleges (see above chapter five, section 3.3.2.) to women.

5.4. Conclusion - teacher control as an indispensable instrument for the efficacy of centralization

Teacher control through expressive, administrative and repressive strategies is a touchstone for the efficacy of centralization. The system can only work commanded from the top if the legitimacy of the domination is not questioned and if the central bureaucrats are certain of the unquestioned implementation of central rules in schools.

6. CONCLUSION - CENTRALIZATION AS A DEMOBILIZING STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE PASSIVITY

The relationship between the Administrative State and the aims of depoliticization, conformism and demobilization had been often referred in this work (see chapter five, section 1.1.2., chapter seven, introduction and section 5., chapter eight, sections 4.5., 4.7. and 5.).

Indeed centralization is congruent with the education for passivity, it is congruent with the pursuiness of mentality uniformity, it is congruent with the habitualness in political and daily life which Salazar proclaimed as ideal (see chapter two, section 1.3.), it is congruent with the emphasis on hierarchy ("I do not believe in equality but in hierarchy" - SALAZAR, VI, 41).

Centralization is the main tool to build and sustain the Administrative State, not only by effectively removing decision-making from local agents (teachers, educational managers), but through the creation in them of an attitude of non legitimacy to decide.

Centralization is based on that theory of human behaviour which McGregor calls "theory X" - the average man is indolent, works as little as it is allowed to, he is not ambitious, he is not willing to take decisions, hates responsibilities, prefers to be ruled than to rule (McGREGOR 1958). It is not necessary to refer the similitude

of "theory X" with Salazar's new man ideal (see chapter two, section 1.3.). But centralization as process of decision making creates in persons the very attitude of unwillingness to decide - this inculcated attitude can then be used as legitimacy basis for the continuation of centralization. It is thus clear the demobilising mechanism of centralization.

It can be hypothesized that it is the persistence of this attitude which may explain the failure of the so called "democratic management" of schools implemented after April 1974 (the government of schools by elected teachers, helped by elected students and by elected members of the non teaching staff) - see FERNANDES 1985 and FORMOSINHO 1986.

It can also be hypothesized that the persistence of this attitude is a great obstacle to the creation of a professional attitude in teachers and it is also an obstacle to the process of regional educational management.

Indeed "centralization is not only a disproportionate process of power sharing, but also a cultural process of non participation, situationism and passivity" (FORMOSINHO 1986).

So one can conclude that the ambiguity of New State theory referent to the role of the State (in general and in education) was solved since 1947-1948 in favour of the implementation of an Administrative State and this is congruent with New State passivity oriented strategies.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

Each chapter had a general introduction which explained its relevance for this thesis and ended with a conclusion which indicated the way in which it contributed to the confirmation of the main hypothesis.

In this last chapter we will try to put together and make sense of all those chapter conclusions.

1. EDUCATING FOR PASSIVITY

As it was said (in chapter two), Salazar's new man was the passive man inculcated with rural values. The Nation itself was essentially the rural people and the elite which identified itself with rural people's values (see chapters three, four and seven).

The New State pursued the building of this "new" man (based on the image of the "old" rural man) through the setting up of mechanisms of non participation in public life and through the implementation of expressive strategies.

Naturally the same purposes were pursued through the educational system (as it has been analysed in chapters three and four). The adequately educated young person of the new generation should be a conformed person, believing in his leaders and admiring the Nation's heroes and in the capacity of his leaders to defend the "pluricontinental and multiracial Portugal"; if possibly, he should be a religious person. The adequately educated young person should be a family man/woman and should exhaust his/her ambitions in family problems and private strategies, he should not need political information (better if he repudiated politics all together).

2. THE "MILD BUT CONSTANT PRESSURE" - FROM RURALISM TO APOLITICISM AND PRIVATENESS

One can argue that if Salazar was truly convinced of the natural passivity of the Portuguese people no demobilising strategies were needed. The answer to this apparent paradox was given in chapter two - the rural man, who is already naturally passive, is the image to which the more mobilised urban man should conform. So the urban man was the main target of the expressive demobilising strategies. Even the educated status group (the "doutores") should learn to conform.

This ruralist expressive strategy was implemented mainly through education - there were many texts of the reading sole textbooks of the New State praising life in the countryside and asserting the supremacy of rural values, as it was seen in chapter four.

But this expressive ruralism was supplemented by an organizational strategy of compartmentalizing rural people in the countryside - if rural people were naturally demobilised then it follows logically that to keep them there is instrumental to achieve demobilization. This compartmentalization was done through not facilitating the emigration of rural people into towns and through the low degree of industrialization. Again one has expressive and organizational strategies walking in conjunction with a global expressive strategy of demobilization.

The non existence of participation in public life, which we observed in the chapter two, was a natural consequence of this global strategy.

The main objective of the "mild but constant pressure" was to obtain "the order guaranteed by the obedience of the souls" (SALAZAR in GEORGEL 1985, 123).

The main basis of the "mild but constant pressure" was the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure", not any elaborate ideology (which is typical of an authoritarian regime). On the contrary, the basis of effective repression was not mere non conformance to this

moral structure, but active political opposition to the regime.

This constant pressure led to an apolitical pattern of life which had as consequence the promotion in each citizen of only private strategies. It is what SALAZAR recommends -to "live habitually". This is part of an implicit agreement between the regime and the citizens, between the State and civil society - neither the State would interfere in areas of citizen's private life (choice of profession, leisure, sports, entertainment, etc.) nor the citizens would interfere in public life. Public life was the monopoly of the State.

Thus to outstep private strategies was in itself a political act, even if the objectives were not directly political - for instance, to publicly press for the building of a school, of a hospital or of a road. The choice of certain means - meetings, petitions, working committees, etc. was considered dangerous by the regime. For this reason meetings among primary school teachers were forbidden; for this same reason family (which the New State considered the main educational agent) was not provided with any official means to influence school education - this would mean to outstep private strategies. Not even at local level small communal strategies were allowed(see chapter eight.

One of the pillars of the "basic sentiments of Portuguese moral structure" was respect for the family. This is obviously part of the traditional values, but its enhancement is not as innocent as it would appear, at first glance - the more engaged you are with extended family affairs, the less time and effort you have for public affairs. Indeed BRADFORD attributes to the absorption with family affairs the no public spirit of Portuguese (BRADFORD 1973, 142).

3. GENERALIZED PRESSURE AND SELECTIVE REPRESSION

The generalized "mild but constant pressure" was

supplemented by a strategy of selective repression, as it had been seen in chapter six.

Changes in the 1960's provoked clearly a shift from the generalized pressure to selective repression due to the increasing mobilization of certain sectors intellectuals, students, progressist catholics, trade unions. It became clear that the "intelligentsia" had refused to convert "en masse" to the regime (ROBINSON 1979, 81). The intellectuals became even to be culturally dominated by leftist values.

The answer of the regime was to increase selective repression. But as it had been said in the conclusion of chapter six all must be seen as part of a global integrated expressive strategy to achieve passivity.

4. SOCIALIZING FOR SITUATIONISM

All types of strategies - expressive, repressive, administrative and organizational - try to socialize portuguese for situationism, that is, for conformity with what is, because it was set up like that.

From the three main currents of thought, ROBINSON finds throughout portuguese history - sebastianism (portuguese messianism), regenerationism and situationism (ROBINSON 1979) - the New State built its strategy mainly on situationism.

To aim in life only for private or extended family goals and, consequently, to pursue only private strategies was the best road to situationism. Centralization was instrumental in compelling the more active towards that road through emptying local means of any decision-making. To live habitually an apolitical life should be the ideal for the common portuguese man.

5. ORGANIZING FOR DEMOBILIZATION

Society is not only composed of individuals, but

of social groups and organizations, as the New State leaders very well knew (see chapter seven). There was then the need to formulate strategies to avoid mobilization of social organizations.

Corporatism served well this purpose through integration of the National into the State. In this way the distinction between State and Civil Society became blurred. The State controlled and suffocated (LUCENA) civil society.

Beyond corporative organization there were set up several organizations to control civil society. The non participation in public life was not enough for the demobilizing purposes of the regime. It was necessary to fill the vacuum which this non participation could provoke. As SCHMITTER says the regime had an horror of the vacuum (SCHMITTER 1975a, 23) and thus created several organizations to fill this void through pre-emptying the potential mobilising spaces. It is the case of the National Union, it is the case of corporative organization, it is also the case of Portuguese Youth.

It is what MAKLER (1979) calls the "organization without mobilization".

6. ADAPTATION OF THE NEW STATE STRATEGIES TO PORTUGUESE PEOPLE TRAITS

As analysed in chapter two, the Salazar theory of government by elites was based on a diagnosis of portuguese people traits.

The regime incorporated the conservative characteristics of the portuguese society and capitalized on the historical dependence of portuguese society in regard to the state (BARRETO 1984, VALENTE 1983).

Even Salazar's leadership was more paternalist than charismatic, more appealing to tradition than to ideology, more appealing to situationism than to sebastianism.

The strong state took the form of the Administrative State which represents a rationalization of the traditional dependence of society in regard to the State.

7. WAS THE PASSIVITY INCULCATION EFFECTIVE ?

The more assertive aspects of the New State mentality inculcation did not seem to be as effectively transmitted as the clearly passivity oriented ones - see SALAZAR's complaints, in 1958, in SALAZAR V, 471, 521-526. He asks "why does today's youth feel that it has its soul empty? It is not enough Fatherland [love and cult] to fill a soul? There should be something wrong with education". MONICA also reports little success in primary school teachers mentality inculcation (see chapter ten).

However the inculcation of a conformed behaviour seemed very successful. Indeed the New State outstepped the life of most authoritarian regimes, it ruled for 48 consecutive years, it did not create a strong opposition, it could maintain, at least until the 1960's, a deep and generalized level of demobilization in the population. Portuguese civil society accepted state domination. So on the whole passivity was effectively obtained and conformism in behaviour was very successfully achieved. As shown throughout this thesis, the education system played a vital part in this process.

NOTES

NOTES OF INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

NOTE 1

This attitude was indicated by non willingness to distinguish between non qualified and qualified teachers at the level of pedagogical authority to chose methods of teaching, textbooks, methods of evaluation and to be responsible for the pass-fail decision for each pupil. This attitude is probably congruent with the individualism exhibited, but it is not congruent neither with professional values nor with democratic accountability.

NOTE 2

"Democratic management" of schools can have several meanings from a minimal to a maximal meaning:

a) It can mean "democratic government" with participation of parents and local community representatives in the government of school, that is, it can imply decentralisation;

b) It can mean just management of school by an elected teaching body chosen between competing teams of candidates with different educational options and pedagogical government programs, what would mean "deconcentration" or partial "functional decentralisation" (see about these concepts applied to education FORMOSINHO 1983 b, 1986);

c) "Democratic management" could only very difficultly mean just election of a teacher body to fulfil the same (restricted) roles and have the same (limited) powers of non elected heads. But this was the meaning which prevailed, which can be seen as partially still consequence of the education for passivity.

See about "democratic management" FERNANDES 1985, LIMA 1985, STOER 1986.

NOTE 3

This is not the case of a contradiction between verbal discourse and practice which is normal within certain limits - see BURRISS 1980 -, but a contradiction between attitudes which were more congruent with the educational changes produced after April 1974.

NOTE 4

The assumption behind this reasoning - that person socialization as child influence adult behaviour - is clearly confirmed by psychological research.

NOTES OF INTRODUCTION

NOTE 5

The passivism inculcated by the New State seems more adequate to explain teachers practices (reported by interviewed teachers and observed by the researcher) than ideological revolutionary attitudes, socialist ideology or the political philosophy of "democratic management" of schools. Those latter explanations account very adequately to interviewed teachers verbal statements, but not to their reported practices. Some questions would be unanswered by this latter explanations but seem more understandable if one accepts the essential administrative continuity (and congruent partial attitude continuity) between New State educational management and democratic educational management after 1974. One can produce some examples of those questions - why were not transferred to school democratically elected teachers bodies more competences than had the previous head? Why was not the new system of school educational management used to create school based innovations? Why was leadership in schools reduced to laissez-faire leadership? Why was leadership of elected bodies reduced to bureaucratic management? Why was given (by school and central administration) to "democratic management" the minimal meaning the concept could contain (see note 2 of this Introduction)? Why is there now such demobilisation in regard to "democratic management", as it is indicated by the fact that around half of the teacher committees are appointed by the central ministry instead of elected by the teachers? (see GEP 1986).

NOTE 6

During sometime after the overthrow of the New State it was taboo to show any area of continuity between the authoritarian and the democratic regime. Once the revolutionary enthusiasm decreased and political mobilization diminished, it is more possible to analyse the problem of continuities.

So one can see in GRACIO 1985a, 1985b an acknowledgement of policy continuity in regard to the unification of post-primary education which one does not find in previous papers about the same subject - see GRACIO 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984.

See about this continuity STOER 1986.

NOTE 7

In book references the date and the number of the page are indicated. In article references only the date is given. In regard to references from official legislation it is indicated the number of the decree, the date of its publication and generally the legal article from where the reference was taken.

NOTES OF INTRODUCTION

NOTE 8

This "Comission for a Black Book about the Fascist Regime" was created in April 1977 to publish documents which could show by themselves how the regime worked and governed - see the Introduction to COMISSAO ... 1979.

NOTE 9

This opinion of Augusto JOAQUIM is quoted in BELO 1986. JOAQUIM added that portuguese left ignored those questions and would pay a price for this ignorance.

NOTE 10

The confirmation of the implementation of the elitist non participatory theory of government was also done through the analysis of the mechanisms of non participation in public life and the role of the President of Republique, of the National Assembly and of the sole party.

NOTE 11

It was also done a not so detailed analysis of the curriculum of secondary school.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 1

NOTE 1

CABRAL 1982 says that to call the regime as "limited pluralism" or "paternal dictatorship" is to justify the New State, to minimize its repressive aspects. On the contrary, to qualify it as fascism is to emphasize those same features. Thus it is an option which could have to do with the political intentions of the authors.

About the influence of political options on the qualification of the New State see implicit references in LUCENA 1979a, PAYNE 1979a. WIARDA complains that fascism "has become a label of disapproval rather than a precise terms of analyses" (WIARDA 1977,4).

NOTE 2

A recent novel about life in a portuguese small town during the World War conveys the idea that Portugal could not even be a Fascism, with capital F, but it could only be a little fascism. New State nationalism was called "little and dull". See Álvaro GUERRA, "Café República", Edições O Jornal, Lisboa, 1982, page 169.

NOTE 3

The fact that there is more agreement in the description of the New State than on its qualification can only mean that there is more consensus about what was the New State than about what fascism is.

NOTE 4

See for this kind of definition for instance GINER 1982. In the end Mussolini's Italy ends up probably being the least characteristic fascism according to this definition.

One can distinguish between the Political Science definitions of regimes more concerned with formal political structures and explicit objectives and Sociological definitions more concerned with the class content of regimes, (see WIARDA 1977, 346-347 as an example of this confrontation).

It seems that many ambiguities in this area come from non clarification of what kind of definition is intended - the perspective followed in this work borrows more, in this respect, from Political Science.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 1

NOTE 5

In the First Conference on Modern Portugal (International Conference Group on Modern Portugal) held in the University of New Hampshire (U.S.A.), October 1973 (see GRAHAM and MAKLER 1979), the most heated discussions took place in the session on portuguese corporatism. But this had more to do with the reality of academic political science than with the reality of Portugal.

NOTE 6

If one accepts that fascism is by nature totalitarian, then the categorization of New State as non totalitarian implicitly rejects the fascist label.

NOTE 7

CAETANO, the other very important leader of the regime, makes a distinction between "essential freedoms" (or "civil freedoms") - the right to build a family, to chose an occupation, freedom of movement, religious freedom and right to private property - and "instrumental freedoms" - freedom of reunion, of association, of speech, of having elections, etc. The first ones could never be limited by the State; but the latter could be limited in order to promote the first ones. "All that the liberalism had of truly good and human will be preserved by us" (CAETANO 1950).

NOTE 8

For this rejection of characterizing the New State as a totalitarian regime see, for instance - GRAHAM 1975, 19, LUCENA 1976a, 120, MARQUES 1976, 181, MARTINS 1969, MONICA 1978, 102, 355, PAYNE 1976, 1979, SCHMITTER 1975a, 40, SETON-WATSON 1972, 248.

See about the different interpretations about the New State LUCENA 1984.

NOTE 9

The episode of portuguese National - Syndicalists (Blue Shirts) which promote fascist ideals, fascist symbols and rituals can be seen as evidence of the rejection of totalitarianism by the New State, since the mainstream of the regime opposed them (see section 2.1.1.a)).

See about this episode GONÇALVES 1981, LUCENA 1979a, MEDINA 1979, NOGUEIRA 1977b, 162-169, 278, ROBINSON 1979, 52, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976, SCHMITTER 1979, WIARDA 1977, 180-181.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 1

NOTE 10

One must realize that the New State was a regime which lasted from 1926-1933 till 1974. One cannot judge the regime analysing only its fascistoid period (1933-1945). The continuity of the regime probably makes us less aware of the changes it suffered in the so long span of time.

NOTE 11

Salazar preferred to deal with a sleeping country (LUCENA 1976a, 66-67). Congruently with his theory of elites (see chapter two, section 2) he did not seek any active popular support in mass demonstrations or similar manifestations.

NOTE 12

NOGUEIRA tells that the Catholic Church made reservations about the setting up of Portuguese Youth with fear that it could lead to divinization of worldly ideals and consequent deviation of spiritual ones - see NOGUEIRA 1977b, 93-97, 1978, 21.

NOTE 13

The characterization of the regime as authoritarian does not intend any type of rehabilitation of the regime, (as CABRAL hints - see NOTE 1), but just a better description of its essence. This characterization does not ignore the important presence of repression, but it just says that its essence was not there. It was rather in the demobilization strategies that its core should be sought.

NOTE 14

LINZ (1975) makes a typology of authoritarian regimes. He proposes several sub-types - Portugal is categorized in the "organic statism sub-type".

NOTE 15

Salazar himself pointed as his aim for Portugal to "live habitually". See about Salazar's leadership style FERRO 1982, 190-192, 283-284, 302-305.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 1

NOTE 16

CRUZ 1982b points up very important differences between the New State ideology and the "integralismo lusitano" movement and concludes that its ideology never turned into being the official ideology of the regime or even its most important doctrinary contribution. (The movement's ideology was ambivalent as CARDOSO 1982 shows).

The attitude of the movement main leaders was of opposition to the New State - the New State used "the corporations as an instrument of domination of the State over the Nation" one of them said (quoted in CRUZ 1982b). They also disagreed with the building of the Police State. But several followers of the movement were co-opted by the rising regime. According to MARTINS (1970) there were several types of integralists and they gave accordingly different answers to the New State from cooperation to almost opposition.

A group came from the movement tried to form a political movement parallel to the Salazar supporters - they were the National Syndicalism movement - see Note 9.

NOTE 17

To co-opt the youth following the National-Syndicalism it was promoted the creation of an official youth movement (Acção Escolar Vanguarda), in 1934. To capture recruits in the same field of National-Syndicalists this official youth movement adopted a violent verbal style (against "bourgeois of easy life", "old-fashioned people", "routine spirit" and "demo-liberal capitalism") and promoted demonstrations and rallies. Salazar was presented as someone who, beyond his calm profile, was a true revolutionary. But, once the need to mobilize youth has passed, the movement entered into rapid decline. As PINTO and RIBEIRO (1982) say, Salazar was not inclined to support them beyond the need of a mere tactical expedient.

NOTE 18

As American Minister, in Lisbon at the time, said in a dispatch to his government (in August 1936) that the portuguese government had, since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, regarded the rebels success "as a matter of life and death" (in MARTINS 1970). So the regime gave several facilities to the rebels and even promoted a volunteers corps (the "Viriatos") who fought with Franco's forces.

NOTE 19

According to MARTINS (1970) the "Legião Portuguesa" was the most spontaneous creation of the regime since it corresponded to certain pressures from below. But the "Legião Portuguesa" was led by Army officers, which was a means of control. As MARQUES says "it quickly faded away and ceased to be taken seriously, as generally happens in Portugal after awhile" (MARQUES 1976,186).

NOTE 20

SCHMITTER 1979 points out that this mobilization period has no equivalent in the recruitment pattern to the core of the regime.

NOTE 21

Both MARTINS 1970 and MARQUES 1976 (176) give more importance to the integralist movement as ideological source of the New State. But CRUZ, in more recent studies (1980, 1982a and b) point to christian democratic thoughts as its main doctrinaire source. This seems to explain better the political behaviour of the regime (see chapters two, three, five and six), its repudiation of the fascist mobilizational core, its longevity and even its evolution. It is also more congruent with the composition of the elite - LEWIS 1979, SCHMITTER 1979.

NOTE 22

SALAZAR supported some eclectic solutions (SALAZAR IV, 433, V, 494) and accepted limited ideological variety within the regime (SALAZAR VI, 242, 356). He said more than once that the New State did not have a pre-ready doctrine, but a doctrine which was being formulated while practical solutions were being implemented - "We are going to make propaganda of an already made doctrine and of a doctrine still to be made" (SALAZAR I, 281 - see also SALAZAR III, preface).

About this conflict between individual and organic representation, he said that the Corporative Chamber was more representative of Nation than the Parliament (SALAZAR IV, 435), but he also said that national interest could not be the combination of corporative interests - see chapter seven and eight.

NOTE 23

See about the different groups within the regime MARQUES 1976, MARTINS 1970, ROBINSON 1979, SCHMITTER 1979,

NOTES OF CHAPTER 1

WIARDA 1977. See also the biography of Salazar by Franco NOGUEIRA and CAETANO's memoirs (1977). A very interesting document about political group in the early times of the regime is GONÇALVES 1981 - it refers to military groups and national syndicalists.

About the monarchic group CAETANO's memoirs are very interesting. CRUZ (1982a and b, 1985) refers to the integralist group and CRUZ 1980 to the Catholic group. WIARDA 1977 is the best source for the group of corporatist theoreticians.

NOTE 24

A notable of the regime (Albino dos Reis) said "we do not recognize parties outside National Union [the sole party]. Within it we do not allow groups".

But CAETANO had other opinion, he defended openly a restricted pluralism within the regime - see for an episode CAETANO 1977, 306.

NOTE 25

LEEDS (1983) proposes a formative period (1932-1936), an intensive period (1936-1947), a "low pressure" period (1947-1958) and a decadence period (1958-1968).

NOTE 26

This campaign is an exception in educational policy after 1945, since it used mobilizational methods in a non mobilizational period.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 2

NOTE 1

SALAZAR disliked parties in general, but admitted that some countries like England, could work well on a party system. He considered that Portugal could never be like that, due to the characteristics of portuguese people.

NOTE 2

"Saudade" is a specific portuguese word with no exact equivalent in other languages. The best approach is to miss someone or something, to be nostalgic or longing. "Nostalgic and longing" was the translation used for "saudoso".

NOTE 3

This is the reason why portuguese are so easy prey of pessimism - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 296.

NOTE 4

Accepting that may not be easy to modify portuguese people (SALAZAR 1933, in FERRO 1982, 126), Salazar says that if he cannot get to 100 he would try to reach 80 (ibidem, 170).

NOTE 5

Thus the constant reference to our "mild customs" (brandos costumes).

NOTE 6

One of the best sources for this type of pessimist self-image of portuguese is a portuguese historian and writer of the 19th century - OLIVEIRA MARTINS. See for recent comments on this subject CARDOSO 1986.

NOTE 7

Those sentences about the virtues of the obedience were compulsorily included in primary school reading textbooks alongside with others of the same style - see chapter three, section 3.2.3.a).

NOTE 8

This is clearly linked with the "aurea mediocritas" as ideal way of life deffended by Renaissance poets - see SALAZAR 1933, in FERRO 1982, 283.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

NOTE 9

Another example of the same paradox -- Salazar criticizes portuguese individualism and built a political regime based on the compartmentalization of social relationships, that is, on the same individualism.

As MARTINS (1985) comments, he reduces the person to its private dimension, "he sets apart, analyses, differentiates and carries his atomizing process to the believers singularness".

NOTE 10

For the regime "people" means the rural people and "masses" the urban population.

NOTE 11

See GALVAO-TELLES 1964b.

NOTE 12

Was there a regime beyond Salazar ideas and personality? Was there a "New State", with a clear political structure or there was just "Salazarism"? Those questions, although in rethoric fashion, were at the core of CAETANO's speech of 1951, in Coimbra (see in CAETANO 1959, 167-185).

WIARDA asks the same question - see WIARDA 1977, 282, 309, 397, note 17.

It will be clear in the end of the thesis that there was indeed a political regime beyond Salazar's autocracy.

NOTE 13

CAETANO in his memoirs tells several episodes in which one can feel that he resents Salazar's autocratic style - see CAETANO 1977, 59-60, 102, 162-166, 293, 340-346, 452.

NOTE 14

See CAETANO 1977, 163, 181, 185-8, 457.

See CRUZ 1982c, GRAHAM 1975, 14, MARQUES 1976, 202-203, SCHMITTER 1975b, WIARDA 1977, 103, 108.

NOTE 15

See CAETANO 1977, 371, 378.

NOTE 16

As CAETANO says - all the collaborators of Salazar who had personality had sometimes conflicts with him (CAETANO 1977, 102).

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

NOTE 17

CAETANO refers often this fragmentary pattern in public administration (CAETANO 1966, 1977, 153,161-166, 181). GRAHAM (1975, 60) says that Salazar used this fragmentary pattern to increase his power.

NOTE 18

See how the President of Republic Craveiro Lopes (1951-1958) was chosen, in CAETANO 1977, 377-380.

NOTE 19

CRUZ 1982c comments that Salazar's leadership was more paternal than charismatic.

NOTE 20

See CRUZ 1982c.

NOTE 21

See an example of this, in the re-election of President Carmona, in CAETANO 1977, 320-321.

NOTE 22

It is the case of Carmona (1928-1951) (see CAETANO 1977, 307-308, 319), the partial case of Craveiro Lopes (1951-1958) (see CAETANO 1977, 379). The most notorious case was Americo Thomaz who was President from 1958 to 1974.

NOTE 23

THOMAZ became a laughing stock of intellectuals, because of his apparent stupidity - see some examples of THOMAZ's speeches in NEVES 1974 and in "Opção", nº 80, 2-11-1977.

NOTE 24

See about this change CRUZ 1982c, LUCENA 1976a, 159-160, ROBINSON 1979, 73-75.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

NOTE 25

See "O Livro de Leitura da Terceira Classe", Livraria Editora Figueirinhas, Porto, 1958, 4th edition, pages 174-175.

NOTE 26

The member of Parliament was José Hermano SARAIVA, later minister of education (1968-1970).

NOTE 27

ROSAS (1985, 48-49) reports that 41% of the members of the Parliament, in the first Parliament of the New State (1934), were state employees.

NOTE 28

See about this BLUME 1975, CRUZ 1982c, LUCENA 1976a, 150.

NOTE 29

See about this restriction CAETANO 1972a, 601, SALAZAR I, 83, 436, VI, 38 - see also LUCENA 1976a, 150.

NOTE 30

See about this CAETANO 1972a, 595, SALAZAR I, 326 - see also CRUZ 1982c.

NOTE 31

The dissident member of Parliament was Mota Amaral, now head of the government of Azores.

NOTE 32

Recent documents published by the COMISSAO DO LIVRO NEGRO SOBRE O FASCISMO may throw some light on this matter - the National Assembly may have not been so obedient as it appeared (see COMISSAO ... 1986, introduction).

NOTE 33

SALAZAR tells to António FERRO the reasons why women should not normally vote - SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 156-160.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

NOTE 34

Republican tradition was not one man, one vote, but it was based rather on a restrict definition of the electorate - see CABRAL 1982, PAYNE 1979a, ROBINSON 1979, 36, 67.

Ironically Portugal was the european country which held more elections between 1933 and 1970 - SCHMITTER 1977.

NOTE 35

See COMISSAO ... 1979, 10, 35, 48, 53-55, 59.

NOTE 36

See COMISSAO ... 1979, 61-68.

NOTE 37

One can recall so important ministers as Adriano Moreira (Overseas Minister), or Veiga Simão (Minister of Education) who were not members of National Union - see CAETANO 1977, 304.

NOTE 38

Afonso QUEIRO was professor of Administrative Law as CAETANO, but in the University of Coimbra, and was a partisan of the New State.

NOTE 39

The notable was the member of Parliament Albino dos Reis.

NOTE 40

CAETANO appears generally more dynamic and open than Salazar, probably because he was younger, he was not the leader and he had to compete with Salazar. But there seemed to exist also some ideological differences - CAETANO was republican and Salazar was, apparently, monarchic; CAETANO seemed to be more sincerely corporatist and less prone to use repressive strategies than Salazar.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 2

NOTE 41

The monarchic group was the major exception in this context, probably due to Salazar's apparently monarchic convictions and probably also due to the great difficulty in restoring the monarchy in the concrete case of Portugal - see CAETANO 1977, 536.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 3

NOTE 1

See other complaints in the same direction in SALAZAR IV, 272, 276.

NOTE 2

Political propaganda is one of the important means of making politics. Salazar defined Politics as "the whole set of individual and collective means by which public conscience is brought to a state of adhesion or of mere conformity with [national] objectives and is brought to cooperation with the Power in its achievement" (SALAZAR IV, 274).

NOTE 3

Salazar does not apply this political motto when analysing Opposition reaction to political repression - see SALAZAR VI, 252-253.

NOTE 4

Political propaganda was also designed to increase the legitimacy of the control of the state over civil society by making clear to the latter that the state devolute the power, which it took from it, in material goods and visible achievements - see JOAQUIM 1979.

NOTE 5

ROBINSON considers that "Students of modern political history searching for what is peculiar to the Portuguese political culture would probably decide that three interrelated "isms" [...] have a tendency to recur: Sebastianism, regenerationism and situationism" (ROBINSON 1979, 32).

Situationism is the art of survival in an unstable situation, the adhesion to whichever is in power just because it is in power. Political propaganda appeals to situationism (indoctrination is more congruent with the two other "isms").

NOTE 6

Salazar distinguishes clearly Politics and Government - see SALAZAR IV, 274, V, 306-309.

NOTE 7

The comic actor was Raul Solnado.

NOTE 8

The ideological fight against communism did not imply mobilization since it was considered abnormal for a portuguese formed in the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral struture" to become a communist. Such exceptional cases were treated through repressive strategies.

This does not mean that occasionally Salazar did not appeal to political indoctrination to fight communism see SALAZAR IV, 475, 510-511. But, in fact, this last comment of Salazar acknowledges that the main strategy to fight communism had been repression and not mobilization.

NOTE 9

This motto of Salazar as the " great educator of our time" is often repeated by CARNEIRO-PACHECO in his speeches - see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1940.

NOTE 10

In this mobilization style CARNEIRO-PACHECO says in regard to girls education "There is a modern education which we take for good, even indispensable, aimed at forming women ready to face life, with healthy body and soul, with common sense and achievement capacities, with strong character, ready to serve [...] God, Fatherland and Family!" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1939).

NOTE 11

The concept "hidden curriculum" used initially by JACKSON (1968) had been used in so many ways that can be seen as a "porridge word" in DE BONO terminology (quoted in MEIGHAN 1981, 53) - due to this lack of precision the concept has been stirred around to stimulate further ideas.

It had been used to cover the universal characteristics of schools in all countries (like compulority, management by teachers, credentials production) (CAMPOS 1980, 63), it has been regarded as referring to the ghosts that haunt the classroom (MEIGHAN 1981, 56), to cover all that is learned in school without having been (intentionally) taught (FORMOSINHO 1983a, 1985e).

NOTE 12

The narrowest definition of curriculum is considering it as a list of subjects and the largest is considering it as all that is learned in school (being or not being intentionally taught). Within this framework one can formulate different definitions of curriculum.

The main text presents also the main definitions one can formulate between those two extreme definitions.

NOTE 13

BERELSON defines item as the "whole 'natural' unit employed by the producers of symbol material". It may be a book, a magazine article, a speech, a letter, an editorial or any other self-contained expression (BERELSON 1952, 141).

NOTE 14

In regard to the main text the context unit is the book.

NOTE 15

As seen above, this was political propaganda, but not political education of masses.

NOTE 16

CARNEIRO-PACHECO saw Choral Singing as a means to promote nationalism, not in the sense of musical education.

NOTE 17

Due to the scarcity of references one has put in the same broad category political education and political propaganda stricto sensu (as defined in this chapter, section 2).

NOTE 18

In the 4th and 5th periods political propaganda (lato sensu) almost disappeared.

NOTE 19

This is a list of all the primary sources for the analyses of secondary education curriculum.

1932 Grammar School Curriculum

- Decree 20741, 11-1-1932

1936 Grammar School Curriculum

- Law 1941, 11-4-1936
- Decree-law 27084, 14-10-1936

1947 Grammar School Curriculum

- Decree-Law 36507, 17-9-1947
- Decree 36508, 17-9-1947

1948 Technical School Curriculum

- Decree-law 37028, 25-8-1948
- Decree 37029, 25-8-1948

1968 Preparatory School Curriculum

- Decree 48572, 9-9-1968

1972 Experimental Curriculum of the new 3rd year
of the Preparatory School

- "Programas", Ministério da Educação Nacional, 1972

NOTE 20

The subject "Trabalhos Manuais" (literally "Manual Works", that is, Crafts) was categorized differently in the various periods according to the primary sources indications - it was included in the moral component in the first cycle of 1932 reform, in the artistic curriculum in the 1936 and 1968 curricula, in the technical curriculum in the second cycle of 1932 reform, in 1947 reform.

NOTE 21

The total work load of grammar school curricula does not include "Lavores Femininos" (Embroidery), which was only part of the girls curriculum. This means that, in

a strict point of view, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are only accurate for boys curriculum. Due to the low work load of Embroidery the difference is not relevant.

NOTE 22

The instructional components of the grammar school curricula are much more stable across periods than the physical and artistic component and the moral component. In fact, standard deviation of percentage numbers of the academic component are (respectively for the first and second cycles) 2.9 and 6.8, and of the technical component are just 1.3 and 5.3, against 7.8 and 9.1 for the physical and artistic component, and 9.8 and 13.5 for the moral component.

The stability of the instructional components reflects the traditional academic dimension of grammar schools. The instability of the moral components - it is the one with higher standard deviations - shows that it is the component most prone to change due to political variations.

NOTE 23

If Portuguese and History of Portugal had been included just in the academic component the peak of the moral component will still be in the second period, as can be seen in the revised percentages (across periods) of the moral component of grammar school curricula of first and second cycles -8%, 26%, 24%, 7% for the first cycle, 0%, 26%, 21%, 3% for the second cycle.

In 1947 it was allocated more time to "Portuguese Youth" (two afternoons) than in 1936, in spite of the more mobilizing character of 1936 Reform. In 1936 "Portuguese Youth", having just been founded, had no possibility of encompassing immediately great number of activities; in 1947 "Portuguese Youth" had already eleven years of existence and was already established in the schools, so it could perform more activities.

NOTE 24

The same trend to increase the importance of the moral component in the second period happens in the third cycle. One can only use as indicators, due to the greater complexity of this cycle structure, the list of compulsory subjects.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 3

SUBJECT CATEGORIES	LIST OF SUBJECTS	1st	2nd	3rd	5th
		1932 Reform	1936 Reform	1947 Reform	1972
NON MORAL SUBJECTS	GEOGRAPHY	X	-	-	-
	PHYSICAL EDUCATION	X	X	X	X
PARTIALLY MORAL SUBJECTS	-PORTUGUESE	-	X	-	-
	-PHYLOSOPHY	X	-	X	X
	-GERMAN	X	-	-	-
MORAL SUBJECTS	-POLITICAL AND ADMINIST. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATION	-	X	X	-
	-RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION	-	-	X	-
	-CHORAL SINGING	-	X	-	-

The categorization of subjects in the three categories was not done by their intrinsic abstract qualities, but by their concrete role in each period. In fact, in 1932 German was a partial moral subject and in 1936 Choral Singing was only viewed through its moral nationalist potential.

NOTE 25

In the third cycle there was since 1947 a compulsory subject which was partially of nationalistic inculcation "Political and Administrative Organization of the Nation" - it envisaged also a vague corporative indoctrination and a clear propaganda (in stricto sensu) of the regime.

But it had a low status mainly due to the fact that only one hour per week was allocated for such comprehensive and ambitious aims - see BETTENCOURT 1983, NUNES 1981, 147-148.

NOTES OF CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER 4

NOTE 1

For a socio-psychoanalytical analysis of portuguese nationalism, see JOAQUIM 1979. See also a recent analysis of portuguese nationalism in ARAGAO 1985, 48-52, 263-273.

NOTE 2

This representation of the Nation by the State (better studied in chapter seven, section 2.2.3.) compelled all State activities to involve the Nation interest. So all official correspondence was ended "For the good of the Nation".

This same pattern applies to the military coup d'état of 1926 which initiated the regime - it was done by the Nation, since the Army is the symbol of the Nation and interpreted well the feelings of the Nation (see MONICA 1978, 88). As a matter of fact, this is the usual justification for the political initiative of the portuguese Armed Forces (SERRA and MATOS 1982 - see also CARRILHO 1985).

NOTE 3

The Minister was the Deffence Minister SANTOS COSTA -quoted in the newspaper "República", 14-5-1974.

One can quote a similar situation in 1974, before the April "coup d'état". A "nationalist" newspaper was saying even in the eve of the regime's fall -"Who governs educational curricula: the national interest or the interest of the anti-national conspiracy? The Portuguese State or the forces of the anti-portuguese subversion? A member of Government who swore fidelity to the Constitution and to the Fatherland [Veiga Simão, then Minister of Education] or the infiltrated agents of the ennemy?" (in the newspaper "Época" 8-3-1974). All this violent accusation was to condemn the methodological instructions of the experimental curriculum for the new third year of preparatory education (seventh year of schooling) which did not emphasize the heroes's methodology in the teaching of History.

NOTE 4

Only two years after the set up of the new regime, it was decreed that it was necessary to initiate and intensify the study of portuguese colonies in all schools, because it is "indispensable to create in our people a colonial opinion" (Decree 15088, 23-2-1928).

Six years later, in 1934, the first congress of the

sole party - the National Union - concluded also that "all education should be impregnated of colonial spirit" (in SAMPAIO 1976, 36). In the same year, there was also a congress specifically addressed to the teaching about colonies and it was recommended that all curricular subjects should be integrated in the "accomplishment of that robust education which built the Empire" (in SAMPAIO 1976, 37).

In Coimbra, it was built a children's living museum named "Portugal dos Pequenitos" (Portugal of the Little Ones) which tried to imprint the imperial dimension of Portugal in children.

NOTE 5

MARTINS (1970) comments that the empire became a generally accepted symbol to achieve status; pro-imperial ideology involved two types of considerations - the weak argument that Portugal, albeit small and poor, could be great with the empire, and the strong argument that Portugal could no longer subsist as an independent state without its colonies.

In Geography textbooks for secondary education the map of the empire was superimposed over the map of Europe to illustrate the idea that Portugal with the colonies was greater than Europe.

NOTE 6

Once the Prime-Minister Marcello Caetano had a slip of the tongue and said "The whole Portugal from Minho to Algarve" [the southern region of Portugal]. The far right interpreted it in a freudian way and criticized him.

NOTE 7

When Salazar said in the preface to his interviews with António Ferro that "Our heroic past hangs too much on our present" and that in our attachment to past conceptions of this heroic past, we run the risk of appearing with empty arms to a new world that does not understand us (SALAZAR 1933), he did not pretend to stand against the past dimension of nationalism, but just to state that to stop only on that dimension was useless (see SALAZAR I, 74). What was necessary was to use those nationalist feelings to rebuild the Nation. In Salazar's words, in the same preface, it was necessary to use the formidable qualities of the people and to neutralize some of its main defects to build a new mentality through which Portugal could rise again.

NOTE 8

The tendency for cultural isolationism comes from the beginning of the regime. CAETANO founded in 1926 a review which claimed itself to be "anti-modern, anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-bourgeois and anti-Bolshevik [...] counter-revolutionary and reactionary; Catholic, Apostolic and Roman, monarchic, intolerant and intransigent" (in ROBINSON 1979, 40).

Salazar also proclaimed the New State as anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic and anti-liberal and said that the New State opposed all the great heresies of today and all forms of internationalism - communism, socialism, syndicalism.

These quotations show tendency to oppose foreign ideas and to cherish cultural isolationism among New State leaders.

NOTE 9

For this conception of History the following sources can be consulted - CALDEIRA 1983, CARDOSO 1982, MONICA 1978, RADICH 1979, SAMPAIO 1976.

NOTE 10

According to this analysis the period of the 1383-1385 crisis was more important than that of Restoration. MONICA says that the Restoration was, with Discoveries and Foundation, one of the most important historical periods (MONICA 1978, 302). The prevalence in all periods of the analysis of references to the 1383 crisis over references to Restoration may have to do with the easier identification of individual heroes in that 1383 period.

NOTE 11

A content analyses of the type of heroes referred shows that military heroes (including in this category the navigators) prevailed over non military heroes (queens, poets, intellectuals), which is consistent with New State conceptions of History - from the 74 texts using heroes as strategy to teach history, 58% refer military heroes and 42% non military heroes. This percentage shows tendency to decrease across periods - 67%, 61%, 53% are the numbers referent to military heroes.

The relatively high percentage of non military heroes may be explained by the non aggressive nor mobilizing dimension of nationalistic inculcation.

NOTE 12

The use of references to monuments to teach History was relatively important in the second and third periods - 1.8% in regard to the total sample and 16% in regard to the History of Portugal texts.

This is part of a strategy of social education of people through monuments, since they are visible and permanent reminders of History, which can serve a more concrete pedagogy and a reinforcement of national personality (SALAZAR III, 402-403). On the other hand, as the New State was engaged in an ambitious program of historical monuments rebuilding the reference to some rebuilt monuments could contribute to the legitimisation of the New State.

NOTE 13

Salazar was presented as the "Saviour of the Fatherland" in a propaganda postcard. Salazar was called "Redeemer of Portugal" in a demonstration in the late 1930's or early 1940's - see CORTESAO 1982, 89-91.

NOTE 14

Salazar was sometimes presented as having married the nation. He said of himself that "One can extend his family to all the Nation" (in FERRO 1982, 305). For many rural persons Salazar had a religious status almost similar to that of a catholic saint.

NOTE 15

The mother is a woman who lives for her children and makes all sacrifices for them. As a mother says in a poem "Where there will be heather and gorses/ Stones which tear the skin/ I will put my body over them/ You will cross over it" (3rd, 1958, 164).

All those sacrifices will be compensated since only children can give us the true joy - "Only children and the fatigues they gave us are our richness. It is for them and through them that we are happy" (3rd, 1958, 43 - see also ibidem, 9).

The role of the children is very well prescribed - they must be eternally grateful to their parents. It is impressed in them a sense of non redeemable debt towards their parents - "Children should remember the sacrifices that parents made to bring them dressed and clean" (3rd, 1958, 56). "Children, you will not pay/ Not even seeing you crawling/ A kiss from your parents" (from a non sampled textbook of the fourth class, in MONICA 1978, 295).

NOTE 16

As MONICA comments obedience was a universal value which should be inculcated also so strongly in the elite as in the masses (MONICA 1978, 286).

NOTE 17

Quoted in MONICA 1978, 102.

NOTE 18

See WIARDA 1977, 49-51, 287-290, 351.

NOTE 19

The textbook is "Compêndio de Filosofia" by Bonifácio Ribeiro and José da Silva - quoted in PINTO, BORGES, MATOS 1974, 182.

NOTE 20

This living for the family included a great emphasis on family meals. This had as consequence that there was no willingness to build canteens in schools. As a Decree-Law said in 1952 "The canteen should only substitute family meals when commanding social or economic reasons impose it"; the canteen should never "inspire a collectivist life style, so contrary to our social traditions and christian principles" (Decree-Law 38968, 27-10-1952).

A secondary school teacher told the researcher that he was looked as pro-communist, in the 1960's, just because he proposed, in a conference, the creation of big school centers where children would spend all school day and would have their meals.

NOTE 21

In terms of the total sample, due to the fact that family inculcation follows a decreasing trend (7% - 6% - 4% - see Table 3.6.), the same pattern applies both to conformist oriented references (2.7% - 2.5% - 1.1%) and to love oriented references (3.7% - 2.9% - 2.0%). Conformist oriented strategies show a lesser decrease from the first to the second period than love oriented ones, but their decrease is sharper in the fourth period. This shows that those references are more linked with New State mentality inculcation strategies than the love oriented ones.

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NOTE 22

In the newspaper "A Voz", 23-2-1928, quoted in MONICA 1978, 140.

NOTE 23

TAMAGNINI, in 1936, wrote "The nationalist policy must necessarily make return to the land all those men that the liberal illusion of an easy social promotion intends to 'unroot' from their natural occupation" (TAMAGNINI 1936, 12).

SALAZAR, in 1935, asks "It is often asked that the Government commands the people to learn to read. But to read what? [...] I rely on the depopulation of towns in favour of the countryside" (in SAMPAIO 1976, 47).

See about ruralism in New State MONICA 1978, 66, 102-105, 138-144.

NOTE 24

Most of the references come from the third class textbook of the second and third periods (which lasted almost until the end of the fifth period) - indeed this textbook can be seen as the paradigm of New State mentality inculcation in all aspects.

NOTE 25

A text where integration of messages is taken to the extreme is presented in the second class textbook of 1958 (2nd, 1958, 53-54).

A village boy going to school, observes, the way long, in the rural dawn, several rural scenes (rural inculcation). Then, he met an illiterate farmer who expressed his wish to learn to read. The boy recommended him the adult courses in the village corporative organisation "Casas do Povo" [literally People's House] (literacy inculcation and corporative propaganda). Then, the text comments that everything that the boy saw can be divided in three categories - animal, vegetal and mineral (science message). The text ends reminding that Man is above all the other natural Beings, because he possesses an immortal soul (religious message).

NOTE 26

Calculations for this information were based on the year of publication of the several textbooks. Those who were in the second class in 1944-1945 were the first ones to be subject in the first and second class to this passivity indoctrination. Those who were in the third class in 1951-1952 were subject to the full passivity strategy. The last year in which the 1958 first class textbook was in force was 1966-1967, since in 1967-1968 it was in force the new first class textbook.

This means that those born in 1936 (now - 1986 - 50 years old) were the first to be subject to the conformist oriented first and second class textbooks; those born in 1942 (now 44 years old) were the first to be inculcated the full message contained in the first, second and third classes reading textbooks; those born in 1960 (now 26 years old) were the last cohort to be inculcated this full message.

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CHAPTER 5

NOTE 1

The role of centralization in the promotion of passivity in the New State regime is congruent with the conformist attitudes generally promoted by centralizing strategies. But exceptionally, in revolutionary periods, centralization can be used to expand new ideas more quickly than other systems - see about this ARCHER 1979, CROZIER 1964, 1970, 1977.

An illustration of the last situations is the use that pro-communists made in the post-revolutionary Portugal (1974-1975) of the centralization to rapidly control the country.

NOTE 2

Many civil servants of the republican regime were co-opted by the New State - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 118, CRUZ 1982c, MARTINS 1970. See chapter eight, sections 4.1. and 4.3..

Some republican politicians were also co-opted - see MARTINS 1970, SCHMITTER 1979.

NOTE 3

See about this SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 81-84, CRUZ 1982c, WIARDA 1977, 122-123, 297, 305.

NOTE 4

There was an implicit agreement between the New State regime and the Army - the State would not interfere with the Army and the Army would not interfere with the government of the country.

NOTE 5

Some important references for the study of the relationship between the State and the Church in the New State regime are - ANTUNES 1982, BRUNEAU 1976, CERQUEIRA 1973, CRUZ 1978, 1980, FERNANDES 1982, GEORGEL 1985, 187-223, ROBINSON 1977, 1979, WIARDA 1977, 123-124, 299-300.

When the Pope John Paul II visited Portugal, in 1982, several weeklies included important dossiers about the subject - see "Expresso", 8-5-1982 and "O Jornal", 7-5-1982 and 13-5-1982.

Salazar himself was an important catholic leader before 1926 - see SALAZAR 1922, 1924.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 5

NOTE 6

Some of these measures were - the expulsion of religious orders; closing down of religious houses and colleges; prohibition of the teaching of religion in all schools; nationalization of Church property; strict control over cult manifestations; prohibition of the use of ecclesiastical habits; suppression of Catholic holidays; introduction of divorce for everyone; extinction of the School of Theology; etc..

For this see MARQUES 1976, 130-134 and FORMOSINHO et alia 1982.

NOTE 7

"To aspire to study the historical evolution of the Portuguese people by first removing its religious life and the mission of the regular and secular clergy, would be tantamount to trying to understand the circulatory system without the blood-vessels" says Fortunato de Almeida, a portuguese historian of the Church (in ROBINSON 1977).

NOTE 8

Although the New State claimed to follow the social doctrine of the Church, when created the corporative structure, the Catholic Church, was never submitted to the corporative organization - see WIARDA 1977, 123-124, 196, 299-300, 330.

NOTE 9

See "Portugal's Clerical Fascism" in "Weekly People", January 27, 1962, page 304. See also CAETANO 1977, 413-415.

NOTE 10

This cooperation between the New State regime and the Catholic Church was clearly visible in elections time, even in difficult situations - see THOMAZ 1983, 240-241. WIARDA says that the Church was part of the state system (WIARDA 1977, 299-300).

NOTE 11

In ROBINSON 1979, 64.

NOTE 12

From the characterization of european civilization as western and christian it was perfectly logical that the Church supported a regime which claimed itself more pro-western and more christian than the Opposition.

NOTE 13

This role of the Church as agency of social control was more clear, and also more efficient, in the rural world.

NOTE 14

In consonance with those ideas - to give to God what is of God and to give to Caesar what is of Caesar - the Concordat did not give back to the Church the property confiscated during the Republican regime (except churches and seminaries) and did not abolish divorce (although divorce was restricted to the non religious marriages).

But the Concordat guaranteed the basic interests of the Catholic Church - it recognised the Church as an artificial person, it gave the Church freedom to communicate openly with the Pope, without any governmental mediation, and gave the Church the right to set up its own schools.

There were conflicts between Salazar and the Holy See during the negotiations for the Concordat - see NOGUEIRA 1978, 262, 1980, 457-459.

NOTE 15

MARQUES explains that the fact that no anti-Catholic propaganda or writings were generally permitted was due not to state intolerance, but because of the political advantages of religious homogeneity and of continuation of tradition (MARQUES 1976, 194).

NOTE 16

The state veto worked the following way - the Holy See had to inform government which priest it preferred for bishop; the portuguese Government had thirty days to raise objections "of general political character".

NOTE 17

This means that political differences within civil society had some parallel in difference within the Catholic Church.

NOTE 18

Due to this mobilization role of Fátima pilgrimage, Portugal was called the nation of three F's - fado (national song), football and Fátima (seen as the three main sources of "alienation").

The strong anti-communist tone of the Fátima message made it ideal for political use.

NOTE 19

The most visible episode of this dissidence was the incident of "Capela do Rato" (Rato Chapel) in which a group of catholics had a religious meeting, in 1972, to protest against colonial war - see about the "catholic dissidents" FREIRE 1976, GEORGEL 1985, 202-218, REGO and GOMES 1973.

NOTE 20

A high bureaucrat (the General Director for Primary Education) said in 1937 "The destiny of the child belongs to the moral; and the moral either is religious or it is nothing".

The official ministerial magazine "Escola Portuguesa" (Portuguese School) dedicated in 1940 a succession of articles to the theme of the christianization of primary school.

NOTE 21

The Minister Galvão Telles said in the sixties: "I think that education must never lose and should rather put growing stress on the spiritualist nature it derives from the shining Christian tradition" (GALVAO TELLES 1966, 42). So, the importance of a religious ambiance of education prevailed over the whole period of the New State.

NOTE 22

See Decree-Laws n. 26611 (19-5-1936), 27301 (4-12-1936), 47311 (12-11-1966) - for instance articles 7, 8 and 12 - 486/71 (8-11-1971) - article 8. See below chapter nine, section 2.

NOTE 23

See Despacho 2/72 from the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport (5-12-1972).

NOTE 24

In Portugal, due to its religious homogeneity, to speak of religious education is to speak of catholic teaching. So, to make religious education compulsory it was to compel all to listen in state schools to the teaching of the portuguese Catholic Church. This would be a very delicate policy susceptible of reviving some form of the religious question which absorbed Portugal during the first three decades of the century.

NOTE 25

The personal experience of the author, as pupil in a boys grammar school from 1957 to 1964, confirms entirely the low status of Religious Moral Education.

The teachers were appointed by the Ministry of Education from lists drawn up by the ecclesiastical authorities. Most of the teachers, in boys schools, were priests. Neither the Church nor the State ever created a course to train those teachers (the syllabus was formulated by the Church).

This lack of pedagogical training had negative effects in a type of teacher who had no other forms of power (use of failure or threat of failure to control students, influence in the general pass-fail decision and other types of power then used by the other teachers). So many Religious and Moral Education teachers were ridiculed by the classroom, others chose to follow the via of political indoctrination with a religious basis - very few teachers, in my impressionistic judgement, were able to put forward some working scheme for serious discussion of moral issues. (It is possible that this judgement is inadequate for girls schools).

NOTE 26

One important illustration of repression over university professors occurred in the University of Lisbon, in 1947 -see CAETANO 1977, 295-305.

NOTE 27

See FORMOSINHO et alia, 1982.

NOTE 28

As MAKLER (1979) says "The typical career path to a modern corporation in Portugal started with an assistant professorship at a university, particularly under

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the tutelage of a well-known "catedrático", movement into an undersecretarial (deputy minister) position, and then either from there to a top industrial post or continuation in the government, moving into a ministerial position, and then into industry".

NOTE 29

This "catedratocracia" was also based in the importance given to the role of intellectuals in policy-making - see CAETANO 1950, 6-11.

NOTE 30

See the studies of SCHMITTER 1979 and MAKLER 1979 about this.

NOTE 31

The Minister of Education who was not university professor was José Hermano Saraiva (1968-1970) - he was secondary school teacher.

NOTE 32

See MONICA's comment about the idea New State has about the "naturalness" of social differences (MONICA 1978, 39, 74-76, 87, 133). See also chapter four, section 5, about the inculcation of the sense of hierarchy.

NOTE 33

The reading textbook was "Livro de Leitura - 4ª classe", Joaquim Gaspar, Livraria Rodrigues, Lisboa, 1968 (?) - see above chapter three, section 3.2.3.c).

NOTE 34

One of the reasons for the non preparation of good elites is, according to SALAZAR and CAETANO, the bookish character of instruction - see SALAZAR 1933, I, 274-275, III, 393 and CAETANO 1941, 32, 1959, 306-307.

In spite of all this condemnation of the bookish method of the teaching this was the model followed. This may be explained by the fact that in the beginning of the regime to form new elites it was necessary to fight conformism; but the same conformism was convenient in a normally working regime.

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NOTE 35

Freitas do AMARAL, the conservative candidate to the Presidency of Republique, in 1986, said in a book supporting his campaign, that in education, Salazar acted as he had centuries ahead of him to formulate and implement educational policies (AMARAL 1985, 174).

NOTE 36

Arguments in favour of this solution - the creation of "postos escolares" - were mainly of economic character - SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 135-137.

NOTE 37

CAETANO says that this compartmentalization of primary education between schools and teaching posts ("postos escolares") was not intended. The real spirit of Salazar's initiative was to provide education for literacy through a person inserted in his community and not by a low qualified monitor who could be, as it often happened, from other community (see CAETANO 1977, 407).

But if the implementation was really preventing New State educational logic, it would be always possible to change the process of implementation. It was not changed for decades...

NOTE 38

TAMAGNINI proposed, in 1936, a triple track, by adding what he called the "escola média de cultura geral" (intermediate education school for general culture). This new kind of school should exist side by side with grammar schools and technical schools. It was aimed at those children of middle class who were not able to enter grammar school. This means that TAMAGNINI, in fact, proposed a double selection - a social selection and an ability selection. Grammar schools were for the able students of the middle and high classes, intermediate schools for the non able of those classes (see TAMAGNINI 1936, 14-20, 24). His proposal was not adopted, maybe because it created a too complex structure.

NOTE 39

"Feminine formation" courses were very popular because they gave access to Teacher Education Colleges. Commercial courses were very popular because they were those which had greatest status due to giving access to white collar jobs.

In 1966-1967 the enrollment percentages in the technical courses were:

- commercial courses	51%
- "feminine formation"	17%
- locksmith	8%
- electrician	8%
- others	16%
	<hr/>
	100%

NOTE 40

The increase of industrialisation also provoked the need to improve the literacy rate of the adult population. Thus the launching of a Campaign for Adult Education (see chapter one, section 3.3.) in a mobilizing style (see chapter one, note 26).

See about the launching of the Campaign the speech of Pires de Lima, then Minister of Education (PIRES-de-LIMA 1953). See also CAETANO 1977, 407.

NOTE 41

Entrance examination to grammar schools were set up in 1935 (TAMAGNINI 1936, 6), because pupils would come to grammar schools without knowing to read, to write (MONICA 1978, 335-336). The first examination year had a failure rate of 34% (TAMAGNINI 1936, 7).

NOTE 42

The almost total underdevelopment of Sciences of Education in Portugal would not permit to implement this policy.

NOTE 43

In grammar school exemption from fees payment was given to 10% of the pupils; in technical schools exemption was given to 25% of the pupils.

NOTE 44

VEIGA SIMAO, the Minister of Education of the fifth period (1970-1974), fused the two departments - Technical Education Department and Grammar School Department - into a single Secondary Education Department. He proposed and got approval for the comprehensive reformulation of the secondary education. So this strategy of compartmentalization ended in the fifth period.

NOTE 45

See also CAETANO 1959, 308-309.

NOTE 46

There was higher non university education - it was mainly the case of religious education (to prepare for priesthood) and artistic education.

NOTE 47

This inextricable connection between higher educational credentials and social status still gives raise to dramatic problems in Portugal - one can have an indicator of this in the difficulty of launching a network of polytechnic higher education schools in Portugal. The populations dislike polytechnic and fight (generally with success - see the case of Vila Real, Covilhã, Algarve) for a University in places where the government planned a polytechnic school.

NOTE 48

LEITE-PINTO was seen as an irreverent person and sometimes did not stop at criticizing privately Salazar himself. See a glimpse of his irony in his subtle critic of GALVAO-TELLES (one of his successors as Minister of Education) reforms in LEITE-PINTO 1966b.

NOTE 49

There was between LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961) and GALVAO-TELLES (1962-1968) the brief rule, as Minister of Education, of Lopes de Almeida (1961-1962).

NOTE 50

Portugal is probably the only country in Europe (and certainly one of the very few in the world) where compulsory schooling can be accomplished through television broadcasted courses with local support. The system is still working.

NOTE 51

Congruently GALVAO-TELLES says about school welfare services that the State must not concern itself with doing everything in this field (not even the most

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part of the material actions), but should just to promote and to motivate without harming the healthy private initiatives (GALVAO TELLES 1966b).

NOTE 52

See about this EMÍDIO 1981.

NOTE 53

The stay on rate depended on the failure rate in the second, third and fourth classes. Failure rates in primary school education were always higher - see MONICA 1978, 333-334.

NOTE 54

In the fifth period secondary education included also preparatory education.

NOTE 55

In HIGGINS and WINTON 1942.

NOTES OF CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 6

NOTE 1

See about this LUCENA 1976a, 133-134.

NOTE 2

This means that the opinion of the common urban man is always inferior to the opinion of the healthier rural people, since only this rural people truly represents portuguese spirit. See about this, chapter two, note 10, chapter seven, section 2.2.1..

NOTE 3

Another consequence was the adoption of a highly criptic style of writing by the "intelligentsia" - see MARQUES 1976, 187.

NOTE 4

See chapter two, note 1.

NOTE 5

This question was posed by CAZAL-RIBEIRO (1973), an extreme wing member of Parliament.

NOTE 6

Probably the inverse statement is truer - the need to increase power compelled the secret police to become visible and thus its omnipresence.

NOTE 7

This phenomenon could only happen due to the strict compartmentalization of social relationships and lack of information in society, due to censorship.

NOTE 8

See for this LUCENA 1976a, 112 and BLUME 1977, 352.

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NOTE 9

See MARTINS 1971, ROBINSON 1979, 136. See also ESTADO NOVO, 1987.

NOTE 10

See about social changes in the 1960's ALARCAO 1964, FREITAS 1973, JESUÍNO 1982, MARTINS 1971, NETO 1968, NUNES 1964, SAYERS 1968.

NOTE 11

One of the most repressive policy decisions, since it goes strongly against individual rights, was that of 1956 which introduced the so-called "security measures" which enabled the Ministry of Justice, under proposal of the Police, to keep indefinitely under arrest (by three-year renewals of the term of sentence) all those who were believed to be dangerous to "society" - MARQUES 1976, 188-189.

NOTE 12

See about repression of catholic militants FREIRE 1976, GEORGEL 1985, 202-218, MARTINS 1970. See an article in the weekly "O Jornal" in 7-5-1982, pages 21-24.

NOTE 13

Many compare secret police activities and role with that of Inquisition in Modern Times - see BRADFORD 1973, 87, MARQUES 1976, 188, WIARDA 1974.

NOTE 14

See CAETANO 1969, 103.

NOTE 15

One must call attention to the fact that the initial incident which later developed into the military "coup d'état" of 25th April 1974 began by a conflict of status between professional soldiers, formed in the traditional Army school, and the militiamen - see GRAHAM 1979, JESUÍNO 1982.

NOTE 16

The recruitment of "cadres" for the Army was not changed, probably because it would alarm civil society, since it was a clear indicator of the continuation of the war and of its potential to disrupt normal life in the country. See about this ALVES-PINTO 1983, 30-34.

NOTE 17

This means that the State imposed strongly to the Catholic Church the general compartmentalization strategy.

NOTE 18

See about secondary student non participation in that period LIMA 1985, 62-74.

NOTE 19

There was a conflict between the use of the traditional academic costume ("capa e batina") and the use of the "Mocidade Portuguesa" uniform.

NOTE 20

See ANDRADE and BARROS 1957, CRUZEIRO 1979, LOPES 1982 for the description of University of Coimbra traditional praxis.

NOTE 21

The decree-law was published without previous consultation to student's associations.

CAETANO (1977, 481-482) says that Salazar foresaw the student unrest and so did not want the publication of the decree-law, but Caetano and the Minister of Education pressed for the publication.

NOTE 22

In Coimbra there was (and still is) only one Student Union for all the University. In the other universities there was a student union for each Faculty of Studies.

NOTE 23

See the full text of this letter in RODRIGUES, MARQUES and MARQUES 1969(?), 213, and reference in RODRIGUES 1982.

NOTE 24

See about student resistance COMISSAO ... 1983.

NOTE 25

Without reference to student mobilization it is not understandable the mobilization within the Armed Forces, between and after the 25th April 1974, the appearance of various parties of the extreme (revolutionary) left just before and after that date, the general mobilization in 1974 and 1975.

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CHAPTER 7

NOTE 1

Both "State" and "Nation" appear in Salazar's writings always written with capital letters.

NOTE 2

Salazar considered, in 1947, that the rebuilding of Europe after the devastation of Second World War, demanded a strong State (SALAZAR IV, 267-273).

NOTE 3

See ASSAC 1964 about this.

NOTE 4

See about these periods MARQUES 1976.

NOTE 5

The new elite, which is the vanguard of the Nation, has to adopt the values of people, that is, the rural values, to be truly representative of the Nation.

NOTE 6

The idea of the originality of portuguese political structure (the "portuguese political experience") is grounded on the idea of "uniqueness" of portuguese essence. Hence the statements that portuguese colonization was unique (see LUCENA 1977a, MARTINS 1970).

So as RATO said "Portugal goes under Salazar indicating to the Western world good constitutional paths" (RATO 1958, 88). This originality has influenced the type of corporatism the New State adopted (WIARDA 1977, 82-83, 334).

It is possible that this obsession with the originality of portuguese experience and the uniqueness of portuguese colonization was a tentative to overpass the well-known national inferiority complex in Portugal (see WIARDA 1975, 57-58, 1977, 334-335 - see also BRADFORD 1973, 148, ROBINSON 1979, 24.).

The motto of the originality of the regime returned in the revolutionary period (1974-1975) under the name of "original via for the socialism". This was probably fruit of the same dialectic between inferiority complex - superiority complex - see a critique of the pretentious of an "original via for the socialism" in PEREIRA 1976,

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181-191 - see also WIARDA 1975, 57-58).

NOTE 7

Salazar's motto "Proudly alone!" reflects the portuguese political isolationism of the post-war period. This isolationism was justified by the fact that Portugal alone, among western European nations, supported with courage and firmness the christian western civilisation. According to Salazar, only Portugal fought what Salazar called "the winds of History", only Portugal remained impermeable to the "great heresies of today". This political isolationism was based on nationalism, since this had implicit the rejection of the currents of thought from which Europe did not want to run away (see chapter four, note 8). It led to an obsession of Portugal being right against the modern thought prevailing in Europe.

This political isolationism is congruent with the cultural isolationism which feeds the idea of the originality of portuguese political structure (see NOTE 6 of this chapter).

Both political and cultural isolationism, through the deprivation of information about foreign institutions and ideas, facilitate the inculcation of passivity and conformism.

NOTE 8

Again Salazar built political conceptions based on the characteristics of portuguese people - see chapter two, section 1.

NOTE 9

See Salazar's development of this idea in SALAZAR III, 234-237.

NOTE 10

This theoretical system of social and political organization based on corporative principles was perfectly in accordance with the social doctrine of the Catholic Church - see chapter one, section 2.1.2., chapter five, section 2.2.2., and note 8.

NOTE 11

In ASSAC 1964.

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NOTE 12

See about this CAMPINOS 1975, 25-27.

NOTE 13

In a traditionalist conception of culture this is not identified with literacy. Thus the statement that many literates were not more cult than many illiterates. But the point of the discussion should not be this confrontation, but rather if it was convenient to provide all persons with the ability to read and write.

NOTE 14

A consequence of this umbilical relationship between State and Nation was to transform automatically political opponents to the existing organization of the State into enemies of the Nation - thus the concept of the Anti-Nation (see chapter four, section 1.2., c).

NOTE 15

There are many designations for those "structural elements" (Constitution of 1933, article 5) - "Component organisms" (SALAZAR I, 87), "living forces", "manifestations of collective life" (SALAZAR I, 92), "basic social organizations" (SALAZAR IV, 259).

NOTE 16

As LUCENA (1979) says "Corporatism does not ignore the fact that classes struggle. What it refuses to accept is class struggle in the Marxist sense. It refuses to regard the struggle as implacable, as providing the foundation for societies and 'the motor of history', or as demanding a revolutionary classless outcome".

NOTE 17

See Salazar's development of this idea in SALAZAR V, 495-497.

NOTE 18

The true corporatism was defended often in CAETANO's and sometimes in SALAZAR's writings - corporatism should be an integral corporatism (SALAZAR I, 345), it

should be pure and not subordinate (CAETANO 1941, 24-25, 55, 61, 124-125, 1972a, 330), it should be a corporatism of association (CAETANO 1950, 22, SALAZAR IV, 433).

NOTE 19

As CAETANO says "Corporatism is not a doctrine made with pieces from other systems: with an idea from this one, and another from that one, liberalism is right here, but communists are right there ... Corporatism has its doctrine perfectly defined ..." (CAETANO 1941, 18). This idea is very much emphasized - see SALAZAR I, 345, III, 130-131, 358-361, IV, 369, 491, CAETANO 1941, preface, 13-22, 36-45, CAETANO 1950, 20-21, MARTINEZ 1967.

This "constitutional rule of the new order", "framing principle of national community", "active conscience of our solidarity" (SALAZAR III, 131) demands not only new structures, but also a new mentality "Corporatism is not a mere organic formula, [...] it represents a new moral and mental attitude in regard to economic and social problems [...] (CAETANO 1941, 75 see also ibidem 80 and CAETANO 1950, 26, CARDOSO 1949, 9).

NOTE 20

"The corporative principle implies the colaboration of free activities, that is, activities "promoted by private initiative and developed under its responsibility, although within the discipline of common good" (CAETANO 1950, 11-our emphasis). CAETANO ressearts in this speech of 1950, in a very vigorous tone, the need to maintain this principle.

In consonance with this orientation portuguese corporatism should be a corporatism of association (SALAZAR IV, 433, CAETANO 1941, 24, 1950, 22). As CAETANO says the State is not the main actor in a corporative system (CAETANO 1941, 24).

NOTE 21

Corporatism means "integration of all nation societies [...] in the political constitution of the State" (CAETANO 1941, 55 - see also SALAZAR I, 87 and about corporatist suffrage CAETANO 1972a).

This political system based on the organic Nation is considered superior to the liberal democratic system of political representation and when fully established will restore political freedom (CAETANO 1941, 124-125).

Corporations will be, such as the State, sources of common law (CAETANO 1941, 24-25, CAETANO 1970a, 80, 1972a, 330, MARTINEZ 1967).

In a radical statement, in 1938, CAETANO even wanted to corporatize politics creating the "national corporation of politic" which was the sole party (CAETANO 1938) - see NOTE 25 of this chapter.

NOTE 22

Thirty three years later MARTINEZ was also saying that corporatism has the potential to fight totalitarian trends of modern states (MARTINEZ 1967). "We will keep everything truly good and human liberalism had" (CAETANO 1941, 124 - see also CAETANO 1950, 21-24).

How was this done? As each of us is naturally incorporated into several groups (family, local community, church, economic corporations, etc.) this "social pluralism" would impede total absorption of the individual by one of them. Thus the autonomy of all these groups, given by a true corporatism of association, is guarantee of a separation of powers which is more efficient to preserve freedom than liberalism (CAETANO 1941, 49-51). Thus the "pulverization of authority" that CARDOSO speaks (CARDOSO 1949, 11).

So only civic freedom was preserved now, but, in the future, even political freedom would be restored by a "sincere organic suffrage" (CAETANO 1941, 125) - see chapter one, NOTE 7, and chapter six, section 1.1. for the distinction between civic and political freedoms in CAETANO's thought.

NOTE 23

One may make a comparison between the conflict between Strong State versus Corporative State (as two solutions which gave very different role to civil society) and the present conflict in Portugal between Centralized State/ Decentralized Regional State. See about this LUCENA 1978b, 1979b, 1979c.

Nowadays the question of the role of the State in society is a very important political issue in Portugal. Hence the pressures for a revision of the 1976 Constitution.

NOTE 24

The "Planos de Fomento" were regularly produced -I Plano (1953-1958), II (1959-1964), complementary (1965-1967), III (1968-1973).

See about those plans SALAZAR V, 91-126, CAETANO 1959, 224-225, 1977, 402-409, 504-518.

NOTE 25

But CAETANO's idea of reinforcement of the role of the sole party, "the corporation of politics" (CAETANO 1938) - see NOTE 21 - may not be very congruent with the reinforcement he pretends of the role of Corporations.

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NOTE 26

As CAETANO acknowledges - "We are between two fires - that of the socialist spirit and that of the liberal spirit". He adds that neither of them will thank the New State for the defense of what it thinks useful in each one of those spirits. (CAETANO 1956 in ZORRO 1969, 66).

NOTE 27

See CAETANO 1950, 5-11, about this gap between theory and practice.

NOTE 28

CAETANO acknowledges that in regard to the role of the State it should be avoided two different tendencies - the centrifugal tendency and the centripetal tendency (CAETANO 1950, 25). See also about this CAETANO 1941, 49-56, CARDOSO 1949, *passim*.

See as important secondary sources about this subject of the theoretical cover given to contradictions of portuguese corporatism LUCENA 1976a, 112, 173-176, WIARDA 1977, 83-84, 105.

NOTE 29

WIARDA and SCHMITTER, probably two of the three most important researchers of portuguese corporatism (the third is LUCENA), have different perspectives about corporatism itself.

According to WIARDA (1973, 1974, 1977, 1979) Portugal is part of Latin-American Iberian tradition. Part of the response of this Iberic Latin world to "the great twentieth-century issues of capitalism, industrialization, alienation and mass society" is the corporative model (WIARDA 1977, preface - see also WIARDA 1974), what is logical since natural corporatism has a long tradition in those countries. So the portuguese corporative experiment was not a "sudden apparition but represented a logical, sequential, twentieth-century extension and elaboration of an older, deeper, 'natural' corporatist tradition" (WIARDA 1977, 8). "The corporative tradition implies a value system based upon widespread acceptance of hierarchy, elitism, organicism and authority" (WIARDA 1979).

SCHMITTER dismisses the cultural explanation as having little to do with political culture. He does not find "very productive to consider corporatism to be an exclusive or distinctive product of a particular culture"

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(SCHMITTER 1974 - see also SCHMITTER 1975b).

From those two different approaches it results that WIARDA is much more empathic in regard to New State corporatism than SCHMITTER.

NOTE 30

See about the ambiguity of "integralismo lusitano" CARDOSO 1982.

NOTE 31

CAETANO seems to diverge slightly from SALAZAR on corporatism themes, being generally CAETANO more emphatic on the defense of truly corporatist principles.

It is not clear if it is a genuine ideological emphasis or just a discrepancy due to the different situation in which he was - he was not the top leader and posed several times as a concurrent regime's ideologue alongside Salazar.

For CAETANO it seems sometimes that corporations themselves could as well adjust individual interest to corporative interest as corporative interest to national interest (CAETANO 1941, 25) and thus he reacts strongly against state interventionism in corporations (CAETANO 1941, 1950, passim.)

But even in CAETANO's speech there are also pro-interventionism texts (CAETANO 1941, 56, just as example) - see NOTE 25.

NOTE 32

See LUCENA 1976a, 161-162, WIARDA 1977, 85.

NOTE 33

See about the social role of mothers CAETANO 1967 in ZORRO 1969, 59-60.

NOTE 34

The conference of CAETANO on the University is one important source for the analysis of the subject of corporatisation of Universities - see CAETANO 1942. See also CAETANO 1949, 1952, CARDOSO 1952.

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NOTE 35

It is clear that corporatisation of the University had much to do both with socialization and human relations within the University.

NOTE 36

The state should be the "pedagogue which teaches the whole Nation" (CAETANO 1941, 133), but Corporations should have an educational role (WIARDA 1977, 85), socializing their members in corporative values, providing activities for leisure times, promoting a pleasant climate in the work. For this last objective it was created FNAT (Fundação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho), that is, "National Foundation for Joy in the Work".

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CHAPTER 8

NOTE 1

The Corporative hierarchy was the following:

- primary organizations - Sindicatos (Trade Unions) and Grémios (Employer's Associations)
- intermediate organizations - Federations of primary organizations of the same branch activity
- Corporations - they were the apex of the system, implemented only since 1957.

In a political level the Corporative Chamber represented the corporative interests next to the sovereignty bodies - National Assembly and Government.

NOTE 2

The member of Parliament referred in the main text is José Hermano Saraiva, later Minister of Education (1968-1970), in a speech in June 1959 - quoted from CRUZ 1982c.

NOTE 3

One can relate this mistrust in the capacity of Corporations to incorporate segmentary interests into a general framework with the belief that portuguese are individualist by nature and do not like to cooperate or work in groups (chapter two, section 1). But there is also a specifically political reason - it seems that Salazar never intended to give political power to the Corporations, since this would upset the structure of the authoritarian regime (see WIARDA 1977, 149, 329). This means that there was never an "organic democracy" (WIARDA 1977, 175, 183).

NOTE 4

In this Chamber representative of national interest (National Assembly) "men representative of great national activities [...] only reluctantly decide to take a stand on questions of a general order for which they did not prepare themselves specially" (SALAZAR IV, 428). So good part of the members of parliament were civil servants - around 50% in 1949 (according to SALAZAR indication in the same speech). Thus the general interest was probably administratively defined - it prevailed not just state like interests, but, in most cases, interests of the state administrative apparatus.

NOTE 5

In 1959 the situation was somewhat modified - the President of Republic ceased to be directly elected and it was elected by an electoral college. This college was composed by all the members of National Assembly and Corporative Chamber, local government mayors and overseas provinces representatives. This college upgraded the Corporative Chamber for it gave it, for the first time, a "general political role" (LUCENA 1976a, 160).

But the reason behind the change was not in the least corporative, or even ideological, but just the opportunist motive of keeping power structures above electoral campaigns to prevent what SALAZAR called a "constitutional 'coup d'état'" (SALAZAR V, 494). This almost happened in 1958 with the enthusiasm created by the campaign of the oppositionist general Humberto Delgado, later to be murdered by the secret police.

NOTE 6

The debate about corporatism was one of the few ideological debates allowed (WIARDA 1977, 194), but it interested only a small part of elite.

NOTE 7

The needs of the war were unanimously chosen as the scapegoat for the kind of corporatism it had been implemented until then (CAETANO 1950, 14-18, 1966, SALAZAR IV, 433, 453-454).

But the trends towards state corporatism came from before the War (CAETANO 1941, 80-82, LUCENA 1979b). After the War "the administration [did not] show itself very disposed to renounce so easily the preponderance it had acquired" (CAETANO 1966).

There were several occasions to reverse the trend towards state corporatism - the end of War in 1945, the period of internal critique (1945-1950), the creation of the first Corporations (1957), the change of leader (1968).

NOTE 8

CAETANO (1950) says that in practice corporative ideal have been altered and transformed and if such modifications were allowed to go on one would be in "presence of a counterfeit covered by false labels". Portugal was a corporative state in intention, but not in fact. After 17 years of corporatism not one single Corporation had been created. It was the Second World War that compelled the state to establish a "centralized control" of the economy. "The free cooperation of

activities gave place to the discipline imposed under the threat of grave sanctions". He pointed two great deviations from the doctrinaire principles - the excess of regulation and the excess of bureaucracy. The State dominated while corporative christian principles were supposed to protect individuals from total submission to the state. So it was time to create the Corporations, but not for them to be transformed into ministerial departments (Direcções-Gerais). As to the proposed (by Salazar) creation of a Ministry of Corporations he thought that it was a mistake. Since all activities should be corporatized all ministries should be corporation ministries insofar as they should have corporative spirit and work in close contact with the Corporations. A Ministry of Corporations in a corporative regime would be like a Ministry of Freedom in a liberal regime.

But Salazar created the Ministry of Corporations and this is an answer to the effect of Caetano's action to reverse the situation from a total state corporatism to a freer one. This lecture and other theoretical stands were useful to produce a corporative revival and an interest in corporative ideals and institutions.

NOTE 9

The reaction of National Assembly to the creation of Corporations was not enthusiastic. It was expressed uncertainty to what the creation of the corporations meant and what the implications of this step would be (WIARDA 1977, 201). This means that, within the New State, there were various members of the elite which did not like corporatism.

NOTE 10

The position of CAETANO was against the creation of a Ministry of Corporations (see NOTE 8 of this chapter). This creation was done against the little group of corporatist theoreticians who defended a freer (from the state) corporatism. But, at the end, Salazar's will prevailed.

NOTE 11

The "parecer" (written advice) of PIRES CARDOSO, one of the important corporatist theoreticians was in favour of an horizontal scheme for corporative organization. This meant that CARDOSO wanted all the participants in the entire productive cycle of a single industry grouped together in a single corporation. If one was speaking of the wine industry this would mean that the growers, day laborers, harvesters, landowners, shoppers, boatmen, processors,

import-exporters, bar owners and so on would be integrated "horizontally" into a single corporation. So there will be a Corporation for each major industry. This scheme would facilitate a system of economic self regulation, a corporatism of association.

This system was approved in the Corporative Chamber, but it was rejected in National Assembly and the vertical scheme adopted instead. This vertical scheme groups corporative organisms according to the major "arms of production" - agriculture, transport, commerce, fishing, industry etc. This system created less Corporations and bigger Corporations and facilitated state control. This time both Salazar and Caetano (then Minister of the Presidency, close to Salazar) favoured the vertical scheme and it the adopted one by the National Assembly. Once more those who favoured a corporatism of association lost.

For all this see WIARDA 1977, 201-202.

NOTE 12

The "Organizations of Economic Coordination" were considered pre-corporative organizations aimed at guaranteeing coordination while the Corporations were not created. So the creation of the latter should naturally imply the extinction of the former. So Corporative Chamber proposed along with the creation of Corporations the suppression of the Organizations of Economic Coordination. But the National Assembly diverged once more (see NOTES 9 and 11 of this chapter) and the "Organizations of Economic Coordination" stayed side by side with the newly created Corporations. It was once more the clear defeat of any ideal of self-direction - see LUCENA 1979c.

In 1958 the Minister of Economy (Correia de Oliveira) definitively transformed the "Organizations of Economic Coordination" in permanent agencies of governmental economic control - see LUCENA 1979c.

NOTE 13

On paper controls over employers were still more strict than those over workers, but the application was biased in favour of the employers (SCHMITTER 1975, 21).

NOTE 14

For the social composition of Corporative Chamber see SCHMITTER 1975a, 31-37. Civil servants and University professors were the occupational groups more present there.

NOTE 15

The behaviour of the Portuguese Communist Party in 1974-1975 seems to indicate that they believed also that it would be easy to transform state corporatism in state socialism.

NOTE 16

Those similitudes between portuguese state and eastern socialist states are acknowledged sometimes by the leaders - CAETANO finds striking resemblances between corporative administration and Yugoslav self-management (CAETANO 1970a, 370).

NOTE 17

For the explanation of the evolution towards state corporatism one line of explanation is the study of the traditional role of the state in Portugal and deduce from the centralizing historical continuity the inevitable failure of a corporatism of association in Portugal. Another line of explanation comes from the study of the specific political reasons related with the political structure and the nature of New State regime.

Those two types of explanations do not cancel each other out, so they should both be used. In this thesis there will be some reference to the first type of explanation in chapter eleven (Conclusions). This line of explanation is not more developed because it would clearly step out of the main objectives and hypotheses of this thesis. But it is not ignored.

What interests us most for the understanding of New State essential logic - and thus for this thesis hypothesis - is to develop the second line of explanation.

NOTE 18

The Corporative Chamber did not perform any role of representation of corporative interests.

Some authors say the Chamber was a "political eunuch" (BLUME 1975) or had "pure ceremonial functions" (FIGUEIREDO 1976, 71), but others saw it as important (PORTAS and GAGO 1980) and politically influential (SCHMITTER 1975, 30). The reality is that although not a powerful body it had some influence. But where the Chamber was influent it was not corporative and where it was corporative it was not influent. That is, its influence did not come from the corporative representation.

The Chamber was important because its most important members were appointed by the Government and

many were high bureaucrats (GRAHAM 1975, 32-33). Indeed the Government controlled the Corporative Chamber. ROBINSON (1979, 49) even calls it an "amalgam of committees of governmentappointed specialists". Only one third of its members were appointed by the Corporations - and this only after 1957, since until then there were no Corporations.

The Government transformed it in a good bureaucratic consultation body, filling it with high civil servants and ex-ministers. One half of the members, in the first Chamber session, were either ex-ministers, high civil servants, university rectors, civil governors or middle government employees (SCHMITTER 1975, 34).

Since the most important legislative body was the Government (and not the National Assembly) it was the Government which benefited most of the Chamber's opinion. But it would give its "parecer" (written advice) only in those matters which the Government would send to the parliament, which were the very minor part. But in those matters the Government sometimes could only ignore its "parecer" at a considerable risk of embarrassment (WIARDA 1977, 222). The Chamber had developed its technical side and this evolution culminated with the creation of a permanent section which would work all the year round (The National Assembly only worked three months per year).

CAETANO wanted that the Corporative Chamber had a more technical role (CAETANO 1977, 405) (CAETANO complaints of the fact that sometimes National Assembly did not give enough importance to Corporative Chamber "pareceres" - CAETANO 1977, 348-350, 405-406).

Besides this moderately important technical role the Chamber had a political one - it was a "body of political sensibility of the regime" (LUCENA 1976a, 163). As such, its debates could be more plural than in National Assembly. Another political role of the Chamber was to be a collection of notables (WIARDA 1977, 233), a "sort of National Honor Society" (SCHMITTER 1975a, 31).

Summing up, although moderately important as technical body, the Corporative Chamber did not really perform any representative role in regard to corporative interests.

NOTE 19

CARDOSO (1949) touches this delicate point in a footnote ... CAETANO hints, in his 1950 Conference, that one could be in "presence of a counterfeit covered by false labels", that is, one could have the "socialism without doctrine" under the label of corporatism (see CAETANO 1950).

Indeed the state cannot be at the same time the strong national father and the promotor of the autonomy of the children.

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NOTE 20

Taking all what said into account one can ask if Corporatism is not completely irrelevant for the analysis of how the regime worked and for the analysis of the role of the state.

Since power was not neither in Corporations nor in the Corporative Chamber (see NOTE 18), since corporative practice diverged clearly from corporative principles (implementing a state subordinate corporatism instead of a pure corporatism of association), since corporative implementation was far less comprehensive than corporative principles (since the 1960's corporative services occupied just one floor of the twenty six floors of the still so-called Ministry of Corporations-WIARDA 1977, 330-331, 341), since Corporatism ended up being one feature more of the regime, among many others, instead of its driving force (WIARDA 1977, 330-331), in sum, since Corporatism it is not an independent variable (WIARDA 1977, 332), one can ask if the analysis of corporatism is not completely irrelevant since it does not explain us how the system works.

Such a temptation is strong, but as SCHMITTER says "Corporatist institutions may not have been designed, much less used, to accomplish such manifest goals [...], but this does not mean that they did not obey conscious (if unconfessed) purposes and perform important (if latent) functions" (SCHMITTER 1975, 58).

NOTE 21

This was the first time it was created a department specifically for administrative reform. From 1967 on there were several changes in the type of organization to cope with administrative reform, mainly after 1974, but the administrative reform is still to be done.

NOTE 22

In the first Congress of National Union, held in 1934, it was recommended that in the subjects related with Public Administration the congressmen should abstain of personal criticisms (in Parreira et alia, 1982).

NOTE 23

The stability of Government favoured the stability of Public Administration. Salazar changed 50% or more of his cabinet members all at once only five times from 1932 to 1968. Periodic changes of ministers generally affected no more than a third of cabinet members (MARQUES 1976, 202-203).

NOTE 24

Public Administration is still growing nowadays - see BARRETO 1984 (see a newspaper article about this subject by Alfredo de Sousa in "Expresso", 26-10-85).

NOTE 25

See about the separation between Administration (Government activity) and Politics SALAZAR I, 61-63, II, 71-74, III, 389-394, IV, 274, 357, 486-487, V, 306-309, VI, 38 - see chapter three, section 2.4.4..

NOTE 26

In the beginning co-opted members were younger than afterwards. CAETANO was chosen by Salazar to work with him with 23 years (CAETANO 1977, 25). The average age of the first Salazar's cabinet was 43,7 years (SCHMITTER 1979). In the following periods seniority took its rights.

NOTE 27

According to CAETANO (1966) there was a gradual increase in the administrative character of ministers and decrease in its political character - see also GRAHAM 1975, 18-19.

NOTE 28

This fusion of political and administrative careers led ministers to be administrative heads, as it was just said. But the inverse also happened - some bureaucrats took in charge the political decisions. See an illustration of this last case in CAETANO 1977, 188.

NOTE 29

See chapter six.

NOTE 30

Concentration of powers is traditional in Latin-American Iberic world (GRAHAM 1974) and in Portugal

(WIARDA 1977, 84). CRUZ 1982c says that Salazar does not reject separation of powers, but makes an hierarchy among them.

NOTE 31

In 1945 a constitutional change puts the Government as the normal legislative body not only de facto, but also de jure.

NOTE 32

One can speak New State as a regime of presidentialism of the Prime-Minister.

NOTE 33

So far was carried this "dictatorship of the executive" that Salazar acknowledged, in 1965, that never succeeded in convincing successive Governments in accepting the need of political support for their activity (SALAZAR VI, 376).

Another consequence of this predominance of Government over other sovereignty bodies was the identification of opposition to the Government to opposition to the regime (BLUME 1975).

For peasants, power was something called "the Government" (RIEGELHAUPT 1979).

NOTE 34

See about this subject - BLUME 1975, GINER 1982, GRAHAM 1975, 63 (note 5), MARQUES 1976, 203, NUNES 1964, 272, PORTAS and GAGO 1980, ROBINSON 1979, 52-53, VALENTE 1983, 356, WIARDA 1977, passim.

NOTE 35

There is a great fallacy in CAETANO's argument - the lack of material resources and partially of human resources is a consequence of centralization and unbalanced distribution of revenues between central and local government and only afterwards can be considered a cause of this lack of resources.

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NOTE 36

The administrative division Province did not have any important role in administration - CAETANO 1970a, 285-287, 345-347.

NOTE 37

"The ideological basis and the form of government institutionalized by the Estado Novo led to a system in which the separation between "Administration" and "Politics" was very evident at the local level. If we consider "politics" to refer to decisions on public matters and "administration" as referring to the execution of previously decided upon policy, then we find that at the parish level most of what appears "political" is, in fact, "administrative". [...]

Unlike most anthropological descriptions of "local-level politics", the local level in the nonparty, authoritarian, corporate state was characterized by minimal and trivial politics, a far cry from the reported dynamic nature of political behavior in other small communities. [...]

There was no need ever to mobilize a voter either for or against, or to make, however insincere, a promise to a community that a road would be built or a school opened. The only way to get anything accomplished was by having a contact or paying a bribe. It became extremely difficult to realize any public goals; instead, the achievement of private ends was pursued" (RIEGELHAUPT 1979a).

NOTE 38

It is obvious that this situation did not only enhance administrative centralization of decision - making, but actively promoted political centralization giving almost all the power to Lisbon politicians.

NOTE 39

As GRAHAM comments the CAETANO's definition of Public Administration as the "body of decisions and operations through which the State and other public entities seek to assure the satisfaction of collective needs [...]. This activity is to a large extent executed through administrative services" (CAETANO 1970a) points clearly to the preeminence of the concept of administered politics rather than of corporatism as the dominant philosophy of the regime (GRAHAM 1975, 18).

NOTE 40

DAHRENDORF quoted in MARTINS 1971, 71.

NOTE 41

Law course prepared and still prepares the major part of portuguese politicians. From the fourteen leaders that the five major portuguese parties had from 1974 to 1987 ten were law licenciates (other two are economists). The same trend seems to go on, although now economists began to appear as source of recruitment for politicians. Indeed the two major portuguese parties (1987) have at their head an economist.

NOTE 42

HESPANHA (1982) tells of two cases of university professors who were compulsorily retired for having criticized the regulation of marriage in the "Concordata" of 1940 between Portugal and the Holy See (no civil divorce for catholic marriages).

NOTE 43

CAETANO (1966) says that the "doutorismo" in Portugal - "every body" wants to get a license in order to be able to be socially addressed as "senhor doutor" - inhibits the creation, in Portugal, of professional schools of Public Administration.

NOTE 44

All Ministers of Education but one were University professors - see chapter five, 2.3.3..

NOTE 45

For references in this thesis to the same subject see chapter three, section 2.4.4., chapter three, notes 2 and 6, chapter eight, section 4.2., chapter eight, note 25.

NOTE 46

For Salazar, politics does need competence, but administration does - SALAZAR III, 274, VI, 38.

CHAPTER 9

NOTES OF CHAPTER 9

NOTE 1

As it had been hinted in previous chapters (chapter seven, section 4.1.4., chapter eight, section 2.1.), there was never great theoretical thought about moral corporations - see FERREIRA 1951.

NOTE 2

It is ironic that the Catholic Church which is a natural corporation and was the doctrinaire support, through catholic social doctrine, of this solution was never corporatized. But the realities of power imposed over doctrine - a Church parallel to the State does not accept to be subject to the corporative scheme. See above chapter five, note 8, chapter eight, section 1.2..

NOTE 3

As LUCENA says, the representatives of the moral interests were often appointed, not elected - LUCENA 1978b.

NOTE 4

See as important sources about these debates about university reform - ANÁLISE SOCIAL, nº 20-21, vol. VI, 1968, DIAS 1971, GUERRA 1970, NUNES 1970, NUNES no date, LEITE-PINTO 1968a, LEITE-PINTO 1968b, RALHA 1968, SANTOS and SAMPAIO 1963.

NOTE 5

The university benefited, in terms of power and status much more with "catedratocracia" than with subordination to the corporative organization.

NOTE 6

Neither BIVAR (1975) nor MONICA (1978) in their analyses of mentality inculcated in primary school refer any significant corporative indoctrination.

NOTE 7

In the most used textbook of "Political and Administrative Organization of the Nation" (AFONSO no date)

around 34% of the pages were about corporatism. This would be important if the low status of the subject did not cancel the indoctrination effect.

NOTE 8

A similar situation of low status happened to "Religious and Moral Education" - see chapter three, section 4.6. and chapter five, section 2.2.7..

NOTE 9

Several important members of the regime elite were connected, in some time of their careers, with "Mocidade Portuguesa" - Marcello CAETANO was leader of M.P. between 1940 and 1944. LEITE-PINTO, later minister of Education (1955-1961), was relator of First Congress of M.P. in 1939. José Hermano SARAIVA, Minister of Education between 1968 and 1970, was general secretary of the Second Congress of M.P., in 1956..

NOTE 10

See about the insufficiency of family in the education of the new generation the following excerpts:

CARNEIRO-PACHECO said in a speech: "But the State cannot ignore that the family, even when morally and civilly good, does not have the necessary conditions to carry on adequately its educative mission". So the school should cooperate with the family; but the school is also not enough for this educative mission and thus M.P. was created. The Minister ends up addressing specially the parents "from whom one could expect the first objections" - "the hour is not for objections, but for action [...]. The honour to be portuguese [...] is earned by a continuous act of love for Portugal, which parents must teach to their children" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a).

CAETANO, in his instructions written between 1940-1944, when he was the leader of M.P., said "M.P. is above the school, in the same level of the honest family and the Church"; "Unfortunately one can not always follow the orientation of the family [...] [since] the portuguese family is often touched by evils which diminish or cancel its educative capacity [...]. We are in such times that often parents need to be educated by their children..." in CAETANO 1952, 8. and 36-37.

NOTE 11

There are still other indicators of a totalitarian discourse at that time - the Militia of M.P. (ARRIAGA 1976, 22-24, 66-67), the threats of extinction of

organizations which opposed M.P. (ARRIAGA 1976, 29, 47), the militant cry of M.P. young members - "Portuguese, Who lives?" "Portugal! Portugal! Portugal!", "Portuguese, who leads us?" "Salazar! Salazar! Salazar!"

NOTE 12

See chapter three, sections 2.6.1., 2.6.2., about this period.

NOTE 13

In 1956 LEITE-PINTO is formal - "It is wrong the one who seeks to find a totalitarian source in the organization [M.P.]" in ARRIAGA 1976, 109. See also CAETANO 1977, 109-113.

NOTE 14

Salazar had said an identical message to the youth organization predecessor of M.P. - the "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" in SALAZAR I, 305-314.

NOTE 15

The categorization was done as follows

PRECEPTS

-Moral Education	- 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10	- 8	- 80%
-Various	- 3, 6	- 2	- 20%
			100%

CONCLUSION

-Moral Education	- 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 24	- 11	- 38%
-Political and Nationalist Education	- 17, 22, 23, 25	- 4	- 14%
-Pre-military training	- 18, 19, 20, 21	- 4	- 14%
-Physical Education	- 1, 2, 3, 4	- 4	- 14%
-Various	- 15, 16, 26, 27, 28, 29	- 6	- 21%
			101%

The numbers refer to the number of the Precept or of the Conclusion.

NOTE 16

Catholic Action was an international catholic movement to facilitate and to lead the participation of laymen in activities of cooperation with the Catholic Church. In Portugal, Catholic Action was set up in 1933, being Cardinal Cerejeira the most important promotor of its establishment.

NOTE 17

It was not only the Catholic Church which looked with suspicion the creation of M.P. (see FERREIRA 1952, NOGUEIRA 1978, 21), but also the Army, since pre-military training was thought to be a task for the Army (CARRILHO 1985, 317) - see also PARREIRA et alia 1982, 226.

NOTE 18

Differently from the reform of 1966 which tried to give a useful purpose to M.P., the reform of 1971 represents in fact its almost extinction.

The most clear indication of this purpose is the transference of all its patrimony to the new organization "Secretariate for Youth".

The political situation of the Minister Veiga Simão, considered a liberal and looked with great suspicion by the mainstream of the regime, did not allow a formal liquidation. The new M.P. Regulation is just a verbal façade to cover its practical disappearance.

The comparison between the Regulation of M.P. (1971) and the Regulation of the "Secretariate for Youth" (1971) is done in Table 9.1-A.

Table 9.1-A

COMPARISON BETWEEN the "M.P." and
"SECRETARIATE FOR YOUTH" REGULATIONS (1971)

CATEGORY OF ARTICLES	Secretariate for Youth	M.P. Regulation
EXPRESSIVE ARTICLES	5 16%	10 42%
INSTRUMENTAL ARTICLES	27 84%	14 58%
TOTAL	32 100%	24 100%

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It is clear that for the moribund M.P. was reserved nationalist inculcation (without means to do it).

NOTE 19

The attack of FERREIRA appears to be, by its style, a attack made in defense of Catholic Church in general or Catholic Boy-Scouts in particular.

NOTE 20

For this episode see ARRIAGA 1976, 74-76.

NOTE 21

There was some reaction to the 1966 Reform - see GALVAO-TELLES 1966c, 33-34.

NOTE 22

Due to this decay there were generally no violent reactions against M.P. militants after the 25th April "coup d'etat".

NOTE 23

As it was commented in the Second Congress of M.P., in 1956, not even the Army could act with efficiency upon masses of half a million persons - in ARRIAGA 1976, 97.

NOTE 24

All those resistances were to Boys M. P., not to Girls M.P..

NOTE 25

See about the resistance of teachers to M.P. BETTENCOURT 1983, 102-104.

See about the resistance of University students to M.P. chapter six, section 2.5.1..

NOTE 26

"Mocidade Portuguesa" would have suffered, in what regards mobilization purposes, the same withdrawal

of support that its predecessor "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" had suffered, once the tactical need which created it disappeared -(see chapter one, section 2.1.1.a) and chapter five, section 1.2.2.).

But as M.P. survived and "Acção Escolar Vanguarda" did not survive this cannot be seen as the whole explanation.

NOTE 27

It is probable that those groups within the regime which resisted to the creation of M.P. felt more free after the end of the War, and consequently of the mobilization necessity, to express their resistances. The speech of FERREIRA (1952) in National Assembly (this chapter, section 2.3.1.) may indicate this.

NOTE 28

Other statements in the same sense are "Compulsority is contra-naturam (sic)". "One of the great mistakes of M.P. [...] is its ambition, in the beginning, to encompass all boys between ages X and Z [...]" a nightmare which still hangs over [...] the organization". "Voluntary attendance is almost the necessary prerequisite to transform M.P. in a true youth organization". See ARRIAGA 1976, 95-101.

NOTE 29

The "League of the Ex-Officers of Portuguese Youth" was a very important organization for the access into posts of political confidence and for the general access to the regime elite.

NOTE 30

See acknowledgement of family educating rights - in SALAZAR I, 341, CAETANO 1946 in ZORRO 1969, 61.

NOTE 31

There is a great difference in the way the portuguese regime and the contemporary spanish Franco's regime dealt with the question of private education. A comparative study will probably throw some more light in to this question.

NOTE 32

The implementation of mass schooling was certainly

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the important factor in this change of policy - see chapter one, section 3.5..

NOTE 33

Seminaries were important instruments in the little social mobility of rural classes. The ablest from it could become priests - and this, in itself, was a social promotion, with great impact in the rural world - or could have access to other careers, after having given up the project of becoming priests.

NOTE 34

In 1972, by a dispatch (despacho of 15-2-1972 published in BOLETIM OFICIAL do Ministério da Educação Nacional, nº 1, October 1972, 189) priests could be TV school (Telescola) monitors. In the same year, by decision of 2-12-1972 (ibidem nº 2, December 1972, 135) priests could be admitted to the process of certification as preparatory school teachers, provided they passed three ad hoc subject examinations in the University. The certification given was to preparatory school where the need of qualified teachers was greater.

NOTE 35

There were (and still are) several religious congregations specifically dedicated to education - Jesuits, Marists (Society of Mary), Salesians, "Doroteias", etc..

NOTE 36

In the 1930^s the private primary teacher education schools were closed because the existing ones were considered competitive in regard to the state ones, and not complementary (that is, they were set up more important towns, side by side with state schools, instead of being set up in the rural interior) (MONICA 1978, 214-215).

NOTE 37

For a list of all private schools see "Guia do Ensino Particular", 1964 and MACHADO 1966.

NOTE 38

See for the relationship between portuguese

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religiosity and portuguese anti-clericalism RIEGELHAUPT 1982.

NOTE 39

It is worth to recall that all those policy measures should be confronted with previous republican policies.

NOTE 40

This same argument explains why Catholic Church did not press for compulsory Religious Education for all.

NOTE 41

João Evangelista LOUREIRO was later on, in the 1970's and 1980's, one of the most influential leaders of educational thought in Portugal.

NOTE 42

This assertive position of Catholic Church Hierarchy in regard to the status of private education went on, in a stronger tone, after the 25th April 1974 - see NOVA TERRA 1976, PLANCHARD 1978.

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CHAPTER 10

NOTE 1

See about content analysis what had been said in chapter three, section 3.2.2..

NOTE 2

Besides expressive rules and instrumental rules, there are also rules about control of teachers which prescribe repressive strategies. There will be reference to them in section 5.2 of this chapter - see also chapter six.

NOTE 3

The information of secret police was a prerequisite for access to the teaching occupation (as for all civil service) - this was one of the important operational means of ideological control.

NOTE 4

The Law 1941, 11-4-1936, is a paradigm of a almost purely expressive legal document. Ten of its fourteen "bases" (guidelines) are of purely expressive nature and four have mixed character. This law changed the name of the Ministry (from Ministry of Public Instruction to Ministry of National Education), determined how teachers should be (politically) selected, set up "Mocidade Portuguesa", created the sole textbooks, determined the patriotic purpose of Choral Singing in schools, and determined that all schools should hang on the wall a crucifix, created corporative indoctrination courses and determined the general revision of syllabus.

NOTE 5

The centralization score of the 2nd period (1936) in the lowest both in terms of period average (3.6 against a average of 4.0 and the nearest lower 3.8) and in terms of percentage of control rules (69.6% against a average of 79.9% and the nearest lower 78.3%).

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NOTE 6

It was a double uniformity since the sole textbooks were uniformly applied in all the country and the sole textbook measure was uniformly applied to all subjects, since the most to the least ideological ones.

NOTE 7

From 1970 onwards curriculum control went into third place. The implementation of mass schooling increased the complexity of school pedagogical organization and government, and this may explain that more attention was paid to those areas. In a central bureaucratic system, to pay more attention to same area means to increase the central control over it.

NOTE 8

GALVAO-TELLES tried to put into legal principles and rules all the educational areas from the organization of the system to pedagogical questions. The approach used resented of the legal format which was imposed on educational matters. It was a trial to rationalize education into the legal-administrative mould.

NOTE 9

GALVAO-TELLES published the "Estatuto da Educação Nacional", in 1969 (after he was substituted as Minister). The "Estatuto da Educação Nacional" was never transformed into law.

NOTE 10

The creation of the Planning Department (GEP-Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento) in the Ministry of Education created, in VEIGA SIMÃO's rule (1970-1974) some conflict between technocratic and bureaucratic power.

NOTE 11

The State even controlled the female primary school teacher marriages, imposing, in 1936, the following limitation to individual rights - the female teacher should ask permission to the Minister of Education to get married(!).

The rationale was to impose that teachers should marry a men of her economic status. See about this CORTESAO 1982, 86, 230.

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NOTE 12

For instance, the rules about teacher duties from 1947 and 1948 are still in force.

NOTE 13

The basis of the calculation is the following:

a) In the analysed areas the counting unit (minimum normative unit) average per Law Article is 2,96;

b) The statutes of technical and grammar school together have 1 173 law articles;

c) The average increase from 1973 to nowadays was 445% (4.45);

d) Assuming that this rate of increase is common to all educational management areas one has
 1 173 Law Articles X 2,96 units per Article =
 3 472 units
 3 472 units X 4.45 (rate of increase) = 15 451 units

e) To those units one could add several other type of rules which were not encompassed in the 1947 and 1948 Statutes. But in order to produce a conservative estimate one only adds the ones related to the teacher as civil servant - 2 101;

f) $15\ 451 + 2\ 101 = 17\ 552$

That is the rationale of this crude and conservative calculation.

NOTE 14

See DIAS 1984.

NOTE 15

The substitution of oral examinations by written examinations in grammar schools in 1936 (see CARVALHO 1986, 776-777) may have contributed to enhance the control over teachers.

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ORGANIZATION OF REFERENCES

References are organized in five sections. The first two sections regard references about the New State political regime. The following two sections regard references about the New State educational policy. When some source is important for both types of sections, it is referred in the political regime section.

Both "political regime" and "educational policy" sections distinguish between the primary sources and the secondary sources used. This is congruent with the importance given in the thesis to the use of primary sources (Introduction, section 5.3.).

It is not included in references the legislation used since this is indicated for each subject. There is also no list of the textbooks used in the analysis, since this was already given in chapter three.

The last section ("Other References") regard references of a general nature which do not specifically regard to the New State. This section does not intend to be seen as a bibliography of all important sources which could help to understand political regimes or educational systems, not even of all sources that influenced the author, but just refers the directly quoted ones.

I hope this References format can help future researchers of the New State regime.

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